x86/cpuid: Prevent out of bound access in do_clear_cpu_cap()
authorThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Wed, 18 Oct 2017 17:39:35 +0000 (19:39 +0200)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Mon, 25 Dec 2017 13:26:15 +0000 (14:26 +0100)
commit36295155d8d4c3f9fb425faac9120559c051b861
tree09174d6c6924d9588eb66886d164c82b158bdfb7
parent61d1ad3631150386f3c142daff97913c1770e0fa
x86/cpuid: Prevent out of bound access in do_clear_cpu_cap()

commit 57b8b1a1856adaa849d02d547411a553a531022b upstream.

do_clear_cpu_cap() allocates a bitmap to keep track of disabled feature
dependencies. That bitmap is sized NCAPINTS * BITS_PER_INIT. The possible
'features' which can be handed in are larger than this, because after the
capabilities the bug 'feature' bits occupy another 32bit. Not really
obvious...

So clearing any of the misfeature bits, as 32bit does for the F00F bug,
accesses that bitmap out of bounds thereby corrupting the stack.

Size the bitmap proper and add a sanity check to catch accidental out of
bound access.

Fixes: 0b00de857a64 ("x86/cpuid: Add generic table for CPUID dependencies")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171018022023.GA12058@yexl-desktop
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c