* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
*
- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2015, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2017, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
*
* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */
#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */
#include "connect.h"
-#include "strequal.h"
+#include "strcase.h"
#include "select.h"
#include "vtls.h"
#include "llist.h"
#include <ocsp.h>
#endif
-#include "rawstr.h"
+#include "strcase.h"
#include "warnless.h"
#include "x509asn1.h"
#define SLOTSIZE 13
PRFileDesc *PR_ImportTCPSocket(PRInt32 osfd);
-
-PRLock * nss_initlock = NULL;
-PRLock * nss_crllock = NULL;
-struct curl_llist *nss_crl_list = NULL;
-NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
-
-volatile int initialized = 0;
+static PRLock *nss_initlock = NULL;
+static PRLock *nss_crllock = NULL;
+static PRLock *nss_findslot_lock = NULL;
+static struct curl_llist *nss_crl_list = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+static volatile int initialized = 0;
typedef struct {
const char *name;
{"ecdh_rsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdh_rsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdh_rsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
- {"echde_rsa_null", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"ecdhe_rsa_null", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
{"ecdhe_rsa_rc4_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
{"ecdhe_rsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
{"ecdh_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
#endif
+#ifdef TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ /* cipher suites using SHA384 */
+ {"rsa_aes_256_gcm_sha_384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"dhe_rsa_aes_256_gcm_sha_384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"dhe_dss_aes_256_gcm_sha_384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_sha_384", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384},
+ {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_sha_384", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384},
+ {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_gcm_sha_384", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_gcm_sha_384", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+ /* chacha20-poly1305 cipher suites */
+ {"ecdhe_rsa_chacha20_poly1305_sha_256",
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {"ecdhe_ecdsa_chacha20_poly1305_sha_256",
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {"dhe_rsa_chacha20_poly1305_sha_256",
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+#endif
};
-static const char* pem_library = "libnsspem.so";
-SECMODModule* mod = NULL;
+static const char *pem_library = "libnsspem.so";
+static SECMODModule *mod = NULL;
/* NSPR I/O layer we use to detect blocking direction during SSL handshake */
static PRDescIdentity nspr_io_identity = PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER;
static PRIOMethods nspr_io_methods;
-static const char* nss_error_to_name(PRErrorCode code)
+static const char *nss_error_to_name(PRErrorCode code)
{
const char *name = PR_ErrorToName(code);
if(name)
return "unknown error";
}
-static void nss_print_error_message(struct SessionHandle *data, PRUint32 err)
+static void nss_print_error_message(struct Curl_easy *data, PRUint32 err)
{
failf(data, "%s", PR_ErrorToString(err, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT));
}
-static SECStatus set_ciphers(struct SessionHandle *data, PRFileDesc * model,
+static SECStatus set_ciphers(struct Curl_easy *data, PRFileDesc * model,
char *cipher_list)
{
unsigned int i;
while((*cipher) && (ISSPACE(*cipher)))
++cipher;
- if((cipher_list = strchr(cipher, ','))) {
+ cipher_list = strchr(cipher, ',');
+ if(cipher_list) {
*cipher_list++ = '\0';
}
found = PR_FALSE;
for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
- if(Curl_raw_equal(cipher, cipherlist[i].name)) {
+ if(strcasecompare(cipher, cipherlist[i].name)) {
cipher_state[i] = PR_TRUE;
found = PR_TRUE;
break;
* should be later deallocated using free(). If the OOM failure occurs, we
* return NULL, too.
*/
-static char* dup_nickname(struct SessionHandle *data, enum dupstring cert_kind)
+static char *dup_nickname(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *str)
{
- const char *str = data->set.str[cert_kind];
const char *n;
if(!is_file(str))
return NULL;
}
+/* Lock/unlock wrapper for PK11_FindSlotByName() to work around race condition
+ * in nssSlot_IsTokenPresent() causing spurious SEC_ERROR_NO_TOKEN. For more
+ * details, go to <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/1297397>.
