/*
* libcryptsetup - cryptsetup library
*
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
- * version 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "libcryptsetup.h"
-#include "luks.h"
-#include "loopaes.h"
-#include "verity.h"
-#include "tcrypt.h"
+#include "luks1/luks.h"
+#include "luks2/luks2.h"
+#include "loopaes/loopaes.h"
+#include "verity/verity.h"
+#include "tcrypt/tcrypt.h"
+#include "integrity/integrity.h"
+#include "bitlk/bitlk.h"
+#include "fvault2/fvault2.h"
+#include "utils_device_locking.h"
#include "internal.h"
+#include "keyslot_context.h"
+
+#define CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED (1 << 0)
+#define CRYPT_CD_QUIET (1 << 1)
struct crypt_device {
char *type;
struct device *metadata_device;
struct volume_key *volume_key;
- uint64_t timeout;
- uint64_t iteration_time;
- int tries;
- int password_verify;
int rng_type;
-
- // FIXME: switch to union
- // FIXME: privatre binary headers and access it properly
- // through sub-library (LUKS1, TCRYPT)
-
- /* used in CRYPT_LUKS1 */
- struct luks_phdr hdr;
- uint64_t PBKDF2_per_sec;
-
- /* used in CRYPT_PLAIN */
- struct crypt_params_plain plain_hdr;
- char *plain_cipher;
- char *plain_cipher_mode;
- char *plain_uuid;
- unsigned int plain_key_size;
-
- /* used in CRYPT_LOOPAES */
- struct crypt_params_loopaes loopaes_hdr;
- char *loopaes_cipher;
- char *loopaes_cipher_mode;
- char *loopaes_uuid;
- unsigned int loopaes_key_size;
-
- /* used in CRYPT_VERITY */
- struct crypt_params_verity verity_hdr;
- char *verity_root_hash;
- unsigned int verity_root_hash_size;
- char *verity_uuid;
-
- /* used in CRYPT_TCRYPT */
- struct crypt_params_tcrypt tcrypt_params;
- struct tcrypt_phdr tcrypt_hdr;
+ uint32_t compatibility;
+ struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf;
+
+ /* global context scope settings */
+ unsigned key_in_keyring:1;
+
+ uint64_t data_offset;
+ uint64_t metadata_size; /* Used in LUKS2 format */
+ uint64_t keyslots_size; /* Used in LUKS2 format */
+
+ /* Workaround for OOM during parallel activation (like in systemd) */
+ bool memory_hard_pbkdf_lock_enabled;
+ struct crypt_lock_handle *pbkdf_memory_hard_lock;
+
+ union {
+ struct { /* used in CRYPT_LUKS1 */
+ struct luks_phdr hdr;
+ char *cipher_spec;
+ } luks1;
+ struct { /* used in CRYPT_LUKS2 */
+ struct luks2_hdr hdr;
+ char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN]; /* only for compatibility */
+ char cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN]; /* only for compatibility */
+ char *keyslot_cipher;
+ unsigned int keyslot_key_size;
+ struct luks2_reencrypt *rh;
+ } luks2;
+ struct { /* used in CRYPT_PLAIN */
+ struct crypt_params_plain hdr;
+ char *cipher_spec;
+ char *cipher;
+ const char *cipher_mode;
+ unsigned int key_size;
+ } plain;
+ struct { /* used in CRYPT_LOOPAES */
+ struct crypt_params_loopaes hdr;
+ char *cipher_spec;
+ char *cipher;
+ const char *cipher_mode;
+ unsigned int key_size;
+ } loopaes;
+ struct { /* used in CRYPT_VERITY */
+ struct crypt_params_verity hdr;
+ const char *root_hash;
+ unsigned int root_hash_size;
+ char *uuid;
+ struct device *fec_device;
+ } verity;
+ struct { /* used in CRYPT_TCRYPT */
+ struct crypt_params_tcrypt params;
+ struct tcrypt_phdr hdr;
+ } tcrypt;
+ struct { /* used in CRYPT_INTEGRITY */
+ struct crypt_params_integrity params;
+ struct volume_key *journal_mac_key;
+ struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key;
+ uint32_t sb_flags;
+ } integrity;
+ struct { /* used in CRYPT_BITLK */
+ struct bitlk_metadata params;
+ char *cipher_spec;
+ } bitlk;
+ struct { /* used in CRYPT_FVAULT2 */
+ struct fvault2_params params;
+ } fvault2;
+ struct { /* used if initialized without header by name */
+ char *active_name;
+ /* buffers, must refresh from kernel on every query */
+ char cipher_spec[MAX_CIPHER_LEN*2+1];
+ char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+ const char *cipher_mode;
+ unsigned int key_size;
+ } none;
+ } u;
/* callbacks definitions */
void (*log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr);
void *log_usrptr;
int (*confirm)(const char *msg, void *usrptr);
void *confirm_usrptr;
- int (*password)(const char *msg, char *buf, size_t length, void *usrptr);
- void *password_usrptr;
-
- /* last error message */
- char error[MAX_ERROR_LENGTH];
};
-/* Global error */
-/* FIXME: not thread safe, remove this later */
-static char global_error[MAX_ERROR_LENGTH] = {0};
+/* Just to suppress redundant messages about crypto backend */
+static int _crypto_logged = 0;
/* Log helper */
static void (*_default_log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr) = NULL;
+static void *_default_log_usrptr = NULL;
static int _debug_level = 0;
+/* Library can do metadata locking */
+static int _metadata_locking = 1;
+
+/* Library scope detection for kernel keyring support */
+static int _kernel_keyring_supported;
+
+/* Library allowed to use kernel keyring for loading VK in kernel crypto layer */
+static int _vk_via_keyring = 1;
+
void crypt_set_debug_level(int level)
{
_debug_level = level;
return _debug_level;
}
-static void crypt_set_error(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *error)
+void crypt_log(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *msg)
{
- size_t size = strlen(error);
-
- /* Set global error, ugly hack... */
- strncpy(global_error, error, MAX_ERROR_LENGTH - 2);
- if (size < MAX_ERROR_LENGTH && global_error[size - 1] == '\n')
- global_error[size - 1] = '\0';
+ if (!msg)
+ return;
- /* Set error string per context */
- if (cd) {
- strncpy(cd->error, error, MAX_ERROR_LENGTH - 2);
- if (size < MAX_ERROR_LENGTH && cd->error[size - 1] == '\n')
- cd->error[size - 1] = '\0';
- }
-}
+ if (level < _debug_level)
+ return;
-void crypt_log(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *msg)
-{
if (cd && cd->log)
cd->log(level, msg, cd->log_usrptr);
else if (_default_log)
- _default_log(level, msg, NULL);
-
- if (level == CRYPT_LOG_ERROR)
- crypt_set_error(cd, msg);
+ _default_log(level, msg, _default_log_usrptr);
+ /* Default to stdout/stderr if there is no callback. */
+ else
+ fprintf(level == CRYPT_LOG_ERROR ? stderr : stdout, "%s", msg);
}
-__attribute__((format(printf, 5, 6)))
-void logger(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *file,
- int line, const char *format, ...)
+__attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)))
+void crypt_logf(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list argp;
- char *target = NULL;
+ char target[LOG_MAX_LEN + 2];
+ int len;
va_start(argp, format);
- if (vasprintf(&target, format, argp) > 0 ) {
- if (level >= 0) {
- crypt_log(cd, level, target);
-#ifdef CRYPT_DEBUG
- } else if (_debug_level)
- printf("# %s:%d %s\n", file ?: "?", line, target);
-#else
- } else if (_debug_level)
- printf("# %s\n", target);
-#endif
+ len = vsnprintf(&target[0], LOG_MAX_LEN, format, argp);
+ if (len > 0 && len < LOG_MAX_LEN) {
+ /* All verbose and error messages in tools end with EOL. */
+ if (level == CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE || level == CRYPT_LOG_ERROR ||
+ level == CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG || level == CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG_JSON)
+ strncat(target, "\n", LOG_MAX_LEN);
+
+ crypt_log(cd, level, target);
}
va_end(argp);
- free(target);
}
static const char *mdata_device_path(struct crypt_device *cd)
return device_path(cd->metadata_device ?: cd->device);
}
+static const char *data_device_path(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ return device_path(cd->device);
+}
+
/* internal only */
struct device *crypt_metadata_device(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
int init_crypto(struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
+ struct utsname uts;
int r;
- crypt_fips_libcryptsetup_check(ctx);
-
r = crypt_random_init(ctx);
if (r < 0) {
- log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend.\n"));
+ log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend."));
return r;
}
- r = crypt_backend_init(ctx);
+ r = crypt_backend_init(crypt_fips_mode());
if (r < 0)
- log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto backend.\n"));
+ log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto backend."));
+
+ if (!r && !_crypto_logged) {
+ log_dbg(ctx, "Crypto backend (%s) initialized in cryptsetup library version %s.",
+ crypt_backend_version(), PACKAGE_VERSION);
+ if (!uname(&uts))
+ log_dbg(ctx, "Detected kernel %s %s %s.",
+ uts.sysname, uts.release, uts.machine);
+ _crypto_logged = 1;
+ }
- log_dbg("Crypto backend (%s) initialized.", crypt_backend_version());
return r;
}
r = crypt_plain_hash(cd, hash_name, (*vk)->key, key_size, pass, passLen);
if (r < 0) {
if (r == -ENOENT)
- log_err(cd, _("Hash algorithm %s not supported.\n"),
+ log_err(cd, _("Hash algorithm %s not supported."),
hash_name);
else
- log_err(cd, _("Key processing error (using hash %s).\n"),
+ log_err(cd, _("Key processing error (using hash %s)."),
hash_name);
crypt_free_volume_key(*vk);
*vk = NULL;
return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_PLAIN, type));
}
-static int isLUKS(const char *type)
+static int isLUKS1(const char *type)
{
return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_LUKS1, type));
}
+static int isLUKS2(const char *type)
+{
+ return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_LUKS2, type));
+}
+
+static int isLUKS(const char *type)
+{
+ return (isLUKS2(type) || isLUKS1(type));
+}
+
static int isLOOPAES(const char *type)
{
return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_LOOPAES, type));
return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_TCRYPT, type));
}
+static int isINTEGRITY(const char *type)
+{
+ return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_INTEGRITY, type));
+}
+
+static int isBITLK(const char *type)
+{
+ return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_BITLK, type));
+}
+
+static int isFVAULT2(const char *type)
+{
+ return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_FVAULT2, type));
+}
+
+static int _onlyLUKS(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t cdflags)
+{
+ int r = 0;
+
+ if (cd && !cd->type) {
+ if (!(cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET))
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type)) {
+ if (!(cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET))
+ log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (r || (cdflags & CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED) || isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return r;
+
+ return LUKS2_unmet_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, 0, cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET);
+}
+
+static int onlyLUKS(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ return _onlyLUKS(cd, 0);
+}
+
+static int _onlyLUKS2(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t cdflags, uint32_t mask)
+{
+ int r = 0;
+
+ if (cd && !cd->type) {
+ if (!(cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET))
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!cd || !isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ if (!(cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET))
+ log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS2 device."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (r || (cdflags & CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED))
+ return r;
+
+ return LUKS2_unmet_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, mask, cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET);
+}
+
+/* Internal only */
+int onlyLUKS2(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ return _onlyLUKS2(cd, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/* Internal only */
+int onlyLUKS2mask(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t mask)
+{
+ return _onlyLUKS2(cd, 0, mask);
+}
+
+static void crypt_set_null_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ free(cd->type);
+ cd->type = NULL;
+ cd->data_offset = 0;
+ cd->metadata_size = 0;
+ cd->keyslots_size = 0;
+ crypt_safe_memzero(&cd->u, sizeof(cd->u));
+}
+
+static void crypt_reset_null_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (cd->type)
+ return;
+
+ free(cd->u.none.active_name);
+ cd->u.none.active_name = NULL;
+}
+
/* keyslot helpers */
static int keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(struct crypt_device *cd, int *keyslot)
{
+ crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+
if (*keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
- *keyslot = LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->hdr);
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ *keyslot = LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
+ else
+ *keyslot = LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, 0);
if (*keyslot < 0) {
- log_err(cd, _("All key slots full.\n"));
+ log_err(cd, _("All key slots full."));
return -EINVAL;
}
}
- switch (LUKS_keyslot_info(&cd->hdr, *keyslot)) {
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ ki = LUKS_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, *keyslot);
+ else
+ ki = LUKS2_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, *keyslot);
+ switch (ki) {
case CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID:
- log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d.\n"),
- *keyslot, LUKS_NUMKEYS - 1);
+ log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."),
+ *keyslot, crypt_keyslot_max(cd->type) - 1);
return -EINVAL;
case CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE:
break;
default:
- log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is full, please select another one.\n"),
+ log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is full, please select another one."),
*keyslot);
return -EINVAL;
}
+ log_dbg(cd, "Selected keyslot %d.", *keyslot);
return 0;
}
/*
* compares UUIDs returned by device-mapper (striped by cryptsetup) and uuid in header
*/
-static int crypt_uuid_cmp(const char *dm_uuid, const char *hdr_uuid)
+int crypt_uuid_cmp(const char *dm_uuid, const char *hdr_uuid)
{
int i, j;
char *str;
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * compares type of active device to provided string (only if there is no explicit type)
+ */
+static int crypt_uuid_type_cmp(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
+{
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+ size_t len;
+ int r;
+
+ /* Must use header-on-disk if we know the type here */
+ if (cd->type || !cd->u.none.active_name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Checking if active device %s without header has UUID type %s.",
+ cd->u.none.active_name, type);
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, cd->u.none.active_name, DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &dmd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = -ENODEV;
+ len = strlen(type);
+ if (dmd.uuid && strlen(dmd.uuid) > len &&
+ !strncmp(dmd.uuid, type, len) && dmd.uuid[len] == '-')
+ r = 0;
+
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+ return r;
+}
+
int PLAIN_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
struct volume_key *vk,
uint32_t flags)
{
int r;
- char *dm_cipher = NULL;
- enum devcheck device_check;
struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
- .target = DM_CRYPT,
- .uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd),
- .size = size,
- .flags = flags,
- .data_device = crypt_data_device(cd),
- .u.crypt = {
- .cipher = NULL,
- .vk = vk,
- .offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
- .iv_offset = crypt_get_iv_offset(cd),
- }
+ .flags = flags,
+ .size = size,
};
- if (dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED)
- device_check = DEV_SHARED;
- else
- device_check = DEV_EXCL;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Trying to activate PLAIN device %s using cipher %s.",
+ name, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd));
- r = device_block_adjust(cd, dmd.data_device, device_check,
- dmd.u.crypt.offset, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
- if (r)
- return r;
+ if (MISALIGNED(size, device_block_size(cd, crypt_data_device(cd)) >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to device logical block size."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- if (crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd))
- r = asprintf(&dm_cipher, "%s-%s", crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
- else
- r = asprintf(&dm_cipher, "%s", crypt_get_cipher(cd));
+ r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, dmd.size, crypt_data_device(cd),
+ vk, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd), crypt_get_iv_offset(cd),
+ crypt_get_data_offset(cd), crypt_get_integrity(cd),
+ crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
if (r < 0)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- dmd.u.crypt.cipher = dm_cipher;
- log_dbg("Trying to activate PLAIN device %s using cipher %s.",
- name, dmd.u.crypt.cipher);
-
- r = dm_create_device(cd, name, CRYPT_PLAIN, &dmd, 0);
+ return r;
- // FIXME
- if (!cd->plain_uuid && dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &dmd) >= 0)
- cd->plain_uuid = CONST_CAST(char*)dmd.uuid;
+ r = create_or_reload_device(cd, name, CRYPT_PLAIN, &dmd);
- free(dm_cipher);
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
return r;
}
return cd->confirm(msg, cd->confirm_usrptr);
}
-static int key_from_terminal(struct crypt_device *cd, char *msg, char **key,
- size_t *key_len, int force_verify)
-{
- char *prompt = NULL, *device_name;
- int r;
-
- *key = NULL;
- if(!msg) {
- if (crypt_loop_device(crypt_get_device_name(cd)))
- device_name = crypt_loop_backing_file(crypt_get_device_name(cd));
- else
- device_name = strdup(crypt_get_device_name(cd));
- if (!device_name)
- return -ENOMEM;
- r = asprintf(&prompt, _("Enter passphrase for %s: "), device_name);
- free(device_name);
- if (r < 0)
- return -ENOMEM;
- msg = prompt;
- }
-
- if (cd->password) {
- *key = crypt_safe_alloc(DEFAULT_PASSPHRASE_SIZE_MAX);
- if (!*key) {
- r = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- r = cd->password(msg, *key, DEFAULT_PASSPHRASE_SIZE_MAX,
- cd->password_usrptr);
- if (r < 0) {
- crypt_safe_free(*key);
- *key = NULL;
- } else
- *key_len = r;
- } else
- r = crypt_get_key(msg, key, key_len, 0, 0, NULL, cd->timeout,
- (force_verify || cd->password_verify), cd);
-out:
- free(prompt);
- return (r < 0) ? r: 0;
-}
-
-static int volume_key_by_terminal_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot,
- struct volume_key **vk)
-{
- char *passphrase_read = NULL;
- size_t passphrase_size_read;
- int r = -EINVAL, eperm = 0, tries = cd->tries;
-
- *vk = NULL;
- do {
- crypt_free_volume_key(*vk);
- *vk = NULL;
-
- r = key_from_terminal(cd, NULL, &passphrase_read,
- &passphrase_size_read, 0);
- /* Continue if it is just passphrase verify mismatch */
- if (r == -EPERM)
- continue;
- if(r < 0)
- goto out;
-
- r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase_read,
- passphrase_size_read, &cd->hdr, vk, cd);
- if (r == -EPERM)
- eperm = 1;
- crypt_safe_free(passphrase_read);
- passphrase_read = NULL;
- } while (r == -EPERM && (--tries > 0));
-out:
- if (r < 0) {
- crypt_free_volume_key(*vk);
- *vk = NULL;
-
- /* Report wrong passphrase if at least one try failed */
- if (eperm && r == -EPIPE)
- r = -EPERM;
- }
-
- crypt_safe_free(passphrase_read);
- return r;
-}
-
-static int key_from_file(struct crypt_device *cd, char *msg,
- char **key, size_t *key_len,
- const char *key_file, size_t key_offset,
- size_t key_size)
-{
- return crypt_get_key(msg, key, key_len, key_offset, key_size, key_file,
- cd->timeout, 0, cd);
-}
-
void crypt_set_log_callback(struct crypt_device *cd,
void (*log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr),
void *usrptr)
{
- if (!cd)
+ if (!cd) {
_default_log = log;
- else {
+ _default_log_usrptr = usrptr;
+ } else {
cd->log = log;
cd->log_usrptr = usrptr;
}
int (*confirm)(const char *msg, void *usrptr),
void *usrptr)
{
- cd->confirm = confirm;
- cd->confirm_usrptr = usrptr;
-}
-
-void crypt_set_password_callback(struct crypt_device *cd,
- int (*password)(const char *msg, char *buf, size_t length, void *usrptr),
- void *usrptr)
-{
- cd->password = password;
- cd->password_usrptr = usrptr;
-}
-
-static void _get_error(char *error, char *buf, size_t size)
-{
- if (!buf || size < 1)
- error[0] = '\0';
- else if (*error) {
- strncpy(buf, error, size - 1);
- buf[size - 1] = '\0';
- error[0] = '\0';
- } else
- buf[0] = '\0';
-}
-
-void crypt_last_error(struct crypt_device *cd, char *buf, size_t size)
-{
- if (cd)
- return _get_error(cd->error, buf, size);
-}
-
-/* Deprecated global error interface */
-void crypt_get_error(char *buf, size_t size)
-{
- return _get_error(global_error, buf, size);
+ if (cd) {
+ cd->confirm = confirm;
+ cd->confirm_usrptr = usrptr;
+ }
}
const char *crypt_get_dir(void)
if (!cd)
return -EINVAL;
- log_dbg("Allocating crypt device %s context.", device);
+ log_dbg(NULL, "Allocating context for crypt device %s.", device ?: "(none)");
+#if !HAVE_DECL_O_CLOEXEC
+ log_dbg(NULL, "Running without O_CLOEXEC.");
+#endif
if (!(h = malloc(sizeof(struct crypt_device))))
return -ENOMEM;
memset(h, 0, sizeof(*h));
- r = device_alloc(&h->device, device);
- if (r < 0)
- goto bad;
+ r = device_alloc(NULL, &h->device, device);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ free(h);
+ return r;
+ }
- dm_backend_init();
+ dm_backend_init(NULL);
- h->iteration_time = 1000;
- h->password_verify = 0;
- h->tries = 3;
h->rng_type = crypt_random_default_key_rng();
+
*cd = h;
return 0;
-bad:
- device_free(h->device);
- free(h);
- return r;
}
static int crypt_check_data_device_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
int r;
uint64_t size, size_min;
- /* Check data device size, require at least one sector */
+ /* Check data device size, require at least header or one sector */
size_min = crypt_get_data_offset(cd) << SECTOR_SHIFT ?: SECTOR_SIZE;
r = device_size(cd->device, &size);
return r;
if (size < size_min) {
- log_err(cd, _("Header detected but device %s is too small.\n"),
+ log_err(cd, _("Header detected but device %s is too small."),
device_path(cd->device));
return -EINVAL;
}
return r;
}
-int crypt_set_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device)
+static int _crypt_set_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device)
{
struct device *dev = NULL;
int r;
- log_dbg("Setting ciphertext data device to %s.", device ?: "(none)");
-
- if (!isLUKS(cd->type) && !isVERITY(cd->type)) {
- log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for this device type.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- /* metadata device must be set */
- if (!cd->device || !device)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- r = device_alloc(&dev, device);
+ r = device_alloc(cd, &dev, device);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (!cd->metadata_device) {
cd->metadata_device = cd->device;
} else
- device_free(cd->device);
+ device_free(cd, cd->device);
cd->device = dev;
- return crypt_check_data_device_size(cd);
+ r = crypt_check_data_device_size(cd);
+ if (!r && isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ device_set_block_size(crypt_data_device(cd), LUKS2_get_sector_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr));
+
+ return r;
}
-static int _crypt_load_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, int require_header, int repair)
+int crypt_set_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device)
{
- struct luks_phdr hdr;
- int r;
-
- r = init_crypto(cd);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ /* metadata device must be set */
+ if (!cd || !cd->device || !device)
+ return -EINVAL;
- r = LUKS_read_phdr(&hdr, require_header, repair, cd);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Setting ciphertext data device to %s.", device ?: "(none)");
- if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS1)))
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!isLUKS1(cd->type) && !isLUKS2(cd->type) && !isVERITY(cd->type) &&
+ !isINTEGRITY(cd->type) && !isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for this device type."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- memcpy(&cd->hdr, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && crypt_get_luks2_reencrypt(cd)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Illegal operation with reencryption in-progress."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- return r;
+ return _crypt_set_data_device(cd, device);
}
-static int _crypt_load_tcrypt(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
+int crypt_init_data_device(struct crypt_device **cd, const char *device, const char *data_device)
{
int r;
- r = init_crypto(cd);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
-
- memcpy(&cd->tcrypt_params, params, sizeof(*params));
-
- r = TCRYPT_read_phdr(cd, &cd->tcrypt_hdr, &cd->tcrypt_params);
-
- cd->tcrypt_params.passphrase = NULL;
- cd->tcrypt_params.passphrase_size = 0;
- cd->tcrypt_params.keyfiles = NULL;
- cd->tcrypt_params.keyfiles_count = 0;
+ if (!cd)
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (r < 0)
+ r = crypt_init(cd, device);
+ if (r || !data_device || !strcmp(device, data_device))
return r;
- if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_TCRYPT)))
- return -ENOMEM;
+ log_dbg(NULL, "Setting ciphertext data device to %s.", data_device);
+ r = _crypt_set_data_device(*cd, data_device);
+ if (r) {
+ crypt_free(*cd);
+ *cd = NULL;
+ }
return r;
}
-static int _crypt_load_verity(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_verity *params)
+static void crypt_free_type(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *force_type)
{
- int r;
- size_t sb_offset = 0;
+ const char *type = force_type ?: cd->type;
+
+ if (isPLAIN(type)) {
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.plain.hdr.hash);
+ free(cd->u.plain.cipher);
+ free(cd->u.plain.cipher_spec);
+ } else if (isLUKS2(type)) {
+ LUKS2_reencrypt_free(cd, cd->u.luks2.rh);
+ LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ free(cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher);
+ } else if (isLUKS1(type)) {
+ free(cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec);
+ } else if (isLOOPAES(type)) {
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.loopaes.hdr.hash);
+ free(cd->u.loopaes.cipher);
+ free(cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec);
+ } else if (isVERITY(type)) {
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.data_device);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_device);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_device);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.salt);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.root_hash);
+ free(cd->u.verity.uuid);
+ device_free(cd, cd->u.verity.fec_device);
+ } else if (isINTEGRITY(type)) {
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.integrity);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key);
+ } else if (isBITLK(type)) {
+ free(cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec);
+ BITLK_bitlk_metadata_free(&cd->u.bitlk.params);
+ } else if (!type) {
+ free(cd->u.none.active_name);
+ cd->u.none.active_name = NULL;
+ }
- r = init_crypto(cd);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+}
- if (params && params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER)
- return -EINVAL;
+/* internal only */
+struct crypt_pbkdf_type *crypt_get_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ return &cd->pbkdf;
+}
- if (params)
- sb_offset = params->hash_area_offset;
+/*
+ * crypt_load() helpers
+ */
+static int _crypt_load_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, int reload, int repair)
+{
+ int r;
+ char *type = NULL;
+ struct luks2_hdr hdr2 = {};
- r = VERITY_read_sb(cd, sb_offset, &cd->verity_uuid, &cd->verity_hdr);
- if (r < 0)
+ log_dbg(cd, "%soading LUKS2 header (repair %sabled).", reload ? "Rel" : "L", repair ? "en" : "dis");
+
+ r = LUKS2_hdr_read(cd, &hdr2, repair);
+ if (r)
return r;
- if (params)
- cd->verity_hdr.flags = params->flags;
+ if (!reload && !(type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS2))) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
- /* Hash availability checked in sb load */
- cd->verity_root_hash_size = crypt_hash_size(cd->verity_hdr.hash_name);
- if (cd->verity_root_hash_size > 4096)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (verify_pbkdf_params(cd, &cd->pbkdf)) {
+ r = init_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ }
- if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_VERITY)))
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (reload) {
+ LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ free(cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher);
+ } else
+ cd->type = type;
- if (params && params->data_device &&
- (r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, params->data_device)) < 0)
- return r;
+ r = 0;
+ memcpy(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, &hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
+ cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher = NULL;
+ cd->u.luks2.rh = NULL;
+out:
+ if (r) {
+ free(type);
+ LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &hdr2);
+ }
return r;
}
-static int _init_by_name_crypt(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+static void _luks2_rollback(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
- struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
- char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
- int key_nums, r;
+ if (!cd || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return;
- r = dm_query_device(cd, name,
- DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE |
- DM_ACTIVE_UUID |
- DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
- DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE, &dmd);
+ if (LUKS2_hdr_rollback(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to rollback LUKS2 metadata in memory."));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ free(cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher);
+ cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher = NULL;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_load_luks(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *requested_type,
+ bool quiet, bool repair)
+{
+ char *cipher_spec;
+ struct luks_phdr hdr = {};
+ int r, version;
+
+ r = init_crypto(cd);
if (r < 0)
- goto out;
+ return r;
- if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
- cd->plain_uuid = dmd.uuid ? strdup(dmd.uuid) : NULL;
- cd->plain_hdr.hash = NULL; /* no way to get this */
- cd->plain_hdr.offset = dmd.u.crypt.offset;
- cd->plain_hdr.skip = dmd.u.crypt.iv_offset;
- cd->plain_key_size = dmd.u.crypt.vk->keylength;
-
- r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(dmd.u.crypt.cipher, cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
- if (!r) {
- cd->plain_cipher = strdup(cipher);
- cd->plain_cipher_mode = strdup(cipher_mode);
+ /* This will return 0 if primary LUKS2 header is damaged */
+ version = LUKS2_hdr_version_unlocked(cd, NULL);
+
+ if ((isLUKS1(requested_type) && version == 2) ||
+ (isLUKS2(requested_type) && version == 1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (requested_type)
+ version = 0;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(requested_type) || version == 1) {
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (verify_pbkdf_params(cd, &cd->pbkdf)) {
+ r = init_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL, CRYPT_LUKS1);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
}
- } else if (isLOOPAES(cd->type)) {
- cd->loopaes_uuid = dmd.uuid ? strdup(dmd.uuid) : NULL;
- cd->loopaes_hdr.offset = dmd.u.crypt.offset;
-
- r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(dmd.u.crypt.cipher, cipher,
