commit
cedc019b9f260facfadd20c6c490e403abf292e3 upstream.
Recent changes to kernel_connect() and kernel_bind() ensure that
callers are insulated from changes to the address parameter made by BPF
SOCK_ADDR hooks. This patch wraps direct calls to ops->connect() and
ops->bind() with kernel_connect() and kernel_bind() to ensure that SMB
mounts do not see their mount address overwritten in such cases.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/9944248dba1bce861375fcce9de663934d933ba9.camel@redhat.com/
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.0+
Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com>
Acked-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
if (server->srcaddr.ss_family != AF_UNSPEC) {
/* Bind to the specified local IP address */
struct socket *socket = server->ssocket;
if (server->srcaddr.ss_family != AF_UNSPEC) {
/* Bind to the specified local IP address */
struct socket *socket = server->ssocket;
- rc = socket->ops->bind(socket,
- (struct sockaddr *) &server->srcaddr,
- sizeof(server->srcaddr));
+ rc = kernel_bind(socket,
+ (struct sockaddr *) &server->srcaddr,
+ sizeof(server->srcaddr));
if (rc < 0) {
struct sockaddr_in *saddr4;
struct sockaddr_in6 *saddr6;
if (rc < 0) {
struct sockaddr_in *saddr4;
struct sockaddr_in6 *saddr6;
socket->sk->sk_sndbuf,
socket->sk->sk_rcvbuf, socket->sk->sk_rcvtimeo);
socket->sk->sk_sndbuf,
socket->sk->sk_rcvbuf, socket->sk->sk_rcvtimeo);
- rc = socket->ops->connect(socket, saddr, slen,
- server->noblockcnt ? O_NONBLOCK : 0);
+ rc = kernel_connect(socket, saddr, slen,
+ server->noblockcnt ? O_NONBLOCK : 0);
/*
* When mounting SMB root file systems, we do not want to block in
* connect. Otherwise bail out and then let cifs_reconnect() perform
/*
* When mounting SMB root file systems, we do not want to block in
* connect. Otherwise bail out and then let cifs_reconnect() perform