x86/modules: Avoid breaking W^X while loading modules

x86/modules: Avoid breaking W^X while loading modules

When modules and BPF filters are loaded, there is a time window in
which some memory is both writable and executable. An attacker that has
already found another vulnerability (e.g., a dangling pointer) might be
able to exploit this behavior to overwrite kernel code. Prevent having
writable executable PTEs in this stage.

In addition, avoiding having W+X mappings can also slightly simplify the
patching of modules code on initialization (e.g., by alternatives and
static-key), as would be done in the next patch. This was actually the
main motivation for this patch.

To avoid having W+X mappings, set them initially as RW (NX) and after
they are set as RO set them as X as well. Setting them as executable is
done as a separate step to avoid one core in which the old PTE is cached
(hence writable), and another which sees the updated PTE (executable),
which would break the W^X protection.

Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com>
Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com>
Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-12-namit@vmware.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>