*
* Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
#include <errno.h>
#include "libcryptsetup.h"
-#include "luks.h"
-#include "luks2.h"
-#include "loopaes.h"
-#include "verity.h"
-#include "tcrypt.h"
-#include "integrity.h"
-#include "bitlk.h"
+#include "luks1/luks.h"
+#include "luks2/luks2.h"
+#include "loopaes/loopaes.h"
+#include "verity/verity.h"
+#include "tcrypt/tcrypt.h"
+#include "integrity/integrity.h"
+#include "bitlk/bitlk.h"
+#include "fvault2/fvault2.h"
#include "utils_device_locking.h"
#include "internal.h"
+#include "keyslot_context.h"
#define CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED (1 << 0)
#define CRYPT_CD_QUIET (1 << 1)
bool memory_hard_pbkdf_lock_enabled;
struct crypt_lock_handle *pbkdf_memory_hard_lock;
- // FIXME: private binary headers and access it properly
- // through sub-library (LUKS1, TCRYPT)
-
union {
struct { /* used in CRYPT_LUKS1 */
struct luks_phdr hdr;
struct bitlk_metadata params;
char *cipher_spec;
} bitlk;
+ struct { /* used in CRYPT_FVAULT2 */
+ struct fvault2_params params;
+ } fvault2;
struct { /* used if initialized without header by name */
char *active_name;
/* buffers, must refresh from kernel on every query */
/* Log helper */
static void (*_default_log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr) = NULL;
+static void *_default_log_usrptr = NULL;
static int _debug_level = 0;
/* Library can do metadata locking */
if (cd && cd->log)
cd->log(level, msg, cd->log_usrptr);
else if (_default_log)
- _default_log(level, msg, NULL);
+ _default_log(level, msg, _default_log_usrptr);
/* Default to stdout/stderr if there is no callback. */
else
fprintf(level == CRYPT_LOG_ERROR ? stderr : stdout, "%s", msg);
}
-__attribute__((format(printf, 5, 6)))
-void logger(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *file,
- int line, const char *format, ...)
+__attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)))
+void crypt_logf(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list argp;
char target[LOG_MAX_LEN + 2];
return r;
}
- r = crypt_backend_init();
+ r = crypt_backend_init(crypt_fips_mode());
if (r < 0)
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto backend."));
return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_BITLK, type));
}
+static int isFVAULT2(const char *type)
+{
+ return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_FVAULT2, type));
+}
+
static int _onlyLUKS(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t cdflags)
{
int r = 0;
static void crypt_set_null_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
- if (!cd->type)
- return;
-
free(cd->type);
cd->type = NULL;
- cd->u.none.active_name = NULL;
cd->data_offset = 0;
cd->metadata_size = 0;
cd->keyslots_size = 0;
+ crypt_safe_memzero(&cd->u, sizeof(cd->u));
}
static void crypt_reset_null_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
*keyslot = LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
else
- *keyslot = LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ *keyslot = LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, 0);
if (*keyslot < 0) {
log_err(cd, _("All key slots full."));
return -EINVAL;
switch (ki) {
case CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID:
log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."),
- *keyslot, LUKS_NUMKEYS - 1);
+ *keyslot, crypt_keyslot_max(cd->type) - 1);
return -EINVAL;
case CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE:
break;
size_t len;
int r;
- /* Must user header-on-disk if we know type here */
+ /* Must use header-on-disk if we know the type here */
if (cd->type || !cd->u.none.active_name)
return -EINVAL;
void (*log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr),
void *usrptr)
{
- if (!cd)
+ if (!cd) {
_default_log = log;
- else {
+ _default_log_usrptr = usrptr;
+ } else {
cd->log = log;
cd->log_usrptr = usrptr;
}
memset(h, 0, sizeof(*h));
r = device_alloc(NULL, &h->device, device);
- if (r < 0)
- goto bad;
+ if (r < 0) {
+ free(h);
+ return r;
+ }
dm_backend_init(NULL);
*cd = h;
return 0;
-bad:
- device_free(NULL, h->device);
- free(h);
- return r;
}
static int crypt_check_data_device_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
cd->device = dev;
- return crypt_check_data_device_size(cd);
+ r = crypt_check_data_device_size(cd);
+ if (!r && isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ device_set_block_size(crypt_data_device(cd), LUKS2_get_sector_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr));
+
+ return r;
}
int crypt_set_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device)
return r;
}
+static void crypt_free_type(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *force_type)
+{
+ const char *type = force_type ?: cd->type;
+
+ if (isPLAIN(type)) {
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.plain.hdr.hash);
+ free(cd->u.plain.cipher);
+ free(cd->u.plain.cipher_spec);
+ } else if (isLUKS2(type)) {
+ LUKS2_reencrypt_free(cd, cd->u.luks2.rh);
+ LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ free(cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher);
+ } else if (isLUKS1(type)) {
+ free(cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec);
+ } else if (isLOOPAES(type)) {
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.loopaes.hdr.hash);
+ free(cd->u.loopaes.cipher);
+ free(cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec);
+ } else if (isVERITY(type)) {
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.data_device);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_device);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_device);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.salt);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.root_hash);
+ free(cd->u.verity.uuid);
+ device_free(cd, cd->u.verity.fec_device);
+ } else if (isINTEGRITY(type)) {
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.integrity);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key);
+ } else if (isBITLK(type)) {
+ free(cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec);
+ BITLK_bitlk_metadata_free(&cd->u.bitlk.params);
+ } else if (!type) {
+ free(cd->u.none.active_name);
+ cd->u.none.active_name = NULL;
+ }
+
+ crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+}
/* internal only */
struct crypt_pbkdf_type *crypt_get_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd)
return r;
}
-static void _luks2_reload(struct crypt_device *cd)
+static void _luks2_rollback(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
if (!cd || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
return;
- (void) _crypt_load_luks2(cd, 1, 0);
+ if (LUKS2_hdr_rollback(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to rollback LUKS2 metadata in memory."));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ free(cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher);
+ cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher = NULL;
}
static int _crypt_load_luks(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *requested_type,
- int require_header, int repair)
+ bool quiet, bool repair)
{
char *cipher_spec;
struct luks_phdr hdr = {};
version = 0;
if (isLUKS1(requested_type) || version == 1) {
- if (cd->type && isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
return -EINVAL;
}
return r;
}
- r = LUKS_read_phdr(&hdr, require_header, repair, cd);
+ r = LUKS_read_phdr(&hdr, !quiet, repair, cd);
if (r)
goto out;
memcpy(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
} else if (isLUKS2(requested_type) || version == 2 || version == 0) {
- if (cd->type && isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
return -EINVAL;
}
* perform repair.