- &key_nums, cipher_mode);
- if (!r) {
- cd->loopaes_cipher = strdup(cipher);
- cd->loopaes_cipher_mode = strdup(cipher_mode);
- /* version 3 uses last key for IV */
- if (dmd.u.crypt.vk->keylength % key_nums)
- key_nums++;
- cd->loopaes_key_size = dmd.u.crypt.vk->keylength / key_nums;
+
+ r = LUKS_read_phdr(&hdr, !quiet, repair, cd);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS1))) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
}
- } else if (isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- if (crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
- r = _crypt_load_luks1(cd, 0, 0);
- if (r < 0) {
- log_dbg("LUKS device header does not match active device.");
- free(cd->type);
- cd->type = NULL;
- r = 0;
- goto out;
- }
- /* check whether UUIDs match each other */
- r = crypt_uuid_cmp(dmd.uuid, cd->hdr.uuid);
- if (r < 0) {
- log_dbg("LUKS device header uuid: %s mismatches DM returned uuid %s",
- cd->hdr.uuid, dmd.uuid);
- free(cd->type);
- cd->type = NULL;
- r = 0;
+
+ /* Set hash to the same as in the loaded header */
+ if (!cd->pbkdf.hash || strcmp(cd->pbkdf.hash, hdr.hashSpec)) {
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->pbkdf.hash);
+ cd->pbkdf.hash = strdup(hdr.hashSpec);
+ if (!cd->pbkdf.hash) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
}
- } else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
- r = TCRYPT_init_by_name(cd, name, &dmd, &cd->device,
- &cd->tcrypt_params, &cd->tcrypt_hdr);
+
+ if (asprintf(&cipher_spec, "%s-%s", hdr.cipherName, hdr.cipherMode) < 0) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ free(cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec);
+ cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec = cipher_spec;
+
+ memcpy(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
+ } else if (isLUKS2(requested_type) || version == 2 || version == 0) {
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Current LUKS2 repair just overrides blkid probes
+ * and perform auto-recovery if possible. This is safe
+ * unless future LUKS2 repair code do something more
+ * sophisticated. In such case we would need to check
+ * for LUKS2 requirements and decide if it's safe to
+ * perform repair.
+ */
+ r = _crypt_load_luks2(cd, cd->type != NULL, repair);
+ if (!r)
+ device_set_block_size(crypt_data_device(cd), LUKS2_get_sector_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr));
+ else if (!quiet)
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."), mdata_device_path(cd));
+ } else {
+ if (version > 2)
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported LUKS version %d."), version);
+ r = -EINVAL;
}
out:
- crypt_free_volume_key(dmd.u.crypt.vk);
- device_free(dmd.data_device);
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.u.crypt.cipher);
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+ crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr, sizeof(hdr));
+
return r;
}
-static int _init_by_name_verity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+static int _crypt_load_tcrypt(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
{
- struct crypt_params_verity params = {};
- struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
- .target = DM_VERITY,
- .u.verity.vp = ¶ms,
- };
int r;
- r = dm_query_device(cd, name,
- DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE |
- DM_ACTIVE_UUID |
- DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_HASH_DEVICE |
- DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_PARAMS, &dmd);
+ if (!params)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = init_crypto(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ memcpy(&cd->u.tcrypt.params, params, sizeof(*params));
+
+ r = TCRYPT_read_phdr(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+
+ cd->u.tcrypt.params.passphrase = NULL;
+ cd->u.tcrypt.params.passphrase_size = 0;
+ cd->u.tcrypt.params.keyfiles = NULL;
+ cd->u.tcrypt.params.keyfiles_count = 0;
+ cd->u.tcrypt.params.veracrypt_pim = 0;
+
if (r < 0)
goto out;
- if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
- cd->verity_uuid = dmd.uuid ? strdup(dmd.uuid) : NULL;
- cd->verity_hdr.flags = CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER; //FIXME
- cd->verity_hdr.data_size = params.data_size;
- cd->verity_root_hash_size = dmd.u.verity.root_hash_size;
- cd->verity_root_hash = NULL;
- cd->verity_hdr.hash_name = params.hash_name;
- cd->verity_hdr.data_device = NULL;
- cd->verity_hdr.hash_device = NULL;
- cd->verity_hdr.data_block_size = params.data_block_size;
- cd->verity_hdr.hash_block_size = params.hash_block_size;
- cd->verity_hdr.hash_area_offset = dmd.u.verity.hash_offset;
- cd->verity_hdr.hash_type = params.hash_type;
- cd->verity_hdr.flags = params.flags;
- cd->verity_hdr.salt_size = params.salt_size;
- cd->verity_hdr.salt = params.salt;
- cd->metadata_device = dmd.u.verity.hash_device;
- }
+ if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_TCRYPT)))
+ r = -ENOMEM;
out:
- device_free(dmd.data_device);
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_free_type(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT);
return r;
}
-int crypt_init_by_name_and_header(struct crypt_device **cd,
- const char *name,
- const char *header_device)
+static int _crypt_load_verity(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_verity *params)
{
- crypt_status_info ci;
- struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
int r;
+ uint64_t sb_offset = 0;
- log_dbg("Allocating crypt device context by device %s.", name);
+ r = init_crypto(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
- ci = crypt_status(NULL, name);
- if (ci == CRYPT_INVALID)
- return -ENODEV;
+ if (params && params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER)
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (ci < CRYPT_ACTIVE) {
- log_err(NULL, _("Device %s is not active.\n"), name);
- return -ENODEV;
- }
+ if (params)
+ sb_offset = params->hash_area_offset;
- r = dm_query_device(NULL, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &dmd);
+ r = VERITY_read_sb(cd, sb_offset, &cd->u.verity.uuid, &cd->u.verity.hdr);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
- *cd = NULL;
+ if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_VERITY))) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
- if (header_device) {
- r = crypt_init(cd, header_device);
- } else {
- r = crypt_init(cd, device_path(dmd.data_device));
+ if (params)
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = params->flags;
- /* Underlying device disappeared but mapping still active */
- if (!dmd.data_device || r == -ENOTBLK)
- log_verbose(NULL, _("Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared.\n"),
- name);
+ /* Hash availability checked in sb load */
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = crypt_hash_size(cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
+ if (cd->u.verity.root_hash_size > 4096) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
- /* Underlying device is not readable but crypt mapping exists */
- if (r == -ENOTBLK) {
- device_free(dmd.data_device);
- dmd.data_device = NULL;
- r = crypt_init(cd, NULL);
- }
+ if (params && params->data_device &&
+ (r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, params->data_device)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (params && params->fec_device) {
+ r = device_alloc(cd, &cd->u.verity.fec_device, params->fec_device);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_area_offset = params->fec_area_offset;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots = params->fec_roots;
}
+out:
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_free_type(cd, CRYPT_VERITY);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_load_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct crypt_params_integrity *params)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ r = init_crypto(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ r = INTEGRITY_read_sb(cd, &cd->u.integrity.params, &cd->u.integrity.sb_flags);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
- if (dmd.uuid) {
- if (!strncmp(CRYPT_PLAIN, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_PLAIN)-1))
- (*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_PLAIN);
- else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_LOOPAES, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LOOPAES)-1))
- (*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_LOOPAES);
- else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_LUKS1, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LUKS1)-1))
- (*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS1);
- else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_VERITY, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_VERITY)-1))
- (*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_VERITY);
- else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_TCRYPT, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_TCRYPT)-1))
- (*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_TCRYPT);
- else
- log_dbg("Unknown UUID set, some parameters are not set.");
- } else
- log_dbg("Active device has no UUID set, some parameters are not set.");
+ // FIXME: add checks for fields in integrity sb vs params
- if (header_device) {
- r = crypt_set_data_device(*cd, device_path(dmd.data_device));
- if (r < 0)
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ if (params) {
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_watermark = params->journal_watermark;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_commit_time = params->journal_commit_time;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors = params->buffer_sectors;
+ if (params->integrity &&
+ !(cd->u.integrity.params.integrity = strdup(params->integrity)))
+ goto out;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.integrity_key_size = params->integrity_key_size;
+ if (params->journal_integrity &&
+ !(cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity = strdup(params->journal_integrity)))
+ goto out;
+ if (params->journal_crypt &&
+ !(cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt = strdup(params->journal_crypt)))
goto out;
- }
- /* Try to initialise basic parameters from active device */
+ if (params->journal_crypt_key) {
+ cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key =
+ crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_crypt_key_size,
+ params->journal_crypt_key);
+ if (!cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (params->journal_integrity_key) {
+ cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key =
+ crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_integrity_key_size,
+ params->journal_integrity_key);
+ if (!cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
- if (dmd.target == DM_CRYPT)
- r = _init_by_name_crypt(*cd, name);
- else if (dmd.target == DM_VERITY)
- r = _init_by_name_verity(*cd, name);
+ if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_INTEGRITY)))
+ goto out;
+ r = 0;
out:
- if (r < 0) {
- crypt_free(*cd);
- *cd = NULL;
- }
- device_free(dmd.data_device);
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_free_type(cd, CRYPT_INTEGRITY);
return r;
}
-int crypt_init_by_name(struct crypt_device **cd, const char *name)
+static int _crypt_load_bitlk(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
- return crypt_init_by_name_and_header(cd, name, NULL);
-}
+ int r;
-static int _crypt_format_plain(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *cipher,
- const char *cipher_mode,
- const char *uuid,
- size_t volume_key_size,
- struct crypt_params_plain *params)
-{
- if (!cipher || !cipher_mode) {
- log_err(cd, _("Invalid plain crypt parameters.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
+ r = init_crypto(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = BITLK_read_sb(cd, &cd->u.bitlk.params);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (asprintf(&cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec, "%s-%s",
+ cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher, cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher_mode) < 0) {
+ cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec = NULL;
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
}
- if (volume_key_size > 1024) {
- log_err(cd, _("Invalid key size.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_BITLK))) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
}
- if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_PLAIN)))
- return -ENOMEM;
+ device_set_block_size(crypt_data_device(cd), cd->u.bitlk.params.sector_size);
+out:
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_free_type(cd, CRYPT_BITLK);
+ return r;
+}
- cd->plain_key_size = volume_key_size;
- cd->volume_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, NULL);
- if (!cd->volume_key)
- return -ENOMEM;
+static int _crypt_load_fvault2(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ int r;
- cd->plain_cipher = strdup(cipher);
- cd->plain_cipher_mode = strdup(cipher_mode);
+ r = init_crypto(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
- if (uuid)
- cd->plain_uuid = strdup(uuid);
+ r = FVAULT2_read_metadata(cd, &cd->u.fvault2.params);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
- if (params && params->hash)
- cd->plain_hdr.hash = strdup(params->hash);
+ if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_FVAULT2)))
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+out:
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_free_type(cd, CRYPT_FVAULT2);
+ return r;
+}
- cd->plain_hdr.offset = params ? params->offset : 0;
- cd->plain_hdr.skip = params ? params->skip : 0;
- cd->plain_hdr.size = params ? params->size : 0;
+int crypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *requested_type,
+ void *params)
+{
+ int r;
- if (!cd->plain_cipher || !cd->plain_cipher_mode)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!cd)
+ return -EINVAL;
- return 0;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Trying to load %s crypt type from device %s.",
+ requested_type ?: "any", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)");
+
+ if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ crypt_reset_null_type(cd);
+ cd->data_offset = 0;
+ cd->metadata_size = 0;
+ cd->keyslots_size = 0;
+
+ if (!requested_type || isLUKS1(requested_type) || isLUKS2(requested_type)) {
+ if (cd->type && !isLUKS1(cd->type) && !isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, true, false);
+ } else if (isVERITY(requested_type)) {
+ if (cd->type && !isVERITY(cd->type)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ r = _crypt_load_verity(cd, params);
+ } else if (isTCRYPT(requested_type)) {
+ if (cd->type && !isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ r = _crypt_load_tcrypt(cd, params);
+ } else if (isINTEGRITY(requested_type)) {
+ if (cd->type && !isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ r = _crypt_load_integrity(cd, params);
+ } else if (isBITLK(requested_type)) {
+ if (cd->type && !isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ r = _crypt_load_bitlk(cd);
+ } else if (isFVAULT2(requested_type)) {
+ if (cd->type && !isFVAULT2(cd->type)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ r = _crypt_load_fvault2(cd);
+ } else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return r;
}
-static int _crypt_format_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd,
+/*
+ * crypt_init() helpers
+ */
+static int _init_by_name_crypt_none(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ int r;
+ char _mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+ struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+
+ if (cd->type || !cd->u.none.active_name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, cd->u.none.active_name,
+ DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+ DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE, &dmd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (!single_segment(&dmd) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT)
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(tgt->u.crypt.cipher,
+ cd->u.none.cipher, NULL,
+ _mode);
+
+ if (!r) {
+ r = snprintf(cd->u.none.cipher_spec, sizeof(cd->u.none.cipher_spec),
+ "%s-%s", cd->u.none.cipher, _mode);
+ if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(cd->u.none.cipher_spec))
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ else {
+ cd->u.none.cipher_mode = cd->u.none.cipher_spec + strlen(cd->u.none.cipher) + 1;
+ cd->u.none.key_size = tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength;
+ r = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static const char *LUKS_UUID(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return NULL;
+ else if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks1.hdr.uuid;
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks2.hdr.uuid;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int _init_by_name_crypt(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ bool found = false;
+ char **dep, *cipher_spec = NULL, cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+ char deps_uuid_prefix[40], *deps[MAX_DM_DEPS+1] = {};
+ const char *dev, *namei;
+ int key_nums, r;
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd, dmdi = {}, dmdep = {};
+ struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment, *tgti = &dmdi.segment;
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, name,
+ DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE |
+ DM_ACTIVE_UUID |
+ DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+ DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE, &dmd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT && tgt->type != DM_LINEAR) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (dmd.uuid) {
+ r = snprintf(deps_uuid_prefix, sizeof(deps_uuid_prefix), CRYPT_SUBDEV "-%.32s", dmd.uuid + 6);
+ if (r < 0 || (size_t)r != (sizeof(deps_uuid_prefix) - 1))
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ r = dm_device_deps(cd, name, deps_uuid_prefix, deps, ARRAY_SIZE(deps));
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(tgt->type == DM_LINEAR ? "null" : tgt->u.crypt.cipher, cipher,
+ &key_nums, cipher_mode);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Cannot parse cipher and mode from active device.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ dep = deps;
+
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT && tgt->u.crypt.integrity && (namei = device_dm_name(tgt->data_device))) {
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, namei, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE, &dmdi);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (!single_segment(&dmdi) || tgti->type != DM_INTEGRITY) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", namei);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!cd->metadata_device) {
+ device_free(cd, cd->device);
+ MOVE_REF(cd->device, tgti->data_device);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* do not try to lookup LUKS2 header in detached header mode */
+ if (dmd.uuid && !cd->metadata_device && !found) {
+ while (*dep && !found) {
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, *dep, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE, &dmdep);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ tgt = &dmdep.segment;
+
+ while (tgt && !found) {
+ dev = device_path(tgt->data_device);
+ if (!dev) {
+ tgt = tgt->next;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!strstr(dev, dm_get_dir()) ||
+ !crypt_string_in(dev + strlen(dm_get_dir()) + 1, deps, ARRAY_SIZE(deps))) {
+ device_free(cd, cd->device);
+ MOVE_REF(cd->device, tgt->data_device);
+ found = true;
+ }
+ tgt = tgt->next;
+ }
+ dep++;
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdep);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (asprintf(&cipher_spec, "%s-%s", cipher, cipher_mode) < 0) {
+ cipher_spec = NULL;
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tgt = &dmd.segment;
+ r = 0;
+
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type) && single_segment(&dmd) && tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+ cd->u.plain.hdr.hash = NULL; /* no way to get this */
+ cd->u.plain.hdr.offset = tgt->u.crypt.offset;
+ cd->u.plain.hdr.skip = tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset;
+ cd->u.plain.hdr.sector_size = tgt->u.crypt.sector_size;
+ cd->u.plain.key_size = tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength;
+ cd->u.plain.cipher = strdup(cipher);
+ MOVE_REF(cd->u.plain.cipher_spec, cipher_spec);
+ cd->u.plain.cipher_mode = cd->u.plain.cipher_spec + strlen(cipher) + 1;
+ } else if (isLOOPAES(cd->type) && single_segment(&dmd) && tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+ cd->u.loopaes.hdr.offset = tgt->u.crypt.offset;
+ cd->u.loopaes.cipher = strdup(cipher);
+ MOVE_REF(cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec, cipher_spec);
+ cd->u.loopaes.cipher_mode = cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec + strlen(cipher) + 1;
+ /* version 3 uses last key for IV */
+ if (tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength % key_nums)
+ key_nums++;
+ cd->u.loopaes.key_size = tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength / key_nums;
+ } else if (isLUKS1(cd->type) || isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ if (crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+ r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, cd->type, true, false);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "LUKS device header does not match active device.");
+ crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+ device_close(cd, cd->metadata_device);
+ device_close(cd, cd->device);
+ r = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* check whether UUIDs match each other */
+ r = crypt_uuid_cmp(dmd.uuid, LUKS_UUID(cd));
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "LUKS device header uuid: %s mismatches DM returned uuid %s",
+ LUKS_UUID(cd), dmd.uuid);
+ crypt_free_type(cd, NULL);
+ r = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_dbg(cd, "LUKS device header not available.");
+ crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+ r = 0;
+ }
+ } else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type) && single_segment(&dmd) && tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+ r = TCRYPT_init_by_name(cd, name, dmd.uuid, tgt, &cd->device,
+ &cd->u.tcrypt.params, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr);
+ } else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+ r = _crypt_load_bitlk(cd);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "BITLK device header not available.");
+ crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+ r = 0;
+ }
+ } else if (isFVAULT2(cd->type)) {
+ r = _crypt_load_fvault2(cd);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "FVAULT2 device header not available.");
+ crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+ r = 0;
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdep);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+ free(cipher_spec);
+ dep = deps;
+ while (*dep)
+ free(*dep++);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _init_by_name_verity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+ struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+ int r;
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, name,
+ DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE |
+ DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_HASH_DEVICE |
+ DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_ROOT_HASH |
+ DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_PARAMS, &dmd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (!single_segment(&dmd) || tgt->type != DM_VERITY) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (r > 0)
+ r = 0;
+
+ if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
+ cd->u.verity.uuid = NULL; // FIXME
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER; //FIXME
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size = tgt->u.verity.vp->data_size;
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size;
+ MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name, tgt->u.verity.vp->hash_name);
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.data_device = NULL;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_device = NULL;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.data_block_size = tgt->u.verity.vp->data_block_size;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_block_size = tgt->u.verity.vp->hash_block_size;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset = tgt->u.verity.hash_offset;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_area_offset = tgt->u.verity.fec_offset;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type = tgt->u.verity.vp->hash_type;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = tgt->u.verity.vp->flags;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size = tgt->u.verity.vp->salt_size;
+ MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.hdr.salt, tgt->u.verity.vp->salt);
+ MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_device, tgt->u.verity.vp->fec_device);
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots = tgt->u.verity.vp->fec_roots;
+ MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.fec_device, tgt->u.verity.fec_device);
+ MOVE_REF(cd->metadata_device, tgt->u.verity.hash_device);
+ MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.root_hash, tgt->u.verity.root_hash);
+ }
+out:
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _init_by_name_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+ struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+ int r;
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE |
+ DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY |
+ DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE |
+ DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS, &dmd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (!single_segment(&dmd) || tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (r > 0)
+ r = 0;
+
+ if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+ cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size = tgt->u.integrity.tag_size;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size = tgt->u.integrity.sector_size;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_size = tgt->u.integrity.journal_size;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_watermark = tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_commit_time = tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.interleave_sectors = tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors = tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors;
+ MOVE_REF(cd->u.integrity.params.integrity, tgt->u.integrity.integrity);
+ MOVE_REF(cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity);
+ MOVE_REF(cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt);
+
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.vk)
+ cd->u.integrity.params.integrity_key_size = tgt->u.integrity.vk->keylength;
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key)
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity_key_size = tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->keylength;
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key)
+ cd->u.integrity.params.integrity_key_size = tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->keylength;
+ MOVE_REF(cd->metadata_device, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device);
+ }
+out:
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_init_by_name_and_header(struct crypt_device **cd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *header_device)
+{
+ crypt_status_info ci;
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+ struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd || !name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(NULL, "Allocating crypt device context by device %s.", name);
+
+ ci = crypt_status(NULL, name);
+ if (ci == CRYPT_INVALID)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (ci < CRYPT_ACTIVE) {
+ log_err(NULL, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ r = dm_query_device(NULL, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &dmd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ *cd = NULL;
+
+ if (header_device) {
+ r = crypt_init(cd, header_device);
+ } else {
+ r = crypt_init(cd, device_path(tgt->data_device));
+
+ /* Underlying device disappeared but mapping still active */
+ if (!tgt->data_device || r == -ENOTBLK)
+ log_verbose(NULL, _("Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared."),
+ name);
+
+ /* Underlying device is not readable but crypt mapping exists */
+ if (r == -ENOTBLK)
+ r = crypt_init(cd, NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (dmd.uuid) {
+ if (!strncmp(CRYPT_PLAIN, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_PLAIN)-1))
+ (*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_PLAIN);
+ else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_LOOPAES, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LOOPAES)-1))
+ (*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_LOOPAES);
+ else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_LUKS1, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LUKS1)-1))
+ (*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS1);
+ else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_LUKS2, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LUKS2)-1))
+ (*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS2);
+ else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_VERITY, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_VERITY)-1))
+ (*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_VERITY);
+ else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_TCRYPT, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_TCRYPT)-1))
+ (*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_TCRYPT);
+ else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_INTEGRITY, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGRITY)-1))
+ (*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_INTEGRITY);
+ else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_BITLK, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_BITLK)-1))
+ (*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_BITLK);
+ else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_FVAULT2, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_FVAULT2)-1))
+ (*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_FVAULT2);
+ else
+ log_dbg(NULL, "Unknown UUID set, some parameters are not set.");
+ } else
+ log_dbg(NULL, "Active device has no UUID set, some parameters are not set.");
+
+ if (header_device) {
+ r = crypt_set_data_device(*cd, device_path(tgt->data_device));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to initialize basic parameters from active device */
+
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT || tgt->type == DM_LINEAR)
+ r = _init_by_name_crypt(*cd, name);
+ else if (tgt->type == DM_VERITY)
+ r = _init_by_name_verity(*cd, name);
+ else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+ r = _init_by_name_integrity(*cd, name);
+out:
+ if (r < 0) {
+ crypt_free(*cd);
+ *cd = NULL;
+ } else if (!(*cd)->type) {
+ /* For anonymous device (no header found) remember initialized name */
+ (*cd)->u.none.active_name = strdup(name);
+ }
+
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+ dm_targets_free(NULL, &dmd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_init_by_name(struct crypt_device **cd, const char *name)
+{
+ return crypt_init_by_name_and_header(cd, name, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * crypt_format() helpers
