/*
* libdevmapper - device-mapper backend for cryptsetup
*
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
- * version 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
*/
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <libdevmapper.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h> /* for major, minor */
+#endif
#include "internal.h"
-#include "luks.h"
#define DM_UUID_LEN 129
+#define DM_BY_ID_PREFIX "dm-uuid-"
+#define DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN 8
#define DM_UUID_PREFIX "CRYPT-"
#define DM_UUID_PREFIX_LEN 6
#define DM_CRYPT_TARGET "crypt"
+#define DM_VERITY_TARGET "verity"
+#define DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET "integrity"
+#define DM_LINEAR_TARGET "linear"
+#define DM_ERROR_TARGET "error"
+#define DM_ZERO_TARGET "zero"
#define RETRY_COUNT 5
-/* Set if dm-crypt version was probed */
-static int _dm_crypt_checked = 0;
-static uint32_t _dm_crypt_flags = 0;
+/* Set if DM target versions were probed */
+static bool _dm_ioctl_checked = false;
+static bool _dm_crypt_checked = false;
+static bool _dm_verity_checked = false;
+static bool _dm_integrity_checked = false;
+
+static int _quiet_log = 0;
+static uint32_t _dm_flags = 0;
-static int _dm_use_count = 0;
static struct crypt_device *_context = NULL;
+static int _dm_use_count = 0;
/* Check if we have DM flag to instruct kernel to force wipe buffers */
#if !HAVE_DECL_DM_TASK_SECURE_DATA
va_start(va, f);
if (vasprintf(&msg, f, va) > 0) {
- if (level < 4) {
- log_err(_context, msg);
- log_err(_context, "\n");
- } else
- log_dbg(msg);
+ if (level < 4 && !_quiet_log) {
+ log_err(_context, "%s", msg);
+ } else {
+ /* We do not use DM visual stack backtrace here */
+ if (strncmp(msg, "<backtrace>", 11))
+ log_dbg(_context, "%s", msg);
+ }
}
free(msg);
va_end(va);
}
-static int _dm_simple(int task, const char *name, int udev_wait);
-
-static void _dm_set_crypt_compat(const char *dm_version, unsigned crypt_maj,
- unsigned crypt_min, unsigned crypt_patch)
+static int _dm_satisfies_version(unsigned target_maj, unsigned target_min, unsigned target_patch,
+ unsigned actual_maj, unsigned actual_min, unsigned actual_patch)
{
- unsigned dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch;
+ if (actual_maj > target_maj)
+ return 1;
- if (sscanf(dm_version, "%u.%u.%u", &dm_maj, &dm_min, &dm_patch) != 3)
- dm_maj = dm_min = dm_patch = 0;
+ if (actual_maj == target_maj && actual_min > target_min)
+ return 1;
- log_dbg("Detected dm-crypt version %i.%i.%i, dm-ioctl version %u.%u.%u.",
- crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch, dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch);
+ if (actual_maj == target_maj && actual_min == target_min && actual_patch >= target_patch)
+ return 1;
- if (crypt_maj >= 1 && crypt_min >= 2)
- _dm_crypt_flags |= DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED;
- else
- log_dbg("Suspend and resume disabled, no wipe key support.");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void _dm_set_crypt_compat(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ unsigned crypt_maj,
+ unsigned crypt_min,
+ unsigned crypt_patch)
+{
+ if (_dm_crypt_checked || crypt_maj == 0)
+ return;
- if (crypt_maj >= 1 && crypt_min >= 10)
- _dm_crypt_flags |= DM_LMK_SUPPORTED;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Detected dm-crypt version %i.%i.%i.",
+ crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch);
- if (dm_maj >= 4 && dm_min >= 20)
- _dm_crypt_flags |= DM_SECURE_SUPPORTED;
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 2, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED;
+ else
+ log_dbg(cd, "Suspend and resume disabled, no wipe key support.");
+
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 10, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_LMK_SUPPORTED;
/* not perfect, 2.6.33 supports with 1.7.0 */
- if (crypt_maj >= 1 && crypt_min >= 8)
- _dm_crypt_flags |= DM_PLAIN64_SUPPORTED;
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 8, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_PLAIN64_SUPPORTED;
+
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 11, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED;
+
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 13, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_TCW_SUPPORTED;
+
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 14, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch)) {
+ _dm_flags |= DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED;