*/
r = _crypt_load_luks2(cd, cd->type != NULL, repair);
+ if (!r)
+ device_set_block_size(crypt_data_device(cd), LUKS2_get_sector_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr));
+ else if (!quiet)
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."), mdata_device_path(cd));
} else {
if (version > 2)
log_err(cd, _("Unsupported LUKS version %d."), version);
cd->u.tcrypt.params.veracrypt_pim = 0;
if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ goto out;
if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_TCRYPT)))
- return -ENOMEM;
-
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+out:
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_free_type(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT);
return r;
}
static int _crypt_load_verity(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_verity *params)
{
int r;
- size_t sb_offset = 0;
+ uint64_t sb_offset = 0;
r = init_crypto(cd);
if (r < 0)
r = VERITY_read_sb(cd, sb_offset, &cd->u.verity.uuid, &cd->u.verity.hdr);
if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ goto out;
- //FIXME: use crypt_free
if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_VERITY))) {
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.salt);
- free(cd->u.verity.uuid);
- crypt_safe_memzero(&cd->u.verity.hdr, sizeof(cd->u.verity.hdr));
- return -ENOMEM;
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
}
if (params)
/* Hash availability checked in sb load */
cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = crypt_hash_size(cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
- if (cd->u.verity.root_hash_size > 4096)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (cd->u.verity.root_hash_size > 4096) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
if (params && params->data_device &&
(r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, params->data_device)) < 0)
- return r;
+ goto out;
if (params && params->fec_device) {
r = device_alloc(cd, &cd->u.verity.fec_device, params->fec_device);
if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ goto out;
cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_area_offset = params->fec_area_offset;
cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots = params->fec_roots;
}
-
+out:
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_free_type(cd, CRYPT_VERITY);
return r;
}
r = INTEGRITY_read_sb(cd, &cd->u.integrity.params, &cd->u.integrity.sb_flags);
if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ goto out;
// FIXME: add checks for fields in integrity sb vs params
+ r = -ENOMEM;
if (params) {
cd->u.integrity.params.journal_watermark = params->journal_watermark;
cd->u.integrity.params.journal_commit_time = params->journal_commit_time;
cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors = params->buffer_sectors;
- // FIXME: check ENOMEM
- if (params->integrity)
- cd->u.integrity.params.integrity = strdup(params->integrity);
+ if (params->integrity &&
+ !(cd->u.integrity.params.integrity = strdup(params->integrity)))
+ goto out;
cd->u.integrity.params.integrity_key_size = params->integrity_key_size;
- if (params->journal_integrity)
- cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity = strdup(params->journal_integrity);
- if (params->journal_crypt)
- cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt = strdup(params->journal_crypt);
+ if (params->journal_integrity &&
+ !(cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity = strdup(params->journal_integrity)))
+ goto out;
+ if (params->journal_crypt &&
+ !(cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt = strdup(params->journal_crypt)))
+ goto out;
if (params->journal_crypt_key) {
cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key =
crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_crypt_key_size,
params->journal_crypt_key);
if (!cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
}
if (params->journal_integrity_key) {
cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key =
crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_integrity_key_size,
params->journal_integrity_key);
if (!cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
}
}
- if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_INTEGRITY))) {
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.integrity);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- return 0;
+ if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_INTEGRITY)))
+ goto out;
+ r = 0;
+out:
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_free_type(cd, CRYPT_INTEGRITY);
+ return r;
}
-static int _crypt_load_bitlk(struct crypt_device *cd,
- struct bitlk_metadata *params)
+static int _crypt_load_bitlk(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
int r;
r = BITLK_read_sb(cd, &cd->u.bitlk.params);
if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ goto out;
if (asprintf(&cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec, "%s-%s",
cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher, cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher_mode) < 0) {
cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec = NULL;
- return -ENOMEM;
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
}
- if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_BITLK)))
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_BITLK))) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
- return 0;
+ device_set_block_size(crypt_data_device(cd), cd->u.bitlk.params.sector_size);
+out:
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_free_type(cd, CRYPT_BITLK);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_load_fvault2(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ r = init_crypto(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = FVAULT2_read_metadata(cd, &cd->u.fvault2.params);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_FVAULT2)))
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+out:
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_free_type(cd, CRYPT_FVAULT2);
+ return r;
}
int crypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd,
return -EINVAL;
}
- r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, 1, 0);
+ r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, true, false);
} else if (isVERITY(requested_type)) {
if (cd->type && !isVERITY(cd->type)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
return -EINVAL;
}
- r = _crypt_load_bitlk(cd, params);
+ r = _crypt_load_bitlk(cd);
+ } else if (isFVAULT2(requested_type)) {
+ if (cd->type && !isFVAULT2(cd->type)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ r = _crypt_load_fvault2(cd);
} else
return -EINVAL;
return NULL;
}
-static void crypt_free_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
-{
- if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.plain.hdr.hash);
- free(cd->u.plain.cipher);
- free(cd->u.plain.cipher_spec);
- } else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
- LUKS2_reencrypt_free(cd, cd->u.luks2.rh);
- LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
- free(cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher);
- } else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
- free(cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec);
- } else if (isLOOPAES(cd->type)) {
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.loopaes.hdr.hash);
- free(cd->u.loopaes.cipher);
- free(cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec);
- } else if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.data_device);
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_device);
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_device);
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.salt);
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.root_hash);
- free(cd->u.verity.uuid);
- device_free(cd, cd->u.verity.fec_device);
- } else if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.integrity);
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity);
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt);
- crypt_free_volume_key(cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key);
- crypt_free_volume_key(cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key);
- } else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
- free(cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec);
- BITLK_bitlk_metadata_free(&cd->u.bitlk.params);
- } else if (!cd->type) {
- free(cd->u.none.active_name);
- cd->u.none.active_name = NULL;
- }
-
- crypt_set_null_type(cd);
-}
-
static int _init_by_name_crypt(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
{
bool found = false;
- char **dep, *cipher_spec = NULL, cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], deps_uuid_prefix[40], *deps[MAX_DM_DEPS+1] = {};
+ char **dep, *cipher_spec = NULL, cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+ char deps_uuid_prefix[40], *deps[MAX_DM_DEPS+1] = {};
const char *dev, *namei;
int key_nums, r;
struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd, dmdi = {}, dmdep = {};
cd->u.loopaes.key_size = tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength / key_nums;
} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type) || isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
if (crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
- r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, cd->type, 0, 0);
+ r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, cd->type, true, false);
if (r < 0) {
log_dbg(cd, "LUKS device header does not match active device.");
crypt_set_null_type(cd);
if (r < 0) {
log_dbg(cd, "LUKS device header uuid: %s mismatches DM returned uuid %s",
LUKS_UUID(cd), dmd.uuid);
- crypt_free_type(cd);
+ crypt_free_type(cd, NULL);
r = 0;
goto out;
}
r = TCRYPT_init_by_name(cd, name, dmd.uuid, tgt, &cd->device,
&cd->u.tcrypt.params, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr);
} else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
- r = _crypt_load_bitlk(cd, NULL);
+ r = _crypt_load_bitlk(cd);
if (r < 0) {
log_dbg(cd, "BITLK device header not available.");
crypt_set_null_type(cd);
r = 0;
}
+ } else if (isFVAULT2(cd->type)) {
+ r = _crypt_load_fvault2(cd);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "FVAULT2 device header not available.");
+ crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+ r = 0;
+ }
}
out:
dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_INTEGRITY);
else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_BITLK, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_BITLK)-1))
(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_BITLK);
+ else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_FVAULT2, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_FVAULT2)-1))
+ (*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_FVAULT2);
else
log_dbg(NULL, "Unknown UUID set, some parameters are not set.");
} else
log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."));
return -EINVAL;
}
+ device_set_block_size(crypt_data_device(cd), sector_size);
}
if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_PLAIN)))
if (r < 0)
return r;
- if (!device_size(crypt_data_device(cd), &dev_size) &&
- dev_size < (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE))
- log_std(cd, _("WARNING: Data offset is outside of currently available data device.\n"));
if (asprintf(&cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec, "%s-%s", cipher, cipher_mode) < 0) {
cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec = NULL;
}
r = LUKS_write_phdr(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
- if (r)
+ if (r) {
free(cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec);
+ return r;
+ }
- return r;
+ if (!device_size(crypt_data_device(cd), &dev_size) &&
+ dev_size <= (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE))
+ log_std(cd, _("Device %s is too small for activation, there is no remaining space for data.\n"),
+ device_path(crypt_data_device(cd)));
