Smack: prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()
authorDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Thu, 23 Jul 2020 15:23:05 +0000 (18:23 +0300)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 21 Aug 2020 09:02:03 +0000 (11:02 +0200)
[ Upstream commit 42a2df3e829f3c5562090391b33714b2e2e5ad4a ]

We have an upper bound on "maplevel" but forgot to check for negative
values.

Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
security/smack/smackfs.c

index 2eba7c1e666301935629e8aafc152223de5a736a..4aecdc8f74b2ac24ab6a570544bdc36cf46fdf27 100644 (file)
@@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
        }
 
        ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel);
-       if (ret != 1 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
+       if (ret != 1 || maplevel < 0 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
                goto out;
 
        rule += SMK_DIGITLEN;