drm/ioctl: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Thu, 20 Dec 2018 00:00:15 +0000 (18:00 -0600)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sat, 29 Dec 2018 12:37:59 +0000 (13:37 +0100)
commit7f3ebea19795eb38438cd3709fabf2afd53cf447
tree38628e078fd9f2ac0e6e6f82237e19215d2d9869
parent6bb41321166fe7db834fd7137b596d4312e38273
drm/ioctl: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

commit 505b5240329b922f21f91d5b5d1e535c805eca6d upstream.

nr is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a
potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:805 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->driver->ioctls' [r]
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:810 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:892 drm_ioctl_flags() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing nr before using it to index dev->driver->ioctls
and drm_ioctls.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20181220000015.GA18973@embeddedor
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c