crypto: ecdh - avoid buffer overflow in ecdh_set_secret()
authorArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Sat, 2 Jan 2021 13:59:09 +0000 (14:59 +0100)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 12 Jan 2021 19:18:17 +0000 (20:18 +0100)
commit3f20005ab271c93b5c26736aa3fcf43aacddab39
treebc4c5e6d1bcb49fb64302d0f0f9aa8d496ce34a9
parentd55d15a332ec651ccb49c42a8a10c03447fdf418
crypto: ecdh - avoid buffer overflow in ecdh_set_secret()

commit 0aa171e9b267ce7c52d3a3df7bc9c1fc0203dec5 upstream.

Pavel reports that commit 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned
accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") fixes one problem but introduces another:
the unconditional memcpy() introduced by that commit may overflow the
target buffer if the source data is invalid, which could be the result of
intentional tampering.

So check params.key_size explicitly against the size of the target buffer
before validating the key further.

Fixes: 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()")
Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
crypto/ecdh.c