+ */
+static int _crypt_format_plain(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *cipher,
const char *cipher_mode,
const char *uuid,
- const char *volume_key,
size_t volume_key_size,
- struct crypt_params_luks1 *params)
+ struct crypt_params_plain *params)
{
- int r;
- unsigned long required_alignment = DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT;
- unsigned long alignment_offset = 0;
+ unsigned int sector_size = params ? params->sector_size : SECTOR_SIZE;
+ uint64_t dev_size;
+
+ if (!cipher || !cipher_mode) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Invalid plain crypt parameters."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (volume_key_size > 1024) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Invalid key size."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (uuid) {
+ log_err(cd, _("UUID is not supported for this crypt type."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (cd->metadata_device) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* For compatibility with old params structure */
+ if (!sector_size)
+ sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+ if (sector_size < SECTOR_SIZE || sector_size > MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ||
+ NOTPOW2(sector_size)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported encryption sector size."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (sector_size > SECTOR_SIZE && !device_size(cd->device, &dev_size)) {
+ if (params && params->offset)
+ dev_size -= (params->offset * SECTOR_SIZE);
+ if (dev_size % sector_size) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ device_set_block_size(crypt_data_device(cd), sector_size);
+ }
+
+ if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_PLAIN)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cd->u.plain.key_size = volume_key_size;
+ cd->volume_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, NULL);
+ if (!cd->volume_key)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (asprintf(&cd->u.plain.cipher_spec, "%s-%s", cipher, cipher_mode) < 0) {
+ cd->u.plain.cipher_spec = NULL;
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ cd->u.plain.cipher = strdup(cipher);
+ cd->u.plain.cipher_mode = cd->u.plain.cipher_spec + strlen(cipher) + 1;
+
+ if (params && params->hash)
+ cd->u.plain.hdr.hash = strdup(params->hash);
+
+ cd->u.plain.hdr.offset = params ? params->offset : 0;
+ cd->u.plain.hdr.skip = params ? params->skip : 0;
+ cd->u.plain.hdr.size = params ? params->size : 0;
+ cd->u.plain.hdr.sector_size = sector_size;
+
+ if (!cd->u.plain.cipher)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *cipher,
+ const char *cipher_mode,
+ const char *uuid,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ struct crypt_params_luks1 *params)
+{
+ int r;
+ unsigned long required_alignment = DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT;
+ unsigned long alignment_offset = 0;
+ uint64_t dev_size;
+
+ if (!cipher || !cipher_mode)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Can't format LUKS without device."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (params && cd->data_offset && params->data_alignment &&
+ (cd->data_offset % params->data_alignment)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Requested data alignment is not compatible with data offset."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS1)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (volume_key)
+ cd->volume_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size,
+ volume_key);
+ else
+ cd->volume_key = crypt_generate_volume_key(cd, volume_key_size);
+
+ if (!cd->volume_key)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (verify_pbkdf_params(cd, &cd->pbkdf)) {
+ r = init_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL, CRYPT_LUKS1);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (params && params->hash && strcmp(params->hash, cd->pbkdf.hash)) {
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->pbkdf.hash);
+ cd->pbkdf.hash = strdup(params->hash);
+ if (!cd->pbkdf.hash)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (params && params->data_device) {
+ if (!cd->metadata_device)
+ cd->metadata_device = cd->device;
+ else
+ device_free(cd, cd->device);
+ cd->device = NULL;
+ if (device_alloc(cd, &cd->device, params->data_device) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (params && cd->metadata_device) {
+ /* For detached header the alignment is used directly as data offset */
+ if (!cd->data_offset)
+ cd->data_offset = params->data_alignment;
+ required_alignment = params->data_alignment * SECTOR_SIZE;
+ } else if (params && params->data_alignment) {
+ required_alignment = params->data_alignment * SECTOR_SIZE;
+ } else
+ device_topology_alignment(cd, cd->device,
+ &required_alignment,
+ &alignment_offset, DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT);
+
+ r = LUKS_check_cipher(cd, volume_key_size, cipher, cipher_mode);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = LUKS_generate_phdr(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd->volume_key, cipher, cipher_mode,
+ cd->pbkdf.hash, uuid,
+ cd->data_offset * SECTOR_SIZE,
+ alignment_offset, required_alignment, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = device_check_access(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), DEV_EXCL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+
+ if (asprintf(&cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec, "%s-%s", cipher, cipher_mode) < 0) {
+ cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec = NULL;
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ r = LUKS_wipe_header_areas(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ free(cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec);
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
+ mdata_device_path(cd));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = LUKS_write_phdr(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+ if (r) {
+ free(cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (!device_size(crypt_data_device(cd), &dev_size) &&
+ dev_size <= (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE))
+ log_std(cd, _("Device %s is too small for activation, there is no remaining space for data.\n"),
+ device_path(crypt_data_device(cd)));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *cipher,
+ const char *cipher_mode,
+ const char *uuid,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ struct crypt_params_luks2 *params,
+ bool sector_size_autodetect)
+{
+ int r, integrity_key_size = 0;
+ unsigned long required_alignment = DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT;
+ unsigned long alignment_offset = 0;
+ unsigned int sector_size;
+ const char *integrity = params ? params->integrity : NULL;
+ uint64_t dev_size;
+ uint32_t dmc_flags;
+
+ cd->u.luks2.hdr.jobj = NULL;
+ cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher = NULL;
+
+ if (!cipher || !cipher_mode)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Can't format LUKS without device."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (params && cd->data_offset && params->data_alignment &&
+ (cd->data_offset % params->data_alignment)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Requested data alignment is not compatible with data offset."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (params && params->sector_size)
+ sector_size_autodetect = false;
+
+ if (params && params->data_device) {
+ if (!cd->metadata_device)
+ cd->metadata_device = cd->device;
+ else
+ device_free(cd, cd->device);
+ cd->device = NULL;
+ if (device_alloc(cd, &cd->device, params->data_device) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (sector_size_autodetect) {
+ sector_size = device_optimal_encryption_sector_size(cd, crypt_data_device(cd));
+ log_dbg(cd, "Auto-detected optimal encryption sector size for device %s is %d bytes.",
+ device_path(crypt_data_device(cd)), sector_size);
+ } else
+ sector_size = params ? params->sector_size : SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+ if (sector_size < SECTOR_SIZE || sector_size > MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ||
+ NOTPOW2(sector_size)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported encryption sector size."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE && !dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmc_flags) &&
+ !(dmc_flags & DM_SECTOR_SIZE_SUPPORTED)) {
+ if (sector_size_autodetect) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "dm-crypt does not support encryption sector size option. Reverting to 512 bytes.");
+ sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+ } else
+ log_std(cd, _("WARNING: The device activation will fail, dm-crypt is missing "
+ "support for requested encryption sector size.\n"));
+ }
+
+ if (integrity) {
+ if (params->integrity_params) {
+ /* Standalone dm-integrity must not be used */
+ if (params->integrity_params->integrity ||
+ params->integrity_params->integrity_key_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /* FIXME: journal encryption and MAC is here not yet supported */
+ if (params->integrity_params->journal_crypt ||
+ params->integrity_params->journal_integrity)
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+ if (!INTEGRITY_tag_size(integrity, cipher, cipher_mode)) {
+ if (!strcmp(integrity, "none"))
+ integrity = NULL;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ integrity_key_size = INTEGRITY_key_size(integrity);
+ if ((integrity_key_size < 0) || (integrity_key_size >= (int)volume_key_size)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = device_check_access(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), DEV_EXCL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (volume_key)
+ cd->volume_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size,
+ volume_key);
+ else
+ cd->volume_key = crypt_generate_volume_key(cd, volume_key_size);
+
+ if (!cd->volume_key)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (params && params->pbkdf)
+ r = crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, params->pbkdf);
+ else if (verify_pbkdf_params(cd, &cd->pbkdf))
+ r = init_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (params && cd->metadata_device) {
+ /* For detached header the alignment is used directly as data offset */
+ if (!cd->data_offset)
+ cd->data_offset = params->data_alignment;
+ required_alignment = params->data_alignment * SECTOR_SIZE;
+ } else if (params && params->data_alignment) {
+ required_alignment = params->data_alignment * SECTOR_SIZE;
+ } else
+ device_topology_alignment(cd, cd->device,
+ &required_alignment,
+ &alignment_offset, DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT);
+
+ r = device_size(crypt_data_device(cd), &dev_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (sector_size_autodetect) {
+ if (cd->data_offset && MISALIGNED(cd->data_offset, sector_size)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Data offset not aligned to sector size. Reverting to 512 bytes.");
+ sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+ } else if (MISALIGNED(dev_size - (uint64_t)required_alignment - (uint64_t)alignment_offset, sector_size)) {
+ /* underflow does not affect misalignment checks */
+ log_dbg(cd, "Device size is not aligned to sector size. Reverting to 512 bytes.");
+ sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* FIXME: allow this later also for normal ciphers (check AF_ALG availability. */
+ if (integrity && !integrity_key_size) {
+ r = crypt_cipher_check_kernel(cipher, cipher_mode, integrity, volume_key_size);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Cipher %s-%s (key size %zd bits) is not available."),
+ cipher, cipher_mode, volume_key_size * 8);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((!integrity || integrity_key_size) && !crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(cipher, cipher_mode) &&
+ !INTEGRITY_tag_size(NULL, cipher, cipher_mode)) {
+ r = LUKS_check_cipher(cd, volume_key_size - integrity_key_size,
+ cipher, cipher_mode);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = LUKS2_generate_hdr(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, cd->volume_key,
+ cipher, cipher_mode,
+ integrity, uuid,
+ sector_size,
+ cd->data_offset * SECTOR_SIZE,
+ alignment_offset,
+ required_alignment,
+ cd->metadata_size, cd->keyslots_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (cd->metadata_size && (cd->metadata_size != LUKS2_metadata_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr)))
+ log_std(cd, _("WARNING: LUKS2 metadata size changed to %" PRIu64 " bytes.\n"),
+ LUKS2_metadata_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr));
+
+ if (cd->keyslots_size && (cd->keyslots_size != LUKS2_keyslots_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr)))
+ log_std(cd, _("WARNING: LUKS2 keyslots area size changed to %" PRIu64 " bytes.\n"),
+ LUKS2_keyslots_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr));
+
+ if (!integrity && sector_size > SECTOR_SIZE) {
+ dev_size -= (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE);
+ if (dev_size % sector_size) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (params && (params->label || params->subsystem)) {
+ r = LUKS2_hdr_labels(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr,
+ params->label, params->subsystem, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ device_set_block_size(crypt_data_device(cd), sector_size);
+
+ r = LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, cd->metadata_device != NULL);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
+ mdata_device_path(cd));
+ if (dev_size < LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr))
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is too small."), device_path(crypt_metadata_device(cd)));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Wipe integrity superblock and create integrity superblock */
+ if (crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd)) {
+ r = crypt_wipe_device(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO,
+ crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE,
+ 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (r == -EBUSY)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s in use."),
+ data_device_path(cd));
+ else if (r == -EACCES) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s, permission denied."),
+ data_device_path(cd));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ } else
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
+ data_device_path(cd));
+
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = INTEGRITY_format(cd, params ? params->integrity_params : NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot format integrity for device %s."),
+ data_device_path(cd));
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* override sequence id check with format */
+ r = LUKS2_hdr_write_force(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (r == -EBUSY)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s in use."),
+ mdata_device_path(cd));
+ else if (r == -EACCES) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s, permission denied."),
+ mdata_device_path(cd));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ } else
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s."),
+ mdata_device_path(cd));
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (r) {
+ LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ /* Device size can be larger now if it is a file container */
+ if (!device_size(crypt_data_device(cd), &dev_size) &&
+ dev_size <= (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE))
+ log_std(cd, _("Device %s is too small for activation, there is no remaining space for data.\n"),
+ device_path(crypt_data_device(cd)));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_loopaes(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *cipher,
+ const char *uuid,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ struct crypt_params_loopaes *params)
+{
+ if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Can't format LOOPAES without device."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (volume_key_size > 1024) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Invalid key size."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (uuid) {
+ log_err(cd, _("UUID is not supported for this crypt type."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (cd->metadata_device) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LOOPAES)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cd->u.loopaes.key_size = volume_key_size;
+
+ cd->u.loopaes.cipher = strdup(cipher ?: DEFAULT_LOOPAES_CIPHER);
+
+ if (params && params->hash)
+ cd->u.loopaes.hdr.hash = strdup(params->hash);
+
+ cd->u.loopaes.hdr.offset = params ? params->offset : 0;
+ cd->u.loopaes.hdr.skip = params ? params->skip : 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_verity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *uuid,
+ struct crypt_params_verity *params)
+{
+ int r = 0, hash_size;
+ uint64_t data_device_size, hash_blocks_size;
+ struct device *fec_device = NULL;
+ char *fec_device_path = NULL, *hash_name = NULL, *root_hash = NULL, *salt = NULL;
+
+ if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Can't format VERITY without device."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!params)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!params->data_device && !cd->metadata_device)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (params->hash_type > VERITY_MAX_HASH_TYPE) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."), params->hash_type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(params->data_block_size) ||
+ VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(params->hash_block_size)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY block size."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (MISALIGNED_512(params->hash_area_offset)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY hash offset."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (MISALIGNED_512(params->fec_area_offset)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY FEC offset."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_VERITY)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (params->data_device) {
+ r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, params->data_device);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (!params->data_size) {
+ r = device_size(cd->device, &data_device_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size = data_device_size / params->data_block_size;
+ } else
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size = params->data_size;
+
+ if (device_is_identical(crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd)) > 0 &&
+ (cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size * params->data_block_size) > params->hash_area_offset) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Data area overlaps with hash area."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ hash_size = crypt_hash_size(params->hash_name);
+ if (hash_size <= 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Hash algorithm %s not supported."),
+ params->hash_name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = hash_size;
+
+ if (params->fec_device) {
+ fec_device_path = strdup(params->fec_device);
+ if (!fec_device_path)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ r = device_alloc(cd, &fec_device, params->fec_device);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ hash_blocks_size = VERITY_hash_blocks(cd, params) * params->hash_block_size;
+ if (device_is_identical(crypt_metadata_device(cd), fec_device) > 0 &&
+ (params->hash_area_offset + hash_blocks_size) > params->fec_area_offset) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Hash area overlaps with FEC area."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (device_is_identical(crypt_data_device(cd), fec_device) > 0 &&
+ (cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size * params->data_block_size) > params->fec_area_offset) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Data area overlaps with FEC area."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ root_hash = malloc(cd->u.verity.root_hash_size);
+ hash_name = strdup(params->hash_name);
+ salt = malloc(params->salt_size);
+
+ if (!root_hash || !hash_name || !salt) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = params->flags;
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash = root_hash;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name = hash_name;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.data_device = NULL;
+ cd->u.verity.fec_device = fec_device;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_device = fec_device_path;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots = params->fec_roots;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.data_block_size = params->data_block_size;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_block_size = params->hash_block_size;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset = params->hash_area_offset;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_area_offset = params->fec_area_offset;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type = params->hash_type;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = params->flags;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size = params->salt_size;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.salt = salt;
+
+ if (params->salt)
+ memcpy(salt, params->salt, params->salt_size);
+ else
+ r = crypt_random_get(cd, salt, params->salt_size, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_CREATE_HASH) {
+ r = VERITY_create(cd, &cd->u.verity.hdr,
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size);
+ if (!r && params->fec_device)
+ r = VERITY_FEC_process(cd, &cd->u.verity.hdr, cd->u.verity.fec_device, 0, NULL);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!(params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER)) {
+ if (uuid) {
+ if (!(cd->u.verity.uuid = strdup(uuid)))
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ } else
+ r = VERITY_UUID_generate(&cd->u.verity.uuid);
+
+ if (!r)
+ r = VERITY_write_sb(cd, cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset,
+ cd->u.verity.uuid,
+ &cd->u.verity.hdr);
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (r) {
+ device_free(cd, fec_device);
+ free(root_hash);
+ free(hash_name);
+ free(fec_device_path);
+ free(salt);
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *uuid,
+ struct crypt_params_integrity *params)
+{
+ int r;
+ uint32_t integrity_tag_size;
+ char *integrity = NULL, *journal_integrity = NULL, *journal_crypt = NULL;
+ struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key = NULL, *journal_mac_key = NULL;
+
+ if (!params)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (uuid) {
+ log_err(cd, _("UUID is not supported for this crypt type."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = device_check_access(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), DEV_EXCL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* Wipe first 8 sectors - fs magic numbers etc. */
+ r = crypt_wipe_device(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 0,
+ 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
+ mdata_device_path(cd));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_INTEGRITY)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (params->journal_crypt_key) {
+ journal_crypt_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_crypt_key_size,
+ params->journal_crypt_key);
+ if (!journal_crypt_key)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (params->journal_integrity_key) {
+ journal_mac_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_integrity_key_size,
+ params->journal_integrity_key);
+ if (!journal_mac_key) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (params->integrity && !(integrity = strdup(params->integrity))) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (params->journal_integrity && !(journal_integrity = strdup(params->journal_integrity))) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (params->journal_crypt && !(journal_crypt = strdup(params->journal_crypt))) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ integrity_tag_size = INTEGRITY_hash_tag_size(integrity);
+ if (integrity_tag_size > 0 && params->tag_size && integrity_tag_size != params->tag_size)
+ log_std(cd, _("WARNING: Requested tag size %d bytes differs from %s size output (%d bytes).\n"),
+ params->tag_size, integrity, integrity_tag_size);
+
+ if (params->tag_size)
+ integrity_tag_size = params->tag_size;
+
+ cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key;
+ cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key = journal_mac_key;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_size = params->journal_size;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_watermark = params->journal_watermark;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_commit_time = params->journal_commit_time;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.interleave_sectors = params->interleave_sectors;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors = params->buffer_sectors;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size = params->sector_size;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size = integrity_tag_size;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.integrity = integrity;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity = journal_integrity;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt = journal_crypt;
+
+ r = INTEGRITY_format(cd, params, cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key, cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key);
+ if (r)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot format integrity for device %s."),
+ mdata_device_path(cd));
+out:
+ if (r) {
+ crypt_free_volume_key(journal_crypt_key);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(journal_mac_key);
+ free(integrity);
+ free(journal_integrity);
+ free(journal_crypt);
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *type,
+ const char *cipher,
+ const char *cipher_mode,
+ const char *uuid,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ void *params,
+ bool sector_size_autodetect)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd || !type)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (cd->type) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Context already formatted as %s.", cd->type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Formatting device %s as type %s.", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)", type);
+
+ crypt_reset_null_type(cd);
+
+ r = init_crypto(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (isPLAIN(type))
+ r = _crypt_format_plain(cd, cipher, cipher_mode,
+ uuid, volume_key_size, params);
+ else if (isLUKS1(type))
+ r = _crypt_format_luks1(cd, cipher, cipher_mode,
+ uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params);
+ else if (isLUKS2(type))
+ r = _crypt_format_luks2(cd, cipher, cipher_mode,
+ uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params, sector_size_autodetect);
+ else if (isLOOPAES(type))
+ r = _crypt_format_loopaes(cd, cipher, uuid, volume_key_size, params);
+ else if (isVERITY(type))
+ r = _crypt_format_verity(cd, uuid, params);
+ else if (isINTEGRITY(type))
+ r = _crypt_format_integrity(cd, uuid, params);
+ else {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unknown crypt device type %s requested."), type);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0) {
+ crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(cd->volume_key);
+ cd->volume_key = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+CRYPT_SYMBOL_EXPORT_NEW(int, crypt_format, 2, 4,
+ /* crypt_format parameters follows */
+ struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *type,
+ const char *cipher,
+ const char *cipher_mode,
+ const char *uuid,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ void *params)
+{
+ return _crypt_format(cd, type, cipher, cipher_mode, uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params, true);
+}
+
+
+CRYPT_SYMBOL_EXPORT_OLD(int, crypt_format, 2, 0,
+ /* crypt_format parameters follows */
+ struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *type,
+ const char *cipher,
+ const char *cipher_mode,
+ const char *uuid,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ void *params)
+{
+ return _crypt_format(cd, type, cipher, cipher_mode, uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params, false);
+}
+
+int crypt_repair(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *requested_type,
+ void *params __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Trying to repair %s crypt type from device %s.",
+ requested_type ?: "any", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)");
+
+ if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Load with repair */
+ r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, false, true);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* cd->type and header must be set in context */
+ r = crypt_check_data_device_size(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* compare volume keys */
+static int _compare_volume_keys(struct volume_key *svk, unsigned skeyring_only,
+ struct volume_key *tvk, unsigned tkeyring_only)
+{
+ if (!svk && !tvk)
+ return 0;
+ else if (!svk || !tvk)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (svk->keylength != tvk->keylength)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!skeyring_only && !tkeyring_only)
+ return crypt_backend_memeq(svk->key, tvk->key, svk->keylength);
+
+ if (svk->key_description && tvk->key_description)
+ return strcmp(svk->key_description, tvk->key_description);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _compare_device_types(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const struct crypt_dm_active_device *src,
+ const struct crypt_dm_active_device *tgt)
+{
+ if (!tgt->uuid) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Missing device uuid in target device.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && !strncmp("INTEGRITY-", tgt->uuid, strlen("INTEGRITY-"))) {
+ if (crypt_uuid_cmp(tgt->uuid, src->uuid)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "LUKS UUID mismatch.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else if (isLUKS(cd->type)) {
+ if (!src->uuid || strncmp(cd->type, tgt->uuid, strlen(cd->type)) ||
+ crypt_uuid_cmp(tgt->uuid, src->uuid)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "LUKS UUID mismatch.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else if (isPLAIN(cd->type) || isLOOPAES(cd->type)) {
+ if (strncmp(cd->type, tgt->uuid, strlen(cd->type))) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Unexpected uuid prefix %s in target device.", tgt->uuid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else if (!isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device type %s for reload.", cd->type ?: "<empty>");
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _compare_crypt_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const struct dm_target *src,
+ const struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+ char *src_cipher = NULL, *src_integrity = NULL;
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+
+ /* for crypt devices keys are mandatory */
+ if (!src->u.crypt.vk || !tgt->u.crypt.vk)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* CIPHER checks */
+ if (!src->u.crypt.cipher || !tgt->u.crypt.cipher)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * dm_query_target converts capi cipher specification to dm-crypt format.
