* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
*
- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2014, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2016, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
*
* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
- * are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ * are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
*
* You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
* copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
#include "curl_setup.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+
#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
#include <limits.h>
#endif
#include "vtls.h"
#include "rawstr.h"
#include "hostcheck.h"
+#include "curl_printf.h"
-#define _MPRINTF_REPLACE /* use the internal *printf() functions */
-#include <curl/mprintf.h>
-
-#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
-
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#else
-#include <rand.h>
-#include <x509v3.h>
-#include <md5.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_PKCS12_H
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#endif
#include "warnless.h"
-#include "curl_memory.h"
#include "non-ascii.h" /* for Curl_convert_from_utf8 prototype */
-/* The last #include file should be: */
+/* The last #include files should be: */
+#include "curl_memory.h"
#include "memdebug.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
#error "OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER not defined"
#endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090581fL
-#define HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION 1
-#else
-#undef HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
+#include <openssl/ui.h>
#endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00904100L
-#define HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK 1
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
+#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL const
#else
-#undef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
+#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL
#endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907001L
-/* ENGINE_load_private_key() takes four arguments */
-#define HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
-#include <openssl/ui.h>
-#else
-/* ENGINE_load_private_key() takes three arguments */
-#undef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L)
+#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE 1
#endif
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00903001L) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_PKCS12_H)
-/* OpenSSL has PKCS 12 support */
-#define HAVE_PKCS12_SUPPORT
-#else
-/* OpenSSL/SSLEay does not have PKCS12 support */
-#undef HAVE_PKCS12_SUPPORT
+#if !defined(HAVE_SSLV2_CLIENT_METHOD) || \
+ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L /* 1.1.0+ has no SSLv2 */
+#undef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 /* undef first to avoid compiler warnings */
+#define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
#endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00906001L
-#define HAVE_ERR_ERROR_STRING_N 1
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && /* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ */ \
+ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+#define SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+#define HAVE_X509_GET0_EXTENSIONS 1 /* added in 1.1.0 -pre1 */
+#define HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY 1 /* since 1.1.0 -pre3 */
+#define HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH 1 /* since 1.1.0 -pre5 */
+#define CONST_EXTS const
+#define CONST_ASN1_BIT_STRING const
+#else
+/* For OpenSSL before 1.1.0 */
+#define ASN1_STRING_get0_data(x) ASN1_STRING_data(x)
+#define X509_get0_notBefore(x) X509_get_notBefore(x)
+#define X509_get0_notAfter(x) X509_get_notAfter(x)
+#define CONST_EXTS /* nope */
+#define CONST_ASN1_BIT_STRING /* nope */
+#define OpenSSL_version_num() SSLeay()
#endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
-#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL const
-#else
-#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL) && /* 1.0.2 or later */ \
+ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+#define HAVE_X509_GET0_SIGNATURE 1
#endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
-/* 0.9.6 didn't have X509_STORE_set_flags() */
-#define HAVE_X509_STORE_SET_FLAGS 1
-#else
-#define X509_STORE_set_flags(x,y) Curl_nop_stmt
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002003L && \
+ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x10002FFFL && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_COMP)
+#define HAVE_SSL_COMP_FREE_COMPRESSION_METHODS 1
#endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L
-#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE 1
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090808fL)
+/* not present in older OpenSSL */
+#define OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(x)
#endif
-#ifndef HAVE_SSLV2_CLIENT_METHOD
-#undef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 /* undef first to avoid compiler warnings */
-#define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#if defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+#define OSSL_PACKAGE "LibreSSL"
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
+#define OSSL_PACKAGE "BoringSSL"
+#else
+#define OSSL_PACKAGE "OpenSSL"
#endif
/*
*/
#define RAND_LOAD_LENGTH 1024
-#ifndef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
-static char global_passwd[64];
-#endif
-
-static int passwd_callback(char *buf, int num, int encrypting
-#ifdef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
- /* This was introduced in 0.9.4, we can set this
- using SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata()
- */
- , void *global_passwd
-#endif
- )
+static int passwd_callback(char *buf, int num, int encrypting,
+ void *global_passwd)
{
DEBUGASSERT(0 == encrypting);
}
#endif
-static int ossl_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
+static int ossl_seed(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
char *buf = data->state.buffer; /* point to the big buffer */
int nread=0;
return nread;
}
-int Curl_ossl_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
+static void Curl_ossl_seed(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
/* we have the "SSL is seeded" boolean static to prevent multiple
time-consuming seedings in vain */
ossl_seed(data);
ssl_seeded = TRUE;
}
- return 0;
}
-
#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE
#define SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE 42
#endif
return -1;
}
-#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H) && defined(HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS)
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
/*
* Supply default password to the engine user interface conversation.
* The password is passed by OpenSSL engine from ENGINE_load_private_key()
case UIT_PROMPT:
case UIT_VERIFY:
password = (const char*)UI_get0_user_data(ui);
- if(NULL != password &&
- UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD) {
+ if(password && (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD)) {
UI_set_result(ui, uis, password);
return 1;
}
switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
case UIT_PROMPT:
case UIT_VERIFY:
- if(NULL != UI_get0_user_data(ui) &&
- UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD) {
+ if(UI_get0_user_data(ui) &&
+ (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD)) {
return 1;
}
default:
char *key_file,
const char *key_type)
{
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
int file_type = do_file_type(cert_type);
- if(cert_file != NULL || file_type == SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE) {
+ if(cert_file || (file_type == SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE)) {
SSL *ssl;
X509 *x509;
int cert_done = 0;
if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]) {
-#ifndef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
- /*
- * If password has been given, we store that in the global
- * area (*shudder*) for a while:
- */
- size_t len = strlen(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
- if(len < sizeof(global_passwd))
- memcpy(global_passwd, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD], len+1);
- else
- global_passwd[0] = '\0';
-#else
- /*
- * We set the password in the callback userdata
- */
+ /* set the password in the callback userdata */
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx,
data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
-#endif
/* Set passwd callback: */
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, passwd_callback);
}
-#define SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR \
- "unable to use client certificate (no key found or wrong pass phrase?)"
-
switch(file_type) {
case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
/* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() only works on PEM files */
if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx,
cert_file) != 1) {
- failf(data, SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR);
+ failf(data,
+ "could not load PEM client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s, "
+ "(no key found, wrong pass phrase, or wrong file format?)",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL) );
return 0;
}
break;
if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx,
cert_file,
file_type) != 1) {
- failf(data, SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR);
+ failf(data,
+ "could not load ASN1 client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s, "
+ "(no key found, wrong pass phrase, or wrong file format?)",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL) );
return 0;
}
break;
case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
{
-#ifdef HAVE_PKCS12_SUPPORT
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_PKCS12_H
FILE *f;
PKCS12 *p12;
EVP_PKEY *pri;
STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL;
- int i;
- f = fopen(cert_file,"rb");
+ f = fopen(cert_file, "rb");
if(!f) {
failf(data, "could not open PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file);
return 0;
fclose(f);
if(!p12) {
- failf(data, "error reading PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file );
+ failf(data, "error reading PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file);
return 0;
}
if(!PKCS12_parse(p12, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD], &pri, &x509,
&ca)) {
failf(data,
- "could not parse PKCS12 file, check password, OpenSSL error %s",
+ "could not parse PKCS12 file, check password, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL) );
PKCS12_free(p12);
return 0;
PKCS12_free(p12);
if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x509) != 1) {
- failf(data, SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR);
+ failf(data,
+ "could not load PKCS12 client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL) );
goto fail;
}
goto fail;
}
/* Set Certificate Verification chain */
- if(ca && sk_X509_num(ca)) {
- for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ca); i++) {
