net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Wed, 23 Apr 2014 21:29:27 +0000 (14:29 -0700)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 26 Jun 2014 19:15:38 +0000 (15:15 -0400)
commitbe0ef855baab7248d0fc71cdf78a47fcfd3708f1
tree7c0650a4aa9cb820b8dfd1eb2cdc41fbcb5fdc1b
parentd8d52aa168fc662f66b5525b7c16cc9de33b74da
net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages

[ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e ]

It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.

To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
19 files changed:
crypto/crypto_user.c
drivers/connector/cn_proc.c
drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
kernel/audit.c
net/can/gw.c
net/core/rtnetlink.c
net/dcb/dcbnl.c
net/decnet/dn_dev.c
net/decnet/dn_fib.c
net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
net/netlink/genetlink.c
net/packet/diag.c
net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
net/sched/act_api.c
net/sched/cls_api.c
net/sched/sch_api.c
net/tipc/netlink.c
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c