+ */
+static PK11SlotInfo* nss_find_slot_by_name(const char *slot_name)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ PR_Lock(nss_findslot_lock);
+ slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(slot_name);
+ PR_Unlock(nss_findslot_lock);
+ return slot;
+}
+
/* Call PK11_CreateGenericObject() with the given obj_class and filename. If
* the call succeeds, append the object handle to the list of objects so that
* the object can be destroyed in Curl_nss_close(). */
if(!slot_name)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
- slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(slot_name);
+ slot = nss_find_slot_by_name(slot_name);
free(slot_name);
if(!slot)
return result;
return CURLE_OK;
}
-static CURLcode nss_load_crl(const char* crlfilename)
+static CURLcode nss_load_crl(const char *crlfilename)
{
PRFileDesc *infile;
PRFileInfo info;
goto fail;
/* place a trailing zero right after the visible data */
- body = (char*)filedata.data;
+ body = (char *)filedata.data;
body[--filedata.len] = '\0';
body = strstr(body, "-----BEGIN");
SECStatus status;
CURLcode result;
struct ssl_connect_data *ssl = conn->ssl;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
(void)sockindex; /* unused */
return result;
}
- slot = PK11_FindSlotByName("PEM Token #1");
+ slot = nss_find_slot_by_name("PEM Token #1");
if(!slot)
return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
SECMOD_WaitForAnyTokenEvent(mod, 0, 0);
PK11_IsPresent(slot);
- status = PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE,
- conn->data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+ status = PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd));
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
return (SECSuccess == status) ? CURLE_OK : CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
static CURLcode cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex,
char *cert_file, char *key_file)
{
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
CURLcode result;
if(cert_file) {
return CURLE_OK;
}
-static char * nss_get_password(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+static char *nss_get_password(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
{
(void)slot; /* unused */
struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)arg;
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING
- if(conn->data->set.ssl.verifystatus) {
+ if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus)) {
SECStatus cacheResult;
const SECItemArray *csa = SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses(fd);
}
#endif
- if(!conn->data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+ if(!SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) {
infof(conn->data, "skipping SSL peer certificate verification\n");
return SECSuccess;
}
unsigned int buflen;
SSLNextProtoState state;
- if(!conn->data->set.ssl_enable_npn && !conn->data->set.ssl_enable_alpn) {
+ if(!conn->bits.tls_enable_npn && !conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
return;
}
if(SSL_GetNextProto(sock, &state, buf, &buflen, buflenmax) == SECSuccess) {
switch(state) {
+#if NSSVERNUM >= 0x031a00 /* 3.26.0 */
+ /* used by NSS internally to implement 0-RTT */
+ case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE:
+ /* fall through! */
+#endif
case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT:
case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_OVERLAP:
infof(conn->data, "ALPN/NPN, server did not agree to a protocol\n");
PRBool *canFalseStart)
{
struct connectdata *conn = client_data;
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
}
#endif
-static void display_cert_info(struct SessionHandle *data,
+static void display_cert_info(struct Curl_easy *data,
CERTCertificate *cert)
{
char *subject, *issuer, *common_name;
static SECStatus BadCertHandler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock)
{
struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)arg;
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError();
CERTCertificate *cert;
/* remember the cert verification result */
- data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = err;
+ if(SSL_IS_PROXY())
+ data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult = err;
+ else
+ data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = err;
- if(err == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN && !data->set.ssl.verifyhost)
+ if(err == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN && !SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost))
/* we are asked not to verify the host name */
return SECSuccess;
const char *pinnedpubkey)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
- struct SessionHandle *data = connssl->data;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = connssl->data;
CERTCertificate *cert;
if(!pinnedpubkey)
struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr **pRetKey)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = (struct ssl_connect_data *)arg;
