sctp: Catch bogus stream sequence numbers
authorVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Fri, 4 Sep 2009 22:21:03 +0000 (18:21 -0400)
committerVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Fri, 4 Sep 2009 22:21:03 +0000 (18:21 -0400)
commitf1751c57f7bb816c9b6b4cb5d79c703aaa7199da
tree68e75889f4fd4b576f50bd52088c79f7c837323d
parentbe2971438dec2e2d041af4701472a93a7dd03642
sctp: Catch bogus stream sequence numbers

Since our TSN map is capable of holding at most a 4K chunk gap,
there is no way that during this gap, a stream sequence number
(unsigned short) can wrap such that the new number is smaller
then the next expected one.  If such a case is encountered,
this is a protocol violation.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c