x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()

commit 993773d11d45c90cb1c6481c2638c3d9f092ea5b upstream.

The index to access the threads tls array is controlled by userspace
via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation
of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

The index can be controlled from:
        ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area.

Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it to access
the p->thread.tls_array.

Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561524630-3642-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
index 9692a5e..b95693a 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include <linux/user.h>
 #include <linux/regset.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -219,6 +220,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
                       struct user_desc __user *u_info)
 {
        struct user_desc info;
+       int index;
 
        if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number))
                return -EFAULT;
@@ -226,8 +228,11 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
        if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
                return -EINVAL;
 
-       fill_user_desc(&info, idx,
-                      &p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]);
+       index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
+       index = array_index_nospec(index,
+                       GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + 1);
+
+       fill_user_desc(&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]);
 
        if (copy_to_user(u_info, &info, sizeof(info)))
                return -EFAULT;