- struct SessionHandle *data = connssl->data;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = connssl->data;
const char *nickname = connssl->client_nickname;
+ static const char pem_slotname[] = "PEM Token #1";
if(connssl->obj_clicert) {
/* use the cert/key provided by PEM reader */
- static const char pem_slotname[] = "PEM Token #1";
SECItem cert_der = { 0, NULL, 0 };
void *proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock);
struct CERTCertificateStr *cert;
struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr *key;
- PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(pem_slotname);
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = nss_find_slot_by_name(pem_slotname);
if(NULL == slot) {
failf(data, "NSS: PK11 slot not found: %s", pem_slotname);
return SECFailure;
if(NULL == nickname)
nickname = "[unknown]";
+ if(!strncmp(nickname, pem_slotname, sizeof(pem_slotname) - 1U)) {
+ failf(data, "NSS: refusing previously loaded certificate from file: %s",
+ nickname);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
if(NULL == *pRetKey) {
failf(data, "NSS: private key not found for certificate: %s", nickname);
return SECFailure;
}
/* data might be NULL */
-static CURLcode nss_init_core(struct SessionHandle *data, const char *cert_dir)
+static CURLcode nss_init_core(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *cert_dir)
{
NSSInitParameters initparams;
}
/* data might be NULL */
-static CURLcode nss_init(struct SessionHandle *data)
+static CURLcode nss_init(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
char *cert_dir;
struct_stat st;
PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 256);
nss_initlock = PR_NewLock();
nss_crllock = PR_NewLock();
+ nss_findslot_lock = PR_NewLock();
}
/* We will actually initialize NSS later */
}
/* data might be NULL */
-CURLcode Curl_nss_force_init(struct SessionHandle *data)
+CURLcode Curl_nss_force_init(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
CURLcode result;
if(!nss_initlock) {
PR_DestroyLock(nss_initlock);
PR_DestroyLock(nss_crllock);
+ PR_DestroyLock(nss_findslot_lock);
nss_initlock = NULL;
initialized = 0;
return -1; /* connection status unknown */
}
+static void nss_close(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
+{
+ /* before the cleanup, check whether we are using a client certificate */
+ const bool client_cert = (connssl->client_nickname != NULL)
+ || (connssl->obj_clicert != NULL);
+
+ free(connssl->client_nickname);
+ connssl->client_nickname = NULL;
+
+ /* destroy all NSS objects in order to avoid failure of NSS shutdown */
+ Curl_llist_destroy(connssl->obj_list, NULL);
+ connssl->obj_list = NULL;
+ connssl->obj_clicert = NULL;
+
+ if(connssl->handle) {
+ if(client_cert)
+ /* A server might require different authentication based on the
+ * particular path being requested by the client. To support this
+ * scenario, we must ensure that a connection will never reuse the
+ * authentication data from a previous connection. */
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(connssl->handle);
+
+ PR_Close(connssl->handle);
+ connssl->handle = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
/*
* This function is called when an SSL connection is closed.
*/
void Curl_nss_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl_proxy = &conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex];
- if(connssl->handle) {
+ if(connssl->handle || connssl_proxy->handle) {
/* NSS closes the socket we previously handed to it, so we must mark it
as closed to avoid double close */
fake_sclose(conn->sock[sockindex]);
conn->sock[sockindex] = CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
+ }
- if((connssl->client_nickname != NULL) || (connssl->obj_clicert != NULL))
- /* A server might require different authentication based on the
- * particular path being requested by the client. To support this
- * scenario, we must ensure that a connection will never reuse the
- * authentication data from a previous connection. */
- SSL_InvalidateSession(connssl->handle);
-
- free(connssl->client_nickname);
- connssl->client_nickname = NULL;
- /* destroy all NSS objects in order to avoid failure of NSS shutdown */
- Curl_llist_destroy(connssl->obj_list, NULL);
- connssl->obj_list = NULL;
- connssl->obj_clicert = NULL;
+ if(connssl->handle)
+ /* nss_close(connssl) will transitively close also connssl_proxy->handle
+ if both are used. Clear it to avoid a double close leading to crash. */
+ connssl_proxy->handle = NULL;
- PR_Close(connssl->handle);
- connssl->handle = NULL;
- }
+ nss_close(connssl);
+ nss_close(connssl_proxy);
}
/* return true if NSS can provide error code (and possibly msg) for the
static CURLcode nss_load_ca_certificates(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
- const char *cafile = data->set.ssl.CAfile;
- const char *capath = data->set.ssl.CApath;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+ const char *cafile = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile);
+ const char *capath = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath);