+ _dm_flags |= DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 18, 1, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_KERNEL_KEYRING_SUPPORTED;
+
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 17, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch)) {
+ _dm_flags |= DM_SECTOR_SIZE_SUPPORTED;
+ _dm_flags |= DM_CAPI_STRING_SUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 19, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_BITLK_EBOIV_SUPPORTED;
+
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 20, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_BITLK_ELEPHANT_SUPPORTED;
+
+ _dm_crypt_checked = true;
+}
+
+static void _dm_set_verity_compat(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ unsigned verity_maj,
+ unsigned verity_min,
+ unsigned verity_patch)
+{
+ if (_dm_verity_checked || verity_maj == 0)
+ return;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Detected dm-verity version %i.%i.%i.",
+ verity_maj, verity_min, verity_patch);
+
+ _dm_flags |= DM_VERITY_SUPPORTED;
+
+ /*
+ * ignore_corruption, restart_on corruption is available since 1.2 (kernel 4.1)
+ * ignore_zero_blocks since 1.3 (kernel 4.5)
+ * (but some dm-verity targets 1.2 don't support it)
+ * FEC is added in 1.3 as well.
+ * Check at most once is added in 1.4 (kernel 4.17).
+ */
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 3, 0, verity_maj, verity_min, verity_patch)) {
+ _dm_flags |= DM_VERITY_ON_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED;
+ _dm_flags |= DM_VERITY_FEC_SUPPORTED;
+ }
- if (crypt_maj >= 1 && crypt_min >= 11)
- _dm_crypt_flags |= DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED;
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 5, 0, verity_maj, verity_min, verity_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE_SUPPORTED;
- /* Repeat test if dm-crypt is not present */
- if (crypt_maj > 0)
- _dm_crypt_checked = 1;
+ _dm_verity_checked = true;
}
-static int _dm_check_versions(void)
+static void _dm_set_integrity_compat(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ unsigned integrity_maj,
+ unsigned integrity_min,
+ unsigned integrity_patch)
+{
+ if (_dm_integrity_checked || integrity_maj == 0)
+ return;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Detected dm-integrity version %i.%i.%i.",
+ integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch);
+
+ _dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED;
+
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 2, 0, integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_RECALC_SUPPORTED;
+
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 3, 0, integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_SUPPORTED;
+
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 4, 0, integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_FIX_PADDING_SUPPORTED;
+
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 6, 0, integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED;
+
+ _dm_integrity_checked = true;
+}
+
+/* We use this for loading target module */
+static void _dm_check_target(dm_target_type target_type)
+{
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_DEVICE_GET_TARGET_VERSION
+ struct dm_task *dmt;
+ const char *target_name = NULL;
+
+ if (!(_dm_flags & DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION_SUPPORTED))
+ return;
+
+ if (target_type == DM_CRYPT)
+ target_name = DM_CRYPT_TARGET;
+ else if (target_type == DM_VERITY)
+ target_name = DM_VERITY_TARGET;
+ else if (target_type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+ target_name = DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET;
+ else
+ return;
+
+ if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_GET_TARGET_VERSION)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, target_name))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+ goto out;
+out:
+ if (dmt)
+ dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+#endif
+}
+
+static int _dm_check_versions(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target_type)
{
struct dm_task *dmt;
struct dm_versions *target, *last_target;
char dm_version[16];
+ unsigned dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch;
+ int r = 0;
- if (_dm_crypt_checked)
+ if ((target_type == DM_CRYPT && _dm_crypt_checked) ||
+ (target_type == DM_VERITY && _dm_verity_checked) ||
+ (target_type == DM_INTEGRITY && _dm_integrity_checked) ||
+ (target_type == DM_LINEAR) || (target_type == DM_ZERO) ||
+ (_dm_crypt_checked && _dm_verity_checked && _dm_integrity_checked))
return 1;
