static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline
-ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
-{
- struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
- struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
- struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
- int keyidx;
- int hdrlen;
- ieee80211_rx_result result = RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
- struct ieee80211_key *sta_ptk = NULL;
- int mmie_keyidx = -1;
- __le16 fc;
-
- /*
- * Key selection 101
- *
- * There are four types of keys:
- * - GTK (group keys)
- * - IGTK (group keys for management frames)
- * - PTK (pairwise keys)
- * - STK (station-to-station pairwise keys)
- *
- * When selecting a key, we have to distinguish between multicast
- * (including broadcast) and unicast frames, the latter can only
- * use PTKs and STKs while the former always use GTKs and IGTKs.
- * Unless, of course, actual WEP keys ("pre-RSNA") are used, then
- * unicast frames can also use key indices like GTKs. Hence, if we
- * don't have a PTK/STK we check the key index for a WEP key.
- *
- * Note that in a regular BSS, multicast frames are sent by the
- * AP only, associated stations unicast the frame to the AP first
- * which then multicasts it on their behalf.
- *
- * There is also a slight problem in IBSS mode: GTKs are negotiated
- * with each station, that is something we don't currently handle.
- * The spec seems to expect that one negotiates the same key with
- * every station but there's no such requirement; VLANs could be
- * possible.
- */
-
- /*
- * No point in finding a key and decrypting if the frame is neither
- * addressed to us nor a multicast frame.
- */
- if (!(status->rx_flags & IEEE80211_RX_RA_MATCH))
- return RX_CONTINUE;
-
- /* start without a key */
- rx->key = NULL;
-
- if (rx->sta)
- sta_ptk = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->ptk);
-
- fc = hdr->frame_control;
-
- if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc))
- mmie_keyidx = ieee80211_get_mmie_keyidx(rx->skb);
-
- if (!is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && sta_ptk) {
- rx->key = sta_ptk;
- if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
- (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
- return RX_CONTINUE;
- /* Skip decryption if the frame is not protected. */
- if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc))
- return RX_CONTINUE;
- } else if (mmie_keyidx >= 0) {
- /* Broadcast/multicast robust management frame / BIP */
- if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
- (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
- return RX_CONTINUE;
-
- if (mmie_keyidx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS ||
- mmie_keyidx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS)
- return RX_DROP_MONITOR; /* unexpected BIP keyidx */
- if (rx->sta)
- rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[mmie_keyidx]);
- if (!rx->key)
- rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->keys[mmie_keyidx]);
- } else if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
- /*
- * The frame was not protected, so skip decryption. However, we
- * need to set rx->key if there is a key that could have been
- * used so that the frame may be dropped if encryption would
- * have been expected.
- */
- struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
- struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = rx->sdata;
- int i;
-
- if (ieee80211_is_mgmt(fc) &&
- is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) &&
- (key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->default_mgmt_key)))
- rx->key = key;
- else {
- if (rx->sta) {
- for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) {
- key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[i]);
- if (key)
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!key) {
- for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) {
- key = rcu_dereference(sdata->keys[i]);
- if (key)
- break;
- }
- }
- if (key)
- rx->key = key;
- }
- return RX_CONTINUE;
- } else {
- u8 keyid;
- /*
- * The device doesn't give us the IV so we won't be
- * able to look up the key. That's ok though, we
- * don't need to decrypt the frame, we just won't
- * be able to keep statistics accurate.
- * Except for key threshold notifications, should
- * we somehow allow the driver to tell us which key
- * the hardware used if this flag is set?
- */
- if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
- (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
- return RX_CONTINUE;
-
- hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc);
-
- if (rx->skb->len < 8 + hdrlen)
- return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* TODO: count this? */
-
- /*
- * no need to call ieee80211_wep_get_keyidx,
- * it verifies a bunch of things we've done already
- */
- skb_copy_bits(rx->skb, hdrlen + 3, &keyid, 1);
- keyidx = keyid >> 6;
-
- /* check per-station GTK first, if multicast packet */
- if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && rx->sta)
- rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[keyidx]);
-
- /* if not found, try default key */
- if (!rx->key) {
- rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->keys[keyidx]);
-
- /*
- * RSNA-protected unicast frames should always be
- * sent with pairwise or station-to-station keys,
- * but for WEP we allow using a key index as well.
- */
- if (rx->key &&
- rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 &&
- rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104 &&
- !is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1))
- rx->key = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- if (rx->key) {
- if (unlikely(rx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED))
- return RX_DROP_MONITOR;
-
- rx->key->tx_rx_count++;
- /* TODO: add threshold stuff again */
- } else {
- return RX_DROP_MONITOR;
- }
-
- switch (rx->key->conf.cipher) {
- case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
- case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
- result = ieee80211_crypto_wep_decrypt(rx);
- break;
- case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
- result = ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(rx);
- break;
- case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
- result = ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(rx);
- break;
- case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
- result = ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(rx);
- break;
- default:
- /*
- * We can reach here only with HW-only algorithms
- * but why didn't it decrypt the frame?!
- */
- return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
- }
-
- /* the hdr variable is invalid after the decrypt handlers */
-
- /* either the frame has been decrypted or will be dropped */
- status->flag |= RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED;
-
- return result;
-}
-
-static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline
ieee80211_rx_h_check_more_data(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local;
return RX_CONTINUE;
} /* ieee80211_rx_h_sta_process */
+static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline
+ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+ struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+ int keyidx;
+ int hdrlen;
+ ieee80211_rx_result result = RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ struct ieee80211_key *sta_ptk = NULL;
+ int mmie_keyidx = -1;
+ __le16 fc;
+
+ /*
+ * Key selection 101
+ *
+ * There are four types of keys:
+ * - GTK (group keys)
+ * - IGTK (group keys for management frames)
+ * - PTK (pairwise keys)
+ * - STK (station-to-station pairwise keys)
+ *
+ * When selecting a key, we have to distinguish between multicast
+ * (including broadcast) and unicast frames, the latter can only
+ * use PTKs and STKs while the former always use GTKs and IGTKs.