+ if(ca) {
+ while(sk_X509_num(ca)) {
/*
* Note that sk_X509_pop() is used below to make sure the cert is
* removed from the stack properly before getting passed to
*/
X509 *x = sk_X509_pop(ca);
if(!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, x)) {
+ X509_free(x);
failf(data, "cannot add certificate to certificate chain");
goto fail;
}
if(!cert_done)
return 0; /* failure! */
+ break;
#else
failf(data, "file type P12 for certificate not supported");
return 0;
case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
if(cert_done)
break;
- if(key_file == NULL)
+ if(!key_file)
/* cert & key can only be in PEM case in the same file */
key_file=cert_file;
case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
{ /* XXXX still needs some work */
EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL;
if(data->state.engine) {
-#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
UI_METHOD *ui_method =
UI_create_method((char *)"cURL user interface");
- if(NULL == ui_method) {
- failf(data, "unable do create OpenSSL user-interface method");
+ if(!ui_method) {
+ failf(data, "unable do create " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " user-interface method");
return 0;
}
UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, UI_method_get_opener(UI_OpenSSL()));
UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, UI_method_get_closer(UI_OpenSSL()));
UI_method_set_reader(ui_method, ssl_ui_reader);
UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ssl_ui_writer);
-#endif
/* the typecast below was added to please mingw32 */
priv_key = (EVP_PKEY *)
- ENGINE_load_private_key(data->state.engine,key_file,
-#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
+ ENGINE_load_private_key(data->state.engine, key_file,
ui_method,
-#endif
data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
-#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
UI_destroy_method(ui_method);
-#endif
if(!priv_key) {
failf(data, "failed to load private key from crypto engine");
return 0;
}
ssl=SSL_new(ctx);
- if(NULL == ssl) {
- failf(data,"unable to create an SSL structure");
+ if(!ssl) {
+ failf(data, "unable to create an SSL structure");
return 0;
}
/* This version was provided by Evan Jordan and is supposed to not
leak memory as the previous version: */
- if(x509 != NULL) {
+ if(x509) {
EVP_PKEY *pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
- EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp,SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
}
failf(data, "Private key does not match the certificate public key");
return 0;
}
-#ifndef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
- /* erase it now */
- memset(global_passwd, 0, sizeof(global_passwd));
-#endif
}
return 1;
}
#endif
}
-static
-int cert_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- X509 *err_cert;
- char buf[256];
-
- err_cert=X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
- (void)x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
- return ok;
-}
-
/* Return error string for last OpenSSL error
*/
-static char *SSL_strerror(unsigned long error, char *buf, size_t size)
+static char *ossl_strerror(unsigned long error, char *buf, size_t size)
{
-#ifdef HAVE_ERR_ERROR_STRING_N
/* OpenSSL 0.9.6 and later has a function named
- ERRO_error_string_n() that takes the size of the buffer as a
+ ERR_error_string_n() that takes the size of the buffer as a
third argument */
ERR_error_string_n(error, buf, size);
-#else
- (void) size;
- ERR_error_string(error, buf);
-#endif
return buf;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */
-
-#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
/**
* Global SSL init
*
*/
int Curl_ossl_init(void)
{
+ OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules();
+
#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_BUILTIN_ENGINES
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
#endif
+ /* OPENSSL_config(NULL); is "strongly recommended" to use but unfortunately
+ that function makes an exit() call on wrongly formatted config files
+ which makes it hard to use in some situations. OPENSSL_config() itself
+ calls CONF_modules_load_file() and we use that instead and we ignore
+ its return code! */
+
+ /* CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION introduced some time between 0.9.8b and
+ 0.9.8e */
+#ifndef CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION
+#define CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION 0x0
+#endif
+
+ CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, NULL,
+ CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION|
+ CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \
+ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ /* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ takes care of initialization itself */
+#else
/* Lets get nice error messages */
SSL_load_error_strings();
return 0;
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+#endif
return 1;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */
-
-#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
-
/* Global cleanup */
void Curl_ossl_cleanup(void)
{
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \
+ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ /* OpenSSL 1.1 deprecates all these cleanup functions and
+ turns them into no-ops in OpenSSL 1.0 compatibility mode */
+#else
/* Free ciphers and digests lists */
EVP_cleanup();
#else
ERR_remove_state(0);
#endif
+
+ /* Free all memory allocated by all configuration modules */
+ CONF_modules_free();
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_COMP_FREE_COMPRESSION_METHODS
+ SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods();
+#endif
+#endif
}
/*
- * This function uses SSL_peek to determine connection status.
+ * This function is used to determine connection status.
*
* Return codes:
* 1 means the connection is still in place
*/
int Curl_ossl_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn)
{
- int rc;
+ /* SSL_peek takes data out of the raw recv buffer without peeking so we use
+ recv MSG_PEEK instead. Bug #795 */
+#ifdef MSG_PEEK
char buf;
-
- rc = SSL_peek(conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].handle, (void*)&buf, 1);
- if(rc > 0)
- return 1; /* connection still in place */
-
- if(rc == 0)
+ ssize_t nread;
+ nread = recv((RECV_TYPE_ARG1)conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET], (RECV_TYPE_ARG2)&buf,
+ (RECV_TYPE_ARG3)1, (RECV_TYPE_ARG4)MSG_PEEK);
+ if(nread == 0)
return 0; /* connection has been closed */
-
+ else if(nread == 1)
+ return 1; /* connection still in place */
+ else if(nread == -1) {
+ int err = SOCKERRNO;
+ if(err == EINPROGRESS ||
+#if defined(EAGAIN) && (EAGAIN != EWOULDBLOCK)
+ err == EAGAIN ||
+#endif
+ err == EWOULDBLOCK)
+ return 1; /* connection still in place */
+ if(err == ECONNRESET ||
+#ifdef ECONNABORTED
+ err == ECONNABORTED ||
+#endif
+#ifdef ENETDOWN
+ err == ENETDOWN ||
+#endif
+#ifdef ENETRESET
+ err == ENETRESET ||
+#endif
+#ifdef ESHUTDOWN
+ err == ESHUTDOWN ||
+#endif
+#ifdef ETIMEDOUT
+ err == ETIMEDOUT ||
+#endif
+ err == ENOTCONN)
+ return 0; /* connection has been closed */
+ }
+#endif
return -1; /* connection status unknown */
}
/* Selects an OpenSSL crypto engine
*/
-CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine(struct SessionHandle *data, const char *engine)
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *engine)
{
-#if defined(USE_SSLEAY) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
ENGINE *e;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
ENGINE_free(e);
failf(data, "Failed to initialise SSL Engine '%s':\n%s",
- engine, SSL_strerror(ERR_get_error(), buf, sizeof(buf)));
+ engine, ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), buf, sizeof(buf)));
return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_INITFAILED;
}
data->state.engine = e;
/* Sets engine as default for all SSL operations
*/
-CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine_default(struct SessionHandle *data)
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine_default(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
if(data->state.engine) {
if(ENGINE_set_default(data->state.engine, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL) > 0) {
- infof(data,"set default crypto engine '%s'\n",
+ infof(data, "set default crypto engine '%s'\n",
ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine));
}
else {
/* Return list of OpenSSL crypto engine names.
*/
-struct curl_slist *Curl_ossl_engines_list(struct SessionHandle *data)
+struct curl_slist *Curl_ossl_engines_list(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
struct curl_slist *list = NULL;
-#if defined(USE_SSLEAY) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
struct curl_slist *beg;
ENGINE *e;
{
int retval = 0;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
- char buf[120]; /* We will use this for the OpenSSL error buffer, so it has
- to be at least 120 bytes long. */
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+ char buf[256]; /* We will use this for the OpenSSL error buffer, so it has
+ to be at least 256 bytes long. */
unsigned long sslerror;
ssize_t nread;
int buffsize;
default:
/* openssl/ssl.h says "look at error stack/return value/errno" */
sslerror = ERR_get_error();
- failf(conn->data, "SSL read: %s, errno %d",
- ERR_error_string(sslerror, buf),
+ failf(conn->data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL read: %s, errno %d",
+ ossl_strerror(sslerror, buf, sizeof(buf)),
SOCKERRNO);
done = 1;
break;
* This function is called when the 'data' struct is going away. Close
* down everything and free all resources!
*/
-int Curl_ossl_close_all(struct SessionHandle *data)
+void Curl_ossl_close_all(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
if(data->state.engine) {
#else
(void)data;
#endif
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int asn1_output(const ASN1_UTCTIME *tm,
- char *buf,
- size_t sizeofbuf)
-{
- const char *asn1_string;
- int gmt=FALSE;
- int i;
- int year=0,month=0,day=0,hour=0,minute=0,second=0;
-
- i=tm->length;
- asn1_string=(const char *)tm->data;
-
- if(i < 10)
- return 1;
- if(asn1_string[i-1] == 'Z')
- gmt=TRUE;
- for(i=0; i<10; i++)
- if((asn1_string[i] > '9') || (asn1_string[i] < '0'))
- return 2;
-
- year= (asn1_string[0]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[1]-'0');
- if(year < 50)
- year+=100;
-
- month= (asn1_string[2]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[3]-'0');
- if((month > 12) || (month < 1))
- return 3;
-
- day= (asn1_string[4]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[5]-'0');
- hour= (asn1_string[6]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[7]-'0');
- minute= (asn1_string[8]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[9]-'0');
-
- if((asn1_string[10] >= '0') && (asn1_string[10] <= '9') &&
- (asn1_string[11] >= '0') && (asn1_string[11] <= '9'))
- second= (asn1_string[10]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[11]-'0');
-
- snprintf(buf, sizeofbuf,
- "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d %s",
- year+1900, month, day, hour, minute, second, (gmt?"GMT":""));
-
- return 0;
}
/* ====================================================== */
in the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI.