+ * We need to do same for cipher specification requested in source
+ * device.
+ */
+ if (crypt_capi_to_cipher(&src_cipher, &src_integrity, src->u.crypt.cipher, src->u.crypt.integrity))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (strcmp(src_cipher, tgt->u.crypt.cipher)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Cipher specs do not match.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength == 0 && crypt_is_cipher_null(tgt->u.crypt.cipher))
+ log_dbg(cd, "Existing device uses cipher null. Skipping key comparison.");
+ else if (_compare_volume_keys(src->u.crypt.vk, 0, tgt->u.crypt.vk, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description != NULL)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Keys in context and target device do not match.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_strcmp(src_integrity, tgt->u.crypt.integrity)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Integrity parameters do not match.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (src->u.crypt.offset != tgt->u.crypt.offset ||
+ src->u.crypt.sector_size != tgt->u.crypt.sector_size ||
+ src->u.crypt.iv_offset != tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset ||
+ src->u.crypt.tag_size != tgt->u.crypt.tag_size) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Integer parameters do not match.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (device_is_identical(src->data_device, tgt->data_device) <= 0)
+ log_dbg(cd, "Data devices do not match.");
+ else
+ r = 0;
+
+out:
+ free(src_cipher);
+ free(src_integrity);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _compare_integrity_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const struct dm_target *src,
+ const struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+ /*
+ * some parameters may be implicit (and set in dm-integrity ctor)
+ *
+ * journal_size
+ * journal_watermark
+ * journal_commit_time
+ * buffer_sectors
+ * interleave_sectors
+ */
+
+ /* check remaining integer values that makes sense */
+ if (src->u.integrity.tag_size != tgt->u.integrity.tag_size ||
+ src->u.integrity.offset != tgt->u.integrity.offset ||
+ src->u.integrity.sector_size != tgt->u.integrity.sector_size) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Integer parameters do not match.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_strcmp(src->u.integrity.integrity, tgt->u.integrity.integrity) ||
+ crypt_strcmp(src->u.integrity.journal_integrity, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity) ||
+ crypt_strcmp(src->u.integrity.journal_crypt, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Journal parameters do not match.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* unfortunately dm-integrity doesn't support keyring */
+ if (_compare_volume_keys(src->u.integrity.vk, 0, tgt->u.integrity.vk, 0) ||
+ _compare_volume_keys(src->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, 0, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, 0) ||
+ _compare_volume_keys(src->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key, 0, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key, 0)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Journal keys do not match.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (device_is_identical(src->data_device, tgt->data_device) <= 0) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Data devices do not match.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_compare_dm_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const struct crypt_dm_active_device *src,
+ const struct crypt_dm_active_device *tgt)
+{
+ int r;
+ const struct dm_target *s, *t;
+
+ if (!src || !tgt)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = _compare_device_types(cd, src, tgt);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ s = &src->segment;
+ t = &tgt->segment;
+
+ while (s || t) {
+ if (!s || !t) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "segments count mismatch.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (s->type != t->type) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "segment type mismatch.");
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (s->type) {
+ case DM_CRYPT:
+ r = _compare_crypt_devices(cd, s, t);
+ break;
+ case DM_INTEGRITY:
+ r = _compare_integrity_devices(cd, s, t);
+ break;
+ case DM_LINEAR:
+ r = (s->u.linear.offset == t->u.linear.offset) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ if (r)
+ break;
+
+ s = s->next;
+ t = t->next;
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device *sdmd)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device tdmd;
+ struct dm_target *src, *tgt = &tdmd.segment;
+
+ if (!cd || !cd->type || !name || !(sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+ DM_ACTIVE_UUID | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE |
+ DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY | DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS |
+ DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY | DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_MAC_KEY, &tdmd);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!single_segment(&tdmd) ||
+ (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT && tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY) ||
+ (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT && tgt->u.crypt.tag_size)) {
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_compare_dm_devices(cd, sdmd, &tdmd);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Mismatching parameters on device %s."), name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ src = &sdmd->segment;
+
+ /* Changing read only flag for active device makes no sense */
+ if (tdmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY)
+ sdmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+ else
+ sdmd->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT && sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+ r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(tgt->u.crypt.vk, src->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ } else if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+ crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.crypt.vk);
+ tgt->u.crypt.vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(src->u.crypt.vk->keylength, src->u.crypt.vk->key);
+ if (!tgt->u.crypt.vk) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT)
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
+ src->u.crypt.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+ else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
+ src->u.integrity.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+ else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ tdmd.flags = sdmd->flags;
+ tgt->size = tdmd.size = sdmd->size;
+
+ r = dm_reload_device(cd, name, &tdmd, 0, 1);
+out:
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &tdmd);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)tdmd.uuid);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _reload_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *iname,
+ const char *ipath,
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device *sdmd,
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device *sdmdi)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device tdmd, tdmdi = {};
+ struct dm_target *src, *srci, *tgt = &tdmd.segment, *tgti = &tdmdi.segment;
+ struct device *data_device = NULL;
+ bool clear = false;
+
+ if (!cd || !cd->type || !name || !iname || !(sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+ DM_ACTIVE_UUID | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE |
+ DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY, &tdmd);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!single_segment(&tdmd) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT || !tgt->u.crypt.tag_size) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), name);
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, iname, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &tdmdi);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), iname);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!single_segment(&tdmdi) || tgti->type != DM_INTEGRITY) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), iname);
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_compare_dm_devices(cd, sdmdi, &tdmdi);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Mismatching parameters on device %s."), iname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* unsupported underneath dm-crypt with auth. encryption */
+ if (sdmdi->segment.u.integrity.meta_device || tdmdi.segment.u.integrity.meta_device)
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+
+ src = &sdmd->segment;
+ srci = &sdmdi->segment;
+
+ r = device_alloc(cd, &data_device, ipath);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, srci->data_device, DEV_OK,
+ srci->u.integrity.offset, &sdmdi->size, NULL);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ src->data_device = data_device;
+
+ r = crypt_compare_dm_devices(cd, sdmd, &tdmd);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Crypt devices mismatch."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Changing read only flag for active device makes no sense */
+ if (tdmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY)
+ sdmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+ else
+ sdmd->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+ if (tdmdi.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY)
+ sdmdi->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+ else
+ sdmdi->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+ if (sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+ r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(tgt->u.crypt.vk, src->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.crypt.vk);
+ tgt->u.crypt.vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(src->u.crypt.vk->keylength, src->u.crypt.vk->key);
+ if (!tgt->u.crypt.vk) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
+ src->u.crypt.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ tdmd.flags = sdmd->flags;
+ tdmd.size = sdmd->size;
+
+ if ((r = dm_reload_device(cd, iname, sdmdi, 0, 0))) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to reload device %s."), iname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = dm_reload_device(cd, name, &tdmd, 0, 0))) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to reload device %s."), name);
+ clear = true;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = dm_suspend_device(cd, name, 0))) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to suspend device %s."), name);
+ clear = true;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = dm_suspend_device(cd, iname, 0))) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to suspend device %s."), iname);
+ clear = true;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = dm_resume_device(cd, iname, act2dmflags(sdmdi->flags)))) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to resume device %s."), iname);
+ clear = true;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = dm_resume_device(cd, name, act2dmflags(tdmd.flags));
+ if (!r)
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * This is worst case scenario. We have active underlying dm-integrity device with
+ * new table but dm-crypt resume failed for some reason. Tear everything down and
+ * burn it for good.
+ */
+
+ log_err(cd, _("Fatal error while reloading device %s (on top of device %s)."), name, iname);
+
+ if (dm_error_device(cd, name))
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to switch device %s to dm-error."), name);
+ if (dm_error_device(cd, iname))
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to switch device %s to dm-error."), iname);
+out:
+ if (clear) {
+ dm_clear_device(cd, name);
+ dm_clear_device(cd, iname);
+
+ if (dm_status_suspended(cd, name) > 0)
+ dm_resume_device(cd, name, 0);
+ if (dm_status_suspended(cd, iname) > 0)
+ dm_resume_device(cd, iname, 0);
+ }
+
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &tdmd);
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &tdmdi);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)tdmdi.uuid);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)tdmd.uuid);
+ device_free(cd, data_device);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_resize(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t new_size)
+{
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdq, dmd = {};
+ struct dm_target *tgt = &dmdq.segment;
+ struct crypt_params_integrity params = {};
+ uint32_t supported_flags = 0;
+ uint64_t old_size;
+ int r;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Also with LUKS2 we must not allow resize when there's
+ * explicit size stored in metadata (length != "dynamic")
+ */
+
+ /* Device context type must be initialized */
+ if (!cd || !cd->type || !name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (isTCRYPT(cd->type) || isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for this device type."));
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Resizing device %s to %" PRIu64 " sectors.", name, new_size);
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY |
+ DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS | DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY |
+ DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_MAC_KEY, &dmdq);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (!single_segment(&dmdq) || (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT && tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((dmdq.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_key_in_keyring(cd)) {
+ r = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_key_in_keyring(cd)) {
+ if (!isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr,
+ tgt->u.crypt.vk, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ dmdq.flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_loop_device(crypt_get_device_name(cd))) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Trying to resize underlying loop device %s.",
+ crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+ /* Here we always use default size not new_size */
+ if (crypt_loop_resize(crypt_get_device_name(cd)))
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot resize loop device."));
+ }
+
+
+ /*
+ * Integrity device metadata are maintained by the kernel. We need to
+ * reload the device (with the same parameters) and let the kernel
+ * calculate the maximum size of integrity device and store it in the
+ * superblock.
+ */
+ if (!new_size && tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY) {
+ r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+ crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE, &old_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ dmd.size = dmdq.size;
+ dmd.flags = dmdq.flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE;
+
+ r = crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, ¶ms);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = dm_integrity_target_set(cd, &dmd.segment, 0, dmdq.segment.size,
+ crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd),
+ crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+ crypt_get_sector_size(cd), tgt->u.integrity.vk, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key,
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, ¶ms);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ r = _reload_device(cd, name, &dmd);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+ crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE, &new_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Maximum integrity device size from kernel %" PRIu64, new_size);
+
+ if (old_size == new_size && new_size == dmdq.size &&
+ !dm_flags(cd, tgt->type, &supported_flags) &&
+ !(supported_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_RESIZE_SUPPORTED))
+ log_std(cd, _("WARNING: Maximum size already set or kernel doesn't support resize.\n"));
+ }
+
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), DEV_OK,
+ crypt_get_data_offset(cd), &new_size, &dmdq.flags);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (MISALIGNED(new_size, (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT ? tgt->u.crypt.sector_size : tgt->u.integrity.sector_size) >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (MISALIGNED(new_size, device_block_size(cd, crypt_data_device(cd)) >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to device logical block size."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ dmd.uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd);
+ dmd.size = new_size;
+ dmd.flags = dmdq.flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+ r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, new_size, crypt_data_device(cd),
+ tgt->u.crypt.vk, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd),
+ crypt_get_iv_offset(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+ crypt_get_integrity(cd), crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
+ crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY) {
+ r = crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, ¶ms);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = dm_integrity_target_set(cd, &dmd.segment, 0, new_size,
+ crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd),
+ crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+ crypt_get_sector_size(cd), tgt->u.integrity.vk, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key,
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, ¶ms);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (new_size == dmdq.size) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Device has already requested size %" PRIu64
+ " sectors.", dmdq.size);
+ r = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS2_unmet_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, 0, 0);
+ if (!r)
+ r = _reload_device(cd, name, &dmd);
+
+ if (r && tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY &&
+ !dm_flags(cd, tgt->type, &supported_flags) &&
+ !(supported_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_RESIZE_SUPPORTED))
+ log_err(cd, _("Resize failed, the kernel doesn't support it."));
+ }
+out:
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdq);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_set_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *uuid)
+{
+ const char *active_uuid;
+ int r;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "%s device uuid.", uuid ? "Setting new" : "Refreshing");
+
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+ return r;
+
+ active_uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd);
+
+ if (uuid && active_uuid && !strncmp(uuid, active_uuid, UUID_STRING_L)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "UUID is the same as requested (%s) for device %s.",
+ uuid, mdata_device_path(cd));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (uuid)
+ log_dbg(cd, "Requested new UUID change to %s for %s.", uuid, mdata_device_path(cd));
+ else
+ log_dbg(cd, "Requested new UUID refresh for %s.", mdata_device_path(cd));
+
+ if (!crypt_confirm(cd, _("Do you really want to change UUID of device?")))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return LUKS_hdr_uuid_set(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, uuid, cd);
+ else
+ return LUKS2_hdr_uuid(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, uuid);
+}
+
+int crypt_set_label(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *label, const char *subsystem)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Setting new labels.");
+
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+ return r;
+
+ return LUKS2_hdr_labels(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, label, subsystem, 1);
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_label(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (_onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return cd->u.luks2.hdr.label;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_subsystem(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (_onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return cd->u.luks2.hdr.subsystem;
+}
+
+int crypt_header_backup(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *requested_type,
+ const char *backup_file)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!backup_file)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Load with repair */
+ r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, false, false);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Requested header backup of device %s (%s) to "
+ "file %s.", mdata_device_path(cd), requested_type ?: "any type", backup_file);
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS1(requested_type)))
+ r = LUKS_hdr_backup(backup_file, cd);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS2(requested_type)))
+ r = LUKS2_hdr_backup(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, backup_file);
+ else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_header_restore(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *requested_type,
+ const char *backup_file)
+{
+ struct luks_phdr hdr1;
+ struct luks2_hdr hdr2;
+ int r, version;
+
+ if (requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!cd || (cd->type && !isLUKS(cd->type)) || !backup_file)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = init_crypto(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Requested header restore to device %s (%s) from "
+ "file %s.", mdata_device_path(cd), requested_type ?: "any type", backup_file);
+
+ version = LUKS2_hdr_version_unlocked(cd, backup_file);
+ if (!version ||
+ (requested_type && version == 1 && !isLUKS1(requested_type)) ||
+ (requested_type && version == 2 && !isLUKS2(requested_type))) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ memset(&hdr2, 0, sizeof(hdr2));
+
+ if (!cd->type) {
+ if (version == 1)
+ r = LUKS_hdr_restore(backup_file, &hdr1, cd);
+ else
+ r = LUKS2_hdr_restore(cd, &hdr2, backup_file);
+
+ crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr1, sizeof(hdr1));
+ crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
+ } else if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS2(requested_type))) {
+ r = LUKS2_hdr_restore(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, backup_file);
+ if (r)
+ (void) _crypt_load_luks2(cd, 1, 0);
+ } else if (isLUKS1(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS1(requested_type)))
+ r = LUKS_hdr_restore(backup_file, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+ else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!r)
+ r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, version == 1 ? CRYPT_LUKS1 : CRYPT_LUKS2, false, true);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_header_is_detached(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd || (cd->type && !isLUKS(cd->type)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = device_is_identical(crypt_data_device(cd), crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Failed to compare data and metadata devices path.");
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return r ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+void crypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Releasing crypt device %s context.", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "empty");
+
+ dm_backend_exit(cd);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(cd->volume_key);
+
+ crypt_free_type(cd, NULL);
+
+ device_free(cd, cd->device);
+ device_free(cd, cd->metadata_device);
+
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->pbkdf.type);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->pbkdf.hash);
+
+ /* Some structures can contain keys (TCRYPT), wipe it */
+ crypt_safe_memzero(cd, sizeof(*cd));
+ free(cd);
+}
+
+static char *crypt_get_device_key_description(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ char *desc = NULL;
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+ struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+
+ if (dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE, &dmd) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (single_segment(&dmd) && tgt->type == DM_CRYPT &&
+ (dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description)
+ desc = strdup(tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
+
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+
+ return desc;
+}
+
+int crypt_suspend(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ char *key_desc;
+ crypt_status_info ci;
+ int r;
+ uint32_t dmflags = DM_SUSPEND_WIPE_KEY;
+
+ /* FIXME: check context uuid matches the dm-crypt device uuid (onlyLUKS branching) */
+
+ if (!cd || !name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Suspending volume %s.", name);
+
+ if (cd->type)
+ r = onlyLUKS(cd);
+ else {
+ r = crypt_uuid_type_cmp(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1);
+ if (r < 0)
+ r = crypt_uuid_type_cmp(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device."));
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ ci = crypt_status(NULL, name);
+ if (ci < CRYPT_ACTIVE) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not active."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ dm_backend_init(cd);
+
+ r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is already suspended."), name);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ key_desc = crypt_get_device_key_description(cd, name);
+
+ /* we can't simply wipe wrapped keys */
+ if (crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)))
+ dmflags &= ~DM_SUSPEND_WIPE_KEY;
+
+ r = dm_suspend_device(cd, name, dmflags);
+ if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+ log_err(cd, _("Suspend is not supported for device %s."), name);
+ else if (r)
+ log_err(cd, _("Error during suspending device %s."), name);
+ else
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key_by_description(cd, key_desc, LOGON_KEY);
+ free(key_desc);
+out:
+ dm_backend_exit(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* key must be properly verified */
+static int resume_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct volume_key *vk,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ int digest, r;
+ struct volume_key *zerokey = NULL;
+
+ if (crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd))) {
+ zerokey = crypt_alloc_volume_key(0, NULL);
+ if (!zerokey)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ vk = zerokey;
+ } else if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) {
+ /* LUKS2 path only */
+ digest = LUKS2_digest_by_segment(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+ if (digest < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, vk, digest);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(cd, name, vk);
+
+ if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+ log_err(cd, _("Resume is not supported for device %s."), name);
+ else if (r)
+ log_err(cd, _("Error during resuming device %s."), name);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk);
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(zerokey);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size)
+{
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ /* FIXME: check context uuid matches the dm-crypt device uuid */
+
+ if (!passphrase || !name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s.", name);
+
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+ return r;
+
+ r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (!r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+ &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+ else
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ keyslot = r;
+
+ r = resume_by_volume_key(cd, vk, name);
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ uint64_t keyfile_offset)
+{
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ char *passphrase_read = NULL;
+ size_t passphrase_size_read;
+ int r;
+
+ /* FIXME: check context uuid matches the dm-crypt device uuid */
+
+ if (!name || !keyfile)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s.", name);
+
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+ return r;
+
+ r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (!r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, keyfile,
+ &passphrase_read, &passphrase_size_read,
+ keyfile_offset, keyfile_size, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read,
+ &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+ else
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT,
+ passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read, &vk);
+
+ crypt_safe_free(passphrase_read);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ keyslot = r;
+
+ r = resume_by_volume_key(cd, vk, name);
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size)
+{
+ return crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot,
+ keyfile, keyfile_size, 0);
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ size_t keyfile_offset)
+{
+ return crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot,
+ keyfile, keyfile_size, keyfile_offset);
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size)
+{
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!name || !volume_key)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s by volume key.", name);
+
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+ return r;
+
+ r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (!r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+ if (!vk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+ else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ if (r == -EPERM || r == -ENOENT)
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = resume_by_volume_key(cd, vk, name);
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_token_pin(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ const char *type, int token, const char *pin, size_t pin_size,
+ void *usrptr)
+{
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ int r, keyslot;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s by token (%s type) %d.",
+ name, type ?: "any", token);
+
+ if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET, 0)))
+ return r;
+
+ r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (!r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = LUKS2_token_unlock_key(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, type,
+ pin, pin_size, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, usrptr, &vk);
+ keyslot = r;
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = resume_by_volume_key(cd, vk, name);
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Keyslot manipulation
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot, // -1 any
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ const char *new_passphrase,
+ size_t new_passphrase_size)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context kc, new_kc;
+
+ if (!passphrase || !new_passphrase)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&kc, passphrase, passphrase_size);
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&new_kc, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size);
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyslot_context(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &kc, keyslot, &new_kc, 0);
+
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&new_kc);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot_old,
+ int keyslot_new,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ const char *new_passphrase,
+ size_t new_passphrase_size)
+{
+ int digest = -1, r, keyslot_new_orig = keyslot_new;
+ struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+ if (!passphrase || !new_passphrase)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Changing passphrase from old keyslot %d to new %d.",
