Bump to version 1.22.1
[platform/upstream/busybox.git] / networking / httpd.c
index 12bad59..621d9cd 100644 (file)
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2002,2003 Glenn Engel <glenne@engel.org>
  * Copyright (C) 2003-2006 Vladimir Oleynik <dzo@simtreas.ru>
  *
- * Licensed under GPLv2 or later, see file LICENSE in this tarball for details.
+ * Licensed under GPLv2 or later, see file LICENSE in this source tree.
  *
  *****************************************************************************
  *
  * The server changes directory to the location of the script and executes it
  * after setting QUERY_STRING and other environment variables.
  *
+ * If directory URL is given, no index.html is found and CGI support is enabled,
+ * cgi-bin/index.cgi will be run. Directory to list is ../$QUERY_STRING.
+ * See httpd_indexcgi.c for an example GCI code.
+ *
  * Doc:
  * "CGI Environment Variables": http://hoohoo.ncsa.uiuc.edu/cgi/env.html
  *
@@ -50,6 +54,8 @@
  * /cgi-bin:foo:bar  # Require user foo, pwd bar on urls starting with /cgi-bin/
  * /adm:admin:setup  # Require user admin, pwd setup on urls starting with /adm/
  * /adm:toor:PaSsWd  # or user toor, pwd PaSsWd on urls starting with /adm/
+ * /adm:root:*       # or user root, pwd from /etc/passwd on urls starting with /adm/
+ * /wiki:*:*         # or any user from /etc/passwd with according pwd on urls starting with /wiki/
  * .au:audio/basic   # additional mime type for audio.au files
  * *.php:/path/php   # run xxx.php through an interpreter
  *
@@ -71,7 +77,7 @@
  *     D:2.3.4.        # deny from 2.3.4.0 - 2.3.4.255
  *     A:*             # (optional line added for clarity)
  *
- * If a sub directory contains a config file it is parsed and merged with
+ * If a sub directory contains config file, it is parsed and merged with
  * any existing settings as if it was appended to the original configuration.
  *
  * subdir paths are relative to the containing subdir and thus cannot
  */
  /* TODO: use TCP_CORK, parse_config() */
 
+//usage:#define httpd_trivial_usage
+//usage:       "[-ifv[v]]"
+//usage:       " [-c CONFFILE]"
+//usage:       " [-p [IP:]PORT]"
+//usage:       IF_FEATURE_HTTPD_SETUID(" [-u USER[:GRP]]")
+//usage:       IF_FEATURE_HTTPD_BASIC_AUTH(" [-r REALM]")
+//usage:       " [-h HOME]\n"
+//usage:       "or httpd -d/-e" IF_FEATURE_HTTPD_AUTH_MD5("/-m") " STRING"
+//usage:#define httpd_full_usage "\n\n"
+//usage:       "Listen for incoming HTTP requests\n"
+//usage:     "\n       -i              Inetd mode"
+//usage:     "\n       -f              Don't daemonize"
+//usage:     "\n       -v[v]           Verbose"
+//usage:     "\n       -p [IP:]PORT    Bind to IP:PORT (default *:80)"
+//usage:       IF_FEATURE_HTTPD_SETUID(
+//usage:     "\n       -u USER[:GRP]   Set uid/gid after binding to port")
+//usage:       IF_FEATURE_HTTPD_BASIC_AUTH(
+//usage:     "\n       -r REALM        Authentication Realm for Basic Authentication")
+//usage:     "\n       -h HOME         Home directory (default .)"
+//usage:     "\n       -c FILE         Configuration file (default {/etc,HOME}/httpd.conf)"
+//usage:       IF_FEATURE_HTTPD_AUTH_MD5(
+//usage:     "\n       -m STRING       MD5 crypt STRING")
+//usage:     "\n       -e STRING       HTML encode STRING"
+//usage:     "\n       -d STRING       URL decode STRING"
+
 #include "libbb.h"
+#if ENABLE_PAM
+/* PAM may include <locale.h>. We may need to undefine bbox's stub define: */
+# undef setlocale
+/* For some obscure reason, PAM is not in pam/xxx, but in security/xxx.
+ * Apparently they like to confuse people. */
+# include <security/pam_appl.h>
+# include <security/pam_misc.h>
+#endif
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_USE_SENDFILE
 # include <sys/sendfile.h>
 #endif
@@ -231,7 +270,7 @@ struct globals {
        int verbose;            /* must be int (used by getopt32) */
        smallint flg_deny_all;
 