+ /* Shut up DM while checking */
+ _quiet_log = 1;
+
+ _dm_check_target(target_type);
+
/* FIXME: add support to DM so it forces crypt target module load here */
if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_LIST_VERSIONS)))
- return 0;
+ goto out;
- if (!dm_task_run(dmt)) {
- dm_task_destroy(dmt);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+ goto out;
- if (!dm_task_get_driver_version(dmt, dm_version, sizeof(dm_version))) {
- dm_task_destroy(dmt);
- return 0;
+ if (!dm_task_get_driver_version(dmt, dm_version, sizeof(dm_version)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!_dm_ioctl_checked) {
+ if (sscanf(dm_version, "%u.%u.%u", &dm_maj, &dm_min, &dm_patch) != 3)
+ goto out;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Detected dm-ioctl version %u.%u.%u.", dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch);
+
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(4, 20, 0, dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_SECURE_SUPPORTED;
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_TASK_DEFERRED_REMOVE
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(4, 27, 0, dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_DEFERRED_SUPPORTED;
+#endif
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_DEVICE_GET_TARGET_VERSION
+ if (_dm_satisfies_version(4, 41, 0, dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch))
+ _dm_flags |= DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION_SUPPORTED;
+#endif
}
target = dm_task_get_versions(dmt);
do {
last_target = target;
if (!strcmp(DM_CRYPT_TARGET, target->name)) {
- _dm_set_crypt_compat(dm_version,
- (unsigned)target->version[0],
+ _dm_set_crypt_compat(cd, (unsigned)target->version[0],
(unsigned)target->version[1],
(unsigned)target->version[2]);
+ } else if (!strcmp(DM_VERITY_TARGET, target->name)) {
+ _dm_set_verity_compat(cd, (unsigned)target->version[0],
+ (unsigned)target->version[1],
+ (unsigned)target->version[2]);
+ } else if (!strcmp(DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET, target->name)) {
+ _dm_set_integrity_compat(cd, (unsigned)target->version[0],
+ (unsigned)target->version[1],
+ (unsigned)target->version[2]);
}
target = (struct dm_versions *)((char *) target + target->next);
} while (last_target != target);
- dm_task_destroy(dmt);
- return 1;
+ r = 1;
+ if (!_dm_ioctl_checked)
+ log_dbg(cd, "Device-mapper backend running with UDEV support %sabled.",
+ _dm_use_udev() ? "en" : "dis");
+
+ _dm_ioctl_checked = true;
+out:
+ if (dmt)
+ dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+ _quiet_log = 0;
+ return r;
}
-uint32_t dm_flags(void)
+int dm_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target, uint32_t *flags)
{
- if (!_dm_crypt_checked)
- _dm_check_versions();
+ _dm_check_versions(cd, target);
+ *flags = _dm_flags;
+
+ if (target == DM_UNKNOWN &&
+ _dm_crypt_checked && _dm_verity_checked && _dm_integrity_checked)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((target == DM_CRYPT && _dm_crypt_checked) ||
+ (target == DM_VERITY && _dm_verity_checked) ||
+ (target == DM_INTEGRITY && _dm_integrity_checked) ||
+ (target == DM_LINEAR) || (target == DM_ZERO)) /* nothing to check */
+ return 0;
- return _dm_crypt_flags;
+ return -ENODEV;
}
-int dm_init(struct crypt_device *context, int check_kernel)
+/* This doesn't run any kernel checks, just set up userspace libdevmapper */
+void dm_backend_init(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
if (!_dm_use_count++) {
- log_dbg("Initialising device-mapper backend%s, UDEV is %sabled.",
- check_kernel ? "" : " (NO kernel check requested)",
- _dm_use_udev() ? "en" : "dis");
- if (check_kernel && !_dm_check_versions()) {
- log_err(context, _("Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?\n"));
- return -1;
- }
- if (getuid() || geteuid())
- log_dbg(("WARNING: Running as a non-root user. Functionality may be unavailable."));
+ log_dbg(cd, "Initialising device-mapper backend library.");
dm_log_init(set_dm_error);
dm_log_init_verbose(10);
}
-
- // FIXME: global context is not safe
- if (context)
- _context = context;
-
- return 1; /* unsafe memory */
}
-void dm_exit(void)
+void dm_backend_exit(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
if (_dm_use_count && (!--_dm_use_count)) {
- log_dbg("Releasing device-mapper backend.");
+ log_dbg(cd, "Releasing device-mapper backend.");
dm_log_init_verbose(0);
dm_log_init(NULL);
dm_lib_release();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * libdevmapper is not context friendly, switch context on every DM call.
