selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
authorStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Fri, 8 Apr 2016 17:52:00 +0000 (13:52 -0400)
committerPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Tue, 26 Apr 2016 19:41:43 +0000 (15:41 -0400)
commit8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f
treedb853a9321a0a656a7cb232b5328b17689ccf18e
parent1ac42476263eec99fb2d3c31ee946cb44e80ddd5
selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks

Distinguish capability checks against a target associated
with the init user namespace versus capability checks against
a target associated with a non-init user namespace by defining
and using separate security classes for the latter.

This is needed to support e.g. Chrome usage of user namespaces
for the Chrome sandbox without needing to allow Chrome to also
exercise capabilities on targets in the init user namespace.

Suggested-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
security/selinux/hooks.c
security/selinux/include/classmap.h