+
+ return 0;
}
static int _crypt_format_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *uuid,
const char *volume_key,
size_t volume_key_size,
- struct crypt_params_luks2 *params)
+ struct crypt_params_luks2 *params,
+ bool sector_size_autodetect)
{
int r, integrity_key_size = 0;
unsigned long required_alignment = DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT;
unsigned long alignment_offset = 0;
- unsigned int sector_size = params ? params->sector_size : SECTOR_SIZE;
+ unsigned int sector_size;
const char *integrity = params ? params->integrity : NULL;
uint64_t dev_size;
uint32_t dmc_flags;
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (params && params->sector_size)
+ sector_size_autodetect = false;
+
+ if (params && params->data_device) {
+ if (!cd->metadata_device)
+ cd->metadata_device = cd->device;
+ else
+ device_free(cd, cd->device);
+ cd->device = NULL;
+ if (device_alloc(cd, &cd->device, params->data_device) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (sector_size_autodetect) {
+ sector_size = device_optimal_encryption_sector_size(cd, crypt_data_device(cd));
+ log_dbg(cd, "Auto-detected optimal encryption sector size for device %s is %d bytes.",
+ device_path(crypt_data_device(cd)), sector_size);
+ } else
+ sector_size = params ? params->sector_size : SECTOR_SIZE;
+
if (sector_size < SECTOR_SIZE || sector_size > MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ||
NOTPOW2(sector_size)) {
log_err(cd, _("Unsupported encryption sector size."));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE && !dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmc_flags) &&
- !(dmc_flags & DM_SECTOR_SIZE_SUPPORTED))
- log_std(cd, _("WARNING: The device activation will fail, dm-crypt is missing "
- "support for requested encryption sector size.\n"));
+ !(dmc_flags & DM_SECTOR_SIZE_SUPPORTED)) {
+ if (sector_size_autodetect) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "dm-crypt does not support encryption sector size option. Reverting to 512 bytes.");
+ sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+ } else
+ log_std(cd, _("WARNING: The device activation will fail, dm-crypt is missing "
+ "support for requested encryption sector size.\n"));
+ }
if (integrity) {
if (params->integrity_params) {
params->integrity_params->journal_integrity)
return -ENOTSUP;
}
- if (!INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, integrity, cipher, cipher_mode)) {
+ if (!INTEGRITY_tag_size(integrity, cipher, cipher_mode)) {
if (!strcmp(integrity, "none"))
integrity = NULL;
else
return -EINVAL;
}
- integrity_key_size = INTEGRITY_key_size(cd, integrity);
+ integrity_key_size = INTEGRITY_key_size(integrity);
if ((integrity_key_size < 0) || (integrity_key_size >= (int)volume_key_size)) {
log_err(cd, _("Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."));
return -EINVAL;
if (r < 0)
return r;
- if (params && params->data_device) {
- if (!cd->metadata_device)
- cd->metadata_device = cd->device;
- else
- device_free(cd, cd->device);
- cd->device = NULL;
- if (device_alloc(cd, &cd->device, params->data_device) < 0)
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
if (params && cd->metadata_device) {
/* For detached header the alignment is used directly as data offset */
if (!cd->data_offset)
&required_alignment,
&alignment_offset, DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT);
+ r = device_size(crypt_data_device(cd), &dev_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (sector_size_autodetect) {
+ if (cd->data_offset && MISALIGNED(cd->data_offset, sector_size)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Data offset not aligned to sector size. Reverting to 512 bytes.");
+ sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+ } else if (MISALIGNED(dev_size - (uint64_t)required_alignment - (uint64_t)alignment_offset, sector_size)) {
+ /* underflow does not affect misalignment checks */
+ log_dbg(cd, "Device size is not aligned to sector size. Reverting to 512 bytes.");
+ sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+ }
+ }
+
/* FIXME: allow this later also for normal ciphers (check AF_ALG availability. */
if (integrity && !integrity_key_size) {
r = crypt_cipher_check_kernel(cipher, cipher_mode, integrity, volume_key_size);
}
if ((!integrity || integrity_key_size) && !crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(cipher, cipher_mode) &&
- !INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, NULL, cipher, cipher_mode)) {
+ !INTEGRITY_tag_size(NULL, cipher, cipher_mode)) {
r = LUKS_check_cipher(cd, volume_key_size - integrity_key_size,
cipher, cipher_mode);
if (r < 0)
if (r < 0)
goto out;
- r = device_size(crypt_data_device(cd), &dev_size);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
-
- if (dev_size < (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE))
- log_std(cd, _("WARNING: Data offset is outside of currently available data device.\n"));
-
if (cd->metadata_size && (cd->metadata_size != LUKS2_metadata_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr)))
log_std(cd, _("WARNING: LUKS2 metadata size changed to %" PRIu64 " bytes.\n"),
LUKS2_metadata_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr));
goto out;
}
+ device_set_block_size(crypt_data_device(cd), sector_size);
+
r = LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, cd->metadata_device != NULL);
if (r < 0) {
log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
}
out:
- if (r)
+ if (r) {
LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ return r;
+ }
- return r;
+ /* Device size can be larger now if it is a file container */
+ if (!device_size(crypt_data_device(cd), &dev_size) &&
+ dev_size <= (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE))
+ log_std(cd, _("Device %s is too small for activation, there is no remaining space for data.\n"),
+ device_path(crypt_data_device(cd)));
+
+ return 0;
}
static int _crypt_format_loopaes(struct crypt_device *cd,
r = device_alloc(cd, &fec_device, params->fec_device);
if (r < 0) {
r = -ENOMEM;
- goto err;
+ goto out;
}
hash_blocks_size = VERITY_hash_blocks(cd, params) * params->hash_block_size;
(params->hash_area_offset + hash_blocks_size) > params->fec_area_offset) {
log_err(cd, _("Hash area overlaps with FEC area."));
r = -EINVAL;
- goto err;
+ goto out;
}
if (device_is_identical(crypt_data_device(cd), fec_device) > 0 &&
(cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size * params->data_block_size) > params->fec_area_offset) {
log_err(cd, _("Data area overlaps with FEC area."));
r = -EINVAL;
- goto err;
+ goto out;
}
}
if (!root_hash || !hash_name || !salt) {
r = -ENOMEM;
- goto err;
+ goto out;
}
cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = params->flags;
else
r = crypt_random_get(cd, salt, params->salt_size, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
if (r)
- goto err;
+ goto out;
if (params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_CREATE_HASH) {
r = VERITY_create(cd, &cd->u.verity.hdr,
if (!r && params->fec_device)
r = VERITY_FEC_process(cd, &cd->u.verity.hdr, cd->u.verity.fec_device, 0, NULL);
if (r)
- goto err;
+ goto out;
}
if (!(params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER)) {
if (!(cd->u.verity.uuid = strdup(uuid)))
r = -ENOMEM;
} else
- r = VERITY_UUID_generate(cd, &cd->u.verity.uuid);
+ r = VERITY_UUID_generate(&cd->u.verity.uuid);
if (!r)
r = VERITY_write_sb(cd, cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset,
&cd->u.verity.hdr);
}
-err:
+out:
if (r) {
device_free(cd, fec_device);
free(root_hash);
params->journal_integrity_key);
if (!journal_mac_key) {
r = -ENOMEM;
- goto err;
+ goto out;
}
}
if (params->integrity && !(integrity = strdup(params->integrity))) {
r = -ENOMEM;
- goto err;
+ goto out;
}
if (params->journal_integrity && !(journal_integrity = strdup(params->journal_integrity))) {
r = -ENOMEM;
- goto err;
+ goto out;
}
if (params->journal_crypt && !(journal_crypt = strdup(params->journal_crypt))) {
r = -ENOMEM;
- goto err;
+ goto out;
}
integrity_tag_size = INTEGRITY_hash_tag_size(integrity);
if (r)
log_err(cd, _("Cannot format integrity for device %s."),
mdata_device_path(cd));
-err:
+out:
if (r) {
crypt_free_volume_key(journal_crypt_key);
crypt_free_volume_key(journal_mac_key);
return r;
}
-int crypt_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
+static int _crypt_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *type,
const char *cipher,
const char *cipher_mode,
const char *uuid,
const char *volume_key,
size_t volume_key_size,
- void *params)
+ void *params,
+ bool sector_size_autodetect)
{
int r;
uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params);
else if (isLUKS2(type))
r = _crypt_format_luks2(cd, cipher, cipher_mode,
- uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params);
+ uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params, sector_size_autodetect);
else if (isLOOPAES(type))
r = _crypt_format_loopaes(cd, cipher, uuid, volume_key_size, params);
else if (isVERITY(type))
return r;
}
-int crypt_repair(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *requested_type,
- void *params __attribute__((unused)))
-{
- int r;
-
- if (!cd)
- return -EINVAL;
+CRYPT_SYMBOL_EXPORT_NEW(int, crypt_format, 2, 4,
+ /* crypt_format parameters follows */
+ struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *type,
+ const char *cipher,
+ const char *cipher_mode,
+ const char *uuid,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ void *params)
+{
+ return _crypt_format(cd, type, cipher, cipher_mode, uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params, true);
+}
+
+
+CRYPT_SYMBOL_EXPORT_OLD(int, crypt_format, 2, 0,
+ /* crypt_format parameters follows */
+ struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *type,
+ const char *cipher,
+ const char *cipher_mode,
+ const char *uuid,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ void *params)
+{
+ return _crypt_format(cd, type, cipher, cipher_mode, uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params, false);
+}
+
+int crypt_repair(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *requested_type,
+ void *params __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd)
+ return -EINVAL;
log_dbg(cd, "Trying to repair %s crypt type from device %s.",
requested_type ?: "any", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)");
return -EINVAL;
/* Load with repair */
- r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, 1, 1);
+ r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, false, true);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
/* compare volume keys */
-static int _compare_volume_keys(struct volume_key *svk, unsigned skeyring_only, struct volume_key *tvk, unsigned tkeyring_only)
+static int _compare_volume_keys(struct volume_key *svk, unsigned skeyring_only,
+ struct volume_key *tvk, unsigned tkeyring_only)
{
if (!svk && !tvk)
return 0;
return 1;
if (!skeyring_only && !tkeyring_only)
- return memcmp(svk->key, tvk->key, svk->keylength);
+ return crypt_backend_memeq(svk->key, tvk->key, svk->keylength);
if (svk->key_description && tvk->key_description)
return strcmp(svk->key_description, tvk->key_description);
log_dbg(cd, "Unexpected uuid prefix %s in target device.", tgt->uuid);
return -EINVAL;
}
- } else {
+ } else if (!isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device type %s for reload.", cd->type ?: "<empty>");
return -ENOTSUP;
}
const struct dm_target *src,
const struct dm_target *tgt)
{
+ char *src_cipher = NULL, *src_integrity = NULL;
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+
/* for crypt devices keys are mandatory */
if (!src->u.crypt.vk || !tgt->u.crypt.vk)
return -EINVAL;
/* CIPHER checks */
if (!src->u.crypt.cipher || !tgt->u.crypt.cipher)
return -EINVAL;
- if (strcmp(src->u.crypt.cipher, tgt->u.crypt.cipher)) {
- log_dbg(cd, "Cipher specs do not match.");
+
+ /*
+ * dm_query_target converts capi cipher specification to dm-crypt format.
