io_uring: don't audit the capability check in io_uring_create()
authorOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Tue, 18 Jul 2023 11:56:07 +0000 (13:56 +0200)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 3 Aug 2023 08:23:48 +0000 (10:23 +0200)
commit04f7d4917471f77d87568145b646d12f51342e8d
tree6ab292eb32e9a43ce35fcb11a52bbf544a088ce3
parent017f686bcb536ff23d49c143fdf9d1fd89a9a924
io_uring: don't audit the capability check in io_uring_create()

[ Upstream commit 6adc2272aaaf84f34b652cf77f770c6fcc4b8336 ]

The check being unconditional may lead to unwanted denials reported by
LSMs when a process has the capability granted by DAC, but denied by an
LSM. In the case of SELinux such denials are a problem, since they can't
be effectively filtered out via the policy and when not silenced, they
produce noise that may hide a true problem or an attack.

Since not having the capability merely means that the created io_uring
context will be accounted against the current user's RLIMIT_MEMLOCK
limit, we can disable auditing of denials for this check by using
ns_capable_noaudit() instead of capable().

Fixes: 2b188cc1bb85 ("Add io_uring IO interface")
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2193317
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230718115607.65652-1-omosnace@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
io_uring/io_uring.c