+ keyslot_old, keyslot_new);
+
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+ return r;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot_old, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+ &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot_old, CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT, passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+ /* will fail for keyslots w/o digest. fix if supported in a future */
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, r);
+ if (digest < 0)
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (keyslot_old != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT && keyslot_old != r) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot mismatch.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ keyslot_old = r;
+
+ if (keyslot_new == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ keyslot_new = LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ keyslot_new = LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk->keylength);
+ if (keyslot_new < 0)
+ keyslot_new = keyslot_old;
+ }
+ log_dbg(cd, "Key change, old slot %d, new slot %d.", keyslot_old, keyslot_new);
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ if (keyslot_old == keyslot_new) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Key slot %d is going to be overwritten.", keyslot_old);
+ (void)crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, keyslot_old);
+ }
+ r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot_new, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size,
+ &cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd);
+ } else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, ¶ms);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (keyslot_old != keyslot_new) {
+ r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_new, digest, 1, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = LUKS2_token_assignment_copy(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_old, keyslot_new, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Key slot %d is going to be overwritten.", keyslot_old);
+ /* FIXME: improve return code so that we can detect area is damaged */
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_old, 1);
+ if (r) {
+ /* (void)crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, keyslot_old); */
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr,
+ keyslot_new, new_passphrase,
+ new_passphrase_size, vk, ¶ms);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Swap old & new so the final keyslot number remains */
+ if (keyslot_new_orig == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT && keyslot_old != keyslot_new) {
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_swap(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_old, keyslot_new);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Swap slot id */
+ r = keyslot_old;
+ keyslot_old = keyslot_new;
+ keyslot_new = r;
+ }
+ } else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (r >= 0 && keyslot_old != keyslot_new)
+ r = crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, keyslot_old);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to swap new key slot."));
+out:
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ _luks2_rollback(cd);
+ return r;
+ }
+ return keyslot_new;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ uint64_t keyfile_offset,
+ const char *new_keyfile,
+ size_t new_keyfile_size,
+ uint64_t new_keyfile_offset)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context kc, new_kc;
+
+ if (!keyfile || !new_keyfile)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_keyfile_init_internal(&kc, keyfile, keyfile_size, keyfile_offset);
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_keyfile_init_internal(&new_kc, new_keyfile, new_keyfile_size, new_keyfile_offset);
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyslot_context(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &kc, keyslot, &new_kc, 0);
+
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&new_kc);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ const char *new_keyfile,
+ size_t new_keyfile_size)
+{
+ return crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, keyslot,
+ keyfile, keyfile_size, 0,
+ new_keyfile, new_keyfile_size, 0);
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ size_t keyfile_offset,
+ const char *new_keyfile,
+ size_t new_keyfile_size,
+ size_t new_keyfile_offset)
+{
+ return crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, keyslot,
+ keyfile, keyfile_size, keyfile_offset,
+ new_keyfile, new_keyfile_size, new_keyfile_offset);
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context kc, new_kc;
+
+ if (!passphrase)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_key_init_internal(&kc, volume_key, volume_key_size);
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&new_kc, passphrase, passphrase_size);
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyslot_context(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &kc, keyslot, &new_kc, 0);
+
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&new_kc);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_destroy(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+ crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+ int r;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Destroying keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+
+ if ((r = _onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED)))
+ return r;
+
+ ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, keyslot);
+ if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is invalid."), keyslot);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Keyslot %d is not active."), keyslot);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return LUKS_del_key(keyslot, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+ }
+
+ return LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, 0);
+}
+
+static int _check_header_data_overlap(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ if (!name || !isLUKS(cd->type))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (device_is_identical(crypt_data_device(cd), crypt_metadata_device(cd)) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* FIXME: check real header size */
+ if (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) == 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device header overlaps with data area."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_devices(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *iname, uint32_t *flags)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!flags || !name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (iname) {
+ r = dm_status_device(cd, iname);
+ if (r >= 0 && !(*flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+ return -EBUSY;
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENODEV)
+ return r;
+ if (r == -ENODEV)
+ *flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+ }
+
+ r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
+ if (r >= 0 && !(*flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+ return -EBUSY;
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENODEV)
+ return r;
+ if (r == -ENODEV)
+ *flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _create_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *type, const char *name, const char *iname,
+ const char *ipath, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmdi)
+{
+ int r;
+ enum devcheck device_check;
+ struct dm_target *tgt;
+ struct device *device = NULL;
+
+ if (!single_segment(dmd))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tgt = &dmd->segment;
+ if (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ device_check = dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED ? DEV_OK : DEV_EXCL;
+
+ r = INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(cd, iname, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, dmdi, 0);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ r = device_alloc(cd, &device, ipath);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ tgt->data_device = device;
+
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, device_check,
+ tgt->u.crypt.offset, &dmd->size, &dmd->flags);
+
+ if (!r)
+ r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
+out:
+ if (r < 0)
+ dm_remove_device(cd, iname, 0);
+
+ device_free(cd, device);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int kernel_keyring_support(void)
+{
+ static unsigned _checked = 0;
+
+ if (!_checked) {
+ _kernel_keyring_supported = keyring_check();
+ _checked = 1;
+ }
+
+ return _kernel_keyring_supported;
+}
+
+static int dmcrypt_keyring_bug(void)
+{
+ uint64_t kversion;
+
+ if (kernel_version(&kversion))
+ return 1;
+ return kversion < compact_version(4,15,0,0);
+}
+
+int create_or_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ const char *type, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+ int r;
+ enum devcheck device_check;
+ struct dm_target *tgt;
+
+ if (!type || !name || !single_segment(dmd))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tgt = &dmd->segment;
+ if (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT && tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* drop CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH flag if any device is inactive */
+ r = check_devices(cd, name, NULL, &dmd->flags);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ if (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH)
+ r = _reload_device(cd, name, dmd);
+ else {
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+ device_check = dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED ? DEV_OK : DEV_EXCL;
+
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, device_check,
+ tgt->u.crypt.offset, &dmd->size, &dmd->flags);
+ if (!r) {
+ tgt->size = dmd->size;
+ r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
+ }
+ } else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY) {
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, DEV_EXCL,
+ tgt->u.integrity.offset, NULL, &dmd->flags);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device, DEV_EXCL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int create_or_reload_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ const char *type, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmdi)
+{
+ int r;
+ const char *iname = NULL;
+ char *ipath = NULL;
+
+ if (!type || !name || !dmd || !dmdi)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (asprintf(&ipath, "%s/%s_dif", dm_get_dir(), name) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ iname = ipath + strlen(dm_get_dir()) + 1;
+
+ /* drop CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH flag if any device is inactive */
+ r = check_devices(cd, name, iname, &dmd->flags);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH)
+ r = _reload_device_with_integrity(cd, name, iname, ipath, dmd, dmdi);
+ else
+ r = _create_device_with_integrity(cd, type, name, iname, ipath, dmd, dmdi);
+out:
+ free(ipath);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _open_and_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ bool use_keyring;
+ int r;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot,
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) ?
+ CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT : CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT,
+ passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ keyslot = r;
+
+ if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+ use_keyring = false;
+ else
+ use_keyring = ((name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) ||
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY));
+
+ if (use_keyring) {
+ r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd,
+ &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, keyslot);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (name)
+ r = LUKS2_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+out:
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
+static int load_all_keys(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vks)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct volume_key *vk = vks;
+
+ while (vk) {
+ r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ vk = crypt_volume_key_next(vk);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _open_all_keys(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ uint32_t flags,
+ struct volume_key **vks)
+{
+ int r, segment;
+ struct volume_key *_vks = NULL;
+ crypt_reencrypt_info ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(hdr);
+
+ segment = (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) ? CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT : CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT;
+
+ switch (ri) {
+ case CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE:
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, segment, passphrase, passphrase_size, &_vks);
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CLEAN:
+ case CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CRASH:
+ if (segment == CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT)
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, segment, passphrase,
+ passphrase_size, &_vks);
+ else
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_all_segments(cd, keyslot,
+ keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+ &_vks);
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+ keyslot = r;
+
+ if (r >= 0 && (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY))
+ r = load_all_keys(cd, hdr, _vks);
+
+ if (r >= 0 && vks)
+ MOVE_REF(*vks, _vks);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, _vks);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(_vks);
+
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+static int _open_and_activate_reencrypt_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ bool dynamic_size;
+ crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
+ uint64_t minimal_size, device_size;
+ struct volume_key *vks = NULL;
+ int r = 0;
+ struct crypt_lock_handle *reencrypt_lock = NULL;
+
+ if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+ flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+
+ r = LUKS2_reencrypt_lock(cd, &reencrypt_lock);
+ if (r) {
+ if (r == -EBUSY)
+ log_err(cd, _("Reencryption in-progress. Cannot activate device."));
+ else
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to get reencryption lock."));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL)))
+ goto out;
+
+ ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(hdr);
+
+ if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CRASH) {
+ r = LUKS2_reencrypt_locked_recovery_by_passphrase(cd, keyslot,
+ keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, &vks);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("LUKS2 reencryption recovery failed."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ keyslot = r;
+
+ ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(hdr);
+ }
+
+ /* recovery finished reencryption or it's already finished */
+ if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vks);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vks);
+ LUKS2_reencrypt_unlock(cd, reencrypt_lock);
+ return _open_and_activate(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+ }
+
+ if (ri > CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CLEAN) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (LUKS2_get_data_size(hdr, &minimal_size, &dynamic_size))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!vks) {
+ r = _open_all_keys(cd, hdr, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags, &vks);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ keyslot = r;
+ }
+
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ r = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vks);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Entering clean reencryption state mode.");
+
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = LUKS2_reencrypt_check_device_size(cd, hdr, minimal_size, &device_size, true, dynamic_size);
+
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = LUKS2_activate_multi(cd, name, vks, device_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT, flags);
+out:
+ LUKS2_reencrypt_unlock(cd, reencrypt_lock);
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vks);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vks);
+
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Activation/deactivation of a device
+ */
+static int _open_and_activate_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
+ int r, rv;
+ struct luks2_hdr *hdr = &cd->u.luks2.hdr;
+ struct volume_key *vks = NULL;
+
+ ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(hdr);
+ if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (ri > CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
+ if (name)
+ r = _open_and_activate_reencrypt_device(cd, hdr, keyslot, name, passphrase,
+ passphrase_size, flags);
+ else {
+ r = _open_all_keys(cd, hdr, keyslot, passphrase,
+ passphrase_size, flags, &vks);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ rv = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vks);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vks);
+ if (rv < 0)
+ return rv;
+ }
+ } else
+ r = _open_and_activate(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase,
+ passphrase_size, flags);
+
+ return r;
+}
+#else
+static int _open_and_activate_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
+
+ ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (ri > CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
+ log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for this device type."));
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ return _open_and_activate(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int _activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) && name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = _check_header_data_overlap(cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF)
+ cd->memory_hard_pbkdf_lock_enabled = true;
+
+ /* plain, use hashed passphrase */
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ if (!name)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = process_key(cd, cd->u.plain.hdr.hash,
+ cd->u.plain.key_size,
+ passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = PLAIN_activate(cd, name, vk, cd->u.plain.hdr.size, flags);
+ keyslot = 0;
+ } else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase,
+ passphrase_size, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ keyslot = r;
+ if (name)
+ r = LUKS1_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+ }
+ } else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ r = _open_and_activate_luks2(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+ keyslot = r;
+ } else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+ r = BITLK_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+ &cd->u.bitlk.params, flags);
+ keyslot = 0;
+ } else if (isFVAULT2(cd->type)) {
+ r = FVAULT2_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+ &cd->u.fvault2.params, flags);
+ keyslot = 0;
+ } else {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device type is not properly initialized."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+out:
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+ cd->memory_hard_pbkdf_lock_enabled = false;
+
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+static int _activate_loopaes(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ char *buffer,
+ size_t buffer_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ int r;
+ unsigned int key_count = 0;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+ r = LOOPAES_parse_keyfile(cd, &vk, cd->u.loopaes.hdr.hash, &key_count,
+ buffer, buffer_size);
+
+ if (!r && name)
+ r = LOOPAES_activate(cd, name, cd->u.loopaes.cipher, key_count,
+ vk, flags);
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _activate_check_status(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, unsigned reload)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return 0;
+
+ r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
+
+ if (r >= 0 && reload)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (r >= 0 || r == -EEXIST) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s already exists."), name);
+ return -EEXIST;
+ }
+
+ if (r == -ENODEV)
+ return 0;
+
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."), name);
+ return r;
+}
+
+// activation/deactivation of device mapping
+int crypt_activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd || !passphrase || (!name && (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s [keyslot %d] using passphrase.",
+ name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase",
+ keyslot);
+
+ r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return _activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ uint64_t keyfile_offset,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ char *passphrase_read = NULL;
+ size_t passphrase_size_read;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd || !keyfile ||
+ ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s [keyslot %d] using keyfile %s.",
+ name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase", keyslot, keyfile);
+
+ r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, keyfile,
+ &passphrase_read, &passphrase_size_read,
+ keyfile_offset, keyfile_size, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+ r = _activate_loopaes(cd, name, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read, flags);
+ else
+ r = _activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read, flags);
+
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(passphrase_read);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ return crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot, keyfile,
+ keyfile_size, 0, flags);
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ size_t keyfile_offset,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ return crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot, keyfile,
+ keyfile_size, keyfile_offset, flags);
+}
+int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ bool use_keyring;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd ||
+ ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s by volume key.", name ? "Activating" : "Checking",
+ name ?: "");
+
+ r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = _check_header_data_overlap(cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* use key directly, no hash */
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
+ if (!name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!volume_key || !volume_key_size || volume_key_size != cd->u.plain.key_size) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Incorrect volume key specified for plain device."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+ if (!vk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = PLAIN_activate(cd, name, vk, cd->u.plain.hdr.size, flags);
+ } else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ /* If key is not provided, try to use internal key */
+ if (!volume_key) {
+ if (!cd->volume_key) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ volume_key_size = cd->volume_key->keylength;
+ volume_key = cd->volume_key->key;
+ }
+
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+ if (!vk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
+
+ if (r == -EPERM)
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+
+ if (!r && name)
+ r = LUKS1_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+ } else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ /* If key is not provided, try to use internal key */
+ if (!volume_key) {
+ if (!cd->volume_key) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ volume_key_size = cd->volume_key->keylength;
+ volume_key = cd->volume_key->key;
+ }
+
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+ if (!vk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+ if (r == -EPERM || r == -ENOENT)
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+ if (r > 0)
+ r = 0;
+
+ if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+ use_keyring = false;
+ else
+ use_keyring = (name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) ||
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY);
+
+ if (!r && use_keyring) {
+ r = LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(cd,
+ &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+ if (!r)
+ r = crypt_volume_key_load_in_keyring(cd, vk);
+ if (!r)
+ flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (!r && name)
+ r = LUKS2_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+ } else if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
+ r = crypt_activate_by_signed_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size, NULL, 0, flags);
+ } else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+ if (!name)
+ return 0;
+ r = TCRYPT_activate(cd, name, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr,
+ &cd->u.tcrypt.params, flags);
+ } else if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+ if (!name)
+ return 0;
+ if (volume_key) {
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+ if (!vk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ r = INTEGRITY_activate(cd, name, &cd->u.integrity.params, vk,
+ cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key,
+ cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key, flags,
+ cd->u.integrity.sb_flags);
+ } else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+ r = BITLK_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size,
+ &cd->u.bitlk.params, flags);
+ } else {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device type is not properly initialized."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_signed_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ const char *signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ char description[512];
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd || !isVERITY(cd->type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!volume_key || !volume_key_size || (!name && signature)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (name)
+ log_dbg(cd, "Activating volume %s by %skey.", name, signature ? "signed " : "");
+ else
+ log_dbg(cd, "Checking volume by key.");
+
+ if (cd->u.verity.hdr.flags & CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE && !signature) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Root hash signature required."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (signature && !kernel_keyring_support()) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Kernel keyring missing: required for passing signature to kernel."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* volume_key == root hash */
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.root_hash);
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash = NULL;
+
+ if (signature) {
+ r = snprintf(description, sizeof(description)-1, "cryptsetup:%s%s%s",
+ crypt_get_uuid(cd) ?: "", crypt_get_uuid(cd) ? "-" : "", name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Adding signature into keyring %s", description);
+ r = keyring_add_key_in_thread_keyring(USER_KEY, description, signature, signature_size);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to load key in kernel keyring."));
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = VERITY_activate(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size,
+ signature ? description : NULL,
+ cd->u.verity.fec_device,
+ &cd->u.verity.hdr, flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY);
+
+ if (!r) {
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = volume_key_size;
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash = malloc(volume_key_size);
+ if (cd->u.verity.root_hash)
+ memcpy(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.root_hash, volume_key, volume_key_size);
+ }
+
+ if (signature)
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key_by_description(cd, description, USER_KEY);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_deactivate_by_name(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *fake_cd = NULL;
+ struct luks2_hdr *hdr2 = NULL;
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
+ int r;
+ uint32_t get_flags = DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_UUID | DM_ACTIVE_HOLDERS;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED) && (flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Deactivating volume %s.", name);
+
+ if (!cd) {
+ r = crypt_init_by_name(&fake_cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ cd = fake_cd;
+ }
+
+ /* skip holders detection and early abort when some flags raised */
+ if (flags & (CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE | CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED | CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL))
+ get_flags &= ~DM_ACTIVE_HOLDERS;
+
+ switch (crypt_status(cd, name)) {
+ case CRYPT_ACTIVE:
+ case CRYPT_BUSY:
+ if (flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL) {
+ r = dm_cancel_deferred_removal(name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Could not cancel deferred remove from device %s."), name);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, name, get_flags, &dmd);
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ if (dmd.holders) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is still in use."), name);
+ r = -EBUSY;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ hdr2 = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+
+ if ((dmd.uuid && !strncmp(CRYPT_LUKS2, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LUKS2)-1)) || hdr2)
+ r = LUKS2_deactivate(cd, name, hdr2, &dmd, flags);
+ else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ r = TCRYPT_deactivate(cd, name, flags);
+ else
+ r = dm_remove_device(cd, name, flags);
+ if (r < 0 && crypt_status(cd, name) == CRYPT_BUSY) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is still in use."), name);
+ r = -EBUSY;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_INACTIVE:
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+ r = -ENODEV;
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_err(cd, _("Invalid device %s."), name);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+ crypt_free(fake_cd);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ return crypt_deactivate_by_name(cd, name, 0);
+}
+
+int crypt_get_active_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ struct crypt_active_device *cad)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd, dmdi = {};
+ const char *namei = NULL;
+ struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+ uint64_t min_offset = UINT64_MAX;
+
+ if (!cd || !name || !cad)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE, &dmd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* For LUKS2 with integrity we need flags from underlying dm-integrity */
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd) && single_segment(&dmd)) {
+ namei = device_dm_name(tgt->data_device);
+ if (namei && dm_query_device(cd, namei, 0, &dmdi) >= 0)
+ dmd.flags |= dmdi.flags;
+ }
+
+ if (cd && isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+ cad->offset = TCRYPT_get_data_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+ cad->iv_offset = TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+ } else {
+ while (tgt) {
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT && (min_offset > tgt->u.crypt.offset)) {
+ min_offset = tgt->u.crypt.offset;
+ cad->iv_offset = tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset;
