--- /dev/null
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Converted from tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/search_pruning.c */
+
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+
+#define MAX_ENTRIES 11
+
+struct test_val {
+ unsigned int index;
+ int foo[MAX_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
+ __uint(max_entries, 1);
+ __type(key, long long);
+ __type(value, struct test_val);
+} map_hash_48b SEC(".maps");
+
+struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
+ __uint(max_entries, 1);
+ __type(key, long long);
+ __type(value, long long);
+} map_hash_8b SEC(".maps");
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("pointer/scalar confusion in state equality check (way 1)")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 leaks addr as return value")
+__retval(POINTER_VALUE)
+__naked void state_equality_check_way_1(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r0 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \
+ goto l1_%=; \
+l0_%=: r0 = r10; \
+l1_%=: goto l2_%=; \
+l2_%=: exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("pointer/scalar confusion in state equality check (way 2)")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 leaks addr as return value")
+__retval(POINTER_VALUE)
+__naked void state_equality_check_way_2(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r0 = r10; \
+ goto l1_%=; \
+l0_%=: r0 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \
+l1_%=: exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("lwt_in")
+__description("liveness pruning and write screening")
+__failure __msg("R0 !read_ok")
+__naked void liveness_pruning_and_write_screening(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ /* Get an unknown value */ \
+ r2 = *(u32*)(r1 + 0); \
+ /* branch conditions teach us nothing about R2 */\
+ if r2 >= 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+l0_%=: if r2 >= 0 goto l1_%=; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+l1_%=: exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("varlen_map_value_access pruning")
+__failure __msg("R0 unbounded memory access")
+__failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 leaks addr")
+__flag(BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT)
+__naked void varlen_map_value_access_pruning(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_48b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r1 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \
+ w2 = %[max_entries]; \
+ if r2 s> r1 goto l1_%=; \
+ w1 = 0; \
+l1_%=: w1 <<= 2; \
+ r0 += r1; \
+ goto l2_%=; \
+l2_%=: r1 = %[test_val_foo]; \
+ *(u64*)(r0 + 0) = r1; \
+l0_%=: exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_hash_48b),
+ __imm_const(max_entries, MAX_ENTRIES),
+ __imm_const(test_val_foo, offsetof(struct test_val, foo))
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("tracepoint")
+__description("search pruning: all branches should be verified (nop operation)")
+__failure __msg("R6 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
+__naked void should_be_verified_nop_operation(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r2 + 0) = r1; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r3 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \
+ if r3 == 0xbeef goto l1_%=; \
+ r4 = 0; \
+ goto l2_%=; \
+l1_%=: r4 = 1; \
+l2_%=: *(u64*)(r10 - 16) = r4; \
+ call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns]; \
+ r5 = *(u64*)(r10 - 16); \
+ if r5 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r6 = 0; \
+ r1 = 0xdead; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1; \
+l0_%=: exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns),
+ __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("search pruning: all branches should be verified (invalid stack access)")
+/* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
+__success __failure_unpriv
+__msg_unpriv("invalid read from stack off -16+0 size 8")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void be_verified_invalid_stack_access(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r2 + 0) = r1; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r3 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \
+ r4 = 0; \
+ if r3 == 0xbeef goto l1_%=; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 16) = r4; \
+ goto l2_%=; \
+l1_%=: *(u64*)(r10 - 24) = r4; \
+l2_%=: call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns]; \
+ r5 = *(u64*)(r10 - 16); \
+l0_%=: exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns),
+ __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("tracepoint")
+__description("precision tracking for u32 spill/fill")
+__failure __msg("R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+__naked void tracking_for_u32_spill_fill(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r7 = r1; \
+ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
+ w6 = 32; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ w6 = 4; \
+l0_%=: /* Additional insns to introduce a pruning point. */\
+ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
+ r3 = 0; \
+ r3 = 0; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l1_%=; \
+ r3 = 0; \
+l1_%=: /* u32 spill/fill */ \
+ *(u32*)(r10 - 8) = r6; \
+ r8 = *(u32*)(r10 - 8); \
+ /* out-of-bound map value access for r6=32 */ \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 16) = r1; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -16; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l2_%=; \
+ r0 += r8; \
+ r1 = *(u32*)(r0 + 0); \
+l2_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32),
+ __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("tracepoint")
+__description("precision tracking for u32 spills, u64 fill")
+__failure __msg("div by zero")
+__naked void for_u32_spills_u64_fill(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
+ r6 = r0; \
+ w7 = 0xffffffff; \
+ /* Additional insns to introduce a pruning point. */\
+ r3 = 1; \
+ r3 = 1; \
+ r3 = 1; \
+ r3 = 1; \
+ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r3 = 1; \
+l0_%=: w3 /= 0; \
+ /* u32 spills, u64 fill */ \
