net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1
authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Thu, 3 May 2018 18:45:58 +0000 (13:45 -0500)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wed, 16 May 2018 08:10:29 +0000 (10:10 +0200)
commitcc21a603273c9992d0d84c3117cc0e7f88b74759
treeb9636e808ea98ef8484e62543ec9046a7ab251e3
parent87aa17ca56b90869ca43a6e15d264490264deda9
net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1

commit acf784bd0ce257fe43da7ca266f7a10b837479d2 upstream.

ioc_data.dev_num can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
net/atm/lec.c:702 lec_vcc_attach() warn: potential spectre issue
'dev_lec'

Fix this by sanitizing ioc_data.dev_num before using it to index
dev_lec. Also, notice that there is another instance in which array
dev_lec is being indexed using ioc_data.dev_num at line 705:
lec_vcc_added(netdev_priv(dev_lec[ioc_data.dev_num]),

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net/atm/lec.c