+ } else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY && (min_offset > tgt->u.integrity.offset)) {
+ min_offset = tgt->u.integrity.offset;
+ cad->iv_offset = 0;
+ } else if (tgt->type == DM_LINEAR && (min_offset > tgt->u.linear.offset)) {
+ min_offset = tgt->u.linear.offset;
+ cad->iv_offset = 0;
+ }
+ tgt = tgt->next;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (min_offset != UINT64_MAX)
+ cad->offset = min_offset;
+
+ cad->size = dmd.size;
+ cad->flags = dmd.flags;
+
+ r = 0;
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+uint64_t crypt_get_active_integrity_failures(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+ uint64_t failures = 0;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* LUKS2 / dm-crypt does not provide this count. */
+ if (dm_query_device(cd, name, 0, &dmd) < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (single_segment(&dmd) && dmd.segment.type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+ (void)dm_status_integrity_failures(cd, name, &failures);
+
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+
+ return failures;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Volume key handling
+ */
+int crypt_volume_key_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ char *volume_key,
+ size_t *volume_key_size,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context kc;
+
+ if (!passphrase)
+ return crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context(cd, keyslot, volume_key, volume_key_size, NULL);
+
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&kc, passphrase, passphrase_size);
+
+ r = crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context(cd, keyslot, volume_key, volume_key_size, &kc);
+
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ char *volume_key,
+ size_t *volume_key_size,
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context *kc)
+{
+ size_t passphrase_size;
+ int key_len, r;
+ const char *passphrase = NULL;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+ if (!cd || !volume_key || !volume_key_size ||
+ (!kc && !isLUKS(cd->type) && !isTCRYPT(cd->type) && !isVERITY(cd->type)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+ key_len = LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+ else
+ key_len = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+
+ if (key_len < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (key_len > (int)*volume_key_size) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key buffer too small."));
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (kc && (!kc->get_passphrase || kc->type == CRYPT_KC_TYPE_KEY))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (kc) {
+ r = kc->get_passphrase(cd, kc, &passphrase, &passphrase_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ if (kc && !kc->get_luks2_key)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for LUKS2 device."));
+ else if (!kc)
+ r = -ENOENT;
+ else
+ r = kc->get_luks2_key(cd, kc, keyslot,
+ keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT ? CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT : CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT,
+ &vk);
+ } else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ if (kc && !kc->get_luks1_volume_key)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for LUKS1 device."));
+ else if (!kc)
+ r = -ENOENT;
+ else
+ r = kc->get_luks1_volume_key(cd, kc, keyslot, &vk);
+ } else if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
+ if (passphrase && cd->u.plain.hdr.hash)
+ r = process_key(cd, cd->u.plain.hdr.hash, key_len,
+ passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."));
+ } else if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
+ /* volume_key == root hash */
+ if (cd->u.verity.root_hash) {
+ memcpy(volume_key, cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size);
+ *volume_key_size = cd->u.verity.root_hash_size;
+ r = 0;
+ } else
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve root hash for verity device."));
+ } else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+ r = TCRYPT_get_volume_key(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params, &vk);
+ } else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+ if (passphrase)
+ r = BITLK_get_volume_key(cd, passphrase, passphrase_size, &cd->u.bitlk.params, &vk);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for BITLK device."));
+ } else if (isFVAULT2(cd->type)) {
+ if (passphrase)
+ r = FVAULT2_get_volume_key(cd, passphrase, passphrase_size, &cd->u.fvault2.params, &vk);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for FVAULT2 device."));
+ } else
+ log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."), cd->type ?: "(none)");
+
+ if (r == -ENOENT && isLUKS(cd->type) && cd->volume_key) {
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
+ r = vk ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (r >= 0 && vk) {
+ memcpy(volume_key, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+ *volume_key_size = vk->keylength;
+ }
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_volume_key_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size)
+{
+ struct volume_key *vk;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = _onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED)))
+ return r;
+
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+ if (!vk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+ else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+ return r >= 0 ? 0 : r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RNG and memory locking
+ */
+void crypt_set_rng_type(struct crypt_device *cd, int rng_type)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return;
+
+ switch (rng_type) {
+ case CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM:
+ case CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM:
+ log_dbg(cd, "RNG set to %d (%s).", rng_type, rng_type ? "random" : "urandom");
+ cd->rng_type = rng_type;
+ }
+}
+
+int crypt_get_rng_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return cd->rng_type;
+}
+
+int crypt_memory_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, int lock)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_set_compatibility(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ if (cd)
+ cd->compatibility = flags;
+}
+
+uint32_t crypt_get_compatibility(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (cd)
+ return cd->compatibility;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reporting
+ */
+crypt_status_info crypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return CRYPT_INVALID;
+
+ if (!cd)
+ dm_backend_init(cd);
+
+ r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
+
+ if (!cd)
+ dm_backend_exit(cd);
+
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENODEV)
+ return CRYPT_INVALID;
+
+ if (r == 0)
+ return CRYPT_ACTIVE;
+
+ if (r > 0)
+ return CRYPT_BUSY;
+
+ return CRYPT_INACTIVE;
+}
+
+static int _luks_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ log_std(cd, "LUKS header information for %s\n\n", mdata_device_path(cd));
+ log_std(cd, "Version: \t%" PRIu16 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.version);
+ log_std(cd, "Cipher name: \t%s\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherName);
+ log_std(cd, "Cipher mode: \t%s\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherMode);
+ log_std(cd, "Hash spec: \t%s\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.hashSpec);
+ log_std(cd, "Payload offset:\t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.payloadOffset);
+ log_std(cd, "MK bits: \t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes * 8);
+ log_std(cd, "MK digest: \t");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE, " ", 0, NULL);
+ log_std(cd, "\n");
+ log_std(cd, "MK salt: \t");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
+ log_std(cd, "\n \t");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt+LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
+ log_std(cd, "\n");
+ log_std(cd, "MK iterations: \t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestIterations);
+ log_std(cd, "UUID: \t%s\n\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.uuid);
+ for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+ if(cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED) {
+ log_std(cd, "Key Slot %d: ENABLED\n",i);
+ log_std(cd, "\tIterations: \t%" PRIu32 "\n",
+ cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordIterations);
+ log_std(cd, "\tSalt: \t");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt,
+ LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
+ log_std(cd, "\n\t \t");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt +
+ LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
+ log_std(cd, "\n");
+
+ log_std(cd, "\tKey material offset:\t%" PRIu32 "\n",
+ cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset);
+ log_std(cd, "\tAF stripes: \t%" PRIu32 "\n",
+ cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].stripes);
+ }
+ else
+ log_std(cd, "Key Slot %d: DISABLED\n", i);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return _luks_dump(cd);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_hdr_dump(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ else if (isVERITY(cd->type))
+ return VERITY_dump(cd, &cd->u.verity.hdr,
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size,
+ cd->u.verity.fec_device);
+ else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ return TCRYPT_dump(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+ else if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+ return INTEGRITY_dump(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), 0);
+ else if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+ return BITLK_dump(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), &cd->u.bitlk.params);
+ else if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return FVAULT2_dump(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), &cd->u.fvault2.params);
+
+ log_err(cd, _("Dump operation is not supported for this device type."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_dump_json(struct crypt_device *cd, const char **json, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ if (!cd || flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_hdr_dump_json(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, json);
+
+ log_err(cd, _("Dump operation is not supported for this device type."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+const char *crypt_get_cipher_spec(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return NULL;
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+ else if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec;
+ else if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.plain.cipher_spec;
+ else if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec;
+ else if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec;
+ else if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+ return cd->u.none.cipher_spec;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_cipher(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.plain.cipher;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherName;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ if (crypt_parse_name_and_mode(LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT),
+ cd->u.luks2.cipher, NULL, cd->u.luks2.cipher_mode))
+ return NULL;
+ return cd->u.luks2.cipher;
+ }
+
+ if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.loopaes.cipher;
+
+ if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.tcrypt.params.cipher;
+
+ if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher;
+
+ if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.fvault2.params.cipher;
+
+ if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+ return cd->u.none.cipher;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_cipher_mode(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.plain.cipher_mode;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherMode;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ if (crypt_parse_name_and_mode(LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT),
+ cd->u.luks2.cipher, NULL, cd->u.luks2.cipher_mode))
+ return NULL;
+ return cd->u.luks2.cipher_mode;
+ }
+
+ if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.loopaes.cipher_mode;
+
+ if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.tcrypt.params.mode;
+
+ if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher_mode;
+
+ if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.fvault2.params.cipher_mode;
+
+ if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+ return cd->u.none.cipher_mode;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* INTERNAL only */
+const char *crypt_get_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.integrity.params.integrity;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_get_integrity(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* INTERNAL only */
+int crypt_get_integrity_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ int key_size = 0;
+
+ if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+ key_size = INTEGRITY_key_size(crypt_get_integrity(cd));
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ key_size = INTEGRITY_key_size(crypt_get_integrity(cd));
+
+ return key_size > 0 ? key_size : 0;
+}
+
+/* INTERNAL only */
+int crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return INTEGRITY_tag_size(crypt_get_integrity(cd),
+ crypt_get_cipher(cd),
+ crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_sector_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return SECTOR_SIZE;
- if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
- log_err(cd, _("Can't format LUKS without device.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.plain.hdr.sector_size;
- if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS1)))
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size;
- if (volume_key)
- cd->volume_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size,
- volume_key);
- else
- cd->volume_key = crypt_generate_volume_key(cd, volume_key_size);
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_get_sector_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
- if(!cd->volume_key)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return SECTOR_SIZE;
+}
- if (params && params->data_device) {
- cd->metadata_device = cd->device;
- cd->device = NULL;
- if (device_alloc(&cd->device, params->data_device) < 0)
- return -ENOMEM;
- required_alignment = params->data_alignment * SECTOR_SIZE;
- } else if (params && params->data_alignment) {
- required_alignment = params->data_alignment * SECTOR_SIZE;
- } else
- device_topology_alignment(cd->device,
- &required_alignment,
- &alignment_offset, DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT);
+const char *crypt_get_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return NULL;
- /* Check early if we cannot allocate block device for key slot access */
- r = device_block_adjust(cd, cd->device, DEV_OK, 0, NULL, NULL);
- if(r < 0)
- return r;
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks1.hdr.uuid;
- r = LUKS_generate_phdr(&cd->hdr, cd->volume_key, cipher, cipher_mode,
- (params && params->hash) ? params->hash : "sha1",
- uuid, LUKS_STRIPES,
- required_alignment / SECTOR_SIZE,
- alignment_offset / SECTOR_SIZE,
- cd->iteration_time, &cd->PBKDF2_per_sec,
- cd->metadata_device ? 1 : 0, cd);
- if(r < 0)
- return r;
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks2.hdr.uuid;
- /* Wipe first 8 sectors - fs magic numbers etc. */
- r = crypt_wipe(crypt_metadata_device(cd), 0, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 1);
- if(r < 0) {
- if (r == -EBUSY)
- log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s which is still in use.\n"),
- mdata_device_path(cd));
- else if (r == -EACCES) {
- log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s, permission denied.\n"),
- mdata_device_path(cd));
- r = -EINVAL;
- } else
- log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s.\n"),
- mdata_device_path(cd));
+ if (isVERITY(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.verity.uuid;
- return r;
- }
+ if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.bitlk.params.guid;
- r = LUKS_write_phdr(&cd->hdr, cd);
+ if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.fvault2.params.family_uuid;
- return r;
+ return NULL;
}
-static int _crypt_format_loopaes(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *cipher,
- const char *uuid,
- size_t volume_key_size,
- struct crypt_params_loopaes *params)
+const char *crypt_get_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
- if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
- log_err(cd, _("Can't format LOOPAES without device.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (volume_key_size > 1024) {
- log_err(cd, _("Invalid key size.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ const char *path;
- if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LOOPAES)))
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!cd)
+ return NULL;
- cd->loopaes_key_size = volume_key_size;
+ path = device_block_path(cd->device);
+ if (!path)
+ path = device_path(cd->device);
- cd->loopaes_cipher = strdup(cipher ?: DEFAULT_LOOPAES_CIPHER);
+ return path;
+}
- if (uuid)
- cd->loopaes_uuid = strdup(uuid);
+const char *crypt_get_metadata_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ const char *path;
- if (params && params->hash)
- cd->loopaes_hdr.hash = strdup(params->hash);
+ if (!cd || !cd->metadata_device)
+ return NULL;
- cd->loopaes_hdr.offset = params ? params->offset : 0;
- cd->loopaes_hdr.skip = params ? params->skip : 0;
+ path = device_block_path(cd->metadata_device);
+ if (!path)
+ path = device_path(cd->metadata_device);
- return 0;
+ return path;
}
-static int _crypt_format_verity(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *uuid,
- struct crypt_params_verity *params)
+int crypt_get_volume_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
- int r = 0, hash_size;
- uint64_t data_device_size;
+ int r;
- if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
- log_err(cd, _("Can't format VERITY without device.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ if (!cd)
+ return 0;
- if (!params || !params->data_device)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.plain.key_size;
- if (params->hash_type > VERITY_MAX_HASH_TYPE) {
- log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY hash type %d.\n"), params->hash_type);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes;
- if (VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(params->data_block_size) ||
- VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(params->hash_block_size)) {
- log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY block size.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ r = LUKS2_get_volume_key_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+ if (r < 0 && cd->volume_key)
+ r = cd->volume_key->keylength;
+ return r < 0 ? 0 : r;
}
- if (params->hash_area_offset % 512) {
- log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY hash offset.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.loopaes.key_size;
- if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_VERITY)))
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (isVERITY(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.verity.root_hash_size;
- r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, params->data_device);
- if (r)
- return r;
- if (!params->data_size) {
- r = device_size(cd->device, &data_device_size);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.tcrypt.params.key_size;
- cd->verity_hdr.data_size = data_device_size / params->data_block_size;
- } else
- cd->verity_hdr.data_size = params->data_size;
+ if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.bitlk.params.key_size / 8;
- hash_size = crypt_hash_size(params->hash_name);
- if (hash_size <= 0) {
- log_err(cd, _("Hash algorithm %s not supported.\n"),
- params->hash_name);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- cd->verity_root_hash_size = hash_size;
+ if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.fvault2.params.key_size;
- cd->verity_root_hash = malloc(cd->verity_root_hash_size);
- if (!cd->verity_root_hash)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+ return cd->u.none.key_size;
- cd->verity_hdr.flags = params->flags;
- if (!(cd->verity_hdr.hash_name = strdup(params->hash_name)))
- return -ENOMEM;
- cd->verity_hdr.data_device = NULL;
- cd->verity_hdr.data_block_size = params->data_block_size;
- cd->verity_hdr.hash_block_size = params->hash_block_size;
- cd->verity_hdr.hash_area_offset = params->hash_area_offset;
- cd->verity_hdr.hash_type = params->hash_type;
- cd->verity_hdr.flags = params->flags;
- cd->verity_hdr.salt_size = params->salt_size;
- if (!(cd->verity_hdr.salt = malloc(params->salt_size)))
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
- if (params->salt)
- memcpy(CONST_CAST(char*)cd->verity_hdr.salt, params->salt,
- params->salt_size);
- else
- r = crypt_random_get(cd, CONST_CAST(char*)cd->verity_hdr.salt,
- params->salt_size, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
- if (r)
- return r;
+int crypt_keyslot_get_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+ if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type))
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_CREATE_HASH) {
- r = VERITY_create(cd, &cd->verity_hdr,
- cd->verity_root_hash, cd->verity_root_hash_size);
- if (r)
- return r;
- }
+ if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= crypt_keyslot_max(cd->type))
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (!(params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER)) {
- if (uuid)
- cd->verity_uuid = strdup(uuid);
- else {
- r = VERITY_UUID_generate(cd, &cd->verity_uuid);
- if (r)
- return r;
- }
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes;
- r = VERITY_write_sb(cd, cd->verity_hdr.hash_area_offset,
- cd->verity_uuid,
- &cd->verity_hdr);
- }
- return r;
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+
+ return -EINVAL;
}
-int crypt_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *type,
+int crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *cipher,
- const char *cipher_mode,
- const char *uuid,
- const char *volume_key,
- size_t volume_key_size,
- void *params)
+ size_t key_size)
{
- int r;
+ char *tmp;
- if (!type)
+ if (!cd || !cipher || !key_size || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
return -EINVAL;
- if (cd->type) {
- log_dbg("Context already formatted as %s.", cd->type);
+ if (LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(cd, cipher))
return -EINVAL;
- }
- log_dbg("Formatting device %s as type %s.", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)", type);
+ if (!(tmp = strdup(cipher)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
- r = init_crypto(cd);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ free(cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher);
+ cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher = tmp;
+ cd->u.luks2.keyslot_key_size = key_size;
- if (isPLAIN(type))
- r = _crypt_format_plain(cd, cipher, cipher_mode,
- uuid, volume_key_size, params);
- else if (isLUKS(type))
- r = _crypt_format_luks1(cd, cipher, cipher_mode,
- uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params);
- else if (isLOOPAES(type))
- r = _crypt_format_loopaes(cd, cipher, uuid, volume_key_size, params);
- else if (isVERITY(type))
- r = _crypt_format_verity(cd, uuid, params);
- else {
- log_err(cd, _("Unknown crypt device type %s requested.\n"), type);
- r = -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, size_t *key_size)
+{
+ const char *cipher;
+
+ if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type) || !key_size)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ if (keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT &&
+ LUKS_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot) < CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE)
+ return NULL;
+ *key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ return cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec;
}
- if (r < 0) {
- free(cd->type);
- cd->type = NULL;
- crypt_free_volume_key(cd->volume_key);
- cd->volume_key = NULL;
+ if (keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+ return LUKS2_get_keyslot_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, key_size);
+
+ /* Keyslot encryption was set through crypt_keyslot_set_encryption() */
+ if (cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher) {
+ *key_size = cd->u.luks2.keyslot_key_size;
+ return cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher;
}
- return r;
+ /* Try to reuse volume encryption parameters */
+ cipher = LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+ if (!LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(cd, cipher)) {
+ *key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ if (*key_size)
+ return cipher;
+ }
+
+ /* Fallback to default LUKS2 keyslot encryption */
+ *key_size = DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_KEYBITS / 8;
+ return DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_CIPHER;
}
-int crypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *requested_type,
- void *params)
+int crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf)
{
- int r;
-
- log_dbg("Trying to load %s crypt type from device %s.",
- requested_type ?: "any", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)");
-
- if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd))
+ if (!cd || !pbkdf || keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
return -EINVAL;
- if (!requested_type || isLUKS(requested_type)) {
- if (cd->type && !isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- log_dbg("Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- r = _crypt_load_luks1(cd, 1, 0);
- } else if (isVERITY(requested_type)) {
- if (cd->type && !isVERITY(cd->type)) {
- log_dbg("Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- r = _crypt_load_verity(cd, params);
- } else if (isTCRYPT(requested_type)) {
- if (cd->type && !isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
- log_dbg("Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- r = _crypt_load_tcrypt(cd, params);
- } else
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return LUKS_keyslot_pbkdf(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot, pbkdf);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_keyslot_pbkdf(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, pbkdf);
- return r;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
-int crypt_repair(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *requested_type,
- void *params __attribute__((unused)))
+int crypt_set_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t data_offset)
{
- int r;
+ if (!cd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (data_offset % (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Data offset is not multiple of %u bytes."), MAX_SECTOR_SIZE);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- log_dbg("Trying to repair %s crypt type from device %s.",
- requested_type ?: "any", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)");
+ cd->data_offset = data_offset;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Data offset set to %" PRIu64 " (512-byte) sectors.", data_offset);
- if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd))
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_set_metadata_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ uint64_t metadata_size,
+ uint64_t keyslots_size)
+{
+ if (!cd)
return -EINVAL;
- if (requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type))
+ if (cd->type && !isLUKS2(cd->type))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (metadata_size && LUKS2_check_metadata_area_size(metadata_size))
+ return -EINVAL;
- /* Load with repair */
- r = _crypt_load_luks1(cd, 1, 1);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ if (keyslots_size && LUKS2_check_keyslots_area_size(keyslots_size))
+ return -EINVAL;
- /* cd->type and header must be set in context */
- r = crypt_check_data_device_size(cd);
- if (r < 0) {
- free(cd->type);
- cd->type = NULL;
- }
+ cd->metadata_size = metadata_size;
+ cd->keyslots_size = keyslots_size;
- return r;
+ return 0;
}
-int crypt_resize(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t new_size)
+int crypt_get_metadata_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ uint64_t *metadata_size,
+ uint64_t *keyslots_size)
{
- struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
- int r;
+ uint64_t msize, ksize;
- /* Device context type must be initialised */
- if (!cd->type || !crypt_get_uuid(cd))
+ if (!cd)
return -EINVAL;
- log_dbg("Resizing device %s to %" PRIu64 " sectors.", name, new_size);
-
- r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
- DM_ACTIVE_UUID | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE |
- DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY, &dmd);
- if (r < 0) {
- log_err(NULL, _("Device %s is not active.\n"), name);
+ if (!cd->type) {
+ msize = cd->metadata_size;
+ ksize = cd->keyslots_size;
+ } else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ msize = LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS;
+ ksize = LUKS_device_sectors(&cd->u.luks1.hdr) * SECTOR_SIZE - msize;
+ } else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ msize = LUKS2_metadata_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ ksize = LUKS2_keyslots_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ } else
return -EINVAL;
- }
- if (!dmd.uuid || dmd.target != DM_CRYPT) {
- r = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (metadata_size)
+ *metadata_size = msize;
+ if (keyslots_size)
+ *keyslots_size = ksize;
- r = device_block_adjust(cd, dmd.data_device, DEV_OK,
- dmd.u.crypt.offset, &new_size, &dmd.flags);
- if (r)
- goto out;
+ return 0;
+}
- if (new_size == dmd.size) {
- log_dbg("Device has already requested size %" PRIu64
- " sectors.", dmd.size);
- r = 0;
- } else {
- dmd.size = new_size;
- if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
- r = -ENOTSUP;
- else
- r = dm_create_device(cd, name, cd->type, &dmd, 1);
- }
-out:
- if (dmd.target == DM_CRYPT) {
- crypt_free_volume_key(dmd.u.crypt.vk);
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.u.crypt.cipher);
- }
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.data_device);
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+uint64_t crypt_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return 0;
- return r;
-}
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.plain.hdr.offset;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks1.hdr.payloadOffset;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_get_data_offset(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
-int crypt_set_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *uuid)
-{
- if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for this device type.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.loopaes.hdr.offset;
- if (uuid && !strncmp(uuid, cd->hdr.uuid, sizeof(cd->hdr.uuid))) {
- log_dbg("UUID is the same as requested (%s) for device %s.",
- uuid, mdata_device_path(cd));
- return 0;
- }
+ if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ return TCRYPT_get_data_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
- if (uuid)
- log_dbg("Requested new UUID change to %s for %s.", uuid, mdata_device_path(cd));
- else
- log_dbg("Requested new UUID refresh for %s.", mdata_device_path(cd));
+ if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.bitlk.params.volume_header_size / SECTOR_SIZE;
- if (!crypt_confirm(cd, _("Do you really want to change UUID of device?")))
