libceph: use kernel_connect()

Direct calls to ops->connect() can overwrite the address parameter when
used in conjunction with BPF SOCK_ADDR hooks. Recent changes to
kernel_connect() ensure that callers are insulated from such side
effects. This patch wraps the direct call to ops->connect() with
kernel_connect() to prevent unexpected changes to the address passed to
ceph_tcp_connect().

This change was originally part of a larger patch targeting the net tree
addressing all instances of unprotected calls to ops->connect()
throughout the kernel, but this change was split up into several patches
targeting various trees.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230821100007.559638-1-jrife@google.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/9944248dba1bce861375fcce9de663934d933ba9.camel@redhat.com/
Fixes: d74bad4e74ee ("bpf: Hooks for sys_connect")
Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger.c b/net/ceph/messenger.c
index 10a41cd..3c8b78d 100644 (file)
--- a/net/ceph/messenger.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c
@@ -459,8 +459,8 @@ int ceph_tcp_connect(struct ceph_connection *con)
        set_sock_callbacks(sock, con);
 
        con_sock_state_connecting(con);
        set_sock_callbacks(sock, con);
 
        con_sock_state_connecting(con);

-       ret = sock->ops->connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, sizeof(ss),
-                                O_NONBLOCK);
+       ret = kernel_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, sizeof(ss),
+                            O_NONBLOCK);

        if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
                dout("connect %s EINPROGRESS sk_state = %u\n",
                     ceph_pr_addr(&con->peer_addr),
        if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
                dout("connect %s EINPROGRESS sk_state = %u\n",
                     ceph_pr_addr(&con->peer_addr),