ipmi: msghandler: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

ipmi: msghandler: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

commit a7102c7461794a5bb31af24b08e9e0f50038897a upstream.

channel and addr->channel are indirectly controlled by user-space,
hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1
vulnerability.

These issues were detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1381 ipmi_set_my_address() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [w] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1401 ipmi_get_my_address() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1421 ipmi_set_my_LUN() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [w] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1441 ipmi_get_my_LUN() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:2260 check_addr() warn: potential spectre issue 'intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing channel and addr->channel before using them to
index user->intf->addrinfo and intf->addrinfo, correspondingly.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>