if(cafile) {
CURLcode result = nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], cafile, PR_TRUE);
}
static CURLcode nss_init_sslver(SSLVersionRange *sslver,
- struct SessionHandle *data)
+ struct Curl_easy *data,
+ struct connectdata *conn)
{
- switch(data->set.ssl.version) {
- default:
+ switch(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version)) {
case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
+ /* map CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT to NSS default */
+ if(SSL_VersionRangeGetDefault(ssl_variant_stream, sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ /* ... but make sure we use at least TLSv1.0 according to libcurl API */
+ if(sslver->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0)
+ sslver->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
sslver->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ /* TODO: set sslver->max to SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 once stable */
#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
sslver->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
#elif defined SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
return CURLE_OK;
#endif
break;
+
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ sslver->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+ sslver->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ failf(data, "Unrecognized parameter passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
failf(data, "TLS minor version cannot be set");
}
static CURLcode nss_fail_connect(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
- struct SessionHandle *data,
+ struct Curl_easy *data,
CURLcode curlerr)
{
PRErrorCode err = 0;
return curlerr;
}
-/* Switch the SSL socket into non-blocking mode. */
-static CURLcode nss_set_nonblock(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
- struct SessionHandle *data)
+/* Switch the SSL socket into blocking or non-blocking mode. */
+static CURLcode nss_set_blocking(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
+ struct Curl_easy *data,
+ bool blocking)
{
static PRSocketOptionData sock_opt;
sock_opt.option = PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking;
- sock_opt.value.non_blocking = PR_TRUE;
+ sock_opt.value.non_blocking = !blocking;
if(PR_SetSocketOption(connssl->handle, &sock_opt) != PR_SUCCESS)
return nss_fail_connect(connssl, data, CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR);
PRFileDesc *nspr_io_stub = NULL;
PRBool ssl_no_cache;
PRBool ssl_cbc_random_iv;
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
CURLcode result;
+ bool second_layer = FALSE;
SSLVersionRange sslver = {
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, /* min */
goto error;
/* do not use SSL cache if disabled or we are not going to verify peer */
- ssl_no_cache = (conn->ssl_config.sessionid && data->set.ssl.verifypeer) ?
- PR_FALSE : PR_TRUE;
+ ssl_no_cache = (SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)
+ && SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) ? PR_FALSE : PR_TRUE;
if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_NO_CACHE, ssl_no_cache) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
/* enable/disable the requested SSL version(s) */
- if(nss_init_sslver(&sslver, data) != CURLE_OK)
+ if(nss_init_sslver(&sslver, data, conn) != CURLE_OK)
goto error;
if(SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &sslver) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
- ssl_cbc_random_iv = !data->set.ssl_enable_beast;
+ ssl_cbc_random_iv = !SSL_SET_OPTION(enable_beast);
#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
/* unless the user explicitly asks to allow the protocol vulnerability, we
use the work-around */
infof(data, "warning: support for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV not compiled in\n");
#endif
- if(data->set.ssl.cipher_list) {
- if(set_ciphers(data, model, data->set.ssl.cipher_list) != SECSuccess) {
+ if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list)) {
+ if(set_ciphers(data, model, SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list)) != SECSuccess) {
result = CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
goto error;
}
}
- if(!data->set.ssl.verifypeer && data->set.ssl.verifyhost)
+ if(!SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) && SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost))
infof(data, "warning: ignoring value of ssl.verifyhost\n");
/* bypass the default SSL_AuthCertificate() hook in case we do not want to
if(SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, nss_auth_cert_hook, conn) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
- data->set.ssl.certverifyresult=0; /* not checked yet */
+ /* not checked yet */
+ if(SSL_IS_PROXY())
+ data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult = 0;
+ else
+ data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = 0;
+
if(SSL_BadCertHook(model, BadCertHandler, conn) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
