powerpc/64s: Make rfi_flush_fallback a little more robust
Because rfi_flush_fallback runs immediately before the return to
userspace it currently runs with the user r1 (stack pointer). This
means if we oops in there we will report a bad kernel stack pointer in
the exception entry path, eg:
Bad kernel stack pointer
7ffff7150e40 at
c0000000000023b4
Oops: Bad kernel stack pointer, sig: 6 [#1]
LE SMP NR_CPUS=32 NUMA PowerNV
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1246 Comm: klogd Not tainted 4.18.0-rc2-gcc-7.3.1-00175-g0443f8a69ba3 #7
NIP:
c0000000000023b4 LR:
0000000010053e00 CTR:
0000000000000040
REGS:
c0000000fffe7d40 TRAP: 4100 Not tainted (4.18.0-rc2-gcc-7.3.1-00175-g0443f8a69ba3)
MSR:
9000000002803031 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,LE> CR:
44000442 XER:
20000000
CFAR:
c00000000000bac8 IRQMASK:
c0000000f1e66a80
GPR00:
0000000002000000 00007ffff7150e40 00007fff93a99900 0000000000000020
...
NIP [
c0000000000023b4] rfi_flush_fallback+0x34/0x80
LR [
0000000010053e00] 0x10053e00
Although the NIP tells us where we were, and the TRAP number tells us
what happened, it would still be nicer if we could report the actual
exception rather than barfing about the stack pointer.
We an do that fairly simply by loading the kernel stack pointer on
entry and restoring the user value before returning. That way we see a
regular oops such as:
Unrecoverable exception 4100 at
c00000000000239c
Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#1]
LE SMP NR_CPUS=32 NUMA PowerNV
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1251 Comm: klogd Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3-gcc-7.3.1-00097-g4ebfcac65acd-dirty #40
NIP:
c00000000000239c LR:
0000000010053e00 CTR:
0000000000000040
REGS:
c0000000f1e17bb0 TRAP: 4100 Not tainted (4.18.0-rc3-gcc-7.3.1-00097-g4ebfcac65acd-dirty)
MSR:
9000000002803031 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,LE> CR:
44000442 XER:
20000000
CFAR:
c00000000000bac8 IRQMASK: 0
...
NIP [
c00000000000239c] rfi_flush_fallback+0x3c/0x80
LR [
0000000010053e00] 0x10053e00
Call Trace:
[
c0000000f1e17e30] [
c00000000000b9e4] system_call+0x5c/0x70 (unreliable)
Note this shouldn't make the kernel stack pointer vulnerable to a
meltdown attack, because it should be flushed from the cache before we
return to userspace. The user r1 value will be in the cache, because
we load it in the return path, but that is harmless.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>