-       unsigned rmt_ip;        /* used for IP-based allow/deny rules */
+       unsigned rmt_ip;        /* used for IP-based allow/deny rules */
        time_t last_mod;
        char *rmt_ip_str;       /* for $REMOTE_ADDR and $REMOTE_PORT */
        const char *bind_addr_or_port;
@@ -267,7 +306,7 @@ struct globals {
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_CONFIG_WITH_SCRIPT_INTERPR
        Htaccess *script_i;     /* config script interpreters */
 #endif
-       char *iobuf;            /* [IOBUF_SIZE] */
+       char *iobuf;            /* [IOBUF_SIZE] */
 #define hdr_buf bb_common_bufsiz1
        char *hdr_ptr;
        int hdr_cnt;
@@ -277,6 +316,10 @@ struct globals {
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_PROXY
        Htaccess_Proxy *proxy;
 #endif
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_GZIP
+       /* client can handle gzip / we are going to send gzip */
+       smallint content_gzip;
+#endif
 };
 #define G (*ptr_to_globals)
 #define verbose           (G.verbose          )
@@ -305,7 +348,7 @@ struct globals {
 #define range_len         (G.range_len        )
 #else
 enum {
-       range_start = 0,
+       range_start = -1,
        range_end = MAXINT(off_t) - 1,
        range_len = MAXINT(off_t),
 };
@@ -319,9 +362,15 @@ enum {
 #define hdr_cnt           (G.hdr_cnt          )
 #define http_error_page   (G.http_error_page  )
 #define proxy             (G.proxy            )
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_GZIP
+# define content_gzip     (G.content_gzip     )
+#else
+# define content_gzip     0
+#endif
 #define INIT_G() do { \
        SET_PTR_TO_GLOBALS(xzalloc(sizeof(G))); \
        IF_FEATURE_HTTPD_BASIC_AUTH(g_realm = "Web Server Authentication";) \
+       IF_FEATURE_HTTPD_RANGES(range_start = -1;) \
        bind_addr_or_port = "80"; \
        index_page = index_html; \
        file_size = -1; \
@@ -747,9 +796,9 @@ static void parse_conf(const char *path, int flag)
                /* the line is not recognized */
  config_error:
                bb_error_msg("config error '%s' in '%s'", buf, filename);
-        } /* while (fgets) */
+       } /* while (fgets) */
 
-        fclose(f);
+       fclose(f);
 }
 
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_ENCODE_URL_STR
@@ -782,78 +831,6 @@ static char *encodeString(const char *string)
 }
 #endif
 
-/*
- * Given a URL encoded string, convert it to plain ascii.
- * Since decoding always makes strings smaller, the decode is done in-place.
- * Thus, callers should xstrdup() the argument if they do not want the
- * argument modified.  The return is the original pointer, allowing this
- * function to be easily used as arguments to other functions.
- *
- * string    The first string to decode.
- * option_d  1 if called for httpd -d
- *
- * Returns a pointer to the decoded string (same as input).
- */
-static unsigned hex_to_bin(unsigned char c)
-{
-       unsigned v;
-
-       v = c - '0';
-       if (v <= 9)
-               return v;
-       /* c | 0x20: letters to lower case, non-letters
-        * to (potentially different) non-letters */
-       v = (unsigned)(c | 0x20) - 'a';
-       if (v <= 5)
-               return v + 10;
-       return ~0;
-/* For testing:
-void t(char c) { printf("'%c'(%u) %u\n", c, c, hex_to_bin(c)); }
-int main() { t(0x10); t(0x20); t('0'); t('9'); t('A'); t('F'); t('a'); t('f');
-t('0'-1); t('9'+1); t('A'-1); t('F'+1); t('a'-1); t('f'+1); return 0; }
-*/
-}
-static char *decodeString(char *orig, int option_d)
-{
-       /* note that decoded string is always shorter than original */
-       char *string = orig;
-       char *ptr = string;
-       char c;
-
-       while ((c = *ptr++) != '\0') {
-               unsigned v;
-
-               if (option_d && c == '+') {
-                       *string++ = ' ';
-                       continue;
-               }
-               if (c != '%') {
-                       *string++ = c;
-                       continue;
-               }
-               v = hex_to_bin(ptr[0]);
-               if (v > 15) {
- bad_hex:
-                       if (!option_d)
-                               return NULL;
-                       *string++ = '%';
-                       continue;
-               }
-               v = (v * 16) | hex_to_bin(ptr[1]);
-               if (v > 255)
-                       goto bad_hex;
-               if (!option_d && (v == '/' || v == '\0')) {
-                       /* caller takes it as indication of invalid
-                        * (dangerous wrt exploits) chars */
-                       return orig + 1;
-               }
-               *string++ = v;
-               ptr += 2;
-       }
-       *string = '\0';
-       return orig;
-}
-
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_BASIC_AUTH
 /*
  * Decode a base64 data stream as per rfc1521.
@@ -1027,10 +1004,14 @@ static void send_headers(int responseNum)
 #endif
                        "Last-Modified: %s\r\n%s %"OFF_FMT"u\r\n",
                                tmp_str,
-                               "Content-length:",
+                               content_gzip ? "Transfer-length:" : "Content-length:",
                                file_size
                );
        }
+
+       if (content_gzip)
+               len += sprintf(iobuf + len, "Content-Encoding: gzip\r\n");
+
        iobuf[len++] = '\r';
        iobuf[len++] = '\n';
        if (infoString) {
@@ -1052,6 +1033,7 @@ static void send_headers(int responseNum)
 static void send_headers_and_exit(int responseNum) NORETURN;
 static void send_headers_and_exit(int responseNum)
 {
+       IF_FEATURE_HTTPD_GZIP(content_gzip = 0;)
        send_headers(responseNum);
        log_and_exit();
 }
@@ -1122,18 +1104,31 @@ static NOINLINE void cgi_io_loop_and_exit(int fromCgi_rd, int toCgi_wr, int post
 