*/
-static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn,
- X509 *server_cert)
+static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn, X509 *server_cert)
{
- int matched = -1; /* -1 is no alternative match yet, 1 means match and 0
- means mismatch */
+ bool matched = FALSE;
int target = GEN_DNS; /* target type, GEN_DNS or GEN_IPADD */
size_t addrlen = 0;
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
struct in6_addr addr;
#else
struct in_addr addr;
#endif
- CURLcode res = CURLE_OK;
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ bool dNSName = FALSE; /* if a dNSName field exists in the cert */
+ bool iPAddress = FALSE; /* if a iPAddress field exists in the cert */
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip &&
if(altnames) {
int numalts;
int i;
+ bool dnsmatched = FALSE;
+ bool ipmatched = FALSE;
/* get amount of alternatives, RFC2459 claims there MUST be at least
one, but we don't depend on it... */
numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
- /* loop through all alternatives while none has matched */
- for(i=0; (i<numalts) && (matched != 1); i++) {
+ /* loop through all alternatives - until a dnsmatch */
+ for(i=0; (i < numalts) && !dnsmatched; i++) {
/* get a handle to alternative name number i */
const GENERAL_NAME *check = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
+ if(check->type == GEN_DNS)
+ dNSName = TRUE;
+ else if(check->type == GEN_IPADD)
+ iPAddress = TRUE;
+
/* only check alternatives of the same type the target is */
if(check->type == target) {
/* get data and length */
- const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
+ const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(check->d.ia5);
size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
switch(target) {
if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
/* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
string and we cannot match it. */
- Curl_cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
- matched = 1;
- else
- matched = 0;
+ Curl_cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name)) {
+ dnsmatched = TRUE;
+ infof(data,
+ " subjectAltName: host \"%s\" matched cert's \"%s\"\n",
+ conn->host.dispname, altptr);
+ }
break;
case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */
/* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size
our server IP address is */
- if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen))
- matched = 1;
- else
- matched = 0;
+ if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen)) {
+ ipmatched = TRUE;
+ infof(data,
+ " subjectAltName: host \"%s\" matched cert's IP address!\n",
+ conn->host.dispname);
+ }
break;
}
}
}
GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
+
+ if(dnsmatched || ipmatched)
+ matched = TRUE;
}
- if(matched == 1)
- /* an alternative name matched the server hostname */
- infof(data, "\t subjectAltName: %s matched\n", conn->host.dispname);
- else if(matched == 0) {
- /* an alternative name field existed, but didn't match and then
- we MUST fail */
- infof(data, "\t subjectAltName does not match %s\n", conn->host.dispname);
+ if(matched)
+ /* an alternative name matched */
+ ;
+ else if(dNSName || iPAddress) {
+ infof(data, " subjectAltName does not match %s\n", conn->host.dispname);
failf(data, "SSL: no alternative certificate subject name matches "
"target host name '%s'", conn->host.dispname);
- res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else {
/* we have to look to the last occurrence of a commonName in the
distinguished one to get the most significant one. */
- int j,i=-1 ;
+ int j, i=-1;
-/* The following is done because of a bug in 0.9.6b */
+ /* The following is done because of a bug in 0.9.6b */
unsigned char *nulstr = (unsigned char *)"";
unsigned char *peer_CN = nulstr;
- X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(server_cert) ;
+ X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(server_cert);
if(name)
while((j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i))>=0)
i=j;
UTF8 etc. */
if(i>=0) {
- ASN1_STRING *tmp = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name,i));
+ ASN1_STRING *tmp =
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i));
/* In OpenSSL 0.9.7d and earlier, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if the input
is already UTF-8 encoded. We check for this case and copy the raw
if(j >= 0) {
peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
if(peer_CN) {
- memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
+ memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(tmp), j);
peer_CN[j] = '\0';
}
}
/* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this
cannot match and we return failure! */
failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field");
- res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
}
}
}
}
- if(res)
+ if(result)
/* error already detected, pass through */
;
else if(!peer_CN) {
failf(data,
"SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
- res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else if(!Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, conn->host.name)) {
failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match "
"target host name '%s'", peer_CN, conn->host.dispname);
- res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else {
- infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", peer_CN);
+ infof(data, " common name: %s (matched)\n", peer_CN);
}
if(peer_CN)
OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
}
- return res;
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
+static CURLcode verifystatus(struct connectdata *conn,
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
+{
+ int i, ocsp_status;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+
+ OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL;
+ OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL;
+ X509_STORE *st = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *ch = NULL;
+
+ long len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(connssl->handle, &p);
+
+ if(!p) {
+ failf(data, "No OCSP response received");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len);
+ if(!rsp) {
+ failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ocsp_status = OCSP_response_status(rsp);
+ if(ocsp_status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
+ failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response status: %s (%d)",
+ OCSP_response_status_str(ocsp_status), ocsp_status);
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp);
+ if(!br) {
+ failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ch = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(connssl->handle);
+ st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(connssl->ctx);
+
+#if ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x1000201fL) /* Fixed after 1.0.2a */ || \
+ defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER))
+ /* The authorized responder cert in the OCSP response MUST be signed by the
+ peer cert's issuer (see RFC6960 section 4.2.2.2). If that's a root cert,
+ no problem, but if it's an intermediate cert OpenSSL has a bug where it
+ expects this issuer to be present in the chain embedded in the OCSP
+ response. So we add it if necessary. */
+
+ /* First make sure the peer cert chain includes both a peer and an issuer,
+ and the OCSP response contains a responder cert. */
+ if(sk_X509_num(ch) >= 2 && sk_X509_num(br->certs) >= 1) {
+ X509 *responder = sk_X509_value(br->certs, sk_X509_num(br->certs) - 1);
+
+ /* Find issuer of responder cert and add it to the OCSP response chain */
+ for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ch); i++) {
+ X509 *issuer = sk_X509_value(ch, i);
+ if(X509_check_issued(issuer, responder) == X509_V_OK) {
+ if(!OCSP_basic_add1_cert(br, issuer)) {
+ failf(data, "Could not add issuer cert to OCSP response");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(OCSP_basic_verify(br, ch, st, 0) <= 0) {
+ failf(data, "OCSP response verification failed");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ for(i = 0; i < OCSP_resp_count(br); i++) {
+ int cert_status, crl_reason;
+ OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = NULL;
+
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
+
+ single = OCSP_resp_get0(br, i);
+ if(!single)
+ continue;
+
+ cert_status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, &crl_reason, &rev,
+ &thisupd, &nextupd);
+
+ if(!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, 300L, -1L)) {
+ failf(data, "OCSP response has expired");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ infof(data, "SSL certificate status: %s (%d)\n",
+ OCSP_cert_status_str(cert_status), cert_status);
+
+ switch(cert_status) {
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
+ break;
+
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+
+ failf(data, "SSL certificate revocation reason: %s (%d)",
+ OCSP_crl_reason_str(crl_reason), crl_reason);
+ goto end;
+
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN:
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+end:
+ if(br) OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br);
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
+
+ return result;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */
+#endif
+
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* The SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK doesn't exist in ancient OpenSSL versions
and thus this cannot be done there. */
static const char *ssl_msg_type(int ssl_ver, int msg)
{
+#ifdef SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR
if(ssl_ver == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) {
switch (msg) {
case SSL2_MT_ERROR:
return "Client CERT";
}
}
- else if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ else
+#endif
+ if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
switch (msg) {
case SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST:
return "Hello request";
return "Client hello";
case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
return "Server hello";
+#ifdef SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
+ case SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET:
+ return "Newsession Ticket";
+#endif
case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE:
- return "CERT";
+ return "Certificate";
case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
return "Server key exchange";
case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
return "CERT verify";
case SSL3_MT_FINISHED:
return "Finished";
+#ifdef SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
+ case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS:
+ return "Certificate Status";
+#endif
}
}
return "Unknown";
static const char *tls_rt_type(int type)
{
- return (
- type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ? "TLS change cipher, " :
- type == SSL3_RT_ALERT ? "TLS alert, " :
- type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ? "TLS handshake, " :
- type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ? "TLS app data, " :
- "TLS Unknown, ");
+ switch(type) {
+#ifdef SSL3_RT_HEADER
+ case SSL3_RT_HEADER:
+ return "TLS header";
+#endif
+ case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ return "TLS change cipher";
+ case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
+ return "TLS alert";
+ case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+ return "TLS handshake";
+ case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
+ return "TLS app data";
+ default:
+ return "TLS Unknown";
+ }
}
* Our callback from the SSL/TLS layers.
*/
static void ssl_tls_trace(int direction, int ssl_ver, int content_type,
- const void *buf, size_t len, const SSL *ssl,
- struct connectdata *conn)
+ const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+ void *userp)
{
- struct SessionHandle *data;
+ struct Curl_easy *data;
const char *msg_name, *tls_rt_name;
char ssl_buf[1024];
- int ver, msg_type, txt_len;
+ char unknown[32];
+ int msg_type, txt_len;
+ const char *verstr = NULL;
+ struct connectdata *conn = userp;
if(!conn || !conn->data || !conn->data->set.fdebug ||
(direction != 0 && direction != 1))
return;
data = conn->data;
- ssl_ver >>= 8;
- ver = (ssl_ver == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR ? '2' :
- ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR ? '3' : '?');
- /* SSLv2 doesn't seem to have TLS record-type headers, so OpenSSL
- * always pass-up content-type as 0. But the interesting message-type
- * is at 'buf[0]'.
