smack: fix possible use after frees in task_security() callers
We hit use after free on dereferncing pointer to task_smack struct in
smk_of_task() called from smack_task_to_inode().
task_security() macro uses task_cred_xxx() to get pointer to the task_smack.
task_cred_xxx() could be used only for non-pointer members of task's
credentials. It cannot be used for pointer members since what they point
to may disapper after dropping RCU read lock.
Mainly task_security() used this way:
smk_of_task(task_security(p))
Intead of this introduce function smk_of_task_struct() which
takes task_struct as argument and returns pointer to smk_known struct
and do this under RCU read lock.
Bogus task_security() macro is not used anymore, so remove it.
KASan's report for this:
AddressSanitizer: use after free in smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70 at addr
c4635600
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-64 (Tainted: PO): kasan error
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8 age=39 cpu=0 pid=1866
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x88/0x1bc
new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8
smack_cred_prepare+0x48/0x21c
security_prepare_creds+0x44/0x4c
prepare_creds+0xdc/0x110
smack_setprocattr+0x104/0x150
security_setprocattr+0x4c/0x54
proc_pid_attr_write+0x12c/0x194
vfs_write+0x1b0/0x370
SyS_write+0x5c/0x94
ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48
INFO: Freed in smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0 age=27 cpu=0 pid=1564
kfree+0x270/0x290
smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0
security_cred_free+0x34/0x3c
put_cred_rcu+0x58/0xcc
rcu_process_callbacks+0x738/0x998
__do_softirq+0x264/0x4cc
do_softirq+0x94/0xf4
irq_exit+0xbc/0x120
handle_IRQ+0x104/0x134
gic_handle_irq+0x70/0xac
__irq_svc+0x44/0x78
_raw_spin_unlock+0x18/0x48
sync_inodes_sb+0x17c/0x1d8
sync_filesystem+0xac/0xfc
vdfs_file_fsync+0x90/0xc0
vfs_fsync_range+0x74/0x7c
INFO: Slab 0xd3b23f50 objects=32 used=31 fp=0xc4635600 flags=0x4080
INFO: Object 0xc4635600 @offset=5632 fp=0x (null)
Bytes b4
c46355f0: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
Object
c4635600: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object
c4635610: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object
c4635620: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object
c4635630: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
Redzone
c4635640: bb bb bb bb ....
Padding
c46356e8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
Padding
c46356f8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
CPU: 5 PID: 834 Comm: launchpad_prelo Tainted: PBO 3.10.30 #1
Backtrace:
[<
c00233a4>] (dump_backtrace+0x0/0x158) from [<
c0023dec>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
r7:
c4634010 r6:
d3b23f50 r5:
c4635600 r4:
d1002140
[<
c0023dcc>] (show_stack+0x0/0x24) from [<
c06d6d7c>] (dump_stack+0x20/0x28)
[<
c06d6d5c>] (dump_stack+0x0/0x28) from [<
c01c1d50>] (print_trailer+0x124/0x144)
[<
c01c1c2c>] (print_trailer+0x0/0x144) from [<
c01c1e88>] (object_err+0x3c/0x44)
r7:
c4635600 r6:
d1002140 r5:
d3b23f50 r4:
c4635600
[<
c01c1e4c>] (object_err+0x0/0x44) from [<
c01cac18>] (kasan_report_error+0x2b8/0x538)
r6:
d1002140 r5:
d3b23f50 r4:
c6429cf8 r3:
c09e1aa7
[<
c01ca960>] (kasan_report_error+0x0/0x538) from [<
c01c9430>] (__asan_load4+0xd4/0xf8)
[<
c01c935c>] (__asan_load4+0x0/0xf8) from [<
c031e168>] (smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70)
r5:
c4635600 r4:
ca9da000
[<
c031e118>] (smack_task_to_inode+0x0/0x70) from [<
c031af64>] (security_task_to_inode+0x3c/0x44)
r5:
cca25e80 r4:
c0ba9780
[<
c031af28>] (security_task_to_inode+0x0/0x44) from [<
c023d614>] (pid_revalidate+0x124/0x178)
r6:
00000000 r5:
cca25e80 r4:
cbabe3c0 r3:
00008124
[<
c023d4f0>] (pid_revalidate+0x0/0x178) from [<
c01db98c>] (lookup_fast+0x35c/0x43y4)
r9:
c6429efc r8:
00000101 r7:
c079d940 r6:
c6429e90 r5:
c6429ed8 r4:
c83c4148
[<
c01db630>] (lookup_fast+0x0/0x434) from [<
c01deec8>] (do_last.isra.24+0x1c0/0x1108)
[<
c01ded08>] (do_last.isra.24+0x0/0x1108) from [<
c01dff04>] (path_openat.isra.25+0xf4/0x648)
[<
c01dfe10>] (path_openat.isra.25+0x0/0x648) from [<
c01e1458>] (do_filp_open+0x3c/0x88)
[<
c01e141c>] (do_filp_open+0x0/0x88) from [<
c01ccb28>] (do_sys_open+0xf0/0x198)
r7:
00000001 r6:
c0ea2180 r5:
0000000b r4:
00000000
[<
c01cca38>] (do_sys_open+0x0/0x198) from [<
c01ccc00>] (SyS_open+0x30/0x34)
[<
c01ccbd0>] (SyS_open+0x0/0x34) from [<
c001db80>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
Read of size 4 by thread T834:
Memory state around the buggy address:
c4635380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635500: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>
c4635600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
c4635680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
c4635700: 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635780: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>