userfaultfd: require CAP_SYS_PTRACE for UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK

userfaultfd: require CAP_SYS_PTRACE for UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK

A while ago Andy noticed
(http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrWY+5ynDct7eU_nDUqx=okQvjm=Y5wJvA4ahBja=CQXGw@mail.gmail.com)
that UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK used by an unprivileged user may have
security implications.

As the first step of the solution the following patch limits the availably
of UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK only for those having CAP_SYS_PTRACE.

The usage of CAP_SYS_PTRACE ensures compatibility with CRIU.

Yet, if there are other users of non-cooperative userfaultfd that run
without CAP_SYS_PTRACE, they would be broken :(

Current implementation of UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK modifies the file
descriptor table from the read() implementation of uffd, which may have
security implications for unprivileged use of the userfaultfd.

Limit availability of UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK only for callers that have
CAP_SYS_PTRACE.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1572967777-8812-2-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Nosh Minwalla <nosh@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <ovzxemul@gmail.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>