        /* NB: breaking out of this loop jumps to log_and_exit() */
        out_cnt = 0;
+       pfd[FROM_CGI].fd = fromCgi_rd;
+       pfd[FROM_CGI].events = POLLIN;
+       pfd[TO_CGI].fd = toCgi_wr;
        while (1) {
-               memset(pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
-
-               pfd[FROM_CGI].fd = fromCgi_rd;
-               pfd[FROM_CGI].events = POLLIN;
-
-               if (toCgi_wr) {
-                       pfd[TO_CGI].fd = toCgi_wr;
-                       if (hdr_cnt > 0) {
-                               pfd[TO_CGI].events = POLLOUT;
-                       } else if (post_len > 0) {
-                               pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
+               /* Note: even pfd[0].events == 0 won't prevent
+                * revents == POLLHUP|POLLERR reports from closed stdin.
+                * Setting fd to -1 works: */
+               pfd[0].fd = -1;
+               pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
+               pfd[0].revents = 0; /* probably not needed, paranoia */
+
+               /* We always poll this fd, thus kernel always sets revents: */
+               /*pfd[FROM_CGI].events = POLLIN; - moved out of loop */
+               /*pfd[FROM_CGI].revents = 0; - not needed */
+
+               /* gcc-4.8.0 still doesnt fill two shorts with one insn :( */
+               /* http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=47059 */
+               /* hopefully one day it will... */
+               pfd[TO_CGI].events = POLLOUT;
+               pfd[TO_CGI].revents = 0; /* needed! */
+
+               if (toCgi_wr && hdr_cnt <= 0) {
+                       if (post_len > 0) {
+                               /* Expect more POST data from network */
+                               pfd[0].fd = 0;
                        } else {
                                /* post_len <= 0 && hdr_cnt <= 0:
                                 * no more POST data to CGI,
@@ -1145,7 +1140,7 @@ static NOINLINE void cgi_io_loop_and_exit(int fromCgi_rd, int toCgi_wr, int post
                }
 
                /* Now wait on the set of sockets */
-               count = safe_poll(pfd, toCgi_wr ? TO_CGI+1 : FROM_CGI+1, -1);
+               count = safe_poll(pfd, hdr_cnt > 0 ? TO_CGI+1 : FROM_CGI+1, -1);
                if (count <= 0) {
 #if 0
                        if (safe_waitpid(pid, &status, WNOHANG) <= 0) {
@@ -1162,7 +1157,7 @@ static NOINLINE void cgi_io_loop_and_exit(int fromCgi_rd, int toCgi_wr, int post
                }
 