+ *(u32*)(r10 - 4) = r6; \
+ *(u32*)(r10 - 8) = r7; \
+ r8 = *(u64*)(r10 - 8); \
+ /* if r8 != X goto pc+1 r8 known in fallthrough branch */\
+ if r8 != 0xffffffff goto l1_%=; \
+ r3 = 1; \
+l1_%=: /* if r8 == X goto pc+1 condition always true on first\
+ * traversal, so starts backtracking to mark r8 as requiring\
+ * precision. r7 marked as needing precision. r6 not marked\
+ * since it's not tracked. \
+ */ \
+ if r8 == 0xffffffff goto l2_%=; \
+ /* fails if r8 correctly marked unknown after fill. */\
+ w3 /= 0; \
+l2_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("allocated_stack")
+__success __msg("processed 15 insns")
+__success_unpriv __msg_unpriv("") __log_level(1) __retval(0)
+__naked void allocated_stack(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r6 = r1; \
+ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
+ r7 = r0; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r6; \
+ r6 = *(u64*)(r10 - 8); \
+ *(u8*)(r10 - 9) = r7; \
+ r7 = *(u8*)(r10 - 9); \
+l0_%=: if r0 != 0 goto l1_%=; \
+l1_%=: if r0 != 0 goto l2_%=; \
+l2_%=: if r0 != 0 goto l3_%=; \
+l3_%=: if r0 != 0 goto l4_%=; \
+l4_%=: exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* The test performs a conditional 64-bit write to a stack location
+ * fp[-8], this is followed by an unconditional 8-bit write to fp[-8],
+ * then data is read from fp[-8]. This sequence is unsafe.
+ *
+ * The test would be mistakenly marked as safe w/o dst register parent
+ * preservation in verifier.c:copy_register_state() function.
+ *
+ * Note the usage of BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ to force creation of the
+ * checkpoint state after conditional 64-bit assignment.
+ */
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("write tracking and register parent chain bug")
+/* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
+__success __failure_unpriv
+__msg_unpriv("invalid read from stack off -8+1 size 8")
+__retval(0) __flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__naked void and_register_parent_chain_bug(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ /* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */ \
+ call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns]; \
+ r6 = r0; \
+ /* r0 = ktime_get_ns() */ \
+ call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns]; \
+ /* if r0 > r6 goto +1 */ \
+ if r0 > r6 goto l0_%=; \
+ /* *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0xdeadbeef */ \
+ r0 = 0xdeadbeef; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r0; \
+l0_%=: r1 = 42; \
+ *(u8*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
+ r2 = *(u64*)(r10 - 8); \
+ /* exit(0) */ \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+++ /dev/null
-{
- "pointer/scalar confusion in state equality check (way 1)",
- .insns = {
- BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
- BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
- BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_JMP_A(1),
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10),
- BPF_JMP_A(0),
- BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- },
- .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
- .result = ACCEPT,
- .retval = POINTER_VALUE,
- .result_unpriv = REJECT,
- .errstr_unpriv = "R0 leaks addr as return value"
-},
-{
- "pointer/scalar confusion in state equality check (way 2)",
- .insns = {
- BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
- BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
- BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10),
- BPF_JMP_A(1),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- },
- .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
- .result = ACCEPT,
- .retval = POINTER_VALUE,
- .result_unpriv = REJECT,
- .errstr_unpriv = "R0 leaks addr as return value"
-},
-{
- "liveness pruning and write screening",
- .insns = {
- /* Get an unknown value */
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 0),
- /* branch conditions teach us nothing about R2 */
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, 0, 1),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, 0, 1),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- },
- .errstr = "R0 !read_ok",
- .result = REJECT,
- .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN,
-},
-{
- "varlen_map_value_access pruning",
- .insns = {
- BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
- BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
- BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 8),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_2, MAX_ENTRIES),
- BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 1),
- BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
- BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_1, 2),
- BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0),
- BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0, offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
- BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- },
- .fixup_map_hash_48b = { 3 },
- .errstr_unpriv = "R0 leaks addr",
- .errstr = "R0 unbounded memory access",
- .result_unpriv = REJECT,
- .result = REJECT,
- .flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
-},
-{
- "search pruning: all branches should be verified (nop operation)",
- .insns = {
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
- BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
- BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 11),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_3, 0xbeef, 2),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
- BPF_JMP_A(1),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 1),
- BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_4, -16),
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_10, -16),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_5, 0, 2),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_6, 0),
- BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, 0, 0xdead),
- BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- },
- .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