- */
- if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && content_type != 0)
- tls_rt_name = tls_rt_type(content_type);
- else
- tls_rt_name = "";
+ switch(ssl_ver) {
+#ifdef SSL2_VERSION /* removed in recent versions */
+ case SSL2_VERSION:
+ verstr = "SSLv2";
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL3_VERSION
+ case SSL3_VERSION:
+ verstr = "SSLv3";
+ break;
+#endif
+ case TLS1_VERSION:
+ verstr = "TLSv1.0";
+ break;
+#ifdef TLS1_1_VERSION
+ case TLS1_1_VERSION:
+ verstr = "TLSv1.1";
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION
+ case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+ verstr = "TLSv1.2";
+ break;
+#endif
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ default:
+ snprintf(unknown, sizeof(unknown), "(%x)", ssl_ver);
+ verstr = unknown;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if(ssl_ver) {
+ /* the info given when the version is zero is not that useful for us */
+
+ ssl_ver >>= 8; /* check the upper 8 bits only below */
- msg_type = *(char*)buf;
- msg_name = ssl_msg_type(ssl_ver, msg_type);
+ /* SSLv2 doesn't seem to have TLS record-type headers, so OpenSSL
+ * always pass-up content-type as 0. But the interesting message-type
+ * is at 'buf[0]'.
+ */
+ if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && content_type)
+ tls_rt_name = tls_rt_type(content_type);
+ else
+ tls_rt_name = "";
- txt_len = snprintf(ssl_buf, sizeof(ssl_buf), "SSLv%c, %s%s (%d):\n",
- ver, tls_rt_name, msg_name, msg_type);
- Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_TEXT, ssl_buf, (size_t)txt_len, NULL);
+ msg_type = *(char*)buf;
+ msg_name = ssl_msg_type(ssl_ver, msg_type);
+
+ txt_len = snprintf(ssl_buf, sizeof(ssl_buf), "%s (%s), %s, %s (%d):\n",
+ verstr, direction?"OUT":"IN",
+ tls_rt_name, msg_name, msg_type);
+ Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_TEXT, ssl_buf, (size_t)txt_len, NULL);
+ }
Curl_debug(data, (direction == 1) ? CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_OUT :
CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_IN, (char *)buf, len, NULL);
}
#endif
-#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/* ====================================================== */
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
# define use_sni(x) Curl_nop_stmt
#endif
-static CURLcode
-ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
- int sockindex)
+/* Check for OpenSSL 1.0.2 which has ALPN support. */
+#undef HAS_ALPN
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L \
+ && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+# define HAS_ALPN 1
+#endif
+
+/* Check for OpenSSL 1.0.1 which has NPN support. */
+#undef HAS_NPN
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10001000L \
+ && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) \
+ && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+# define HAS_NPN 1
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAS_NPN
+
+/*
+ * in is a list of lenght prefixed strings. this function has to select
+ * the protocol we want to use from the list and write its string into out.
+ */
+
+static int
+select_next_protocol(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
+ const char *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ for(i = 0; i + keylen <= inlen; i += in[i] + 1) {
+ if(memcmp(&in[i + 1], key, keylen) == 0) {
+ *out = (unsigned char *) &in[i + 1];
+ *outlen = in[i];
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+select_next_proto_cb(SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
+ void *arg)
+{
+ struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata*) arg;
+
+ (void)ssl;
+
+#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
+ if(conn->data->set.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 &&
+ !select_next_protocol(out, outlen, in, inlen, NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID,
+ NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN)) {
+ infof(conn->data, "NPN, negotiated HTTP2 (%s)\n",
+ NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID);
+ conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(!select_next_protocol(out, outlen, in, inlen, ALPN_HTTP_1_1,
+ ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
+ infof(conn->data, "NPN, negotiated HTTP1.1\n");
+ conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ }
+
+ infof(conn->data, "NPN, no overlap, use HTTP1.1\n");
+ *out = (unsigned char *)ALPN_HTTP_1_1;
+ *outlen = ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
+ conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
+
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+#endif /* HAS_NPN */
+
+static const char *
+get_ssl_version_txt(SSL *ssl)
{
- CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK;
+ if(!ssl)
+ return "";
+
+ switch(SSL_version(ssl)) {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
+ case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+ case TLS1_1_VERSION:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case TLS1_VERSION:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ case SSL3_VERSION:
+ return "SSLv3";
+ case SSL2_VERSION:
+ return "SSLv2";
+ }
+ return "unknown";
+}
+
+static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
char *ciphers;
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
- SSL_METHOD_QUAL SSL_METHOD *req_method=NULL;
- void *ssl_sessionid=NULL;
- X509_LOOKUP *lookup=NULL;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+ SSL_METHOD_QUAL SSL_METHOD *req_method = NULL;
+ X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
long ctx_options;
/* Make funny stuff to get random input */
Curl_ossl_seed(data);
+ data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = !X509_V_OK;
+
/* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */
switch(data->set.ssl.version) {
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
/* it will be handled later with the context options */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \
+ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ req_method = TLS_client_method();
+#else
req_method = SSLv23_client_method();
+#endif
use_sni(TRUE);
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
- failf(data, "OpenSSL was built without SSLv2 support");
+ failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without SSLv2 support");
return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
#else
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
break;
#endif
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+ failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without SSLv3 support");
+ return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
+#else
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP)
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
req_method = SSLv3_client_method();
use_sni(FALSE);
break;
+#endif
}
if(connssl->ctx)
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK
if(data->set.fdebug && data->set.verbose) {
- /* the SSL trace callback is only used for verbose logging so we only
- inform about failures of setting it */
- if(!SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(connssl->ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK,
- (void (*)(void))ssl_tls_trace)) {
- infof(data, "SSL: couldn't set callback!\n");
- }
- else if(!SSL_CTX_ctrl(connssl->ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0,
- conn)) {
- infof(data, "SSL: couldn't set callback argument!\n");
- }
+ /* the SSL trace callback is only used for verbose logging */
+ SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(connssl->ctx, ssl_tls_trace);
+ SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(connssl->ctx, conn);
}
#endif
The "-no_ticket" option was introduced in Openssl0.9.8j. It's a flag to
disable "rfc4507bis session ticket support". rfc4507bis was later turned
- into the proper RFC5077 it seems: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077
+ into the proper RFC5077 it seems: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077
The enabled extension concerns the session management. I wonder how often
libcurl stops a connection and then resumes a TLS session. also, sending
this option regardless of OpenSSL version and SSL_OP_ALL definition.
OpenSSL added a work-around for a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability
- (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt). In 0.9.6e they added a bit to
+ (https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt). In 0.9.6e they added a bit to
SSL_OP_ALL that _disables_ that work-around despite the fact that
SSL_OP_ALL is documented to do "rather harmless" workarounds. In order to
keep the secure work-around, the SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS bit
#endif
switch(data->set.ssl.version) {
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
- ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) {
infof(data, "Set version TLSv1.x for SRP authorisation\n");
- ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
}
#endif
- break;
-
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
#endif
break;
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
SSL_CTX_set_options(connssl->ctx, ctx_options);
+#ifdef HAS_NPN
+ if(conn->bits.tls_enable_npn)
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(connssl->ctx, select_next_proto_cb, conn);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAS_ALPN
+ if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
+ int cur = 0;
+ unsigned char protocols[128];
+
+#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
+ if(data->set.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2) {
+ protocols[cur++] = NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN;
+
+ memcpy(&protocols[cur], NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID,
+ NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN);
+ cur += NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN;
+ infof(data, "ALPN, offering %s\n", NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ protocols[cur++] = ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
+ memcpy(&protocols[cur], ALPN_HTTP_1_1, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH);
+ cur += ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
+ infof(data, "ALPN, offering %s\n", ALPN_HTTP_1_1);
+
+ /* expects length prefixed preference ordered list of protocols in wire
+ * format
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(connssl->ctx, protocols, cur);
+ }
+#endif
+
if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT] || data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE]) {
if(!cert_stuff(conn,
connssl->ctx,
failf(data, "failed setting cipher list: %s", ciphers);
return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
}
+ infof(data, "Cipher selection: %s\n", ciphers);
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) {
failf(data, "Unable to set SRP user name");
return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
}
- if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(connssl->ctx,data->set.ssl.password)) {
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(connssl->ctx, data->set.ssl.password)) {
failf(data, "failed setting SRP password");
return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
}
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH])) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
/* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
- failf(data,"error setting certificate verify locations:\n"
+ failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:\n"
" CAfile: %s\n CApath: %s",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]?