+ * FIXME: this is not safe if called in parallel but neither is DM lib.
+ */
+static int dm_init_context(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target)
+{
+ _context = cd;
+ if (!_dm_check_versions(cd, target)) {
+ if (getuid() || geteuid())
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot initialize device-mapper, "
+ "running as non-root user."));
+ else
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot initialize device-mapper. "
+ "Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?"));
_context = NULL;
+ return -ENOTSUP;
}
+ return 0;
+}
+static void dm_exit_context(void)
+{
+ _context = NULL;
}
/* Return path to DM device */
return NULL;
if (!dm_task_set_minor(dmt, minor) ||
!dm_task_set_major(dmt, major) ||
+ !dm_task_no_flush(dmt) ||
!dm_task_run(dmt) ||
!(name = dm_task_get_name(dmt))) {
dm_task_destroy(dmt);
return strdup(path);
}
+char *dm_device_name(const char *path)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (stat(path, &st) < 0 || !S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return dm_device_path(NULL, major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev));
+}
+
static void hex_key(char *hexkey, size_t key_size, const char *key)
{
unsigned i;
sprintf(&hexkey[i * 2], "%02x", (unsigned char)key[i]);
}
-static char *get_params(struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+static size_t int_log10(uint64_t x)
{
- int r, max_size;
- char *params, *hexkey;
- const char *features = "";
+ uint64_t r = 0;
+ for (x /= 10; x > 0; x /= 10)
+ r++;
+ return r;
+}
+
+#define CLEN 64 /* 2*MAX_CIPHER_LEN */
+#define CLENS "63" /* for sscanf length + '\0' */
+#define CAPIL 144 /* should be enough to fit whole capi string */
+#define CAPIS "143" /* for sscanf of crypto API string + 16 + \0 */
+
+static int cipher_c2dm(const char *org_c, const char *org_i, unsigned tag_size,
+ char *c_dm, int c_dm_size,
+ char *i_dm, int i_dm_size)
+{
+ int c_size = 0, i_size = 0, i;
+ char cipher[CLEN], mode[CLEN], iv[CLEN+1], tmp[CLEN];
+ char capi[CAPIL];
+
+ if (!c_dm || !c_dm_size || !i_dm || !i_dm_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ i = sscanf(org_c, "%" CLENS "[^-]-%" CLENS "s", cipher, tmp);
+ if (i != 2)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ i = sscanf(tmp, "%" CLENS "[^-]-%" CLENS "s", mode, iv);
+ if (i == 1) {
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
+ strncpy(iv, mode, sizeof(iv)-1);
+ *mode = '\0';
+ if (snprintf(capi, sizeof(capi), "%s", cipher) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (i == 2) {
+ if (snprintf(capi, sizeof(capi), "%s(%s)", mode, cipher) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!org_i) {
+ /* legacy mode: CIPHER-MODE-IV*/
+ i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, "%s", "");
+ c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "%s", org_c);
+ } else if (!strcmp(org_i, "none")) {
+ /* IV only: capi:MODE(CIPHER)-IV */
+ i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, " integrity:%u:none", tag_size);
+ c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "capi:%s-%s", capi, iv);
+ } else if (!strcmp(org_i, "aead") && !strcmp(mode, "ccm")) {
+ /* CCM AEAD: capi:rfc4309(MODE(CIPHER))-IV */
+ i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, " integrity:%u:aead", tag_size);
+ c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "capi:rfc4309(%s)-%s", capi, iv);
+ } else if (!strcmp(org_i, "aead")) {
+ /* AEAD: capi:MODE(CIPHER))-IV */
+ i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, " integrity:%u:aead", tag_size);
+ c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "capi:%s-%s", capi, iv);
+ } else if (!strcmp(org_i, "poly1305")) {
+ /* POLY1305 AEAD: capi:rfc7539(MODE(CIPHER),POLY1305)-IV */
+ i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, " integrity:%u:aead", tag_size);
+ c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "capi:rfc7539(%s,poly1305)-%s", capi, iv);
+ } else {
+ /* other AEAD: capi:authenc(<AUTH>,MODE(CIPHER))-IV */
+ i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, " integrity:%u:aead", tag_size);
