vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
authorDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Tue, 30 Jan 2018 01:03:05 +0000 (17:03 -0800)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wed, 7 Feb 2018 19:12:23 +0000 (11:12 -0800)
commit98116c32d3b4b60bc1add46a81ed4f991ef02a7d
tree9edf627cfcb7ca434c58d130a230aa2a5e4bedcc
parent0035134041207f990e0756e2a6f63b7dc3bfe95b
vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

commit 56c30ba7b348b90484969054d561f711ba196507

'fd' is a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to
read from the 'fdt->fd' array.  In order to avoid potential leaks of
kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction
stream that could issue reads based on an invalid 'file *' returned from
__fcheck_files.

Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727418500.33451.17392199002892248656.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
include/linux/fdtable.h