KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Flush link stack on guest exit to host kernel
authorMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Wed, 13 Nov 2019 10:05:44 +0000 (21:05 +1100)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 29 Nov 2019 09:10:32 +0000 (10:10 +0100)
commitfcddcfa746ad108e5a9bc00ddd0cd24cc7b4d2fd
treeac97c4afe470cc15c0e0b0a06730aed6bd482193
parent79f6bca3bc524d8b2e29bbc96ad541d13d6d9547
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Flush link stack on guest exit to host kernel

commit af2e8c68b9c5403f77096969c516f742f5bb29e0 upstream.

On some systems that are vulnerable to Spectre v2, it is up to
software to flush the link stack (return address stack), in order to
protect against Spectre-RSB.

When exiting from a guest we do some house keeping and then
potentially exit to C code which is several stack frames deep in the
host kernel. We will then execute a series of returns without
preceeding calls, opening up the possiblity that the guest could have
poisoned the link stack, and direct speculative execution of the host
to a gadget of some sort.

To prevent this we add a flush of the link stack on exit from a guest.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/powerpc/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S