                if (pfd[TO_CGI].revents) {
-                       /* hdr_cnt > 0 here due to the way pfd[TO_CGI].events set */
+                       /* hdr_cnt > 0 here due to the way poll() called */
                        /* Have data from peer and can write to CGI */
                        count = safe_write(toCgi_wr, hdr_ptr, hdr_cnt);
                        /* Doesn't happen, we dont use nonblocking IO here
@@ -1284,18 +1279,21 @@ static void setenv1(const char *name, const char *value)
  *
  * Parameters:
  * const char *url              The requested URL (with leading /).
+ * const char *orig_uri         The original URI before rewriting (if any)
  * int post_len                 Length of the POST body.
  * const char *cookie           For set HTTP_COOKIE.
  * const char *content_type     For set CONTENT_TYPE.
  */
 static void send_cgi_and_exit(
                const char *url,
+               const char *orig_uri,
                const char *request,
                int post_len,
                const char *cookie,
                const char *content_type) NORETURN;
 static void send_cgi_and_exit(
                const char *url,
+               const char *orig_uri,
                const char *request,
                int post_len,
                const char *cookie,
@@ -1303,7 +1301,7 @@ static void send_cgi_and_exit(
 {
        struct fd_pair fromCgi;  /* CGI -> httpd pipe */
        struct fd_pair toCgi;    /* httpd -> CGI pipe */
-       char *script;
+       char *script, *last_slash;
        int pid;
 
        /* Make a copy. NB: caller guarantees:
@@ -1317,22 +1315,25 @@ static void send_cgi_and_exit(
         */
 
        /* Check for [dirs/]script.cgi/PATH_INFO */
-       script = (char*)url;
+       last_slash = script = (char*)url;
        while ((script = strchr(script + 1, '/')) != NULL) {
+               int dir;
                *script = '\0';
-               if (!is_directory(url + 1, 1, NULL)) {
+               dir = is_directory(url + 1, /*followlinks:*/ 1);
+               *script = '/';
+               if (!dir) {
                        /* not directory, found script.cgi/PATH_INFO */
-                       *script = '/';
                        break;
                }
-               *script = '/'; /* is directory, find next '/' */
+               /* is directory, find next '/' */
+               last_slash = script;
        }
        setenv1("PATH_INFO", script);   /* set to /PATH_INFO or "" */
        setenv1("REQUEST_METHOD", request);
        if (g_query) {
-               putenv(xasprintf("%s=%s?%s", "REQUEST_URI", url, g_query));
+               putenv(xasprintf("%s=%s?%s", "REQUEST_URI", orig_uri, g_query));
        } else {
-               setenv1("REQUEST_URI", url);
+               setenv1("REQUEST_URI", orig_uri);
        }
        if (script != NULL)
                *script = '\0';         /* cut off /PATH_INFO */
@@ -1406,7 +1407,7 @@ static void send_cgi_and_exit(
                log_and_exit();
        }
 
-       if (!pid) {
+       if (pid == 0) {
                /* Child process */
                char *argv[3];
 
@@ -1422,11 +1423,11 @@ static void send_cgi_and_exit(
                /* dup2(1, 2); */
 
                /* Chdiring to script's dir */
-               script = strrchr(url, '/');
+               script = last_slash;
                if (script != url) { /* paranoia */
                        *script = '\0';
                        if (chdir(url + 1) != 0) {
-                               bb_perror_msg("chdir(%s)", url + 1);
+                               bb_perror_msg("can't change directory to '%s'", url + 1);
                                goto error_execing_cgi;
                        }
                        // not needed: *script = '/';
@@ -1500,7 +1501,23 @@ static NOINLINE void send_file_and_exit(const char *url, int what)
        int fd;
        ssize_t count;
 
-       fd = open(url, O_RDONLY);
+       if (content_gzip) {
+               /* does <url>.gz exist? Then use it instead */
+               char *gzurl = xasprintf("%s.gz", url);
+               fd = open(gzurl, O_RDONLY);
+               free(gzurl);
+               if (fd != -1) {
+                       struct stat sb;
+                       fstat(fd, &sb);
+                       file_size = sb.st_size;
+                       last_mod = sb.st_mtime;
+               } else {
+                       IF_FEATURE_HTTPD_GZIP(content_gzip = 0;)
+                       fd = open(url, O_RDONLY);
+               }
+       } else {
+               fd = open(url, O_RDONLY);
+       }
        if (fd < 0) {
                if (DEBUG)
                        bb_perror_msg("can't open '%s'", url);
@@ -1583,18 +1600,21 @@ static NOINLINE void send_file_and_exit(const char *url, int what)
                        url, found_mime_type);
 
