crypto: asym_tpm: correct zero out potential secrets
authorGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 4 Dec 2020 08:01:36 +0000 (09:01 +0100)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 31 Dec 2020 09:48:53 +0000 (10:48 +0100)
commitf93274ef0fe972c120c96b3207f8fce376231a60
tree6153831daa0d136ce15fdcd0df0ee425ea5423db
parent0acfbe9ce46925ac92f6e27d0e273297e57c633c
crypto: asym_tpm: correct zero out potential secrets

The function derive_pub_key() should be calling memzero_explicit()
instead of memset() in case the complier decides to optimize away the
call to memset() because it "knows" no one is going to touch the memory
anymore.

Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Ilil Blum Shem-Tov <ilil.blum.shem-tov@intel.com>
Tested-by: Ilil Blum Shem-Tov <ilil.blum.shem-tov@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/X8ns4AfwjKudpyfe@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c