x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs
authorJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Tue, 25 Sep 2018 12:39:28 +0000 (14:39 +0200)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 14 May 2019 17:19:34 +0000 (19:19 +0200)
commit787b367ecab5e9e722ddd257bf21a90c370eab95
tree06def32c93e6fecb5f3f4efcf2edbbeaaf690f7d
parentb410c57f4907dcf23a29f46f15b081fb404d7f4d
x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs

commit bb4b3b7762735cdaba5a40fd94c9303d9ffa147a upstream.

If spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled, RSB is filled on context switch
in order to protect from various classes of spectrev2 attacks.

If this mitigation is enabled, say so in sysfs for spectrev2.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438580.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c