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]: "none",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH] ? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]:
"none");
}
+#ifdef CURL_CA_FALLBACK
+ else if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+ /* verfying the peer without any CA certificates won't
+ work so use openssl's built in default as fallback */
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(connssl->ctx);
+ }
+#endif
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]) {
/* tell SSL where to find CRL file that is used to check certificate
lookup=X509_STORE_add_lookup(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(connssl->ctx),
X509_LOOKUP_file());
if(!lookup ||
- (!X509_load_crl_file(lookup,data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE],
+ (!X509_load_crl_file(lookup, data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE],
X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) ) {
- failf(data,"error loading CRL file: %s",
+ failf(data, "error loading CRL file: %s",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]);
return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
}
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]: "none");
}
+ /* Try building a chain using issuers in the trusted store first to avoid
+ problems with server-sent legacy intermediates.
+ Newer versions of OpenSSL do alternate chain checking by default which
+ gives us the same fix without as much of a performance hit (slight), so we
+ prefer that if available.
+ https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3621&user=guest&pass=guest
+ */
+#if defined(X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) && !defined(X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+ X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(connssl->ctx),
+ X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST);
+ }
+#endif
+
/* SSL always tries to verify the peer, this only says whether it should
* fail to connect if the verification fails, or if it should continue
* anyway. In the latter case the result of the verification is checked with
* SSL_get_verify_result() below. */
SSL_CTX_set_verify(connssl->ctx,
data->set.ssl.verifypeer?SSL_VERIFY_PEER:SSL_VERIFY_NONE,
- cert_verify_callback);
+ NULL);
/* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */
if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) {
- retcode = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, connssl->ctx,
- data->set.ssl.fsslctxp);
- if(retcode) {
- failf(data,"error signaled by ssl ctx callback");
- return retcode;
+ result = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, connssl->ctx,
+ data->set.ssl.fsslctxp);
+ if(result) {
+ failf(data, "error signaled by ssl ctx callback");
+ return result;
}
}
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context (handle)!");
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifystatus)
+ SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(connssl->handle, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
+#endif
+
SSL_set_connect_state(connssl->handle);
connssl->server_cert = 0x0;
#endif
/* Check if there's a cached ID we can/should use here! */
- if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL)) {
- /* we got a session id, use it! */
- if(!SSL_set_session(connssl->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
- failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_session failed: %s",
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(),NULL));
- return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ if(conn->ssl_config.sessionid) {
+ void *ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+ if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL)) {
+ /* we got a session id, use it! */
+ if(!SSL_set_session(connssl->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
+ failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_session failed: %s",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+ /* Informational message */
+ infof (data, "SSL re-using session ID\n");
}
- /* Informational message */
- infof (data, "SSL re-using session ID\n");
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
}
/* pass the raw socket into the SSL layers */
if(!SSL_set_fd(connssl->handle, (int)sockfd)) {
failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_fd failed: %s",
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(),NULL));
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
+
return CURLE_OK;
}
-static CURLcode
-ossl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
int err;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
-
DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state
|| ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state
|| ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state);
else {
/* untreated error */
unsigned long errdetail;
- char error_buffer[256]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at least
- 256 bytes long. */
- CURLcode rc;
- const char *cert_problem = NULL;
+ char error_buffer[256]=""; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at
+ least 256 bytes long. */
+ CURLcode result;
long lerr;
+ int lib;
+ int reason;
+
+ /* the connection failed, we're not waiting for anything else. */
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
- connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2; /* the connection failed,
- we're not waiting for
- anything else. */
-
- errdetail = ERR_get_error(); /* Gets the earliest error code from the
- thread's error queue and removes the
- entry. */
-
- switch(errdetail) {
- case 0x1407E086:
- /* 1407E086:
- SSL routines:
- SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE:
- certificate verify failed */
- /* fall-through */
- case 0x14090086:
- /* 14090086:
- SSL routines:
- SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
- certificate verify failed */
- rc = CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
+ /* Get the earliest error code from the thread's error queue and removes
+ the entry. */
+ errdetail = ERR_get_error();
+
+ /* Extract which lib and reason */
+ lib = ERR_GET_LIB(errdetail);
+ reason = ERR_GET_REASON(errdetail);
+
+ if((lib == ERR_LIB_SSL) &&
+ (reason == SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED)) {
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(connssl->handle);
if(lerr != X509_V_OK) {
+ data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = lerr;
snprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer),
"SSL certificate problem: %s",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr));
}
else
- cert_problem = "SSL certificate problem, verify that the CA cert is"
- " OK.";
-
- break;
- default:
- rc = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
- SSL_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
- break;
+ /* strcpy() is fine here as long as the string fits within
+ error_buffer */
+ strcpy(error_buffer, "SSL certificate verification failed");
+ }
+ else {
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ ossl_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
}
/* detail is already set to the SSL error above */
* (RST connection etc.), OpenSSL gives no explanation whatsoever and
* the SO_ERROR is also lost.
*/
- if(CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR == rc && errdetail == 0) {
+ if(CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR == result && errdetail == 0) {
failf(data, "Unknown SSL protocol error in connection to %s:%ld ",
conn->host.name, conn->remote_port);
- return rc;
+ return result;
}
+
/* Could be a CERT problem */
+ failf(data, "%s", error_buffer);
- failf(data, "%s%s", cert_problem ? cert_problem : "", error_buffer);
- return rc;
+ return result;
}
}
else {
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3;
/* Informational message */
- infof (data, "SSL connection using %s\n",
- SSL_get_cipher(connssl->handle));
+ infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s\n",
+ get_ssl_version_txt(connssl->handle),
+ SSL_get_cipher(connssl->handle));
+
+#ifdef HAS_ALPN
+ /* Sets data and len to negotiated protocol, len is 0 if no protocol was
+ * negotiated
+ */
+ if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
+ const unsigned char* neg_protocol;
+ unsigned int len;
+ SSL_get0_alpn_selected(connssl->handle, &neg_protocol, &len);
+ if(len != 0) {
+ infof(data, "ALPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", len, neg_protocol);
+
+#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
+ if(len == NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN &&
+ !memcmp(NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID, neg_protocol, len)) {
+ conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ if(len == ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH &&
+ !memcmp(ALPN_HTTP_1_1, neg_protocol, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
+ conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ infof(data, "ALPN, server did not agree to a protocol\n");
+ }
+#endif
return CURLE_OK;
}
return 0;
}
-static void pubkey_show(struct SessionHandle *data,
+#define push_certinfo(_label, _num) \
+do { \
+ long info_len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, &ptr); \
+ Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(data, _num, _label, ptr, info_len); \
+ if(1!=BIO_reset(mem)) \
+ break; \
+} WHILE_FALSE
+
+static void pubkey_show(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ BIO *mem,
int num,
const char *type,
const char *name,
- unsigned char *raw,
- int len)
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+ const
+#endif
+ BIGNUM *bn)
{
- size_t left;
- int i;
+ char *ptr;
char namebuf[32];
- char *buffer;
-
- left = len*3 + 1;
- buffer = malloc(left);
- if(buffer) {
- char *ptr=buffer;
- snprintf(namebuf, sizeof(namebuf), "%s(%s)", type, name);
- for(i=0; i< len; i++) {
- snprintf(ptr, left, "%02x:", raw[i]);
- ptr += 3;
- left -= 3;
- }
- infof(data, " %s: %s\n", namebuf, buffer);
- Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, num, namebuf, buffer);
- free(buffer);
- }
+
+ snprintf(namebuf, sizeof(namebuf), "%s(%s)", type, name);
+
+ if(bn)
+ BN_print(mem, bn);
+ push_certinfo(namebuf, num);
}
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num) \
+ pubkey_show(data, mem, _num, #_type, #_name, _name)
+
+#else
#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num) \
do { \
- if(pubkey->pkey._type->_name != NULL) { \
- int len = BN_num_bytes(pubkey->pkey._type->_name); \
- if(len < CERTBUFFERSIZE) { \
- BN_bn2bin(pubkey->pkey._type->_name, (unsigned char*)bufp); \
- bufp[len] = 0; \
- pubkey_show(data, _num, #_type, #_name, (unsigned char*)bufp, len); \
- } \
+ if(_type->_name) { \
+ pubkey_show(data, mem, _num, #_type, #_name, _type->_name); \
} \
} WHILE_FALSE
+#endif
-static int X509V3_ext(struct SessionHandle *data,
+static int X509V3_ext(struct Curl_easy *data,
int certnum,
- STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts)
+ CONST_EXTS STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts)
{
int i;
size_t j;
- if(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) <= 0)
+ if((int)sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) <= 0)
/* no extensions, bail out */
return 1;
- for(i=0; i<sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
+ for(i=0; i < (int)sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
BUF_MEM *biomem;
asn1_object_dump(obj, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
- infof(data, "%s: %s\n", namebuf,
- X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)?"(critical)":"");
-
if(!X509V3_EXT_print(bio_out, ext, 0, 0))
- M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_print(bio_out, ext->value);
+ ASN1_STRING_print(bio_out, (ASN1_STRING *)X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext));
BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
- /* biomem->length bytes at biomem->data, this little loop here is only
- done for the infof() call, we send the "raw" data to the certinfo
- function */
- for(j=0; j<(size_t)biomem->length; j++) {
+ for(j = 0; j < (size_t)biomem->length; j++) {
const char *sep="";
if(biomem->data[j] == '\n') {
sep=", ";
j++; /* skip the newline */
};
- while((biomem->data[j] == ' ') && (j<(size_t)biomem->length))
+ while((j<(size_t)biomem->length) && (biomem->data[j] == ' '))
j++;
if(j<(size_t)biomem->length)
ptr+=snprintf(ptr, sizeof(buf)-(ptr-buf), "%s%c", sep,
biomem->data[j]);
}
- infof(data, " %s\n", buf);
Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, namebuf, buf);
return 0; /* all is fine */
}
-
-static void X509_signature(struct SessionHandle *data,
- int numcert,
- ASN1_STRING *sig)
-{
- char buf[1024];
- char *ptr = buf;
- int i;
- for(i=0; i<sig->length; i++)
- ptr+=snprintf(ptr, sizeof(buf)-(ptr-buf), "%02x:", sig->data[i]);
-
- infof(data, " Signature: %s\n", buf);
- Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, numcert, "Signature", buf);
-}
-
-static void dumpcert(struct SessionHandle *data, X509 *x, int numcert)
-{
- BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- BUF_MEM *biomem;
-
- /* this outputs the cert in this 64 column wide style with newlines and
- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- texts and more */
- PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_out, x);
-
- BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
-
- infof(data, "%s\n", biomem->data);
-
- Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(data, numcert,
- "Cert", biomem->data, biomem->length);
-
- BIO_free(bio_out);
-
-}
-
-/*
- * This size was previously 512 which has been reported "too small" without
- * any specifics, so it was enlarged to allow more data to get shown uncut.