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_RANGES
-       if (what == SEND_BODY)
-               range_start = 0; /* err pages and ranges don't mix */
+       if (what == SEND_BODY /* err pages and ranges don't mix */
+        || content_gzip /* we are sending compressed page: can't do ranges */  ///why?
+       ) {
+               range_start = -1;
+       }
        range_len = MAXINT(off_t);
-       if (range_start) {
-               if (!range_end) {
+       if (range_start >= 0) {
+               if (!range_end || range_end > file_size - 1) {
                        range_end = file_size - 1;
                }
                if (range_end < range_start
                 || lseek(fd, range_start, SEEK_SET) != range_start
                ) {
                        lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
-                       range_start = 0;
+                       range_start = -1;
                } else {
                        range_len = range_end - range_start + 1;
                        send_headers(HTTP_PARTIAL_CONTENT);
@@ -1617,7 +1637,7 @@ static NOINLINE void send_file_and_exit(const char *url, int what)
                                        break; /* fall back to read/write loop */
                                goto fin;
                        }
-                       IF_FEATURE_HTTPD_RANGES(range_len -= sz;)
+                       IF_FEATURE_HTTPD_RANGES(range_len -= count;)
                        if (count == 0 || range_len == 0)
                                log_and_exit();
                }
@@ -1668,6 +1688,56 @@ static int checkPermIP(void)
 }
 
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_BASIC_AUTH
+
+# if ENABLE_PAM
+struct pam_userinfo {
+       const char *name;
+       const char *pw;
+};
+
+static int pam_talker(int num_msg,
+               const struct pam_message **msg,
+               struct pam_response **resp,
+               void *appdata_ptr)
+{
+       int i;
+       struct pam_userinfo *userinfo = (struct pam_userinfo *) appdata_ptr;
+       struct pam_response *response;
+
+       if (!resp || !msg || !userinfo)
+               return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+
+       /* allocate memory to store response */
+       response = xzalloc(num_msg * sizeof(*response));
+
+       /* copy values */
+       for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++) {
+               const char *s;
+
+               switch (msg[i]->msg_style) {
+               case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+                       s = userinfo->name;
+                       break;
+               case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+                       s = userinfo->pw;
+                       break;
+               case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+               case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+                       s = "";
+                       break;
+               default:
+                       free(response);
+                       return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+               }
+               response[i].resp = xstrdup(s);
+               if (PAM_SUCCESS != 0)
+                       response[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+       }
+       *resp = response;
+       return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+# endif
+
 /*
  * Config file entries are of the form "/<path>:<user>:<passwd>".
  * If config file has no prefix match for path, access is allowed.
@@ -1677,7 +1747,7 @@ static int checkPermIP(void)
  *
  * Returns 1 if user_and_passwd is OK.
  */
-static int check_user_passwd(const char *path, const char *user_and_passwd)
+static int check_user_passwd(const char *path, char *user_and_passwd)
 {
        Htaccess *cur;
        const char *prev = NULL;
@@ -1685,6 +1755,7 @@ static int check_user_passwd(const char *path, const char *user_and_passwd)
        for (cur = g_auth; cur; cur = cur->next) {
                const char *dir_prefix;
                size_t len;
+               int r;
 
                dir_prefix = cur->before_colon;
 
@@ -1700,7 +1771,8 @@ static int check_user_passwd(const char *path, const char *user_and_passwd)
                len = strlen(dir_prefix);
                if (len != 1 /* dir_prefix "/" matches all, don't need to check */
                 && (strncmp(dir_prefix, path, len) != 0
-                   || (path[len] != '/' && path[len] != '\0'))
+                   || (path[len] != '/' && path[len] != '\0')
+                   )
                ) {
                        continue;
                }
@@ -1709,38 +1781,105 @@ static int check_user_passwd(const char *path, const char *user_and_passwd)
                prev = dir_prefix;
 
                if (ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_AUTH_MD5) {
-                       char *md5_passwd;
+                       char *colon_after_user;
+                       const char *passwd;
+# if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS && !ENABLE_PAM
+                       char sp_buf[256];
+# endif
 
-                       md5_passwd = strchr(cur->after_colon, ':');
-                       if (md5_passwd && md5_passwd[1] == '$' && md5_passwd[2] == '1'
-                        && md5_passwd[3] == '$' && md5_passwd[4]
-                       ) {
-                               char *encrypted;
-                               int r, user_len_p1;
+                       colon_after_user = strchr(user_and_passwd, ':');
+                       if (!colon_after_user)
+                               goto bad_input;
 
