pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
authorKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Mon, 9 Mar 2015 21:11:12 +0000 (23:11 +0200)
committerSasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Sat, 28 Mar 2015 14:03:28 +0000 (10:03 -0400)
commit1cd3d374b25ba7e9934be66781ff7fc4513a2b09
tree78ca0d8a9db61fdadcf35ae9cd4519b9e18b74ee
parent016958bf0577daa731bf0fc84aaa8a47d2dd705d
pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace

[ Upstream commit ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce ]

As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.

This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.

[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html

[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
  this is the simple model.   - Linus ]

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
fs/proc/task_mmu.c