- * The "perfect" size is yet to figure out.
- */
-#define CERTBUFFERSIZE 8192
-
static CURLcode get_cert_chain(struct connectdata *conn,
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
{
+ CURLcode result;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk;
int i;
- char *bufp;
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
int numcerts;
-
- bufp = malloc(CERTBUFFERSIZE);
- if(!bufp)
- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ BIO *mem;
sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(connssl->handle);
if(!sk) {
- free(bufp);
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
numcerts = sk_X509_num(sk);
- if(Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(data, numcerts)) {
- free(bufp);
- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+ result = Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(data, numcerts);
+ if(result) {
+ return result;
}
- infof(data, "--- Certificate chain\n");
- for(i=0; i<numcerts; i++) {
- long value;
- ASN1_INTEGER *num;
- ASN1_TIME *certdate;
+ mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- /* get the certs in "importance order" */
-#if 0
- X509 *x = sk_X509_value(sk, numcerts - i - 1);
-#else
+ for(i = 0; i < numcerts; i++) {
+ ASN1_INTEGER *num;
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
-#endif
-
- X509_CINF *cinf;
EVP_PKEY *pubkey=NULL;
int j;
char *ptr;
+ CONST_ASN1_BIT_STRING ASN1_BIT_STRING *psig = NULL;
- (void)x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
- infof(data, "%2d Subject: %s\n", i, bufp);
- Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Subject", bufp);
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(mem, X509_get_subject_name(x), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ push_certinfo("Subject", i);
- (void)x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
- infof(data, " Issuer: %s\n", bufp);
- Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Issuer", bufp);
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(mem, X509_get_issuer_name(x), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ push_certinfo("Issuer", i);
- value = X509_get_version(x);
- infof(data, " Version: %lu (0x%lx)\n", value+1, value);
- snprintf(bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE, "%lx", value);
- Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Version", bufp); /* hex */
+ BIO_printf(mem, "%lx", X509_get_version(x));
+ push_certinfo("Version", i);
- num=X509_get_serialNumber(x);
- if(num->length <= 4) {
- value = ASN1_INTEGER_get(num);
- infof(data," Serial Number: %ld (0x%lx)\n", value, value);
- snprintf(bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE, "%lx", value);
- }
- else {
- int left = CERTBUFFERSIZE;
-
- ptr = bufp;
- *ptr++ = 0;
- if(num->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
- *ptr++='-';
-
- for(j=0; (j<num->length) && (left>=4); j++) {
- /* TODO: length restrictions */
- snprintf(ptr, 3, "%02x%c",num->data[j],
- ((j+1 == num->length)?'\n':':'));
- ptr += 3;
- left-=4;
+ num = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
+ if(num->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
+ BIO_puts(mem, "-");
+ for(j = 0; j < num->length; j++)
+ BIO_printf(mem, "%02x", num->data[j]);
+ push_certinfo("Serial Number", i);
+
+#if defined(HAVE_X509_GET0_SIGNATURE) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET0_EXTENSIONS)
+ {
+ const X509_ALGOR *palg = NULL;
+ ASN1_STRING *a = ASN1_STRING_new();
+ if(a) {
+ X509_get0_signature(&psig, &palg, x);
+ X509_signature_print(mem, palg, a);
+ ASN1_STRING_free(a);
+
+ if(palg) {
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, palg->algorithm);
+ push_certinfo("Public Key Algorithm", i);
+ }
}
- if(num->length)
- infof(data," Serial Number: %s\n", bufp);
- else
- bufp[0]=0;
+ X509V3_ext(data, i, X509_get0_extensions(x));
}
- if(bufp[0])
- Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Serial Number", bufp); /* hex */
-
- cinf = x->cert_info;
+#else
+ {
+ /* before OpenSSL 1.0.2 */
+ X509_CINF *cinf = x->cert_info;
- j = asn1_object_dump(cinf->signature->algorithm, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
- if(!j) {
- infof(data, " Signature Algorithm: %s\n", bufp);
- Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Signature Algorithm", bufp);
- }
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, cinf->signature->algorithm);
+ push_certinfo("Signature Algorithm", i);
- certdate = X509_get_notBefore(x);
- asn1_output(certdate, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
- infof(data, " Start date: %s\n", bufp);
- Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Start date", bufp);
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, cinf->key->algor->algorithm);
+ push_certinfo("Public Key Algorithm", i);
- certdate = X509_get_notAfter(x);
- asn1_output(certdate, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
- infof(data, " Expire date: %s\n", bufp);
- Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Expire date", bufp);
+ X509V3_ext(data, i, cinf->extensions);
- j = asn1_object_dump(cinf->key->algor->algorithm, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
- if(!j) {
- infof(data, " Public Key Algorithm: %s\n", bufp);
- Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Public Key Algorithm", bufp);
+ psig = x->signature;
}
+#endif
+
+ ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notBefore(x));
+ push_certinfo("Start date", i);
+
+ ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notAfter(x));
+ push_certinfo("Expire date", i);
pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if(!pubkey)
infof(data, " Unable to load public key\n");
else {
- switch(pubkey->type) {
+ int pktype;
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
+ pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pubkey);
+#else
+ pktype = pubkey->type;
+#endif
+ switch(pktype) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
- infof(data, " RSA Public Key (%d bits)\n",
- BN_num_bits(pubkey->pkey.rsa->n));
- snprintf(bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE, "%d", BN_num_bits(pubkey->pkey.rsa->n));
- Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "RSA Public Key", bufp);
-
+ {
+ RSA *rsa;
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pubkey);
+#else
+ rsa = pubkey->pkey.rsa;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+ {
+ const BIGNUM *n;
+ const BIGNUM *e;
+ const BIGNUM *d;
+ const BIGNUM *p;
+ const BIGNUM *q;
+ const BIGNUM *dmp1;
+ const BIGNUM *dmq1;
+ const BIGNUM *iqmp;
+
+ RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, &d);
+ RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
+ RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
+ BN_print(mem, n);
+ push_certinfo("RSA Public Key", i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, d, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, p, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, q, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmp1, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmq1, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, iqmp, i);
+ }
+#else
+ BIO_printf(mem, "%d", BN_num_bits(rsa->n));
+ push_certinfo("RSA Public Key", i);
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i);
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i);
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, d, i);
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmp1, i);
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmq1, i);
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, iqmp, i);
+#endif
+
break;
+ }
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ {
+ DSA *dsa;
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
+ dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pubkey);
+#else
+ dsa = pubkey->pkey.dsa;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+ {
+ const BIGNUM *p;
+ const BIGNUM *q;
+ const BIGNUM *g;
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key;
+
+ DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+ DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
+
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, priv_key, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i);
+ }
+#else
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i);
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i);
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i);
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, priv_key, i);
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i);
+#endif
break;
+ }
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+ {
+ DH *dh;
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
+ dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pubkey);
+#else
+ dh = pubkey->pkey.dh;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+ {
+ const BIGNUM *p;
+ const BIGNUM *q;
+ const BIGNUM *g;
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key;
+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, &q, &g);
+ DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, &priv_key);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, q, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, priv_key, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i);
+ }
+#else
print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
print_pubkey_BN(dh, priv_key, i);
print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i);
+#endif
break;
+ }
#if 0
case EVP_PKEY_EC: /* symbol not present in OpenSSL 0.9.6 */
/* left TODO */
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
}
- X509V3_ext(data, i, cinf->extensions);
-
- X509_signature(data, i, x->signature);
+ if(psig) {
+ for(j = 0; j < psig->length; j++)
+ BIO_printf(mem, "%02x:", psig->data[j]);
+ push_certinfo("Signature", i);
+ }
- dumpcert(data, x, i);
+ PEM_write_bio_X509(mem, x);
+ push_certinfo("Cert", i);
}
- free(bufp);
+ BIO_free(mem);
return CURLE_OK;
}
/*
+ * Heavily modified from:
+ * https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Certificate_and_Public_Key_Pinning#OpenSSL
+ */
+static CURLcode pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(struct Curl_easy *data, X509* cert,
+ const char *pinnedpubkey)
+{
+ /* Scratch */
+ int len1 = 0, len2 = 0;
+ unsigned char *buff1 = NULL, *temp = NULL;
+
+ /* Result is returned to caller */
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
+
+ /* if a path wasn't specified, don't pin */
+ if(!pinnedpubkey)
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ if(!cert)
+ return result;
+
+ do {
+ /* Begin Gyrations to get the subjectPublicKeyInfo */
+ /* Thanks to Viktor Dukhovni on the OpenSSL mailing list */
+
+ /* https://groups.google.com/group/mailing.openssl.users/browse_thread
+ /thread/d61858dae102c6c7 */
+ len1 = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), NULL);
+ if(len1 < 1)
+ break; /* failed */
+
+ /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/buffer.html */
+ buff1 = temp = malloc(len1);
+ if(!buff1)
+ break; /* failed */
+
+ /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/d2i_X509.html */
+ len2 = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &temp);
+
+ /*
+ * These checks are verifying we got back the same values as when we
+ * sized the buffer. It's pretty weak since they should always be the
+ * same. But it gives us something to test.
