arm64: ptrace: Fix seccomp of traced syscall -1 (NO_SYSCALL)
authorTimothy E Baldwin <T.E.Baldwin99@members.leeds.ac.uk>
Sat, 16 Jan 2021 15:18:54 +0000 (15:18 +0000)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 4 Mar 2021 10:38:32 +0000 (11:38 +0100)
commit428c4a4d0dc7ef021c5e61042156741451bc846d
treef4390ec6cd98327cd91c7b0a07767fd6a7c24e27
parentb506450ce3d904386c1bd7e33c74f9343548d2d8
arm64: ptrace: Fix seccomp of traced syscall -1 (NO_SYSCALL)

commit df84fe94708985cdfb78a83148322bcd0a699472 upstream.

Since commit f086f67485c5 ("arm64: ptrace: add support for syscall
emulation"), if system call number -1 is called and the process is being
traced with PTRACE_SYSCALL, for example by strace, the seccomp check is
skipped and -ENOSYS is returned unconditionally (unless altered by the
tracer) rather than carrying out action specified in the seccomp filter.

The consequence of this is that it is not possible to reliably strace
a seccomp based implementation of a foreign system call interface in
which r7/x8 is permitted to be -1 on entry to a system call.

Also trace_sys_enter and audit_syscall_entry are skipped if a system
call is skipped.

Fix by removing the in_syscall(regs) check restoring the previous
behaviour which is like AArch32, x86 (which uses generic code) and
everything else.

Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas<catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: f086f67485c5 ("arm64: ptrace: add support for syscall emulation")
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Tested-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Timothy E Baldwin <T.E.Baldwin99@members.leeds.ac.uk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/90edd33b-6353-1228-791f-0336d94d5f8c@majoroak.me.uk
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c