+ c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "capi:authenc(%s,%s)-%s", org_i, capi, iv);
+ }
+
+ if (c_size < 0 || c_size == c_dm_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (i_size < 0 || i_size == i_dm_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cipher_dm2c(char **org_c, char **org_i, const char *c_dm, const char *i_dm)
+{
+ char cipher[CLEN], mode[CLEN], iv[CLEN], auth[CLEN];
+ char tmp[CAPIL], dmcrypt_tmp[CAPIL*2], capi[CAPIL+1];
+ size_t len;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!c_dm)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* legacy mode */
+ if (strncmp(c_dm, "capi:", 4)) {
+ if (!(*org_c = strdup(c_dm)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ *org_i = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* modes with capi: prefix */
+ i = sscanf(c_dm, "capi:%" CAPIS "[^-]-%" CLENS "s", tmp, iv);
+ if (i != 2)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ len = strlen(tmp);
+ if (len < 2)
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) {
- if (dm_flags() & DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED) {
- features = " 1 allow_discards";
- log_dbg("Discard/TRIM is allowed.");
+ if (tmp[len-1] == ')')
+ tmp[len-1] = '\0';
+
+ if (sscanf(tmp, "rfc4309(%" CAPIS "s", capi) == 1) {
+ if (!(*org_i = strdup("aead")))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ } else if (sscanf(tmp, "rfc7539(%" CAPIS "[^,],%" CLENS "s", capi, auth) == 2) {
+ if (!(*org_i = strdup(auth)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ } else if (sscanf(tmp, "authenc(%" CLENS "[^,],%" CAPIS "s", auth, capi) == 2) {
+ if (!(*org_i = strdup(auth)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ } else {
+ if (i_dm) {
+ if (!(*org_i = strdup(i_dm)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
} else
- log_dbg("Discard/TRIM is not supported by the kernel.");
+ *org_i = NULL;
+ memset(capi, 0, sizeof(capi));
+ strncpy(capi, tmp, sizeof(capi)-1);
+ }
+
+ i = sscanf(capi, "%" CLENS "[^(](%" CLENS "[^)])", mode, cipher);
+ if (i == 2)
+ snprintf(dmcrypt_tmp, sizeof(dmcrypt_tmp), "%s-%s-%s", cipher, mode, iv);
+ else
+ snprintf(dmcrypt_tmp, sizeof(dmcrypt_tmp), "%s-%s", capi, iv);
+
+ if (!(*org_c = strdup(dmcrypt_tmp))) {
+ free(*org_i);
+ *org_i = NULL;
+ return -ENOMEM;
}
- hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(dmd->vk->keylength * 2 + 1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt */
+static char *get_dm_crypt_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ int r, max_size, null_cipher = 0, num_options = 0, keystr_len = 0;
+ char *params, *hexkey;
+ char sector_feature[32], features[512], integrity_dm[256], cipher_dm[256];
+
+ if (!tgt)
+ return NULL;
+
+ r = cipher_c2dm(tgt->u.crypt.cipher, tgt->u.crypt.integrity, tgt->u.crypt.tag_size,
+ cipher_dm, sizeof(cipher_dm), integrity_dm, sizeof(integrity_dm));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS)
+ num_options++;
+ if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT)
+ num_options++;
+ if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS)
+ num_options++;
+ if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS)
+ num_options++;
+ if (tgt->u.crypt.integrity)
+ num_options++;
+
+ if (tgt->u.crypt.sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE) {
+ num_options++;
+ snprintf(sector_feature, sizeof(sector_feature), " sector_size:%u", tgt->u.crypt.sector_size);
+ } else
+ *sector_feature = '\0';
+
+ if (num_options) {
+ snprintf(features, sizeof(features)-1, " %d%s%s%s%s%s%s", num_options,
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) ? " allow_discards" : "",
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT) ? " same_cpu_crypt" : "",
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS) ? " submit_from_crypt_cpus" : "",
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS) ? " iv_large_sectors" : "",
+ sector_feature, integrity_dm);
+ } else
+ *features = '\0';
+
+ if (!strncmp(cipher_dm, "cipher_null-", 12))
+ null_cipher = 1;
+
