crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs - don't access already-freed walk.iv
authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Wed, 10 Apr 2019 06:46:32 +0000 (23:46 -0700)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wed, 22 May 2019 05:37:37 +0000 (07:37 +0200)
commitd42d342022b18d13a0cf3a4425011e17f3ecd9cb
tree1fc2d539e0e4bee2099d140bfb1cd1e70ff57f01
parent69b9d32d5139e1a722d3a12bf57f752c835b17b5
crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs - don't access already-freed walk.iv

commit 4a8108b70508df0b6c4ffa4a3974dab93dcbe851 upstream.

If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv.  But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.

xts-aes-neonbs doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected
by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv.  However this is more
subtle than desired, and unconditionally accessing walk.iv has caused a
real problem in other algorithms.  Thus, update xts-aes-neonbs to start
checking the return value of skcipher_walk_virt().

Fixes: 1abee99eafab ("crypto: arm64/aes - reimplement bit-sliced ARM/NEON implementation for arm64")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.11+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c