- .errstr = "R6 invalid mem access 'scalar'",
- .result = REJECT,
- .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
-},
-{
- "search pruning: all branches should be verified (invalid stack access)",
- .insns = {
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
- BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
- BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 8),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_3, 0xbeef, 2),
- BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_4, -16),
- BPF_JMP_A(1),
- BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_4, -24),
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_10, -16),
- BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- },
- .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
- .errstr_unpriv = "invalid read from stack off -16+0 size 8",
- .result_unpriv = REJECT,
- /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
- .result = ACCEPT,
-},
-{
- "precision tracking for u32 spill/fill",
- .insns = {
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_1),
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
- BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_6, 32),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
- BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_6, 4),
- /* Additional insns to introduce a pruning point. */
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
- /* u32 spill/fill */
- BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, -8),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_10, -8),
- /* out-of-bound map value access for r6=32 */
- BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -16, 0),
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -16),
- BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
- BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
- BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_8),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- },
- .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 15 },
- .result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range",
- .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
-},
-{
- "precision tracking for u32 spills, u64 fill",
- .insns = {
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0),
- BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_7, 0xffffffff),
- /* Additional insns to introduce a pruning point. */
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 1),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 1),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 1),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 1),
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 1),
- BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_DIV, BPF_REG_3, 0),
- /* u32 spills, u64 fill */
- BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, -4),
- BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, -8),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_10, -8),
- /* if r8 != X goto pc+1 r8 known in fallthrough branch */
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_8, 0xffffffff, 1),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 1),
- /* if r8 == X goto pc+1 condition always true on first
- * traversal, so starts backtracking to mark r8 as requiring
- * precision. r7 marked as needing precision. r6 not marked
- * since it's not tracked.
- */
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_8, 0xffffffff, 1),
- /* fails if r8 correctly marked unknown after fill. */
- BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_DIV, BPF_REG_3, 0),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- },
- .result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "div by zero",
- .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
-},
-{
- "allocated_stack",
- .insns = {
- BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1),
- BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
- BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_0),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 5),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, -8),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10, -8),
- BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, -9),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_10, -9),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
- BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- },
- .result = ACCEPT,
- .result_unpriv = ACCEPT,
- .insn_processed = 15,
-},
-/* The test performs a conditional 64-bit write to a stack location
- * fp[-8], this is followed by an unconditional 8-bit write to fp[-8],
- * then data is read from fp[-8]. This sequence is unsafe.
- *
- * The test would be mistakenly marked as safe w/o dst register parent
- * preservation in verifier.c:copy_register_state() function.
- *
- * Note the usage of BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ to force creation of the
- * checkpoint state after conditional 64-bit assignment.
- */
-{
- "write tracking and register parent chain bug",
- .insns = {
- /* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0),
- /* r0 = ktime_get_ns() */
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
- /* if r0 > r6 goto +1 */
- BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 1),
- /* *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0xdeadbeef */
- BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, -8, 0xdeadbeef),
- /* r1 = 42 */
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 42),
- /* *(u8 *)(r10 - 8) = r1 */
- BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_1, -8),
- /* r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) */
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_FP, -8),
- /* exit(0) */
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- },
- .flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ,
- .errstr_unpriv = "invalid read from stack off -8+1 size 8",
- .result_unpriv = REJECT,
- /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
- .result = ACCEPT,
-},
projects / platform / kernel / linux-starfive.git / commitdiff