x86, tls, ldt: Stop checking lm in LDT_empty
authorAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Thu, 22 Jan 2015 19:27:58 +0000 (11:27 -0800)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 30 Jan 2015 01:40:56 +0000 (17:40 -0800)
commit19ecb537faf6445986bf74f8b50f49c88cc5260a
tree2e698366d62e03d8f89afe0258f8325944e77c73
parenteeff6c78a31b6a34bd357a0a8302c8635e7c1908
x86, tls, ldt: Stop checking lm in LDT_empty

commit e30ab185c490e9a9381385529e0fd32f0a399495 upstream.

32-bit programs don't have an lm bit in their ABI, so they can't
reliably cause LDT_empty to return true without resorting to memset.
They shouldn't need to do this.

This should fix a longstanding, if minor, issue in all 64-bit kernels
as well as a potential regression in the TLS hardening code.

Fixes: 41bdc78544b8 x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/72a059de55e86ad5e2935c80aa91880ddf19d07c.1421954363.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h