+ * We need to do same for cipher specification requested in source
+ * device.
+ */
+ if (crypt_capi_to_cipher(&src_cipher, &src_integrity, src->u.crypt.cipher, src->u.crypt.integrity))
return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (strcmp(src_cipher, tgt->u.crypt.cipher)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Cipher specs do not match.");
+ goto out;
}
if (tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength == 0 && crypt_is_cipher_null(tgt->u.crypt.cipher))
log_dbg(cd, "Existing device uses cipher null. Skipping key comparison.");
else if (_compare_volume_keys(src->u.crypt.vk, 0, tgt->u.crypt.vk, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description != NULL)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Keys in context and target device do not match.");
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
}
- if (crypt_strcmp(src->u.crypt.integrity, tgt->u.crypt.integrity)) {
+ if (crypt_strcmp(src_integrity, tgt->u.crypt.integrity)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Integrity parameters do not match.");
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
}
if (src->u.crypt.offset != tgt->u.crypt.offset ||
src->u.crypt.iv_offset != tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset ||
src->u.crypt.tag_size != tgt->u.crypt.tag_size) {
log_dbg(cd, "Integer parameters do not match.");
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
}
- if (device_is_identical(src->data_device, tgt->data_device) <= 0) {
+ if (device_is_identical(src->data_device, tgt->data_device) <= 0)
log_dbg(cd, "Data devices do not match.");
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ else
+ r = 0;
- return 0;
+out:
+ free(src_cipher);
+ free(src_integrity);
+
+ return r;
}
static int _compare_integrity_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
return -EINVAL;
}
- /* unsupported underneath dm-crypt with auth. encryption */
- if (src->u.integrity.meta_device || tgt->u.integrity.meta_device)
- return -ENOTSUP;
-
- if (src->size != tgt->size) {
- log_dbg(cd, "Device size parameters do not match.");
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
if (device_is_identical(src->data_device, tgt->data_device) <= 0) {
log_dbg(cd, "Data devices do not match.");
return -EINVAL;
r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
DM_ACTIVE_UUID | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE |
- DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY, &tdmd);
+ DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY | DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS |
+ DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY | DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_MAC_KEY, &tdmd);
if (r < 0) {
log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (!single_segment(&tdmd) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT || tgt->u.crypt.tag_size) {
+ if (!single_segment(&tdmd) ||
+ (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT && tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY) ||
+ (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT && tgt->u.crypt.tag_size)) {
r = -ENOTSUP;
log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), name);
goto out;
else
sdmd->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
- if (sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT && sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(tgt->u.crypt.vk, src->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
if (r)
goto out;
- } else {
+ } else if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.crypt.vk);
tgt->u.crypt.vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(src->u.crypt.vk->keylength, src->u.crypt.vk->key);
if (!tgt->u.crypt.vk) {
}
}
- r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
- src->u.crypt.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT)
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
+ src->u.crypt.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+ else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
+ src->u.integrity.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+ else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
if (r)
goto out;
struct crypt_dm_active_device tdmd, tdmdi = {};
struct dm_target *src, *srci, *tgt = &tdmd.segment, *tgti = &tdmdi.segment;
struct device *data_device = NULL;
+ bool clear = false;
if (!cd || !cd->type || !name || !iname || !(sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!single_segment(&tdmd) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT || !tgt->u.crypt.tag_size) {
- r = -ENOTSUP;
log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), name);
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
goto out;
}
}
if (!single_segment(&tdmdi) || tgti->type != DM_INTEGRITY) {
- r = -ENOTSUP;
log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), iname);
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
goto out;
}
goto out;
}
+ /* unsupported underneath dm-crypt with auth. encryption */
+ if (sdmdi->segment.u.integrity.meta_device || tdmdi.segment.u.integrity.meta_device)
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+
src = &sdmd->segment;
srci = &sdmdi->segment;
if ((r = dm_reload_device(cd, name, &tdmd, 0, 0))) {
log_err(cd, _("Failed to reload device %s."), name);
- goto err_clear;
+ clear = true;
+ goto out;
}
if ((r = dm_suspend_device(cd, name, 0))) {
log_err(cd, _("Failed to suspend device %s."), name);
- goto err_clear;
+ clear = true;
+ goto out;
}
if ((r = dm_suspend_device(cd, iname, 0))) {
log_err(cd, _("Failed to suspend device %s."), iname);
- goto err_clear;
+ clear = true;
+ goto out;
}
if ((r = dm_resume_device(cd, iname, act2dmflags(sdmdi->flags)))) {
log_err(cd, _("Failed to resume device %s."), iname);
- goto err_clear;
+ clear = true;
+ goto out;
}
r = dm_resume_device(cd, name, act2dmflags(tdmd.flags));
log_err(cd, _("Failed to switch device %s to dm-error."), name);
if (dm_error_device(cd, iname))
log_err(cd, _("Failed to switch device %s to dm-error."), iname);
- goto out;
+out:
+ if (clear) {
+ dm_clear_device(cd, name);
+ dm_clear_device(cd, iname);
-err_clear:
- dm_clear_device(cd, name);
- dm_clear_device(cd, iname);
+ if (dm_status_suspended(cd, name) > 0)
+ dm_resume_device(cd, name, 0);
+ if (dm_status_suspended(cd, iname) > 0)
+ dm_resume_device(cd, iname, 0);
+ }
- if (dm_status_suspended(cd, name) > 0)
- dm_resume_device(cd, name, 0);
- if (dm_status_suspended(cd, iname) > 0)
- dm_resume_device(cd, iname, 0);
-out:
dm_targets_free(cd, &tdmd);
dm_targets_free(cd, &tdmdi);
free(CONST_CAST(void*)tdmdi.uuid);
{
struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdq, dmd = {};
struct dm_target *tgt = &dmdq.segment;
+ struct crypt_params_integrity params = {};
+ uint32_t supported_flags = 0;
+ uint64_t old_size;
int r;
/*
log_dbg(cd, "Resizing device %s to %" PRIu64 " sectors.", name, new_size);
- r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY, &dmdq);
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY |
+ DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS | DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY |
+ DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_MAC_KEY, &dmdq);
if (r < 0) {
log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (!single_segment(&dmdq) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT) {
+ if (!single_segment(&dmdq) || (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT && tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
log_err(cd, _("Cannot resize loop device."));
}
+
+ /*
+ * Integrity device metadata are maintained by the kernel. We need to
+ * reload the device (with the same parameters) and let the kernel
+ * calculate the maximum size of integrity device and store it in the
+ * superblock.