if(SSL_HandshakeCallback(model, HandshakeCallback, conn) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
- if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+ if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) {
const CURLcode rv = nss_load_ca_certificates(conn, sockindex);
if(rv) {
result = rv;
}
}
- if(data->set.ssl.CRLfile) {
- const CURLcode rv = nss_load_crl(data->set.ssl.CRLfile);
+ if(SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile)) {
+ const CURLcode rv = nss_load_crl(SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile));
if(rv) {
result = rv;
goto error;
}
- infof(data, " CRLfile: %s\n", data->set.ssl.CRLfile);
+ infof(data, " CRLfile: %s\n", SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile));
}
- if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT]) {
- char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, STRING_CERT);
+ if(SSL_SET_OPTION(cert)) {
+ char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, SSL_SET_OPTION(cert));
if(nickname) {
/* we are not going to use libnsspem.so to read the client cert */
connssl->obj_clicert = NULL;
}
else {
- CURLcode rv = cert_stuff(conn, sockindex, data->set.str[STRING_CERT],
- data->set.str[STRING_KEY]);
+ CURLcode rv = cert_stuff(conn, sockindex, SSL_SET_OPTION(cert),
+ SSL_SET_OPTION(key));
if(rv) {
/* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */
result = rv;
goto error;
}
- /* wrap OS file descriptor by NSPR's file descriptor abstraction */
- nspr_io = PR_ImportTCPSocket(sockfd);
- if(!nspr_io)
- goto error;
+ if(conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].use) {
+ DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connection_complete == conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].state);
+ DEBUGASSERT(conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].handle != NULL);
+ nspr_io = conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].handle;
+ second_layer = TRUE;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* wrap OS file descriptor by NSPR's file descriptor abstraction */
+ nspr_io = PR_ImportTCPSocket(sockfd);
+ if(!nspr_io)
+ goto error;
+ }
/* create our own NSPR I/O layer */
nspr_io_stub = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(nspr_io_identity, &nspr_io_methods);
if(!nspr_io_stub) {
- PR_Close(nspr_io);
+ if(!second_layer)
+ PR_Close(nspr_io);
goto error;
}
/* push our new layer to the NSPR I/O stack */
if(PR_PushIOLayer(nspr_io, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, nspr_io_stub) != PR_SUCCESS) {
- PR_Close(nspr_io);
+ if(!second_layer)
+ PR_Close(nspr_io);
PR_Close(nspr_io_stub);
goto error;
}
/* import our model socket onto the current I/O stack */
connssl->handle = SSL_ImportFD(model, nspr_io);
if(!connssl->handle) {
- PR_Close(nspr_io);
+ if(!second_layer)
+ PR_Close(nspr_io);
goto error;
}
model = NULL;
/* This is the password associated with the cert that we're using */
- if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]) {
- SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(connssl->handle, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+ if(SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd)) {
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(connssl->handle, SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd));
}
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING
- if(data->set.ssl.verifystatus) {
+ if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus)) {
if(SSL_OptionSet(connssl->handle, SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING, PR_TRUE)
!= SECSuccess)
goto error;
#endif
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_NPN
- if(SSL_OptionSet(connssl->handle, SSL_ENABLE_NPN, data->set.ssl_enable_npn
- ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ if(SSL_OptionSet(connssl->handle, SSL_ENABLE_NPN, conn->bits.tls_enable_npn
+ ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
#endif
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_ALPN
- if(SSL_OptionSet(connssl->handle, SSL_ENABLE_ALPN, data->set.ssl_enable_alpn
- ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ if(SSL_OptionSet(connssl->handle, SSL_ENABLE_ALPN, conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn
+ ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
#endif
#endif
#if defined(SSL_ENABLE_NPN) || defined(SSL_ENABLE_ALPN)
- if(data->set.ssl_enable_npn || data->set.ssl_enable_alpn) {
+ if(conn->bits.tls_enable_npn || conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
int cur = 0;
unsigned char protocols[128];
goto error;
/* propagate hostname to the TLS layer */
- if(SSL_SetURL(connssl->handle, conn->host.name) != SECSuccess)
+ if(SSL_SetURL(connssl->handle, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
+ conn->host.name) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
/* prevent NSS from re-using the session for a different hostname */
- if(SSL_SetSockPeerID(connssl->handle, conn->host.name) != SECSuccess)
+ if(SSL_SetSockPeerID(connssl->handle, SSL_IS_PROXY() ?