+ */
+ if((len1 != len2) || !temp || ((temp - buff1) != len1))
+ break; /* failed */
+
+ /* End Gyrations */
+
+ /* The one good exit point */
+ result = Curl_pin_peer_pubkey(data, pinnedpubkey, buff1, len1);
+ } while(0);
+
+ /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/buffer.html */
+ if(buff1)
+ free(buff1);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
* Get the server cert, verify it and show it etc, only call failf() if the
* 'strict' argument is TRUE as otherwise all this is for informational
* purposes only!
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
bool strict)
{
- CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK;
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
int rc;
- long lerr;
- ASN1_TIME *certdate;
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ long lerr, len;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
X509 *issuer;
FILE *fp;
char *buffer = data->state.buffer;
+ const char *ptr;
+ BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if(data->set.ssl.certinfo)
/* we've been asked to gather certificate info! */
(void)get_cert_chain(conn, connssl);
- data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = !X509_V_OK;
-
connssl->server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(connssl->handle);
if(!connssl->server_cert) {
- if(strict)
- failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get peer certificate!");
+ if(!strict)
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get peer certificate!");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
- infof (data, "Server certificate:\n");
+
+ infof(data, "Server certificate:\n");
rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(connssl->server_cert),
buffer, BUFSIZE);
- infof(data, "\t subject: %s\n", rc?"[NONE]":buffer);
+ infof(data, " subject: %s\n", rc?"[NONE]":buffer);
- certdate = X509_get_notBefore(connssl->server_cert);
- asn1_output(certdate, buffer, BUFSIZE);
- infof(data, "\t start date: %s\n", buffer);
+ ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notBefore(connssl->server_cert));
+ len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr);
+ infof(data, " start date: %.*s\n", len, ptr);
+ rc = BIO_reset(mem);
- certdate = X509_get_notAfter(connssl->server_cert);
- asn1_output(certdate, buffer, BUFSIZE);
- infof(data, "\t expire date: %s\n", buffer);
+ ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notAfter(connssl->server_cert));
+ len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr);
+ infof(data, " expire date: %.*s\n", len, ptr);
+ rc = BIO_reset(mem);
+
+ BIO_free(mem);
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
- retcode = verifyhost(conn, connssl->server_cert);
- if(retcode) {
+ result = verifyhost(conn, connssl->server_cert);
+ if(result) {
X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
connssl->server_cert = NULL;
- return retcode;
+ return result;
}
}
if(rc) {
if(strict)
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-issuer name!");
- retcode = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else {
- infof(data, "\t issuer: %s\n", buffer);
+ infof(data, " issuer: %s\n", buffer);
/* We could do all sorts of certificate verification stuff here before
deallocating the certificate. */
/* e.g. match issuer name with provided issuer certificate */
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]) {
- fp=fopen(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT],"r");
+ fp = fopen(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT], FOPEN_READTEXT);
if(!fp) {
if(strict)
failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)",
connssl->server_cert = NULL;
return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
}
- issuer = PEM_read_X509(fp,NULL,ZERO_NULL,NULL);
+
+ issuer = PEM_read_X509(fp, NULL, ZERO_NULL, NULL);
if(!issuer) {
if(strict)
failf(data, "SSL: Unable to read issuer cert (%s)",
fclose(fp);
return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
}
+
fclose(fp);
- if(X509_check_issued(issuer,connssl->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) {
+
+ if(X509_check_issued(issuer, connssl->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) {
if(strict)
failf(data, "SSL: Certificate issuer check failed (%s)",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
connssl->server_cert = NULL;
return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
}
- infof(data, "\t SSL certificate issuer check ok (%s)\n",
+
+ infof(data, " SSL certificate issuer check ok (%s)\n",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
X509_free(issuer);
}
- lerr = data->set.ssl.certverifyresult=
+ lerr = data->set.ssl.certverifyresult =
SSL_get_verify_result(connssl->handle);
+
if(data->set.ssl.certverifyresult != X509_V_OK) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
/* We probably never reach this, because SSL_connect() will fail
if(strict)
failf(data, "SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld)",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
- retcode = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
- infof(data, "\t SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld),"
+ infof(data, " SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld),"
" continuing anyway.\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
}
else
- infof(data, "\t SSL certificate verify ok.\n");
+ infof(data, " SSL certificate verify ok.\n");
+ }
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifystatus) {
+ result = verifystatus(conn, connssl);
+ if(result) {
+ X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+ connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(!strict)
+ /* when not strict, we don't bother about the verify cert problems */
+ result = CURLE_OK;
+
+ ptr = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY];
+ if(!result && ptr) {
+ result = pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(data, connssl->server_cert, ptr);
+ if(result)
+ failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key!");
}
X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
connssl->server_cert = NULL;
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
- return retcode;
+ return result;
}
-
-static CURLcode
-ossl_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
- int sockindex)
+static CURLcode ossl_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
- CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK;
- void *old_ssl_sessionid=NULL;
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
- int incache;
- SSL_SESSION *our_ssl_sessionid;
DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state);
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION
- our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get1_session(connssl->handle);
+ if(conn->ssl_config.sessionid) {
+ bool incache;
+ SSL_SESSION *our_ssl_sessionid;
+ void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
- /* SSL_get1_session() will increment the reference
- count and the session will stay in memory until explicitly freed with
- SSL_SESSION_free(3), regardless of its state.
- This function was introduced in openssl 0.9.5a. */
-#else
- our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get_session(connssl->handle);
+ our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get1_session(connssl->handle);
- /* if SSL_get1_session() is unavailable, use SSL_get_session().
- This is an inferior option because the session can be flushed
- at any time by openssl. It is included only so curl compiles
- under versions of openssl < 0.9.5a.
+ /* SSL_get1_session() will increment the reference count and the session
+ will stay in memory until explicitly freed with SSL_SESSION_free(3),
+ regardless of its state. */
- WARNING: How curl behaves if it's session is flushed is
- untested.
- */
-#endif
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+ incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL));
+ if(incache) {
+ if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) {
+ infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n");
+ Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, old_ssl_sessionid);
+ incache = FALSE;
+ }
+ }
- incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL));
- if(incache) {
- if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) {
- infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n");
- Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, old_ssl_sessionid);
- incache = FALSE;
+ if(!incache) {
+ result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, our_ssl_sessionid,
+ 0 /* unknown size */);
+ if(result) {
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
+ failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
+ return result;
+ }
}
- }
- if(!incache) {
- retcode = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, our_ssl_sessionid,
- 0 /* unknown size */);
- if(retcode) {
- failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
- return retcode;
+ else {
+ /* Session was incache, so refcount already incremented earlier.
+ * Avoid further increments with each SSL_get1_session() call.
+ * This does not free the session as refcount remains > 0
+ */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(our_ssl_sessionid);
}
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
}
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION
- else {
- /* Session was incache, so refcount already incremented earlier.