+ */
+ if (!new_size && tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY) {
+ r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+ crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE, &old_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ dmd.size = dmdq.size;
+ dmd.flags = dmdq.flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE;
+
+ r = crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, ¶ms);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = dm_integrity_target_set(cd, &dmd.segment, 0, dmdq.segment.size,
+ crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd),
+ crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+ crypt_get_sector_size(cd), tgt->u.integrity.vk, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key,
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, ¶ms);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ r = _reload_device(cd, name, &dmd);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+ crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE, &new_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Maximum integrity device size from kernel %" PRIu64, new_size);
+
+ if (old_size == new_size && new_size == dmdq.size &&
+ !dm_flags(cd, tgt->type, &supported_flags) &&
+ !(supported_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_RESIZE_SUPPORTED))
+ log_std(cd, _("WARNING: Maximum size already set or kernel doesn't support resize.\n"));
+ }
+
r = device_block_adjust(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), DEV_OK,
- crypt_get_data_offset(cd), &new_size, &dmdq.flags);
+ crypt_get_data_offset(cd), &new_size, &dmdq.flags);
if (r)
goto out;
- if (MISALIGNED(new_size, tgt->u.crypt.sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
+ if (MISALIGNED(new_size, (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT ? tgt->u.crypt.sector_size : tgt->u.integrity.sector_size) >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."));
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
dmd.uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd);
dmd.size = new_size;
dmd.flags = dmdq.flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
- r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, new_size, crypt_data_device(cd),
- tgt->u.crypt.vk, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd),
- crypt_get_iv_offset(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
- crypt_get_integrity(cd), crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
- crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
+
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+ r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, new_size, crypt_data_device(cd),
+ tgt->u.crypt.vk, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd),
+ crypt_get_iv_offset(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+ crypt_get_integrity(cd), crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
+ crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY) {
+ r = crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, ¶ms);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = dm_integrity_target_set(cd, &dmd.segment, 0, new_size,
+ crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd),
+ crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+ crypt_get_sector_size(cd), tgt->u.integrity.vk, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key,
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, ¶ms);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ }
if (new_size == dmdq.size) {
log_dbg(cd, "Device has already requested size %" PRIu64
r = LUKS2_unmet_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, 0, 0);
if (!r)
r = _reload_device(cd, name, &dmd);
+
+ if (r && tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY &&
+ !dm_flags(cd, tgt->type, &supported_flags) &&
+ !(supported_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_RESIZE_SUPPORTED))
+ log_err(cd, _("Resize failed, the kernel doesn't support it."));
}
out:
dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
return LUKS2_hdr_labels(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, label, subsystem, 1);
}
+const char *crypt_get_label(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (_onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return cd->u.luks2.hdr.label;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_subsystem(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (_onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return cd->u.luks2.hdr.subsystem;
+}
+
int crypt_header_backup(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *requested_type,
const char *backup_file)
return -EINVAL;
/* Load with repair */
- r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, 1, 0);
+ r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, false, false);
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS2(requested_type))) {
r = LUKS2_hdr_restore(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, backup_file);
if (r)
- _luks2_reload(cd);
+ (void) _crypt_load_luks2(cd, 1, 0);
} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS1(requested_type)))
r = LUKS_hdr_restore(backup_file, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
else
r = -EINVAL;
if (!r)
- r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, version == 1 ? CRYPT_LUKS1 : CRYPT_LUKS2, 1, 1);
+ r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, version == 1 ? CRYPT_LUKS1 : CRYPT_LUKS2, false, true);
return r;
}
+int crypt_header_is_detached(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd || (cd->type && !isLUKS(cd->type)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = device_is_identical(crypt_data_device(cd), crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Failed to compare data and metadata devices path.");
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return r ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
void crypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
if (!cd)
return;
- log_dbg(cd, "Releasing crypt device %s context.", mdata_device_path(cd));
+ log_dbg(cd, "Releasing crypt device %s context.", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "empty");
dm_backend_exit(cd);
crypt_free_volume_key(cd->volume_key);
- crypt_free_type(cd);
+ crypt_free_type(cd, NULL);
device_free(cd, cd->device);
device_free(cd, cd->metadata_device);
digest = LUKS2_digest_by_segment(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
if (digest < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd,
- &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, digest);
+ r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, vk, digest);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read,
&cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
else
- r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read, &vk);
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT,
+ passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read, &vk);
crypt_safe_free(passphrase_read);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
-/*
- * Keyslot manipulation
- */
-int crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
- int keyslot, // -1 any
- const char *passphrase,
- size_t passphrase_size,
- const char *new_passphrase,
- size_t new_passphrase_size)
+int crypt_resume_by_token_pin(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ const char *type, int token, const char *pin, size_t pin_size,
+ void *usrptr)
{
- int digest, r, active_slots;
- struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ int r, keyslot;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return -EINVAL;
- log_dbg(cd, "Adding new keyslot, existing passphrase %sprovided,"
- "new passphrase %sprovided.",
- passphrase ? "" : "not ", new_passphrase ? "" : "not ");
+ log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s by token (%s type) %d.",
+ name, type ?: "any", token);
- if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+ if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET, 0)))
return r;
- if (!passphrase || !new_passphrase)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
- if (r)
+ r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
return r;
- if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
- active_slots = LUKS_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
- else
- active_slots = LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
- if (active_slots == 0) {
- /* No slots used, try to use pre-generated key in header */
- if (cd->volume_key) {
- vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
- r = vk ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
- } else {
- log_err(cd, _("Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- } else if (active_slots < 0)
+ if (!r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
return -EINVAL;
- else {
- /* Passphrase provided, use it to unlock existing keyslot */
- if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
- r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase,
- passphrase_size, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
- else
- r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, passphrase,
- passphrase_size, &vk);
}
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
+ r = LUKS2_token_unlock_key(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, type,
+ pin, pin_size, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, usrptr, &vk);
+ keyslot = r;
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = resume_by_volume_key(cd, vk, name);
- if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
- r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot, CONST_CAST(char*)new_passphrase,
- new_passphrase_size, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd);
- else {
- r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
- digest = r;
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
- if (r >= 0)
- r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, ¶ms);
+/*
+ * Keyslot manipulation
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot, // -1 any
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ const char *new_passphrase,
+ size_t new_passphrase_size)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context kc, new_kc;
- if (r >= 0)
- r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, digest, 1, 0);
+ if (!passphrase || !new_passphrase)
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (r >= 0)
- r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot,
- CONST_CAST(char*)new_passphrase,
- new_passphrase_size, vk, ¶ms);
- }
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&kc, passphrase, passphrase_size);
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&new_kc, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyslot_context(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &kc, keyslot, &new_kc, 0);
- r = 0;
-out:
- crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
- if (r < 0) {
- _luks2_reload(cd);
- return r;
- }
- return keyslot;
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&new_kc);
+
+ return r;
}
int crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *new_passphrase,
size_t new_passphrase_size)
{
- int digest = -1, r;
+ int digest = -1, r, keyslot_new_orig = keyslot_new;
struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
keyslot_new = LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
- keyslot_new = LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ keyslot_new = LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk->keylength);
if (keyslot_new < 0)
keyslot_new = keyslot_old;
}
r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr,
keyslot_new, new_passphrase,
new_passphrase_size, vk, ¶ms);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Swap old & new so the final keyslot number remains */
+ if (keyslot_new_orig == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT && keyslot_old != keyslot_new) {
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_swap(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_old, keyslot_new);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Swap slot id */
+ r = keyslot_old;
+ keyslot_old = keyslot_new;
+ keyslot_new = r;
+ }
} else
r = -EINVAL;
out:
crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
if (r < 0) {
- _luks2_reload(cd);
+ _luks2_rollback(cd);
return r;
}
return keyslot_new;
size_t new_keyfile_size,
uint64_t new_keyfile_offset)
{
- int digest, r, active_slots;
- size_t passwordLen, new_passwordLen;
- struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
- char *password = NULL, *new_password = NULL;
- struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context kc, new_kc;
if (!keyfile || !new_keyfile)
return -EINVAL;
- log_dbg(cd, "Adding new keyslot, existing keyfile %s, new keyfile %s.",
- keyfile, new_keyfile);
-
- if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
- return r;
-
- r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
- if (r)
- return r;
-
- if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
- active_slots = LUKS_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
- else
- active_slots = LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
- if (active_slots == 0) {
- /* No slots used, try to use pre-generated key in header */
- if (cd->volume_key) {
- vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
- r = vk ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
- } else {
- log_err(cd, _("Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- } else {
- r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, keyfile,
- &password, &passwordLen,