+ * Unless, of course, actual WEP keys ("pre-RSNA") are used, then
+ * unicast frames can also use key indices like GTKs. Hence, if we
+ * don't have a PTK/STK we check the key index for a WEP key.
+ *
+ * Note that in a regular BSS, multicast frames are sent by the
+ * AP only, associated stations unicast the frame to the AP first
+ * which then multicasts it on their behalf.
+ *
+ * There is also a slight problem in IBSS mode: GTKs are negotiated
+ * with each station, that is something we don't currently handle.
+ * The spec seems to expect that one negotiates the same key with
+ * every station but there's no such requirement; VLANs could be
+ * possible.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * No point in finding a key and decrypting if the frame is neither
+ * addressed to us nor a multicast frame.
+ */
+ if (!(status->rx_flags & IEEE80211_RX_RA_MATCH))
+ return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+ /* start without a key */
+ rx->key = NULL;
+
+ if (rx->sta)
+ sta_ptk = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->ptk);
+
+ fc = hdr->frame_control;
+
+ if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc))
+ mmie_keyidx = ieee80211_get_mmie_keyidx(rx->skb);
+
+ if (!is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && sta_ptk) {
+ rx->key = sta_ptk;
+ if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
+ (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
+ return RX_CONTINUE;
+ /* Skip decryption if the frame is not protected. */
+ if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc))
+ return RX_CONTINUE;
+ } else if (mmie_keyidx >= 0) {
+ /* Broadcast/multicast robust management frame / BIP */
+ if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
+ (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
+ return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+ if (mmie_keyidx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS ||
+ mmie_keyidx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS)
+ return RX_DROP_MONITOR; /* unexpected BIP keyidx */
+ if (rx->sta)
+ rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[mmie_keyidx]);
+ if (!rx->key)
+ rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->keys[mmie_keyidx]);
+ } else if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
+ /*
+ * The frame was not protected, so skip decryption. However, we
+ * need to set rx->key if there is a key that could have been
+ * used so that the frame may be dropped if encryption would
+ * have been expected.
+ */
+ struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
+ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = rx->sdata;
+ int i;
+
+ if (ieee80211_is_mgmt(fc) &&
+ is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) &&
+ (key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->default_mgmt_key)))
+ rx->key = key;
+ else {
+ if (rx->sta) {
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) {
+ key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[i]);
+ if (key)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!key) {
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) {
+ key = rcu_dereference(sdata->keys[i]);
+ if (key)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (key)
+ rx->key = key;
+ }
+ return RX_CONTINUE;
+ } else {
+ u8 keyid;
+ /*
+ * The device doesn't give us the IV so we won't be
+ * able to look up the key. That's ok though, we
+ * don't need to decrypt the frame, we just won't
+ * be able to keep statistics accurate.
+ * Except for key threshold notifications, should
+ * we somehow allow the driver to tell us which key
+ * the hardware used if this flag is set?
+ */
+ if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
+ (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
+ return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+ hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc);
+
+ if (rx->skb->len < 8 + hdrlen)
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* TODO: count this? */
+
+ /*
+ * no need to call ieee80211_wep_get_keyidx,
+ * it verifies a bunch of things we've done already
+ */
+ skb_copy_bits(rx->skb, hdrlen + 3, &keyid, 1);
+ keyidx = keyid >> 6;
+
+ /* check per-station GTK first, if multicast packet */
+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && rx->sta)
+ rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[keyidx]);
+
+ /* if not found, try default key */
+ if (!rx->key) {
+ rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->keys[keyidx]);
+
+ /*
+ * RSNA-protected unicast frames should always be
+ * sent with pairwise or station-to-station keys,
+ * but for WEP we allow using a key index as well.
+ */
+ if (rx->key &&
+ rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 &&
+ rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104 &&
+ !is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1))
+ rx->key = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rx->key) {
+ if (unlikely(rx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED))
+ return RX_DROP_MONITOR;
+
+ rx->key->tx_rx_count++;
+ /* TODO: add threshold stuff again */
+ } else {
+ return RX_DROP_MONITOR;
+ }
+
+ switch (rx->key->conf.cipher) {
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
+ result = ieee80211_crypto_wep_decrypt(rx);
+ break;
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
+ result = ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(rx);
+ break;
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+ result = ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(rx);
+ break;
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
+ result = ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(rx);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /*
+ * We can reach here only with HW-only algorithms
+ * but why didn't it decrypt the frame?!
+ */
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ }
+
+ /* the hdr variable is invalid after the decrypt handlers */
+
+ /* either the frame has been decrypted or will be dropped */
+ status->flag |= RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED;
+
+ return result;
+}
+
static inline struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *
ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
unsigned int frag, unsigned int seq, int rx_queue,
*/
rx->skb = skb;
- CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt)
CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_check_more_data)
CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_uapsd_and_pspoll)
CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_sta_process)
+ CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt)
CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_defragment)
CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify)
/* must be after MMIC verify so header is counted in MPDU mic */
projects / platform / adaptation / renesas_rcar / renesas_kernel.git / blobdiff