netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
authorEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Wed, 27 Mar 2019 15:21:30 +0000 (08:21 -0700)
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fri, 29 Mar 2019 00:00:45 +0000 (17:00 -0700)
commit355b98553789b646ed97ad801a619ff898471b92
tree433cd3a5856dfdcc1022cb5cc2e7c1aa0bf383e3
parent6289d0facd9ebce4cc83e5da39e15643ee998dc5
netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()

net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)

I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.

Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.

Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
include/net/net_namespace.h
include/net/netns/hash.h
net/core/net_namespace.c