+ conn->http_proxy.host.name : conn->host.name)
+ != SECSuccess)
goto error;
return CURLE_OK;
static CURLcode nss_do_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
CURLcode result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
PRUint32 timeout;
+ long * const certverifyresult = SSL_IS_PROXY() ?
+ &data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult : &data->set.ssl.certverifyresult;
+ const char * const pinnedpubkey = SSL_IS_PROXY() ?
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_PROXY] :
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_ORIG];
+
/* check timeout situation */
const long time_left = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
if(PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
/* blocking direction is updated by nss_update_connecting_state() */
return CURLE_AGAIN;
- else if(conn->data->set.ssl.certverifyresult == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN)
+ else if(*certverifyresult == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN)
result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
- else if(conn->data->set.ssl.certverifyresult!=0)
+ else if(*certverifyresult != 0)
result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
goto error;
}
if(result)
goto error;
- if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]) {
+ if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
SECStatus ret = SECFailure;
- char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT);
+ char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
if(nickname) {
- /* we support only nicknames in case of STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT for now */
+ /* we support only nicknames in case of issuercert for now */
ret = check_issuer_cert(connssl->handle, nickname);
free(nickname);
}
}
}
- result = cmp_peer_pubkey(connssl, data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY]);
+ result = cmp_peer_pubkey(connssl, pinnedpubkey);
if(result)
/* status already printed */
goto error;
bool *done)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
- struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
const bool blocking = (done == NULL);
CURLcode result;
- if(connssl->state == ssl_connection_complete)
+ if(connssl->state == ssl_connection_complete) {
+ if(!blocking)
+ *done = TRUE;
return CURLE_OK;
+ }
if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_1) {
result = nss_setup_connect(conn, sockindex);
/* we do not expect CURLE_AGAIN from nss_setup_connect() */
return result;
- if(!blocking) {
- /* in non-blocking mode, set NSS non-blocking mode before handshake */
- result = nss_set_nonblock(connssl, data);
- if(result)
- return result;
- }
-
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
}
+ /* enable/disable blocking mode before handshake */
+ result = nss_set_blocking(connssl, data, blocking);
+ if(result)
+ return result;
+
result = nss_do_connect(conn, sockindex);
switch(result) {
case CURLE_OK:
if(blocking) {
/* in blocking mode, set NSS non-blocking mode _after_ SSL handshake */
- result = nss_set_nonblock(connssl, data);
+ result = nss_set_blocking(connssl, data, /* blocking */ FALSE);
if(result)
return result;
}
}
/* data might be NULL */
-int Curl_nss_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
+int Curl_nss_seed(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
/* make sure that NSS is initialized */
return !!Curl_nss_force_init(data);
}
/* data might be NULL */
-int Curl_nss_random(struct SessionHandle *data,
- unsigned char *entropy,
- size_t length)
+CURLcode Curl_nss_random(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ unsigned char *entropy,
+ size_t length)
{
Curl_nss_seed(data); /* Initiate the seed if not already done */
if(SECSuccess != PK11_GenerateRandom(entropy, curlx_uztosi(length)))
/* signal a failure */
- return -1;
+ return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
- return 0;
+ return CURLE_OK;
}
void Curl_nss_md5sum(unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
#endif
}
-bool Curl_nss_false_start(void) {
+bool Curl_nss_false_start(void)
+{
#if NSSVERNUM >= 0x030f04 /* 3.15.4 */
return TRUE;
#else
projects / platform / upstream / curl.git / blobdiff