- return -EPERM;
+ if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.fvault2.params.log_vol_off / SECTOR_SIZE;
- return LUKS_hdr_uuid_set(&cd->hdr, uuid, cd);
+ return cd->data_offset;
}
-int crypt_header_backup(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *requested_type,
- const char *backup_file)
+uint64_t crypt_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
- int r;
+ if (!cd)
+ return 0;
- if ((requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type)) || !backup_file)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.plain.hdr.skip;
- r = init_crypto(cd);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.loopaes.hdr.skip;
- log_dbg("Requested header backup of device %s (%s) to "
- "file %s.", mdata_device_path(cd), requested_type, backup_file);
+ if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ return TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
- return LUKS_hdr_backup(backup_file, &cd->hdr, cd);
+ return 0;
}
-int crypt_header_restore(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *requested_type,
- const char *backup_file)
+crypt_keyslot_info crypt_keyslot_status(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
{
- int r;
+ if (_onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED) < 0)
+ return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
- if (requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type))
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return LUKS_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot);
+ else if(isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
- r = init_crypto(cd);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_max(const char *type)
+{
+ if (isLUKS1(type))
+ return LUKS_NUMKEYS;
- log_dbg("Requested header restore to device %s (%s) from "
- "file %s.", mdata_device_path(cd), requested_type, backup_file);
+ if (isLUKS2(type))
+ return LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX;
- return LUKS_hdr_restore(backup_file, &cd->hdr, cd);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
-void crypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd)
+int crypt_keyslot_area(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ uint64_t *offset,
+ uint64_t *length)
{
- if (cd) {
- log_dbg("Releasing crypt device %s context.", mdata_device_path(cd));
+ if (_onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED) || !offset || !length)
+ return -EINVAL;
- dm_backend_exit();
- crypt_free_volume_key(cd->volume_key);
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_keyslot_area(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, offset, length);
- device_free(cd->device);
- device_free(cd->metadata_device);
- free(cd->type);
+ return LUKS_keyslot_area(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot, offset, length);
+}
- /* used in plain device only */
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->plain_hdr.hash);
- free(cd->plain_cipher);
- free(cd->plain_cipher_mode);
- free(cd->plain_uuid);
+crypt_keyslot_priority crypt_keyslot_get_priority(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+ if (_onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED))
+ return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID;
- /* used in loop-AES device only */
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->loopaes_hdr.hash);
- free(cd->loopaes_cipher);
- free(cd->loopaes_uuid);
+ if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= crypt_keyslot_max(cd->type))
+ return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID;
- /* used in verity device only */
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->verity_hdr.hash_name);
- free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->verity_hdr.salt);
- free(cd->verity_root_hash);
- free(cd->verity_uuid);
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
- free(cd);
- }
+ return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL;
}
-int crypt_suspend(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *name)
+int crypt_keyslot_set_priority(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, crypt_keyslot_priority priority)
{
- crypt_status_info ci;
int r;
- log_dbg("Suspending volume %s.", name);
+ log_dbg(cd, "Setting keyslot %d to priority %d.", keyslot, priority);
- if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
- r = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (priority == CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID)
+ return -EINVAL;
- ci = crypt_status(NULL, name);
- if (ci < CRYPT_ACTIVE) {
- log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not active.\n"), name);
+ if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= crypt_keyslot_max(cd->type))
return -EINVAL;
- }
- dm_backend_init();
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+ return r;
- r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
+ return LUKS2_keyslot_priority_set(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, priority, 1);
+}
- if (r) {
- log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is already suspended.\n"), name);
- r = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
+const char *crypt_get_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ return cd ? cd->type : NULL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_default_type(void)
+{
+ return DEFAULT_LUKS_FORMAT;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_verity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct crypt_params_verity *vp)
+{
+ if (!cd || !isVERITY(cd->type) || !vp)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ vp->data_device = device_path(cd->device);
+ vp->hash_device = mdata_device_path(cd);
+ vp->fec_device = device_path(cd->u.verity.fec_device);
+ vp->fec_area_offset = cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_area_offset;
+ vp->fec_roots = cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots;
+ vp->hash_name = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name;
+ vp->salt = cd->u.verity.hdr.salt;
+ vp->salt_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size;
+ vp->data_block_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.data_block_size;
+ vp->hash_block_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_block_size;
+ vp->data_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size;
+ vp->hash_area_offset = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset;
+ vp->hash_type = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type;
+ vp->flags = cd->u.verity.hdr.flags & (CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER | CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_integrity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct crypt_params_integrity *ip)
+{
+ if (!cd || !ip)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+ ip->journal_size = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_size;
+ ip->journal_watermark = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_watermark;
+ ip->journal_commit_time = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_commit_time;
+ ip->interleave_sectors = cd->u.integrity.params.interleave_sectors;
+ ip->tag_size = cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size;
+ ip->sector_size = cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size;
+ ip->buffer_sectors = cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors;
+
+ ip->integrity = cd->u.integrity.params.integrity;
+ ip->integrity_key_size = crypt_get_integrity_key_size(cd);
+
+ ip->journal_integrity = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity;
+ ip->journal_integrity_key_size = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity_key_size;
+ ip->journal_integrity_key = NULL;
+
+ ip->journal_crypt = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt;
+ ip->journal_crypt_key_size = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt_key_size;
+ ip->journal_crypt_key = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ } else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ ip->journal_size = 0; // FIXME
+ ip->journal_watermark = 0; // FIXME
+ ip->journal_commit_time = 0; // FIXME
+ ip->interleave_sectors = 0; // FIXME
+ ip->sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(cd);
+ ip->buffer_sectors = 0; // FIXME
+
+ ip->integrity = LUKS2_get_integrity(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+ ip->integrity_key_size = crypt_get_integrity_key_size(cd);
+ ip->tag_size = INTEGRITY_tag_size(ip->integrity, crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+
+ ip->journal_integrity = NULL;
+ ip->journal_integrity_key_size = 0;
+ ip->journal_integrity_key = NULL;
+
+ ip->journal_crypt = NULL;
+ ip->journal_crypt_key_size = 0;
+ ip->journal_crypt_key = NULL;
+ return 0;
}
- r = dm_suspend_and_wipe_key(cd, name);
- if (r == -ENOTSUP)
- log_err(cd, "Suspend is not supported for device %s.\n", name);
- else if (r)
- log_err(cd, "Error during suspending device %s.\n", name);
-out:
- dm_backend_exit();
- return r;
+ return -ENOTSUP;
}
-int crypt_resume_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *name,
- int keyslot,
- const char *passphrase,
- size_t passphrase_size)
+int crypt_convert(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *type,
+ void *params)
{
- struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ struct luks_phdr hdr1;
+ struct luks2_hdr hdr2;
int r;
- log_dbg("Resuming volume %s.", name);
+ if (!type)
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
- r = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ log_dbg(cd, "Converting LUKS device to type %s", type);
- r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
- if (r < 0)
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
return r;
- if (!r) {
- log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended.\n"), name);
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type) && isLUKS2(type))
+ r = LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(cd, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &hdr2);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && isLUKS1(type))
+ r = LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, &hdr1);
+ else
return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (r < 0) {
+ /* in-memory header may be invalid after failed conversion */
+ _luks2_rollback(cd);
+ if (r == -EBUSY)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."), mdata_device_path(cd));
+ return r;
}
- if (passphrase) {
- r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size,
- &cd->hdr, &vk, cd);
- } else
- r = volume_key_by_terminal_passphrase(cd, keyslot, &vk);
+ crypt_free_type(cd, NULL);
- if (r >= 0) {
- keyslot = r;
- r = dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(cd, name, vk->keylength, vk->key);
- if (r == -ENOTSUP)
- log_err(cd, "Resume is not supported for device %s.\n", name);
- else if (r)
- log_err(cd, "Error during resuming device %s.\n", name);
- } else
- r = keyslot;
-out:
- crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
- return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+ return crypt_load(cd, type, params);
}
-int crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *name,
- int keyslot,
- const char *keyfile,
- size_t keyfile_size,
- size_t keyfile_offset)
+/* Internal access function to header pointer */
+void *crypt_get_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
{
- struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
- char *passphrase_read = NULL;
- size_t passphrase_size_read;
- int r;
+ /* If requested type differs, ignore it */
+ if (strcmp(cd->type, type))
+ return NULL;
- log_dbg("Resuming volume %s.", name);
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+ return &cd->u.plain;
- if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
- r = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return &cd->u.luks1.hdr;
- r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return &cd->u.luks2.hdr;
- if (!r) {
- log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended.\n"), name);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+ return &cd->u.loopaes;
- if (!keyfile)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (isVERITY(cd->type))
+ return &cd->u.verity;
- r = key_from_file(cd, _("Enter passphrase: "), &passphrase_read,
- &passphrase_size_read, keyfile, keyfile_offset,
- keyfile_size);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
+ if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ return &cd->u.tcrypt;
- r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase_read,
- passphrase_size_read, &cd->hdr, &vk, cd);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
+ return NULL;
+}
- keyslot = r;
- r = dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(cd, name, vk->keylength, vk->key);
- if (r)
- log_err(cd, "Error during resuming device %s.\n", name);
-out:
- crypt_safe_free(passphrase_read);
- crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
- return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+/* internal only */
+struct luks2_reencrypt *crypt_get_luks2_reencrypt(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ return cd->u.luks2.rh;
}
-int crypt_resume_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *name,
- int keyslot,
- const char *keyfile,
- size_t keyfile_size)
+/* internal only */
+void crypt_set_luks2_reencrypt(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_reencrypt *rh)
{
- return crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset(cd, name, keyslot,
- keyfile, keyfile_size, 0);
+ cd->u.luks2.rh = rh;
}
-// slot manipulation
-int crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
- int keyslot, // -1 any
- const char *passphrase, // NULL -> terminal
- size_t passphrase_size,
- const char *new_passphrase, // NULL -> terminal
- size_t new_passphrase_size)
+/*
+ * Token handling
+ */
+int crypt_activate_by_token_pin(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ const char *type, int token, const char *pin, size_t pin_size,
+ void *usrptr, uint32_t flags)
{
- struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
- char *password = NULL, *new_password = NULL;
- size_t passwordLen, new_passwordLen;
int r;
- log_dbg("Adding new keyslot, existing passphrase %sprovided,"
- "new passphrase %sprovided.",
- passphrase ? "" : "not ", new_passphrase ? "" : "not ");
-
- if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s using token (%s type) %d.",
+ name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase",
+ type ?: "any", token);
- r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
- if (r)
+ if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
return r;
- if (!LUKS_keyslot_active_count(&cd->hdr)) {
- /* No slots used, try to use pre-generated key in header */
- if (cd->volume_key) {
- vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
- r = vk ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
- } else {
- log_err(cd, _("Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- } else if (passphrase) {
- /* Passphrase provided, use it to unlock existing keyslot */
- r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase,
- passphrase_size, &cd->hdr, &vk, cd);
- } else {
- /* Passphrase not provided, ask first and use it to unlock existing keyslot */
- r = key_from_terminal(cd, _("Enter any passphrase: "),
- &password, &passwordLen, 0);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
-
- r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, password,
- passwordLen, &cd->hdr, &vk, cd);
- crypt_safe_free(password);
- }
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+ return -EINVAL;
- if(r < 0)
- goto out;
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) && name)
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (new_passphrase) {
- new_password = CONST_CAST(char*)new_passphrase;
- new_passwordLen = new_passphrase_size;
- } else {
- r = key_from_terminal(cd, _("Enter new passphrase for key slot: "),
- &new_password, &new_passwordLen, 1);
- if(r < 0)
- goto out;
- }
+ r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
- r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot, new_password, new_passwordLen,
- &cd->hdr, vk, cd->iteration_time, &cd->PBKDF2_per_sec, cd);
- if(r < 0) goto out;
+ return LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, name, type,
+ pin, pin_size, flags, usrptr);
+}
- r = 0;
-out:
- if (!new_passphrase)
- crypt_safe_free(new_password);
- crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
- return r ?: keyslot;
+int crypt_activate_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name, int token, void *usrptr, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ return crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, NULL, token, NULL, 0, usrptr, flags);
}
-int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
- int keyslot,
- const char *keyfile,
- size_t keyfile_size,
- size_t keyfile_offset,
- const char *new_keyfile,
- size_t new_keyfile_size,
- size_t new_keyfile_offset)
+int crypt_token_json_get(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, const char **json)
{
- struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
- char *password = NULL; size_t passwordLen;
- char *new_password = NULL; size_t new_passwordLen;
int r;
- log_dbg("Adding new keyslot, existing keyfile %s, new keyfile %s.",
- keyfile ?: "[none]", new_keyfile ?: "[none]");
-
- if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
+ if (!json)
return -EINVAL;
- }
- r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
- if (r)
+ log_dbg(cd, "Requesting JSON for token %d.", token);
+
+ if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
return r;
- if (!LUKS_keyslot_active_count(&cd->hdr)) {
- /* No slots used, try to use pre-generated key in header */
- if (cd->volume_key) {
- vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
- r = vk ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
- } else {
- log_err(cd, _("Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- } else {
- /* Read password from file of (if NULL) from terminal */
- if (keyfile)
- r = key_from_file(cd, _("Enter any passphrase: "),
- &password, &passwordLen,
- keyfile, keyfile_offset, keyfile_size);
- else
- r = key_from_terminal(cd, _("Enter any passphrase: "),
- &password, &passwordLen, 0);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
+ return LUKS2_token_json_get(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, json) ?: token;
+}
- r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, password, passwordLen,
- &cd->hdr, &vk, cd);
- }
+int crypt_token_json_set(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, const char *json)
+{
+ int r;
- if(r < 0)
- goto out;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Updating JSON for token %d.", token);
- if (new_keyfile)
- r = key_from_file(cd, _("Enter new passphrase for key slot: "),
- &new_password, &new_passwordLen, new_keyfile,
- new_keyfile_offset, new_keyfile_size);
- else
- r = key_from_terminal(cd, _("Enter new passphrase for key slot: "),
- &new_password, &new_passwordLen, 1);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+ return r;
- r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot, new_password, new_passwordLen,
- &cd->hdr, vk, cd->iteration_time, &cd->PBKDF2_per_sec, cd);
-out:
- crypt_safe_free(password);
- crypt_safe_free(new_password);
- crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
- return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+ return LUKS2_token_create(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, json, 1);
}
-int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
- int keyslot,
- const char *keyfile,
- size_t keyfile_size,
- const char *new_keyfile,
- size_t new_keyfile_size)
+crypt_token_info crypt_token_status(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, const char **type)
{
- return crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(cd, keyslot,
- keyfile, keyfile_size, 0,
- new_keyfile, new_keyfile_size, 0);
+ if (_onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0))
+ return CRYPT_TOKEN_INVALID;
+
+ return LUKS2_token_status(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, type);
}
-int crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
- int keyslot,
- const char *volume_key,
- size_t volume_key_size,
- const char *passphrase,
- size_t passphrase_size)
+int crypt_token_max(const char *type)
{
- struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
- int r = -EINVAL;
- char *new_password = NULL; size_t new_passwordLen;
+ if (isLUKS2(type))
+ return LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX;
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
- log_dbg("Adding new keyslot %d using volume key.", keyslot);
+int crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int token,
+ struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *params)
+{
+ crypt_token_info token_info;
+ const char *type;
+ int r;
- if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
+ if (!params)
return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (volume_key)
- vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
- else if (cd->volume_key)
- vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
-
- if (!vk)
- return -ENOMEM;
- r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->hdr, vk);
- if (r < 0) {
- log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume.\n"));
- goto out;
- }
+ log_dbg(cd, "Requesting LUKS2 keyring token %d.", token);
- r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
- if (r)
- goto out;
+ if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
+ return r;
- if (!passphrase) {
- r = key_from_terminal(cd, _("Enter new passphrase for key slot: "),
- &new_password, &new_passwordLen, 1);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
- passphrase = new_password;
- passphrase_size = new_passwordLen;
+ token_info = LUKS2_token_status(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, &type);
+ switch (token_info) {
+ case CRYPT_TOKEN_INVALID:
+ log_dbg(cd, "Token %d is invalid.", token);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ case CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE:
+ log_dbg(cd, "Token %d is inactive.", token);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ case CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL:
+ if (!strcmp(type, LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING))
+ break;
+ /* Fall through */
+ case CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL_UNKNOWN:
+ case CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL:
+ case CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL_UNKNOWN:
+ log_dbg(cd, "Token %d has unexpected type %s.", token, type);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
- r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size,
- &cd->hdr, vk, cd->iteration_time, &cd->PBKDF2_per_sec, cd);
-out:
- crypt_safe_free(new_password);
- crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
- return (r < 0) ? r : keyslot;
+ return LUKS2_token_keyring_get(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, params);
}
-int crypt_keyslot_destroy(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+int crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int token,
+ const struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *params)
{
- crypt_keyslot_info ki;
-
- log_dbg("Destroying keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+ int r;
+ char json[4096];
- if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
+ if (!params || !params->key_description)
return -EINVAL;
- }
- ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, keyslot);
- if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID) {
- log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is invalid.\n"), keyslot);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ log_dbg(cd, "Creating new LUKS2 keyring token (%d).", token);
- if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE) {
- log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is not used.\n"), keyslot);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+ return r;
- return LUKS_del_key(keyslot, &cd->hdr, cd);
+ r = LUKS2_token_keyring_json(json, sizeof(json), params);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return LUKS2_token_create(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, json, 1);
}
-// activation/deactivation of device mapping
-int crypt_activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *name,
- int keyslot,
- const char *passphrase,
- size_t passphrase_size,
- uint32_t flags)
+int crypt_token_assign_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, int keyslot)
{
- crypt_status_info ci;
- struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
- char *read_passphrase = NULL;
- size_t passphraseLen = 0;
int r;
- log_dbg("%s volume %s [keyslot %d] using %spassphrase.",
- name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "",
- keyslot, passphrase ? "" : "[none] ");
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+ return r;
- if (name) {
- ci = crypt_status(NULL, name);
- if (ci == CRYPT_INVALID)
- return -EINVAL;
- else if (ci >= CRYPT_ACTIVE) {
- log_err(cd, _("Device %s already exists.\n"), name);
- return -EEXIST;
- }
- }
+ return LUKS2_token_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, token, 1, 1);
+}
- /* plain, use hashed passphrase */
- if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
- if (!name)
- return -EINVAL;
+int crypt_token_unassign_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, int keyslot)
+{
+ int r;
- if (!passphrase) {
- r = key_from_terminal(cd, NULL, &read_passphrase,
- &passphraseLen, 0);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
- passphrase = read_passphrase;
- passphrase_size = passphraseLen;
- }
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+ return r;
- r = process_key(cd, cd->plain_hdr.hash,
- cd->plain_key_size,
- passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
+ return LUKS2_token_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, token, 0, 1);
+}
- r = PLAIN_activate(cd, name, vk, cd->plain_hdr.size, flags);
- keyslot = 0;
- } else if (isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- /* provided passphrase, do not retry */
- if (passphrase) {
- r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase,
- passphrase_size, &cd->hdr, &vk, cd);
- } else
- r = volume_key_by_terminal_passphrase(cd, keyslot, &vk);
+int crypt_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, int keyslot)
+{
+ int r;
- if (r >= 0) {
- keyslot = r;
- if (name)
- r = LUKS1_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
- }
- } else
- r = -EINVAL;
-out:
- crypt_safe_free(read_passphrase);
- crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
+ return r;
- return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+ return LUKS2_token_is_assigned(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, token);
}
-int crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *name,
- int keyslot,
- const char *keyfile,
- size_t keyfile_size,
- size_t keyfile_offset,
- uint32_t flags)
+/* Internal only */
+int crypt_metadata_locking_enabled(void)
+{
+ return _metadata_locking;
+}
+
+int crypt_metadata_locking(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)), int enable)
+{
+ if (enable && !_metadata_locking)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ _metadata_locking = enable ? 1 : 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_persistent_flags_set(struct crypt_device *cd, crypt_flags_type type, uint32_t flags)
{
- crypt_status_info ci;
- struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
- char *passphrase_read = NULL;
- size_t passphrase_size_read;
- unsigned int key_count = 0;
int r;
- log_dbg("Activating volume %s [keyslot %d] using keyfile %s.",
- name ?: "", keyslot, keyfile ?: "[none]");
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+ return r;
- if (name) {
- ci = crypt_status(NULL, name);
- if (ci == CRYPT_INVALID)
- return -EINVAL;
- else if (ci >= CRYPT_ACTIVE) {
- log_err(cd, _("Device %s already exists.\n"), name);
- return -EEXIST;
- }
- }
+ if (type == CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION)
+ return LUKS2_config_set_flags(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, flags);
- if (!keyfile)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (type == CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS)
+ return LUKS2_config_set_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, flags, true);
- if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
- if (!name)
- return -EINVAL;
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
- r = key_from_file(cd, _("Enter passphrase: "),
- &passphrase_read, &passphrase_size_read,
- keyfile, keyfile_offset, keyfile_size);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
+int crypt_persistent_flags_get(struct crypt_device *cd, crypt_flags_type type, uint32_t *flags)
+{
+ int r;
- r = process_key(cd, cd->plain_hdr.hash,
- cd->plain_key_size,
- passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read, &vk);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
+ if (!flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
- r = PLAIN_activate(cd, name, vk, cd->plain_hdr.size, flags);
- } else if (isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- r = key_from_file(cd, _("Enter passphrase: "), &passphrase_read,
- &passphrase_size_read, keyfile, keyfile_offset, keyfile_size);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
- r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase_read,
- passphrase_size_read, &cd->hdr, &vk, cd);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
- keyslot = r;
+ if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
+ return r;
- if (name) {
- r = LUKS1_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
- }
- r = keyslot;
- } else if (isLOOPAES(cd->type)) {
- r = key_from_file(cd, NULL, &passphrase_read, &passphrase_size_read,
- keyfile, keyfile_offset, keyfile_size);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
- r = LOOPAES_parse_keyfile(cd, &vk, cd->loopaes_hdr.hash, &key_count,
- passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
- if (name)
- r = LOOPAES_activate(cd, name, cd->loopaes_cipher,
- key_count, vk, flags);
- } else
- r = -EINVAL;
+ if (type == CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION)
+ return LUKS2_config_get_flags(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, flags);
-out:
- crypt_safe_free(passphrase_read);
- crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ if (type == CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS)
+ return LUKS2_config_get_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, flags);
- return r;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
-int crypt_activate_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *name,
- int keyslot,
- const char *keyfile,
- size_t keyfile_size,
- uint32_t flags)
+static int update_volume_key_segment_digest(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int digest, int commit)
{
- return crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, name, keyslot, keyfile,
- keyfile_size, 0, flags);
