firmware: improve LSM/IMA security behaviour
authorSven Van Asbroeck <thesven73@gmail.com>
Mon, 17 Jun 2019 18:23:54 +0000 (14:23 -0400)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 18 Jun 2019 07:10:02 +0000 (09:10 +0200)
commit2472d64af2d3561954e2f05365a67692bb852f2a
tree970ea3d44d0f259e58f629d49b419c91a365139f
parent5669245b57df8a0edae475e06d1b851729a21457
firmware: improve LSM/IMA security behaviour

The firmware loader queries if LSM/IMA permits it to load firmware
via the sysfs fallback. Unfortunately, the code does the opposite:
it expressly permits sysfs fw loading if security_kernel_load_data(
LOADING_FIRMWARE) returns -EACCES. This happens because a
zero-on-success return value is cast to a bool that's true on success.

Fix the return value handling so we get the correct behaviour.

Fixes: 6e852651f28e ("firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback")
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <TheSven73@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c