-                               md5_passwd++;
-                               user_len_p1 = md5_passwd - cur->after_colon;
-                               /* comparing "user:" */
-                               if (strncmp(cur->after_colon, user_and_passwd, user_len_p1) != 0) {
+                       /* compare "user:" */
+                       if (cur->after_colon[0] != '*'
+                        && strncmp(cur->after_colon, user_and_passwd,
+                                       colon_after_user - user_and_passwd + 1) != 0
+                       ) {
+                               continue;
+                       }
+                       /* this cfg entry is '*' or matches username from peer */
+
+                       passwd = strchr(cur->after_colon, ':');
+                       if (!passwd)
+                               goto bad_input;
+                       passwd++;
+                       if (passwd[0] == '*') {
+# if ENABLE_PAM
+                               struct pam_userinfo userinfo;
+                               struct pam_conv conv_info = { &pam_talker, (void *) &userinfo };
+                               pam_handle_t *pamh;
+
+                               *colon_after_user = '\0';
+                               userinfo.name = user_and_passwd;
+                               userinfo.pw = colon_after_user + 1;
+                               r = pam_start("httpd", user_and_passwd, &conv_info, &pamh) != PAM_SUCCESS;
+                               if (r == 0) {
+                                       r = pam_authenticate(pamh, PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK) != PAM_SUCCESS
+                                        || pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK)    != PAM_SUCCESS
+                                       ;
+                                       pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
+                               }
+                               *colon_after_user = ':';
+                               goto end_check_passwd;
+# else
+#  if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
+                               /* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
+                               struct spwd spw;
+#  endif
+                               struct passwd *pw;
+
+                               *colon_after_user = '\0';
+                               pw = getpwnam(user_and_passwd);
+                               *colon_after_user = ':';
+                               if (!pw || !pw->pw_passwd)
                                        continue;
+                               passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
+#  if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
+                               if ((passwd[0] == 'x' || passwd[0] == '*') && !passwd[1]) {
+                                       /* getspnam_r may return 0 yet set result to NULL.
+                                        * At least glibc 2.4 does this. Be extra paranoid here. */
+                                       struct spwd *result = NULL;
+                                       r = getspnam_r(pw->pw_name, &spw, sp_buf, sizeof(sp_buf), &result);
+                                       if (r == 0 && result)
+                                               passwd = result->sp_pwdp;
                                }
+#  endif
+                               /* In this case, passwd is ALWAYS encrypted:
+                                * it came from /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow!
+                                */
+                               goto check_encrypted;
+# endif /* ENABLE_PAM */
+                       }
+                       /* Else: passwd is from httpd.conf, it is either plaintext or encrypted */
 
+                       if (passwd[0] == '$' && isdigit(passwd[1])) {
+                               char *encrypted;
+# if !ENABLE_PAM
+ check_encrypted:
+# endif
+                               /* encrypt pwd from peer and check match with local one */
                                encrypted = pw_encrypt(
-                                       user_and_passwd + user_len_p1 /* cleartext pwd from user */,
-                                       md5_passwd /*salt */, 1 /* cleanup */);
-                               r = strcmp(encrypted, md5_passwd);
+                                       /* pwd (from peer): */  colon_after_user + 1,
+                                       /* salt: */ passwd,
+                                       /* cleanup: */ 0
+                               );
+                               r = strcmp(encrypted, passwd);
                                free(encrypted);
-                               if (r == 0)
-                                       goto set_remoteuser_var; /* Ok */
-                               continue;
+                       } else {
+                               /* local passwd is from httpd.conf and it's plaintext */
+                               r = strcmp(colon_after_user + 1, passwd);
                        }
+                       goto end_check_passwd;
                }
-
+ bad_input:
                /* Comparing plaintext "user:pass" in one go */
-               if (strcmp(cur->after_colon, user_and_passwd) == 0) {
- set_remoteuser_var:
+               r = strcmp(cur->after_colon, user_and_passwd);
+ end_check_passwd:
+               if (r == 0) {
                        remoteuser = xstrndup(user_and_passwd,
-                                       strchrnul(user_and_passwd, ':') - user_and_passwd);
+                               strchrnul(user_and_passwd, ':') - user_and_passwd
+                       );
                        return 1; /* Ok */
                }
        } /* for */
@@ -1838,7 +1977,9 @@ static void handle_incoming_and_exit(const len_and_sockaddr *fromAddr)
                send_headers_and_exit(HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);
 
        /* Determine type of request (GET/POST) */
-       urlp = strpbrk(iobuf, " \t");
+       // rfc2616: method and URI is separated by exactly one space
+       //urlp = strpbrk(iobuf, " \t"); - no, tab isn't allowed
+       urlp = strchr(iobuf, ' ');
        if (urlp == NULL)
                send_headers_and_exit(HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);
        *urlp++ = '\0';
@@ -1856,7 +1997,8 @@ static void handle_incoming_and_exit(const len_and_sockaddr *fromAddr)
        if (strcasecmp(iobuf, request_GET) != 0)
                send_headers_and_exit(HTTP_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
 #endif
-       urlp = skip_whitespace(urlp);
+       // rfc2616: method and URI is separated by exactly one space
+       //urlp = skip_whitespace(urlp); - should not be necessary
        if (urlp[0] != '/')
                send_headers_and_exit(HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);
 