- * Avoid further increments with each SSL_get1_session() call.
- * This does not free the session as refcount remains > 0
- */
- SSL_SESSION_free(our_ssl_sessionid);
- }
-#endif
/*
* We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
* operations.
*/
- if(!data->set.ssl.verifypeer && !data->set.ssl.verifyhost)
- (void)servercert(conn, connssl, FALSE);
- else
- retcode = servercert(conn, connssl, TRUE);
+ result = servercert(conn, connssl,
+ (data->set.ssl.verifypeer || data->set.ssl.verifyhost));
- if(CURLE_OK == retcode)
+ if(!result)
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
- return retcode;
+
+ return result;
}
static Curl_recv ossl_recv;
static Curl_send ossl_send;
-static CURLcode
-ossl_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn,
- int sockindex,
- bool nonblocking,
- bool *done)
+static CURLcode ossl_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn,
+ int sockindex,
+ bool nonblocking,
+ bool *done)
{
- CURLcode retcode;
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ CURLcode result;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
long timeout_ms;
return CURLE_OK;
}
- if(ssl_connect_1==connssl->connecting_state) {
+ if(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state) {
/* Find out how much more time we're allowed */
timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
}
- retcode = ossl_connect_step1(conn, sockindex);
- if(retcode)
- return retcode;
+
+ result = ossl_connect_step1(conn, sockindex);
+ if(result)
+ return result;
}
while(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
}
/* if ssl is expecting something, check if it's available. */
- if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_reading
- || connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_writing) {
+ if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_reading ||
+ connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_writing) {
curl_socket_t writefd = ssl_connect_2_writing==
connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
* before step2 has completed while ensuring that a client using select()
* or epoll() will always have a valid fdset to wait on.
*/
- retcode = ossl_connect_step2(conn, sockindex);
- if(retcode || (nonblocking &&
- (ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
- ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
- ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state)))
- return retcode;
+ result = ossl_connect_step2(conn, sockindex);
+ if(result || (nonblocking &&
+ (ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
+ ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
+ ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state)))
+ return result;
} /* repeat step2 until all transactions are done. */
-
- if(ssl_connect_3==connssl->connecting_state) {
- retcode = ossl_connect_step3(conn, sockindex);
- if(retcode)
- return retcode;
+ if(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state) {
+ result = ossl_connect_step3(conn, sockindex);
+ if(result)
+ return result;
}
- if(ssl_connect_done==connssl->connecting_state) {
+ if(ssl_connect_done == connssl->connecting_state) {
connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete;
conn->recv[sockindex] = ossl_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = ossl_send;
return CURLE_OK;
}
-CURLcode
-Curl_ossl_connect_nonblocking(struct connectdata *conn,
- int sockindex,
- bool *done)
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_connect_nonblocking(struct connectdata *conn,
+ int sockindex,
+ bool *done)
{
return ossl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, TRUE, done);
}
-CURLcode
-Curl_ossl_connect(struct connectdata *conn,
- int sockindex)
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
- CURLcode retcode;
+ CURLcode result;
bool done = FALSE;
- retcode = ossl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, FALSE, &done);
- if(retcode)
- return retcode;
+ result = ossl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, FALSE, &done);
+ if(result)
+ return result;
DEBUGASSERT(done);
return CURLE_OK;
}
-bool Curl_ossl_data_pending(const struct connectdata *conn,
- int connindex)
+bool Curl_ossl_data_pending(const struct connectdata *conn, int connindex)
{
if(conn->ssl[connindex].handle)
/* SSL is in use */
/* SSL_write() is said to return 'int' while write() and send() returns
'size_t' */
int err;
- char error_buffer[120]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at least 120
+ char error_buffer[256]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at least 256
bytes long. */
unsigned long sslerror;
int memlen;
The OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error. */
sslerror = ERR_get_error();
failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() error: %s",
- ERR_error_string(sslerror, error_buffer));
+ ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)));
*curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
return -1;
}
*curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
return -1;
}
+ *curlcode = CURLE_OK;
return (ssize_t)rc; /* number of bytes */
}
size_t buffersize, /* max amount to read */
CURLcode *curlcode)
{
- char error_buffer[120]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at
- least 120 bytes long. */
+ char error_buffer[256]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at
+ least 256 bytes long. */
unsigned long sslerror;
ssize_t nread;
int buffsize;
default:
/* openssl/ssl.h for SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL says "look at error stack/return
value/errno" */
- /* http://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/ERR_get_error.html */
+ /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/ERR_get_error.html */
sslerror = ERR_get_error();
if((nread < 0) || sslerror) {
/* If the return code was negative or there actually is an error in the
queue */
failf(conn->data, "SSL read: %s, errno %d",
- ERR_error_string(sslerror, error_buffer),
+ ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)),
SOCKERRNO);
*curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
return -1;
size_t Curl_ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
{
-#ifdef YASSL_VERSION
- /* yassl provides an OpenSSL API compatibility layer so it looks identical
- to OpenSSL in all other aspects */
- return snprintf(buffer, size, "yassl/%s", YASSL_VERSION);
-#else /* YASSL_VERSION */
-
-#if(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x905000)
- {
- char sub[2];
- unsigned long ssleay_value;
- sub[1]='\0';
- ssleay_value=SSLeay();
- if(ssleay_value < 0x906000) {
- ssleay_value=SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER;
- sub[0]='\0';
- }
- else {
- if(ssleay_value&0xff0) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ return snprintf(buffer, size, OSSL_PACKAGE);
+#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
+ char sub[3];
+ unsigned long ssleay_value;
+ sub[2]='\0';
+ sub[1]='\0';
+ ssleay_value=OpenSSL_version_num();
+ if(ssleay_value < 0x906000) {
+ ssleay_value=SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER;
+ sub[0]='\0';
+ }
+ else {
+ if(ssleay_value&0xff0) {
+ int minor_ver = (ssleay_value >> 4) & 0xff;
+ if(minor_ver > 26) {
+ /* handle extended version introduced for 0.9.8za */
+ sub[1] = (char) ((minor_ver - 1) % 26 + 'a' + 1);
+ sub[0] = 'z';
+ }
+ else {
sub[0]=(char)(((ssleay_value>>4)&0xff) + 'a' -1);
}
- else
- sub[0]='\0';
- }
-
- return snprintf(buffer, size, "OpenSSL/%lx.%lx.%lx%s",
- (ssleay_value>>28)&0xf,
- (ssleay_value>>20)&0xff,
- (ssleay_value>>12)&0xff,
- sub);
- }
-
-#else /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER is less than 0.9.5 */
-
-#if(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x900000)
- return snprintf(buffer, size, "OpenSSL/%lx.%lx.%lx",
- (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>28)&0xff,
- (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>20)&0xff,
- (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xf);
-
-#else /* (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x900000) */
- {
- char sub[2];
- sub[1]='\0';
- if(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER&0x0f) {
- sub[0]=(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER&0x0f) + 'a' -1;
}
else
sub[0]='\0';
-
- return snprintf(buffer, size, "SSL/%x.%x.%x%s",
- (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xff,
- (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>8)&0xf,
- (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>4)&0xf, sub);
}
-#endif /* (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x900000) */
-#endif /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER is less than 0.9.5 */
-#endif /* YASSL_VERSION */
+ return snprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%lx.%lx.%lx%s",
+ OSSL_PACKAGE,
+ (ssleay_value>>28)&0xf,
+ (ssleay_value>>20)&0xff,
+ (ssleay_value>>12)&0xff,
+ sub);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
}
-void Curl_ossl_random(struct SessionHandle *data, unsigned char *entropy,
- size_t length)
+/* can be called with data == NULL */
+int Curl_ossl_random(struct Curl_easy *data, unsigned char *entropy,
+ size_t length)
{
- Curl_ossl_seed(data); /* Initiate the seed if not already done */
+ if(data) {
+ Curl_ossl_seed(data); /* Initiate the seed if not already done */
+ }
RAND_bytes(entropy, curlx_uztosi(length));
+ return 0; /* 0 as in no problem */
}
void Curl_ossl_md5sum(unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
MD5_Update(&MD5pw, tmp, tmplen);
MD5_Final(md5sum, &MD5pw);
}
-#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
+void Curl_ossl_sha256sum(const unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
+ size_t tmplen,
+ unsigned char *sha256sum /* output */,
+ size_t unused)
+{
+ SHA256_CTX SHA256pw;
+ (void)unused;
+ SHA256_Init(&SHA256pw);
+ SHA256_Update(&SHA256pw, tmp, tmplen);
+ SHA256_Final(sha256sum, &SHA256pw);
+}
+#endif
+
+bool Curl_ossl_cert_status_request(void)
+{
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
+ return TRUE;
+#else
+ return FALSE;
+#endif
+}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
projects / platform / upstream / curl.git / blobdiff