- keyfile_offset, keyfile_size, 0);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
-
- if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
- r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, password, passwordLen,
- &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
- else
- r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, password, passwordLen, &vk);
- }
-
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
-
- r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, new_keyfile,
- &new_password, &new_passwordLen,
- new_keyfile_offset, new_keyfile_size, 0);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
-
- if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
- r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot, new_password, new_passwordLen,
- &cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd);
- else {
- r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
- digest = r;
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_keyfile_init_internal(&kc, keyfile, keyfile_size, keyfile_offset);
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_keyfile_init_internal(&new_kc, new_keyfile, new_keyfile_size, new_keyfile_offset);
- if (r >= 0)
- r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, ¶ms);
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyslot_context(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &kc, keyslot, &new_kc, 0);
- if (r >= 0)
- r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, digest, 1, 0);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&new_kc);
- if (r >= 0)
- r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot,
- new_password, new_passwordLen, vk, ¶ms);
- }
-out:
- crypt_safe_free(password);
- crypt_safe_free(new_password);
- crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
- if (r < 0) {
- _luks2_reload(cd);
- return r;
- }
- return keyslot;
+ return r;
}
int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *passphrase,
size_t passphrase_size)
{
- struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
int r;
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context kc, new_kc;
if (!passphrase)
return -EINVAL;
- log_dbg(cd, "Adding new keyslot %d using volume key.", keyslot);
-
- if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
- return r;
-
- if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
- return crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, keyslot,
- volume_key, volume_key_size, passphrase,
- passphrase_size, 0);
-
- r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
-
- if (volume_key)
- vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
- else if (cd->volume_key)
- vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_key_init_internal(&kc, volume_key, volume_key_size);
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&new_kc, passphrase, passphrase_size);
- if (!vk)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyslot_context(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &kc, keyslot, &new_kc, 0);
- r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
- if (r < 0)
- log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
- else
- r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size,
- &cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&new_kc);
- crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
- return (r < 0) ? r : keyslot;
+ return r;
}
int crypt_keyslot_destroy(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
if (kernel_version(&kversion))
return 1;
- return kversion < version(4,15,0,0);
+ return kversion < compact_version(4,15,0,0);
}
int create_or_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
return -EINVAL;
tgt = &dmd->segment;
- if (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT)
+ if (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT && tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY)
return -EINVAL;
/* drop CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH flag if any device is inactive */
if (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH)
r = _reload_device(cd, name, dmd);
else {
- device_check = dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED ? DEV_OK : DEV_EXCL;
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+ device_check = dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED ? DEV_OK : DEV_EXCL;
- r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, device_check,
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, device_check,
tgt->u.crypt.offset, &dmd->size, &dmd->flags);
- if (!r) {
- tgt->size = dmd->size;
+ if (!r) {
+ tgt->size = dmd->size;
+ r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
+ }
+ } else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY) {
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, DEV_EXCL,
+ tgt->u.integrity.offset, NULL, &dmd->flags);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device, DEV_EXCL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+ }
+
r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
}
}
return r;
}
-/* See fixmes in _open_and_activate_luks2 */
-int update_reencryption_flag(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable, bool commit);
-
-/* TODO: This function should 1:1 with pre-reencryption code */
static int _open_and_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
int keyslot,
const char *name,
struct volume_key *vk = vks;
while (vk) {
- r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, hdr, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk));
+ r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk));
if (r < 0)
return r;
vk = crypt_volume_key_next(vk);
}
if ((r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL)))
- goto err;
+ goto out;
ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(hdr);
if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CRASH) {
r = LUKS2_reencrypt_locked_recovery_by_passphrase(cd, keyslot,
- keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags, &vks);
+ keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, &vks);
if (r < 0) {
log_err(cd, _("LUKS2 reencryption recovery failed."));
- goto err;
+ goto out;
}
keyslot = r;
if (ri > CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CLEAN) {
r = -EINVAL;
- goto err;
+ goto out;
}
if (LUKS2_get_data_size(hdr, &minimal_size, &dynamic_size))
- goto err;
+ goto out;
if (!vks) {
r = _open_all_keys(cd, hdr, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags, &vks);
if (r >= 0) {
r = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vks);
if (r < 0)
- goto err;
+ goto out;
}
log_dbg(cd, "Entering clean reencryption state mode.");
if (r >= 0)
r = LUKS2_activate_multi(cd, name, vks, device_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT, flags);
-err:
+out:
LUKS2_reencrypt_unlock(cd, reencrypt_lock);
if (r < 0)
crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vks);
r = _open_and_activate_luks2(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
keyslot = r;
} else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
- r = BITLK_activate(cd, name, passphrase, passphrase_size,
- &cd->u.bitlk.params, flags);
+ r = BITLK_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+ &cd->u.bitlk.params, flags);
+ keyslot = 0;
+ } else if (isFVAULT2(cd->type)) {
+ r = FVAULT2_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+ &cd->u.fvault2.params, flags);
keyslot = 0;
} else {
log_err(cd, _("Device type is not properly initialized."));
if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
use_keyring = false;
else
- use_keyring = (name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY);
+ use_keyring = (name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) ||
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY);
if (!r && use_keyring) {
r = LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(cd,
cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key,
cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key, flags,
cd->u.integrity.sb_flags);
+ } else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+ r = BITLK_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size,
+ &cd->u.bitlk.params, flags);
} else {
log_err(cd, _("Device type is not properly initialized."));
r = -EINVAL;
return -EINVAL;
}
- log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s by %skey.", name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "", signature ? "signed " : "");
+ if (name)
+ log_dbg(cd, "Activating volume %s by %skey.", name, signature ? "signed " : "");
+ else
+ log_dbg(cd, "Checking volume by key.");
if (cd->u.verity.hdr.flags & CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE && !signature) {
log_err(cd, _("Root hash signature required."));
if (!name)
return -EINVAL;
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED) && (flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
log_dbg(cd, "Deactivating volume %s.", name);
if (!cd) {
}
/* skip holders detection and early abort when some flags raised */
- if (flags & (CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE | CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED))
+ if (flags & (CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE | CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED | CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL))
get_flags &= ~DM_ACTIVE_HOLDERS;
switch (crypt_status(cd, name)) {
case CRYPT_ACTIVE:
case CRYPT_BUSY:
+ if (flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL) {
+ r = dm_cancel_deferred_removal(name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Could not cancel deferred remove from device %s."), name);
+ break;
+ }
+
r = dm_query_device(cd, name, get_flags, &dmd);
if (r >= 0) {
if (dmd.holders) {
if (!name)
return 0;
- /* FIXME: LUKS2 / dm-crypt does not provide this count. */
+ /* LUKS2 / dm-crypt does not provide this count. */
if (dm_query_device(cd, name, 0, &dmd) < 0)
return 0;
int keyslot,
char *volume_key,
size_t *volume_key_size,
- const char *passphrase,
- size_t passphrase_size)
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context kc;
+
+ if (!passphrase)
+ return crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context(cd, keyslot, volume_key, volume_key_size, NULL);
+
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&kc, passphrase, passphrase_size);
+
+ r = crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context(cd, keyslot, volume_key, volume_key_size, &kc);
+
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ char *volume_key,
+ size_t *volume_key_size,
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context *kc)
{
+ size_t passphrase_size;
+ int key_len, r;
+ const char *passphrase = NULL;
struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
- int key_len, r = -EINVAL;
- if (!cd || !volume_key || !volume_key_size || (!isTCRYPT(cd->type) && !isVERITY(cd->type) && !passphrase))
+ if (!cd || !volume_key || !volume_key_size ||
+ (!kc && !isLUKS(cd->type) && !isTCRYPT(cd->type) && !isVERITY(cd->type)))
return -EINVAL;
if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
return -ENOMEM;
}
- if (isPLAIN(cd->type) && cd->u.plain.hdr.hash) {
- r = process_key(cd, cd->u.plain.hdr.hash, key_len,
- passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+ if (kc && (!kc->get_passphrase || kc->type == CRYPT_KC_TYPE_KEY))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (kc) {
+ r = kc->get_passphrase(cd, kc, &passphrase, &passphrase_size);
if (r < 0)
- log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ if (kc && !kc->get_luks2_key)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for LUKS2 device."));
+ else if (!kc)
+ r = -ENOENT;
+ else
+ r = kc->get_luks2_key(cd, kc, keyslot,
+ keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT ? CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT : CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT,
+ &vk);
} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
- r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase,
- passphrase_size, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
- } else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
- r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot,
- keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT ? CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT : CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT,
- passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
- } else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
- r = TCRYPT_get_volume_key(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params, &vk);
+ if (kc && !kc->get_luks1_volume_key)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for LUKS1 device."));
+ else if (!kc)
+ r = -ENOENT;
+ else
+ r = kc->get_luks1_volume_key(cd, kc, keyslot, &vk);
+ } else if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
+ if (passphrase && cd->u.plain.hdr.hash)
+ r = process_key(cd, cd->u.plain.hdr.hash, key_len,
+ passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."));
} else if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
/* volume_key == root hash */
if (cd->u.verity.root_hash) {
r = 0;
} else
log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve root hash for verity device."));
+ } else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+ r = TCRYPT_get_volume_key(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params, &vk);
+ } else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+ if (passphrase)
+ r = BITLK_get_volume_key(cd, passphrase, passphrase_size, &cd->u.bitlk.params, &vk);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for BITLK device."));
+ } else if (isFVAULT2(cd->type)) {
+ if (passphrase)
