HID: hiddev: fix potential Spectre v1
authorBreno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Fri, 19 Oct 2018 20:01:33 +0000 (17:01 -0300)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 13 Nov 2018 19:16:56 +0000 (11:16 -0800)
commitdd0ee8a4221b2f8baceedc4bec987485f63fa29c
tree33211d0db83b56bf27463896f6405c4c4bcd9d3f
parent8e30869fa3298c54750d418d57b6f1995cef7bad
HID: hiddev: fix potential Spectre v1

commit f11274396a538b31bc010f782e05c2ce3f804c13 upstream.

uref->usage_index can be indirectly controlled by userspace, hence leading
to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This field is used as an array index by the hiddev_ioctl_usage() function,
when 'cmd' is either HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX, HIDIOCGUSAGES or
HIDIOCSUSAGES.

For cmd == HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX case, uref->usage_index is compared to
field->maxusage and then used as an index to dereference field->usage
array. The same thing happens to the cmd == HIDIOC{G,S}USAGES cases, where
uref->usage_index is checked against an array maximum value and then it is
used as an index in an array.

This is a summary of the HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX case, which matches the
traditional Spectre V1 first load:

copy_from_user(uref, user_arg, sizeof(*uref))
if (uref->usage_index >= field->maxusage)
goto inval;
i = field->usage[uref->usage_index].collection_index;
return i;

This patch fixes this by sanitizing field uref->usage_index before using it
to index field->usage (HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX) or field->value in
HIDIOC{G,S}USAGES arrays, thus, avoiding speculation in the first load.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
v2: Contemplate cmd == HIDIOC{G,S}USAGES case
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c