x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS
authorJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Tue, 14 Jun 2022 21:16:15 +0000 (23:16 +0200)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sat, 23 Jul 2022 10:54:09 +0000 (12:54 +0200)
commit8d5cff499a6d740c91ff37963907e0e983c37f0f
treefc2d7390086b8c2e3683f8b8046442dcf2bac56f
parent4207d7b645b82b9a2c0faffeb9f36999ac040a2a
x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS

commit 9756bba28470722dacb79ffce554336dd1f6a6cd upstream.

Prevent RSB underflow/poisoning attacks with RSB.  While at it, add a
bunch of comments to attempt to document the current state of tribal
knowledge about RSB attacks and what exactly is being mitigated.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S