x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()
authorDianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
Wed, 26 Jun 2019 04:50:30 +0000 (12:50 +0800)
committerThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Thu, 27 Jun 2019 21:48:04 +0000 (23:48 +0200)
commit993773d11d45c90cb1c6481c2638c3d9f092ea5b
treeed3029d1d5c44fed104a622db172ed6c090d3481
parent31a2fbb390fee4231281b939e1979e810f945415
x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()

The index to access the threads tls array is controlled by userspace
via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation
of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

The index can be controlled from:
        ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area.

Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it to access
the p->thread.tls_array.

Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561524630-3642-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com
arch/x86/kernel/tls.c