@@ -1879,7 +2021,7 @@ static void handle_incoming_and_exit(const len_and_sockaddr *fromAddr)
        /* NB: urlcopy ptr is never changed after this */
 
        /* Extract url args if present */
-       g_query = NULL;
+       /* g_query = NULL; - already is */
        tptr = strchr(urlcopy, '?');
        if (tptr) {
                *tptr++ = '\0';
@@ -1887,7 +2029,7 @@ static void handle_incoming_and_exit(const len_and_sockaddr *fromAddr)
        }
 
        /* Decode URL escape sequences */
-       tptr = decodeString(urlcopy, 0);
+       tptr = percent_decode_in_place(urlcopy, /*strict:*/ 1);
        if (tptr == NULL)
                send_headers_and_exit(HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);
        if (tptr == urlcopy + 1) {
@@ -1899,34 +2041,40 @@ static void handle_incoming_and_exit(const len_and_sockaddr *fromAddr)
        /* Algorithm stolen from libbb bb_simplify_path(),
         * but don't strdup, retain trailing slash, protect root */
        urlp = tptr = urlcopy;
-       do {
+       for (;;) {
                if (*urlp == '/') {
                        /* skip duplicate (or initial) slash */
                        if (*tptr == '/') {
-                               continue;
+                               goto next_char;
                        }
                        if (*tptr == '.') {
-                               /* skip extra "/./" */
-                               if (tptr[1] == '/' || !tptr[1]) {
-                                       continue;
-                               }
-                               /* "..": be careful */
-                               if (tptr[1] == '.' && (tptr[2] == '/' || !tptr[2])) {
-                                       ++tptr;
-                                       if (urlp == urlcopy) /* protect root */
+                               if (tptr[1] == '.' && (tptr[2] == '/' || tptr[2] == '\0')) {
+                                       /* "..": be careful */
+                                       /* protect root */
+                                       if (urlp == urlcopy)
                                                send_headers_and_exit(HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);
-                                       while (*--urlp != '/') /* omit previous dir */;
+                                       /* omit previous dir */
+                                       while (*--urlp != '/')
                                                continue;
+                                       /* skip to "./" or ".<NUL>" */
+                                       tptr++;
+                               }
+                               if (tptr[1] == '/' || tptr[1] == '\0') {
+                                       /* skip extra "/./" */
+                                       goto next_char;
                                }
                        }
                }
                *++urlp = *tptr;
-       } while (*++tptr);
-       *++urlp = '\0';       /* terminate after last character */
+               if (*urlp == '\0')
+                       break;
+ next_char:
+               tptr++;
+       }
 
        /* If URL is a directory, add '/' */
        if (urlp[-1] != '/') {
-               if (is_directory(urlcopy + 1, 1, NULL)) {
+               if (is_directory(urlcopy + 1, /*followlinks:*/ 1)) {
                        found_moved_temporarily = urlcopy;
                }
        }
@@ -1940,7 +2088,7 @@ static void handle_incoming_and_exit(const len_and_sockaddr *fromAddr)
        while (ip_allowed && (tptr = strchr(tptr + 1, '/')) != NULL) {
                /* have path1/path2 */
                *tptr = '\0';
-               if (is_directory(urlcopy + 1, 1, NULL)) {
+               if (is_directory(urlcopy + 1, /*followlinks:*/ 1)) {
                        /* may have subdir config */
                        parse_conf(urlcopy + 1, SUBDIR_PARSE);
                        ip_allowed = checkPermIP();
@@ -2039,15 +2187,32 @@ static void handle_incoming_and_exit(const len_and_sockaddr *fromAddr)
                                        s += sizeof("bytes=")-1;
                                        range_start = BB_STRTOOFF(s, &s, 10);
                                        if (s[0] != '-' || range_start < 0) {
-                                               range_start = 0;
+                                               range_start = -1;
                                        } else if (s[1]) {
                                                range_end = BB_STRTOOFF(s+1, NULL, 10);
                                                if (errno || range_end < range_start)
-                                                       range_start = 0;
+                                                       range_start = -1;
                                        }
                                }
                        }
 #endif
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_GZIP
+                       if (STRNCASECMP(iobuf, "Accept-Encoding:") == 0) {
+                               /* Note: we do not support "gzip;q=0"
+                                * method of _disabling_ gzip
+                                * delivery. No one uses that, though */
+                               const char *s = strstr(iobuf, "gzip");
+                               if (s) {
+                                       // want more thorough checks?
+                                       //if (s[-1] == ' '
+                                       // || s[-1] == ','
+                                       // || s[-1] == ':'
+                                       //) {
+                                               content_gzip = 1;
+                                       //}
+                               }
+                       }
+#endif
                } /* while extra header reading */
        }
 