+ int r;
+
+ /* Remove any assignments in memory */
+ r = LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(cd, hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST, 0, 0);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ /* Assign it to the specific digest */
+ return LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(cd, hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, digest, 1, commit);
}
-int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *name,
- const char *volume_key,
- size_t volume_key_size,
- uint32_t flags)
+static int verify_and_update_segment_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, struct crypt_keyslot_context *kc)
{
- crypt_status_info ci;
+ int digest, r;
struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
- int r = -EINVAL;
- log_dbg("Activating volume %s by volume key.", name ?: "[none]");
+ assert(kc);
+ assert(kc->get_luks2_key);
+ assert(keyslot >= 0);
- if (name) {
- ci = crypt_status(NULL, name);
- if (ci == CRYPT_INVALID)
- return -EINVAL;
- else if (ci >= CRYPT_ACTIVE) {
- log_err(cd, _("Device %s already exists.\n"), name);
- return -EEXIST;
- }
- }
+ r = kc->get_luks2_key(cd, kc, keyslot, CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT, &vk);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
- /* use key directly, no hash */
- if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
- if (!name)
- return -EINVAL;
+ /* check volume_key (param) digest matches keyslot digest */
+ r = LUKS2_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vk, keyslot);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ digest = r;
- if (!volume_key || !volume_key_size || volume_key_size != cd->plain_key_size) {
- log_err(cd, _("Incorrect volume key specified for plain device.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ /* nothing to do, volume key in keyslot is already assigned to default segment */
+ r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ goto out;
- vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
- if (!vk)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ /* FIXME: check new volume key is usable with current default segment */
- r = PLAIN_activate(cd, name, vk, cd->plain_hdr.size, flags);
- } else if (isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- /* If key is not provided, try to use internal key */
- if (!volume_key) {
- if (!cd->volume_key) {
- log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- volume_key_size = cd->volume_key->keylength;
- volume_key = cd->volume_key->key;
- }
+ r = update_volume_key_segment_digest(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, digest, 1);
+ if (r)
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."), keyslot);
+out:
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
- vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
- if (!vk)
- return -ENOMEM;
- r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->hdr, vk);
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
- if (r == -EPERM)
- log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume.\n"));
+static int luks2_keyslot_add_by_verified_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot_new,
+ const char *new_passphrase,
+ size_t new_passphrase_size,
+ struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
- if (!r && name)
- r = LUKS1_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
- } else if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
- /* volume_key == root hash */
- if (!volume_key || !volume_key_size) {
- log_err(cd, _("Incorrect root hash specified for verity device.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ assert(cd);
+ assert(keyslot_new >= 0);
+ assert(new_passphrase);
+ assert(vk);
+ assert(crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk) >= 0);
- r = VERITY_activate(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size,
- &cd->verity_hdr, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY);
-
- if (r == -EPERM) {
- free(cd->verity_root_hash);
- cd->verity_root_hash = NULL;
- } if (!r) {
- cd->verity_root_hash_size = volume_key_size;
- if (!cd->verity_root_hash)
- cd->verity_root_hash = malloc(volume_key_size);
- if (cd->verity_root_hash)
- memcpy(cd->verity_root_hash, volume_key, volume_key_size);
- }
- } else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
- if (!name)
- return 0;
- r = TCRYPT_activate(cd, name, &cd->tcrypt_hdr,
- &cd->tcrypt_params, flags);
- } else
- log_err(cd, _("Device type is not properly initialised.\n"));
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, ¶ms);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to initialize default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."));
+ return r;
+ }
- crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_new, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk), 1, 0);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."), keyslot_new);
+ return r;
+ }
- return r;
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_new,
+ CONST_CAST(char*)new_passphrase,
+ new_passphrase_size, vk, ¶ms);
+
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot_new;
}
-int crypt_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+static int luks2_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot_new,
+ const char *new_passphrase,
+ size_t new_passphrase_size,
+ struct volume_key *vk)
{
int r;
- if (!name)
- return -EINVAL;
+ assert(cd);
+ assert(keyslot_new >= 0);
+ assert(new_passphrase);
+ assert(vk);
- log_dbg("Deactivating volume %s.", name);
+ r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ crypt_volume_key_set_id(vk, r);
- if (!cd)
- dm_backend_init();
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+ return r;
+ }
- switch (crypt_status(cd, name)) {
- case CRYPT_ACTIVE:
- case CRYPT_BUSY:
- if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
- r = TCRYPT_deactivate(cd, name);
- else
- r = dm_remove_device(cd, name, 0, 0);
- break;
- case CRYPT_INACTIVE:
- log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active.\n"), name);
- r = -ENODEV;
- break;
- default:
- log_err(cd, _("Invalid device %s.\n"), name);
- r = -EINVAL;
+ return luks2_keyslot_add_by_verified_volume_key(cd, keyslot_new, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size, vk);
+}
+
+static int luks1_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot_new,
+ const char *new_passphrase,
+ size_t new_passphrase_size,
+ struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ assert(cd);
+ assert(keyslot_new >= 0);
+ assert(new_passphrase);
+ assert(vk);
+
+ r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+ return r;
}
- if (!cd)
- dm_backend_exit();
+ r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot_new, CONST_CAST(char*)new_passphrase,
+ new_passphrase_size, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd);
- return r;
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot_new;
}
-int crypt_volume_key_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
- int keyslot,
- char *volume_key,
- size_t *volume_key_size,
- const char *passphrase,
- size_t passphrase_size)
+static int keyslot_add_by_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ bool is_luks1,
+ int keyslot_new,
+ const char *new_passphrase,
+ size_t new_passphrase_size,
+ struct volume_key *vk,
+ uint32_t flags)
{
- struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
- unsigned key_len;
- int r = -EINVAL;
+ int r, digest;
+
+ assert(cd);
+ assert(keyslot_new >= 0);
+ assert(new_passphrase);
+ assert(vk);
+
+ if (!flags)
+ return is_luks1 ? luks1_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, keyslot_new, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size, vk) :
+ luks2_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, keyslot_new, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size, vk);
- if (crypt_fips_mode()) {
- log_err(cd, "Function not available in FIPS mode.\n");
- return -EACCES;
+ if (is_luks1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ digest = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+ if (digest >= 0) /* if key matches volume key digest tear down new vk flag */
+ flags &= ~CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET;
+ else {
+ /* if key matches any existing digest, do not create new digest */
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_DIGEST_REUSE))
+ digest = LUKS2_digest_any_matching(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk);
+
+ /* no segment flag or new vk flag requires new key digest */
+ if (flags & (CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT | CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET)) {
+ if (digest < 0 || !(flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_DIGEST_REUSE))
+ digest = LUKS2_digest_create(cd, "pbkdf2", &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk);
+ }
}
- key_len = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
- if (key_len > *volume_key_size) {
- log_err(cd, _("Volume key buffer too small.\n"));
- return -ENOMEM;
+ r = digest;
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+ return r;
}
- if (isPLAIN(cd->type) && cd->plain_hdr.hash) {
- r = process_key(cd, cd->plain_hdr.hash, key_len,
- passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
- if (r < 0)
- log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device.\n"));
- } else if (isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase,
- passphrase_size, &cd->hdr, &vk, cd);
- } else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
- r = TCRYPT_get_volume_key(cd, &cd->tcrypt_hdr, &cd->tcrypt_params, &vk);
- } else
- log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for %s crypt device.\n"), cd->type ?: "(none)");
+ crypt_volume_key_set_id(vk, digest);
- if (r >= 0) {
- memcpy(volume_key, vk->key, vk->keylength);
- *volume_key_size = vk->keylength;
+ if (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET) {
+ r = update_volume_key_segment_digest(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, digest, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."), keyslot_new);
}
- crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
- return r;
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = luks2_keyslot_add_by_verified_volume_key(cd, keyslot_new, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size, vk);
+
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot_new;
}
-int crypt_volume_key_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
const char *volume_key,
- size_t volume_key_size)
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
{
- struct volume_key *vk;
int r;
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context kc, new_kc;
- if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
+ if (!passphrase || ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT) &&
+ (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET)))
return -EINVAL;
- }
- vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
- if (!vk)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)) < 0)
+ return r;
- r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->hdr, vk);
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET) && crypt_keyslot_status(cd, keyslot) > CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE &&
+ isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ if (volume_key)
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_key_init_internal(&kc, volume_key, volume_key_size);
+ else
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&kc, passphrase, passphrase_size);
- if (r == -EPERM)
- log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume.\n"));
+ r = verify_and_update_segment_digest(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, &kc);
- crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
- return r;
-}
+ return r;
+ }
-void crypt_set_timeout(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t timeout_sec)
-{
- log_dbg("Timeout set to %" PRIu64 " miliseconds.", timeout_sec);
- cd->timeout = timeout_sec;
-}
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_key_init_internal(&kc, volume_key, volume_key_size);
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&new_kc, passphrase, passphrase_size);
-void crypt_set_password_retry(struct crypt_device *cd, int tries)
-{
- log_dbg("Password retry count set to %d.", tries);
- cd->tries = tries;
-}
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyslot_context(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &kc, keyslot, &new_kc, flags);
-void crypt_set_iteration_time(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t iteration_time_ms)
-{
- log_dbg("Iteration time set to %" PRIu64 " miliseconds.", iteration_time_ms);
- cd->iteration_time = iteration_time_ms;
-}
-void crypt_set_iterarion_time(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t iteration_time_ms)
-{
- crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, iteration_time_ms);
-}
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&new_kc);
-void crypt_set_password_verify(struct crypt_device *cd, int password_verify)
-{
- log_dbg("Password verification %s.", password_verify ? "enabled" : "disabled");
- cd->password_verify = password_verify ? 1 : 0;
+ return r;
}
-void crypt_set_rng_type(struct crypt_device *cd, int rng_type)
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyslot_context(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot_existing,
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context *kc,
+ int keyslot_new,
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context *new_kc,
+ uint32_t flags)
{
- switch (rng_type) {
- case CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM:
- case CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM:
- log_dbg("RNG set to %d (%s).", rng_type, rng_type ? "random" : "urandom");
- cd->rng_type = rng_type;
- }
-}
+ bool is_luks1;
+ int active_slots, r;
+ const char *new_passphrase;
+ size_t new_passphrase_size;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
-int crypt_get_rng_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
-{
- if (!cd)
+ if (!kc || ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT) &&
+ (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET)))
return -EINVAL;
- return cd->rng_type;
-}
-
-int crypt_memory_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, int lock)
-{
- return lock ? crypt_memlock_inc(cd) : crypt_memlock_dec(cd);
-}
-
-// reporting
-crypt_status_info crypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
-{
- int r;
+ r = flags ? onlyLUKS2(cd) : onlyLUKS(cd);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
- if (!cd)
- dm_backend_init();
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET) && crypt_keyslot_status(cd, keyslot_existing) > CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE)
+ return verify_and_update_segment_digest(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_existing, kc);
- r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
+ if (!new_kc || !new_kc->get_passphrase)
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (!cd)
- dm_backend_exit();
+ log_dbg(cd, "Adding new keyslot %d by %s%s, volume key provided by %s (%d).",
+ keyslot_new, keyslot_context_type_string(new_kc),
+ (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT) ? " unassigned to a crypt segment" : "",
+ keyslot_context_type_string(kc), keyslot_existing);
- if (r < 0 && r != -ENODEV)
- return CRYPT_INVALID;
+ r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot_new);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
- if (r == 0)
- return CRYPT_ACTIVE;
+ is_luks1 = isLUKS1(cd->type);
+ if (is_luks1)
+ active_slots = LUKS_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
+ else
+ active_slots = LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
- if (r > 0)
- return CRYPT_BUSY;
+ if (active_slots < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
- return CRYPT_INACTIVE;
-}
+ if (active_slots == 0 && kc->type != CRYPT_KC_TYPE_KEY)
+ r = -ENOENT;
+ else if (is_luks1 && kc->get_luks1_volume_key)
+ r = kc->get_luks1_volume_key(cd, kc, keyslot_existing, &vk);
+ else if (!is_luks1 && kc->get_luks2_volume_key)
+ r = kc->get_luks2_volume_key(cd, kc, keyslot_existing, &vk);
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
-static void hexprint(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *d, int n, const char *sep)
-{
- int i;
- for(i = 0; i < n; i++)
- log_std(cd, "%02hhx%s", (const char)d[i], sep);
-}
+ if (r == -ENOENT) {
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT) && kc->type == CRYPT_KC_TYPE_KEY) {
+ if (!(vk = crypt_generate_volume_key(cd, kc->u.k.volume_key_size)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ r = 0;
+ } else if (cd->volume_key) {
+ if (!(vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ r = 0;
+ } else if (active_slots == 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
-static int _luks_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
-{
- int i;
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
- log_std(cd, "LUKS header information for %s\n\n", mdata_device_path(cd));
- log_std(cd, "Version: \t%d\n", cd->hdr.version);
- log_std(cd, "Cipher name: \t%s\n", cd->hdr.cipherName);
- log_std(cd, "Cipher mode: \t%s\n", cd->hdr.cipherMode);
- log_std(cd, "Hash spec: \t%s\n", cd->hdr.hashSpec);
- log_std(cd, "Payload offset:\t%d\n", cd->hdr.payloadOffset);
- log_std(cd, "MK bits: \t%d\n", cd->hdr.keyBytes * 8);
- log_std(cd, "MK digest: \t");
- hexprint(cd, cd->hdr.mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE, " ");
- log_std(cd, "\n");
- log_std(cd, "MK salt: \t");
- hexprint(cd, cd->hdr.mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
- log_std(cd, "\n \t");
- hexprint(cd, cd->hdr.mkDigestSalt+LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
- log_std(cd, "\n");
- log_std(cd, "MK iterations: \t%d\n", cd->hdr.mkDigestIterations);
- log_std(cd, "UUID: \t%s\n\n", cd->hdr.uuid);
- for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
- if(cd->hdr.keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED) {
- log_std(cd, "Key Slot %d: ENABLED\n",i);
- log_std(cd, "\tIterations: \t%d\n",
- cd->hdr.keyblock[i].passwordIterations);
- log_std(cd, "\tSalt: \t");
- hexprint(cd, cd->hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt,
- LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
- log_std(cd, "\n\t \t");
- hexprint(cd, cd->hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt +
- LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
- log_std(cd, "\n");
+ r = new_kc->get_passphrase(cd, new_kc, &new_passphrase, &new_passphrase_size);
+ /* If new keyslot context is token just assign it to new keyslot */
+ if (r >= 0 && new_kc->type == CRYPT_KC_TYPE_TOKEN && !is_luks1)
+ r = LUKS2_token_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_new, new_kc->u.t.id, 1, 0);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = keyslot_add_by_key(cd, is_luks1, keyslot_new, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size, vk, flags);
- log_std(cd, "\tKey material offset:\t%d\n",
- cd->hdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset);
- log_std(cd, "\tAF stripes: \t%d\n",
- cd->hdr.keyblock[i].stripes);
- }
- else
- log_std(cd, "Key Slot %d: DISABLED\n", i);
- }
- return 0;
-}
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
-static int _verity_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
-{
- log_std(cd, "VERITY header information for %s\n", mdata_device_path(cd));
- log_std(cd, "UUID: \t%s\n", cd->verity_uuid ?: "");
- log_std(cd, "Hash type: \t%u\n", cd->verity_hdr.hash_type);
- log_std(cd, "Data blocks: \t%" PRIu64 "\n", cd->verity_hdr.data_size);
- log_std(cd, "Data block size: \t%u\n", cd->verity_hdr.data_block_size);
- log_std(cd, "Hash block size: \t%u\n", cd->verity_hdr.hash_block_size);
- log_std(cd, "Hash algorithm: \t%s\n", cd->verity_hdr.hash_name);
- log_std(cd, "Salt: \t");
- if (cd->verity_hdr.salt_size)
- hexprint(cd, cd->verity_hdr.salt, cd->verity_hdr.salt_size, "");
- else
- log_std(cd, "-");
- log_std(cd, "\n");
- if (cd->verity_root_hash) {
- log_std(cd, "Root hash: \t");
- hexprint(cd, cd->verity_root_hash, cd->verity_root_hash_size, "");
- log_std(cd, "\n");
+ if (r < 0) {
+ _luks2_rollback(cd);
+ return r;
}
- return 0;
-}
-
-int crypt_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
-{
- if (isLUKS(cd->type))
- return _luks_dump(cd);
- else if (isVERITY(cd->type))
- return _verity_dump(cd);
- else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
- return TCRYPT_dump(cd, &cd->tcrypt_hdr, &cd->tcrypt_params);
- log_err(cd, _("Dump operation is not supported for this device type.\n"));
- return -EINVAL;
+ return keyslot_new;
}
-const char *crypt_get_cipher(struct crypt_device *cd)
+/*
+ * Keyring handling
+ */
+int crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
- if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
- return cd->plain_cipher;
+ uint32_t dmc_flags;
- if (isLUKS(cd->type))
- return cd->hdr.cipherName;
+ /* dm backend must be initialized */
+ if (!cd || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return 0;
- if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
- return cd->loopaes_cipher;
+ if (!_vk_via_keyring || !kernel_keyring_support())
+ return 0;
- if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
- return cd->tcrypt_params.cipher;
+ if (dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmc_flags))
+ return dmcrypt_keyring_bug() ? 0 : 1;
- return NULL;
+ return (dmc_flags & DM_KERNEL_KEYRING_SUPPORTED);
}
-const char *crypt_get_cipher_mode(struct crypt_device *cd)
+int crypt_volume_key_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)), int enable)
{
- if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
- return cd->plain_cipher_mode;
-
- if (isLUKS(cd->type))
- return cd->hdr.cipherMode;
-
- if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
- return cd->loopaes_cipher_mode;
-
- if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
- return cd->tcrypt_params.mode;
-
- return NULL;
+ _vk_via_keyring = enable ? 1 : 0;
+ return 0;
}
-const char *crypt_get_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd)
+/* internal only */
+int crypt_volume_key_load_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, struct volume_key *vk)
{
- if (isLUKS(cd->type))
- return cd->hdr.uuid;
+ int r;
+ const char *type_name = key_type_name(LOGON_KEY);
- if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
- return cd->plain_uuid;
+ if (!vk || !cd || !type_name)
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
- return cd->loopaes_uuid;
+ if (!vk->key_description) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Invalid key description");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- if (isVERITY(cd->type))
- return cd->verity_uuid;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Loading key (%zu bytes, type %s) in thread keyring.", vk->keylength, type_name);
- return NULL;
+ r = keyring_add_key_in_thread_keyring(LOGON_KEY, vk->key_description, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+ if (r) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "keyring_add_key_in_thread_keyring failed (error %d)", r);
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to load key in kernel keyring."));
+ } else
+ crypt_set_key_in_keyring(cd, 1);
+
+ return r;
}
-const char *crypt_get_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd)
+/* internal only */
+int crypt_key_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
- const char *path = device_block_path(cd->device);
-
- if (!path)
- path = device_path(cd->device);
-
- return path;
+ return cd ? cd->key_in_keyring : 0;
}
-int crypt_get_volume_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+/* internal only */
+void crypt_set_key_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, unsigned key_in_keyring)
{
- if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
- return cd->plain_key_size;
+ if (!cd)
+ return;
- if (isLUKS(cd->type))
- return cd->hdr.keyBytes;
+ cd->key_in_keyring = key_in_keyring;
+}
- if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
- return cd->loopaes_key_size;
+/* internal only */
+void crypt_drop_keyring_key_by_description(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *key_description, key_type_t ktype)
+{
+ int r;
+ const char *type_name = key_type_name(ktype);
- if (isVERITY(cd->type))
- return cd->verity_root_hash_size;
+ if (!key_description || !type_name)
+ return;
- if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
- return cd->tcrypt_params.key_size;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Requesting keyring %s key for revoke and unlink.", type_name);
- return 0;
+ r = keyring_revoke_and_unlink_key(ktype, key_description);
+ if (r)
+ log_dbg(cd, "keyring_revoke_and_unlink_key failed (error %d)", r);
+ crypt_set_key_in_keyring(cd, 0);
}
-uint64_t crypt_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd)
+/* internal only */
+void crypt_drop_keyring_key(struct crypt_device *cd, struct volume_key *vks)
{
- if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
- return cd->plain_hdr.offset;
-
- if (isLUKS(cd->type))
- return cd->hdr.payloadOffset;
-
- if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
- return cd->loopaes_hdr.offset;
+ struct volume_key *vk = vks;
- if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
- return TCRYPT_get_data_offset(cd, &cd->tcrypt_hdr, &cd->tcrypt_params);
-
- return 0;
+ while (vk) {
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key_by_description(cd, vk->key_description, LOGON_KEY);
+ vk = crypt_volume_key_next(vk);
+ }
}
-uint64_t crypt_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd)
+int crypt_activate_by_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *key_description,
+ int keyslot,
+ uint32_t flags)
{
- if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
- return cd->plain_hdr.skip;
+ char *passphrase;
+ size_t passphrase_size;
+ int r;
- if (isLUKS(cd->type))
- return 0;
+ if (!cd || !key_description)
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
- return cd->loopaes_hdr.skip;
+ log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s [keyslot %d] using passphrase in keyring.",
+ name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase", keyslot);
- if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
- return TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(cd, &cd->tcrypt_hdr, &cd->tcrypt_params);
+ if (!kernel_keyring_support()) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Kernel keyring is not supported by the kernel."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- return 0;
-}
+ r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
-crypt_keyslot_info crypt_keyslot_status(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
-{
- if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
- log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
- return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
+ r = keyring_get_passphrase(key_description, &passphrase, &passphrase_size);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to read passphrase from keyring (error %d)."), r);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
- return LUKS_keyslot_info(&cd->hdr, keyslot);
-}
+ r = _activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
-int crypt_keyslot_max(const char *type)
-{
- if (type && isLUKS(type))
- return LUKS_NUMKEYS;
+ crypt_safe_free(passphrase);
- return -EINVAL;
+ return r;
}
-int crypt_keyslot_area(struct crypt_device *cd,
- int keyslot,
- uint64_t *offset,
- uint64_t *length)
+/*
+ * Workaround for serialization of parallel activation and memory-hard PBKDF
+ * In specific situation (systemd activation) this causes OOM killer activation.
+ * For now, let's provide this ugly way to serialize unlocking of devices.
+ */
+int crypt_serialize_lock(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
- if (!isLUKS(cd->type))
+ if (!cd->memory_hard_pbkdf_lock_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Taking global memory-hard access serialization lock.");
+ if (crypt_write_lock(cd, "memory-hard-access", true, &cd->pbkdf_memory_hard_lock)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire global memory-hard access serialization lock."));
+ cd->pbkdf_memory_hard_lock = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
+ }
- return LUKS_keyslot_area(&cd->hdr, keyslot, offset, length);
+ return 0;
}
-const char *crypt_get_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+void crypt_serialize_unlock(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
- return cd->type;
+ if (!cd->memory_hard_pbkdf_lock_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ crypt_unlock_internal(cd, cd->pbkdf_memory_hard_lock);
+ cd->pbkdf_memory_hard_lock = NULL;
}
-int crypt_get_verity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
- struct crypt_params_verity *vp)
+crypt_reencrypt_info crypt_reencrypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params)
{
- if (!isVERITY(cd->type) || !vp)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (params)
+ memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
- vp->data_device = device_path(cd->device);
- vp->hash_device = mdata_device_path(cd);
- vp->hash_name = cd->verity_hdr.hash_name;
- vp->salt = cd->verity_hdr.salt;
- vp->salt_size = cd->verity_hdr.salt_size;
- vp->data_block_size = cd->verity_hdr.data_block_size;
- vp->hash_block_size = cd->verity_hdr.hash_block_size;
- vp->data_size = cd->verity_hdr.data_size;
- vp->hash_area_offset = cd->verity_hdr.hash_area_offset;
- vp->hash_type = cd->verity_hdr.hash_type;
- vp->flags = cd->verity_hdr.flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER;
- return 0;
-}
+ if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type))
+ return CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID;
-int crypt_get_active_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
- struct crypt_active_device *cad)
-{
- struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
- int r;
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE;
- r = dm_query_device(cd, name, 0, &dmd);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ if (_onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET, CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_ONLINE_REENCRYPT))
+ return CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID;
- if (dmd.target != DM_CRYPT && dmd.target != DM_VERITY)
- return -ENOTSUP;
+ return LUKS2_reencrypt_get_params(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, params);
+}
- if (cd && isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
- cad->offset = TCRYPT_get_data_offset(cd, &cd->tcrypt_hdr, &cd->tcrypt_params);
- cad->iv_offset = TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(cd, &cd->tcrypt_hdr, &cd->tcrypt_params);
- } else {
- cad->offset = dmd.u.crypt.offset;
- cad->iv_offset = dmd.u.crypt.iv_offset;
- }
- cad->size = dmd.size;
- cad->flags = dmd.flags;
+static void __attribute__((destructor)) libcryptsetup_exit(void)
+{
+ crypt_token_unload_external_all(NULL);
- return 0;
+ crypt_backend_destroy();
+ crypt_random_exit();
}
projects / platform / upstream / cryptsetup.git / blobdiff