Bluetooth: Prevent buffer overflow in l2cap config request
authorDan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Fri, 24 Jun 2011 12:38:05 +0000 (08:38 -0400)
committerGustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
Tue, 28 Jun 2011 17:57:55 +0000 (14:57 -0300)
commit7ac28817536797fd40e9646452183606f9e17f71
tree0e8f9966e42128fea6a49436055570f8575d34a9
parentfa7ccfb17033bfb5bca86f6b909cab0b807efbc0
Bluetooth: Prevent buffer overflow in l2cap config request

A remote user can provide a small value for the command size field in
the command header of an l2cap configuration request, resulting in an
integer underflow when subtracting the size of the configuration request
header.  This results in copying a very large amount of data via
memcpy() and destroying the kernel heap.  Check for underflow.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c