@@ -2060,10 +2225,10 @@ static void handle_incoming_and_exit(const len_and_sockaddr *fromAddr)
        }
 
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_BASIC_AUTH
-       /* Case: no "Authorization:" was seen, but page does require passwd.
+       /* Case: no "Authorization:" was seen, but page might require passwd.
         * Check that with dummy user:pass */
        if (authorized < 0)
-               authorized = check_user_passwd(urlcopy, ":");
+               authorized = check_user_passwd(urlcopy, (char *) "");
        if (!authorized)
                send_headers_and_exit(HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED);
 #endif
@@ -2109,12 +2274,20 @@ static void handle_incoming_and_exit(const len_and_sockaddr *fromAddr)
                        /* protect listing "cgi-bin/" */
                        send_headers_and_exit(HTTP_FORBIDDEN);
                }
-               send_cgi_and_exit(urlcopy, prequest, length, cookie, content_type);
+               send_cgi_and_exit(urlcopy, urlcopy, prequest, length, cookie, content_type);
        }
 #endif
 
-       if (urlp[-1] == '/')
+       if (urlp[-1] == '/') {
+               /* When index_page string is appended to <dir>/ URL, it overwrites
+                * the query string. If we fall back to call /cgi-bin/index.cgi,
+                * query string would be lost and not available to the CGI.
+                * Work around it by making a deep copy.
+                */
+               if (ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_CGI)
+                       g_query = xstrdup(g_query); /* ok for NULL too */
                strcpy(urlp, index_page);
+       }
        if (stat(tptr, &sb) == 0) {
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_CONFIG_WITH_SCRIPT_INTERPR
                char *suffix = strrchr(tptr, '.');
@@ -2122,7 +2295,7 @@ static void handle_incoming_and_exit(const len_and_sockaddr *fromAddr)
                        Htaccess *cur;
                        for (cur = script_i; cur; cur = cur->next) {
                                if (strcmp(cur->before_colon + 1, suffix) == 0) {
-                                       send_cgi_and_exit(urlcopy, prequest, length, cookie, content_type);
+                                       send_cgi_and_exit(urlcopy, urlcopy, prequest, length, cookie, content_type);
                                }
                        }
                }
@@ -2135,9 +2308,8 @@ static void handle_incoming_and_exit(const len_and_sockaddr *fromAddr)
                /* It's a dir URL and there is no index.html
                 * Try cgi-bin/index.cgi */
                if (access("/cgi-bin/index.cgi"+1, X_OK) == 0) {
-                       urlp[0] = '\0';
-                       g_query = urlcopy;
-                       send_cgi_and_exit("/cgi-bin/index.cgi", prequest, length, cookie, content_type);
+                       urlp[0] = '\0'; /* remove index_page */
+                       send_cgi_and_exit("/cgi-bin/index.cgi", urlcopy, prequest, length, cookie, content_type);
                }
        }
        /* else fall through to send_file, it errors out if open fails: */
@@ -2236,6 +2408,7 @@ static void mini_httpd_nommu(int server_socket, int argc, char **argv)
                        /* Run a copy of ourself in inetd mode */
                        re_exec(argv_copy);
                }
+               argv_copy[0][0] &= 0x7f;
                /* parent, or vfork failed */
                close(n);
        } /* while (1) */
@@ -2329,7 +2502,7 @@ int httpd_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
                        , &verbose
                );
        if (opt & OPT_DECODE_URL) {
-               fputs(decodeString(url_for_decode, 1), stdout);
+               fputs(percent_decode_in_place(url_for_decode, /*strict:*/ 0), stdout);
                return 0;
        }
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_ENCODE_URL_STR
@@ -2344,8 +2517,8 @@ int httpd_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
                salt[0] = '$';
                salt[1] = '1';
                salt[2] = '$';
-               crypt_make_salt(salt + 3, 4, 0);
-               puts(pw_encrypt(pass, salt, 1));
+               crypt_make_salt(salt + 3, 4);
+               puts(pw_encrypt(pass, salt, /*cleanup:*/ 0));
                return 0;
        }
 #endif