+ r = FVAULT2_get_volume_key(cd, passphrase, passphrase_size, &cd->u.fvault2.params, &vk);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for FVAULT2 device."));
} else
log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."), cd->type ?: "(none)");
+ if (r == -ENOENT && isLUKS(cd->type) && cd->volume_key) {
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
+ r = vk ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
if (r >= 0 && vk) {
memcpy(volume_key, vk->key, vk->keylength);
*volume_key_size = vk->keylength;
else
r = -EINVAL;
-
- if (r == -EPERM)
- log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
-
crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
return r >= 0 ? 0 : r;
int crypt_memory_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, int lock)
{
- return lock ? crypt_memlock_inc(cd) : crypt_memlock_dec(cd);
+ return 0;
}
void crypt_set_compatibility(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t flags)
return CRYPT_INACTIVE;
}
-static void hexprint(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *d, int n, const char *sep)
-{
- int i;
- for(i = 0; i < n; i++)
- log_std(cd, "%02hhx%s", (const char)d[i], sep);
-}
-
static int _luks_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
int i;
log_std(cd, "Payload offset:\t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.payloadOffset);
log_std(cd, "MK bits: \t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes * 8);
log_std(cd, "MK digest: \t");
- hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE, " ");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE, " ", 0, NULL);
log_std(cd, "\n");
log_std(cd, "MK salt: \t");
- hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
log_std(cd, "\n \t");
- hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt+LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt+LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
log_std(cd, "\n");
log_std(cd, "MK iterations: \t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestIterations);
log_std(cd, "UUID: \t%s\n\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.uuid);
log_std(cd, "\tIterations: \t%" PRIu32 "\n",
cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordIterations);
log_std(cd, "\tSalt: \t");
- hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt,
- LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt,
+ LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
log_std(cd, "\n\t \t");
- hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt +
- LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt +
+ LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
log_std(cd, "\n");
log_std(cd, "\tKey material offset:\t%" PRIu32 "\n",
return 0;
}
-static int _verity_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
-{
- log_std(cd, "VERITY header information for %s\n", mdata_device_path(cd));
- log_std(cd, "UUID: \t%s\n", cd->u.verity.uuid ?: "");
- log_std(cd, "Hash type: \t%u\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type);
- log_std(cd, "Data blocks: \t%" PRIu64 "\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size);
- log_std(cd, "Data block size: \t%u\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.data_block_size);
- log_std(cd, "Hash block size: \t%u\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_block_size);
- log_std(cd, "Hash algorithm: \t%s\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
- log_std(cd, "Salt: \t");
- if (cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size)
- hexprint(cd, cd->u.verity.hdr.salt, cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size, "");
- else
- log_std(cd, "-");
- log_std(cd, "\n");
- if (cd->u.verity.root_hash) {
- log_std(cd, "Root hash: \t");
- hexprint(cd, cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size, "");
- log_std(cd, "\n");
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
int crypt_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
if (!cd)
else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
return LUKS2_hdr_dump(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
else if (isVERITY(cd->type))
- return _verity_dump(cd);
+ return VERITY_dump(cd, &cd->u.verity.hdr,
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size,
+ cd->u.verity.fec_device);
else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
return TCRYPT_dump(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
else if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
return INTEGRITY_dump(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), 0);
else if (isBITLK(cd->type))
return BITLK_dump(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), &cd->u.bitlk.params);
+ else if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return FVAULT2_dump(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), &cd->u.fvault2.params);
+
+ log_err(cd, _("Dump operation is not supported for this device type."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_dump_json(struct crypt_device *cd, const char **json, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ if (!cd || flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_hdr_dump_json(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, json);
log_err(cd, _("Dump operation is not supported for this device type."));
return -EINVAL;
if (isBITLK(cd->type))
return cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher;
+ if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.fvault2.params.cipher;
+
if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
return cd->u.none.cipher;
if (isBITLK(cd->type))
return cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher_mode;
+ if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.fvault2.params.cipher_mode;
+
if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
return cd->u.none.cipher_mode;
/* INTERNAL only */
int crypt_get_integrity_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
+ int key_size = 0;
+
if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
- return INTEGRITY_key_size(cd, crypt_get_integrity(cd));
+ key_size = INTEGRITY_key_size(crypt_get_integrity(cd));
if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
- return INTEGRITY_key_size(cd, crypt_get_integrity(cd));
+ key_size = INTEGRITY_key_size(crypt_get_integrity(cd));
- return 0;
+ return key_size > 0 ? key_size : 0;
}
/* INTERNAL only */
return cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size;
if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
- return INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, crypt_get_integrity(cd),
+ return INTEGRITY_tag_size(crypt_get_integrity(cd),
crypt_get_cipher(cd),
crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
return 0;
if (isBITLK(cd->type))
return cd->u.bitlk.params.guid;
+ if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.fvault2.params.family_uuid;
+
return NULL;
}
if (isBITLK(cd->type))
return cd->u.bitlk.params.key_size / 8;
+ if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.fvault2.params.key_size;
+
if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
return cd->u.none.key_size;
{
char *tmp;
- if (!cd || !cipher || ! key_size || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ if (!cd || !cipher || !key_size || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
return -EINVAL;
if (LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(cd, cipher))
return -EINVAL;
- tmp = strdup(cipher);
+ if (!(tmp = strdup(cipher)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
free(cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher);
cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher = tmp;
- if (!cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher)
- return -ENOMEM;
cd->u.luks2.keyslot_key_size = key_size;
return 0;
if (isBITLK(cd->type))
return cd->u.bitlk.params.volume_header_size / SECTOR_SIZE;
+ if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.fvault2.params.log_vol_off / SECTOR_SIZE;
+
return cd->data_offset;
}
int crypt_keyslot_max(const char *type)
{
- if (type && isLUKS1(type))
+ if (isLUKS1(type))
return LUKS_NUMKEYS;
- if (type && isLUKS2(type))
+ if (isLUKS2(type))
return LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX;
return -EINVAL;
return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID;
if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
- return LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+ return LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL;
}
ip->integrity = LUKS2_get_integrity(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
ip->integrity_key_size = crypt_get_integrity_key_size(cd);
- ip->tag_size = INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, ip->integrity, crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+ ip->tag_size = INTEGRITY_tag_size(ip->integrity, crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
ip->journal_integrity = NULL;
ip->journal_integrity_key_size = 0;
if (r < 0) {
/* in-memory header may be invalid after failed conversion */
- _luks2_reload(cd);
+ _luks2_rollback(cd);
if (r == -EBUSY)
log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."), mdata_device_path(cd));
return r;
}
- crypt_free_type(cd);
+ crypt_free_type(cd, NULL);
return crypt_load(cd, type, params);
}
/*
* Token handling
*/
-int crypt_activate_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *name, int token, void *usrptr, uint32_t flags)
+int crypt_activate_by_token_pin(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ const char *type, int token, const char *pin, size_t pin_size,
+ void *usrptr, uint32_t flags)
{
int r;
- log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s using token %d.",
- name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase", token);
+ log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s using token (%s type) %d.",
+ name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase",
+ type ?: "any", token);
if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
return r;
if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) && name)
return -EINVAL;
- if (token == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN)
- return LUKS2_token_open_and_activate_any(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, name, flags);
+ r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, name, type,
+ pin, pin_size, flags, usrptr);
+}
- return LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, name, flags, usrptr);
+int crypt_activate_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name, int token, void *usrptr, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ return crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, NULL, token, NULL, 0, usrptr, flags);
}
int crypt_token_json_get(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, const char **json)
if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
return r;
- return LUKS2_token_json_get(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, json) ?: token;
+ return LUKS2_token_json_get(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, json) ?: token;
}
int crypt_token_json_set(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, const char *json)
return LUKS2_token_status(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, type);
}
+int crypt_token_max(const char *type)
+{
+ if (isLUKS2(type))
+ return LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX;
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
int crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
int token,
struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *params)
return -EINVAL;
}
- return LUKS2_builtin_token_get(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING, params);
+ return LUKS2_token_keyring_get(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, params);
}
int crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
const struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *params)
{
int r;
+ char json[4096];
- if (!params)
+ if (!params || !params->key_description)
return -EINVAL;
log_dbg(cd, "Creating new LUKS2 keyring token (%d).", token);
if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
return r;
- return LUKS2_builtin_token_create(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING, params, 1);
+ r = LUKS2_token_keyring_json(json, sizeof(json), params);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return LUKS2_token_create(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, json, 1);
}
int crypt_token_assign_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, int keyslot)
if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
return r;
- return LUKS2_token_is_assigned(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, token);
+ return LUKS2_token_is_assigned(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, token);
}
/* Internal only */
return _metadata_locking;
}
-int crypt_metadata_locking(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable)
+int crypt_metadata_locking(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)), int enable)
{
if (enable && !_metadata_locking)
return -EPERM;
}
static int verify_and_update_segment_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
- struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot,
- const char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size,
- const char *password, size_t password_size)
+ struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, struct crypt_keyslot_context *kc)
{
int digest, r;
struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
- if (keyslot < 0 || (volume_key && !volume_key_size))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (volume_key)
- vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
- else {
- r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT, password, password_size, &vk);
- if (r != keyslot) {
- r = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- }
+ assert(kc);
+ assert(kc->get_luks2_key);
+ assert(keyslot >= 0);
- if (!vk)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ r = kc->get_luks2_key(cd, kc, keyslot, CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT, &vk);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
/* check volume_key (param) digest matches keyslot digest */
r = LUKS2_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vk, keyslot);
log_err(cd, _("Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."), keyslot);
out:
crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
}
+static int luks2_keyslot_add_by_verified_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot_new,
+ const char *new_passphrase,
+ size_t new_passphrase_size,
+ struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
+
+ assert(cd);
+ assert(keyslot_new >= 0);
+ assert(new_passphrase);
+ assert(vk);
+ assert(crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk) >= 0);
+
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, ¶ms);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to initialize default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_new, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk), 1, 0);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."), keyslot_new);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_new,
+ CONST_CAST(char*)new_passphrase,
+ new_passphrase_size, vk, ¶ms);
+
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot_new;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot_new,
+ const char *new_passphrase,
+ size_t new_passphrase_size,
+ struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ assert(cd);
+ assert(keyslot_new >= 0);
+ assert(new_passphrase);
+ assert(vk);
+
+ r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ crypt_volume_key_set_id(vk, r);
+
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return luks2_keyslot_add_by_verified_volume_key(cd, keyslot_new, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size, vk);
+}
+
+static int luks1_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot_new,
+ const char *new_passphrase,
+ size_t new_passphrase_size,
+ struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ assert(cd);
+ assert(keyslot_new >= 0);
+ assert(new_passphrase);
+ assert(vk);
+
+ r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot_new, CONST_CAST(char*)new_passphrase,
+ new_passphrase_size, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd);
+
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot_new;
+}
+
+static int keyslot_add_by_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ bool is_luks1,
+ int keyslot_new,
+ const char *new_passphrase,
+ size_t new_passphrase_size,
+ struct volume_key *vk,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ int r, digest;
+
+ assert(cd);
+ assert(keyslot_new >= 0);
+ assert(new_passphrase);
+ assert(vk);
+
+ if (!flags)
+ return is_luks1 ? luks1_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, keyslot_new, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size, vk) :
+ luks2_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, keyslot_new, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size, vk);
+
+ if (is_luks1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ digest = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+ if (digest >= 0) /* if key matches volume key digest tear down new vk flag */
+ flags &= ~CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET;
+ else {
+ /* if key matches any existing digest, do not create new digest */
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_DIGEST_REUSE))
+ digest = LUKS2_digest_any_matching(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk);
+
+ /* no segment flag or new vk flag requires new key digest */
+ if (flags & (CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT | CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET)) {
+ if (digest < 0 || !(flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_DIGEST_REUSE))
+ digest = LUKS2_digest_create(cd, "pbkdf2", &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk);
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = digest;
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ crypt_volume_key_set_id(vk, digest);
+
+ if (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET) {
+ r = update_volume_key_segment_digest(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, digest, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."), keyslot_new);
+ }
+
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = luks2_keyslot_add_by_verified_volume_key(cd, keyslot_new, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size, vk);
+
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot_new;
+}
int crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
int keyslot,
size_t passphrase_size,
uint32_t flags)
{
- int digest, r;
- struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
- struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context kc, new_kc;
if (!passphrase || ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT) &&
(flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET)))
return -EINVAL;
- log_dbg(cd, "Adding new keyslot %d with volume key %sassigned to a crypt segment.",
- keyslot, flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT ? "un" : "");
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)) < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET) && crypt_keyslot_status(cd, keyslot) > CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE &&
+ isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ if (volume_key)
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_key_init_internal(&kc, volume_key, volume_key_size);
+ else
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&kc, passphrase, passphrase_size);
+
+ r = verify_and_update_segment_digest(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, &kc);
+
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
- if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
return r;
+ }
- /* new volume key assignment */
- if ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET) && crypt_keyslot_status(cd, keyslot) > CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE)
- return verify_and_update_segment_digest(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr,
- keyslot, volume_key, volume_key_size, passphrase, passphrase_size);
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_key_init_internal(&kc, volume_key, volume_key_size);
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&new_kc, passphrase, passphrase_size);
- r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
- if (r < 0)
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyslot_context(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &kc, keyslot, &new_kc, flags);
+
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&new_kc);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyslot_context(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot_existing,
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context *kc,
+ int keyslot_new,
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context *new_kc,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ bool is_luks1;
+ int active_slots, r;
+ const char *new_passphrase;
+ size_t new_passphrase_size;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+ if (!kc || ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT) &&
+ (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = flags ? onlyLUKS2(cd) : onlyLUKS(cd);
+ if (r)
return r;
- if (volume_key)
- vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
- else if (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT)
- vk = crypt_generate_volume_key(cd, volume_key_size);
- else if (cd->volume_key)
- vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
- else
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET) && crypt_keyslot_status(cd, keyslot_existing) > CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE)
+ return verify_and_update_segment_digest(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_existing, kc);
+
+ if (!new_kc || !new_kc->get_passphrase)
return -EINVAL;
- if (!vk)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Adding new keyslot %d by %s%s, volume key provided by %s (%d).",
+ keyslot_new, keyslot_context_type_string(new_kc),
+ (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT) ? " unassigned to a crypt segment" : "",
+ keyslot_context_type_string(kc), keyslot_existing);
- /* if key matches volume key digest tear down new vk flag */
- digest = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
- if (digest >= 0)
- flags &= ~CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET;
+ r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot_new);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
- /* if key matches any existing digest, do not create new digest */
- if (digest < 0 && (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_DIGEST_REUSE))
- digest = LUKS2_digest_any_matching(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk);
+ is_luks1 = isLUKS1(cd->type);
+ if (is_luks1)
+ active_slots = LUKS_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
+ else
+ active_slots = LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
- /* no segment flag or new vk flag requires new key digest */
- if (flags & (CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT | CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET)) {
- if (digest < 0 || !(flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_DIGEST_REUSE))
- digest = LUKS2_digest_create(cd, "pbkdf2", &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk);
- }
+ if (active_slots < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
- r = digest;
- if (r < 0) {
- log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
- goto out;
- }
+ if (active_slots == 0 && kc->type != CRYPT_KC_TYPE_KEY)
+ r = -ENOENT;
+ else if (is_luks1 && kc->get_luks1_volume_key)
+ r = kc->get_luks1_volume_key(cd, kc, keyslot_existing, &vk);
+ else if (!is_luks1 && kc->get_luks2_volume_key)
+ r = kc->get_luks2_volume_key(cd, kc, keyslot_existing, &vk);
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
- r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, ¶ms);
- if (r < 0) {
- log_err(cd, _("Failed to initialize default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."));
- goto out;
+ if (r == -ENOENT) {
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT) && kc->type == CRYPT_KC_TYPE_KEY) {
+ if (!(vk = crypt_generate_volume_key(cd, kc->u.k.volume_key_size)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ r = 0;
+ } else if (cd->volume_key) {
+ if (!(vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ r = 0;
+ } else if (active_slots == 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
}
- r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, digest, 1, 0);
- if (r < 0) {
- log_err(cd, _("Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."), keyslot);
- goto out;
- }
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
- r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot,
- passphrase, passphrase_size, vk, ¶ms);
+ r = new_kc->get_passphrase(cd, new_kc, &new_passphrase, &new_passphrase_size);
+ /* If new keyslot context is token just assign it to new keyslot */
+ if (r >= 0 && new_kc->type == CRYPT_KC_TYPE_TOKEN && !is_luks1)
+ r = LUKS2_token_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_new, new_kc->u.t.id, 1, 0);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = keyslot_add_by_key(cd, is_luks1, keyslot_new, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size, vk, flags);
- if (r >= 0 && (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET))
- r = update_volume_key_segment_digest(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, digest, 1);
-out:
crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
if (r < 0) {
- _luks2_reload(cd);
+ _luks2_rollback(cd);
return r;
}
- return keyslot;
+
+ return keyslot_new;
}
/*
* Keyring handling
*/
-
int crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
uint32_t dmc_flags;
return (dmc_flags & DM_KERNEL_KEYRING_SUPPORTED);
}
-int crypt_volume_key_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable)
+int crypt_volume_key_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)), int enable)
{
_vk_via_keyring = enable ? 1 : 0;
return 0;
r = _activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
- crypt_safe_memzero(passphrase, passphrase_size);
- free(passphrase);
+ crypt_safe_free(passphrase);
return r;
}
crypt_reencrypt_info crypt_reencrypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params)
{
- if (!cd || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ if (params)
+ memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
+
+ if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type))
+ return CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
return CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE;
if (_onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET, CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_ONLINE_REENCRYPT))
static void __attribute__((destructor)) libcryptsetup_exit(void)
{
+ crypt_token_unload_external_all(NULL);
+
crypt_backend_destroy();
crypt_random_exit();
}
projects / platform / upstream / cryptsetup.git / blobdiff