x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
authorDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Tue, 30 Jan 2018 01:02:59 +0000 (17:02 -0800)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wed, 7 Feb 2018 19:12:23 +0000 (11:12 -0800)
commit0035134041207f990e0756e2a6f63b7dc3bfe95b
tree2d83b72c8215d06145135b8029fda5fc33319c8c
parentedaf1538d3a5620862544a20aab14cb601787e1a
x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation

commit 2fbd7af5af8665d18bcefae3e9700be07e22b681

The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel
space. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent any out of bounds speculation.

While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it
does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory
relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache
behavior.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417984.33451.1216731042505722161.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/x86/entry/common.c