+ if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+ keystr_len = strlen(tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description) + int_log10(tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength) + 10;
+ hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(keystr_len);
+ } else
+ hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(null_cipher ? 2 : (tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength * 2 + 1));
+
if (!hexkey)
return NULL;
- hex_key(hexkey, dmd->vk->keylength, dmd->vk->key);
+ if (null_cipher)
+ strncpy(hexkey, "-", 2);
+ else if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+ r = snprintf(hexkey, keystr_len, ":%zu:logon:%s", tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
+ if (r < 0 || r >= keystr_len) {
+ params = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else
+ hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key);
- max_size = strlen(hexkey) + strlen(dmd->cipher) +
- strlen(dmd->device) + strlen(features) + 64;
+ max_size = strlen(hexkey) + strlen(cipher_dm) +
+ strlen(device_block_path(tgt->data_device)) +
+ strlen(features) + 64;
params = crypt_safe_alloc(max_size);
if (!params)
goto out;
r = snprintf(params, max_size, "%s %s %" PRIu64 " %s %" PRIu64 "%s",
- dmd->cipher, hexkey, dmd->iv_offset, dmd->device,
- dmd->offset, features);
+ cipher_dm, hexkey, tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset,
+ device_block_path(tgt->data_device), tgt->u.crypt.offset,
+ features);
if (r < 0 || r >= max_size) {
crypt_safe_free(params);
params = NULL;
return params;
}
-/* DM helpers */
-static int _dm_simple(int task, const char *name, int udev_wait)
+/* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity */
+static char *get_dm_verity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
{
- int r = 0;
- struct dm_task *dmt;
- uint32_t cookie = 0;
+ int max_size, r, num_options = 0;
+ struct crypt_params_verity *vp;
+ char *params = NULL, *hexroot = NULL, *hexsalt = NULL;
+ char features[256], fec_features[256], verity_verify_args[512+32];
- if (!_dm_use_udev())
- udev_wait = 0;
+ if (!tgt || !tgt->u.verity.vp)
+ return NULL;
- if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(task)))
- return 0;
+ vp = tgt->u.verity.vp;
+
+ /* These flags are not compatible */
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION) &&
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION))
+ flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION;
+
+ if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION)
+ num_options++;
+ if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION)
+ num_options++;
+ if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS)
+ num_options++;
+ if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE)
+ num_options++;
+
+ if (tgt->u.verity.fec_device) {
+ num_options += 8;
+ snprintf(fec_features, sizeof(fec_features)-1,
+ " use_fec_from_device %s fec_start %" PRIu64 " fec_blocks %" PRIu64 " fec_roots %" PRIu32,
+ device_block_path(tgt->u.verity.fec_device), tgt->u.verity.fec_offset,
+ vp->data_size + tgt->u.verity.hash_blocks, vp->fec_roots);
+ } else
+ *fec_features = '\0';
+
+ if (tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc) {
+ num_options += 2;
+ snprintf(verity_verify_args, sizeof(verity_verify_args)-1,
+ " root_hash_sig_key_desc %s", tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc);
+ } else
+ *verity_verify_args = '\0';
+
+ if (num_options)
+ snprintf(features, sizeof(features)-1, " %d%s%s%s%s", num_options,
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION) ? " ignore_corruption" : "",
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION) ? " restart_on_corruption" : "",
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS) ? " ignore_zero_blocks" : "",
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE) ? " check_at_most_once" : "");
+ else
+ *features = '\0';
- if (name && !dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+ hexroot = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size * 2 + 1);
+ if (!hexroot)
goto out;
+ hex_key(hexroot, tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size, tgt->u.verity.root_hash);
-#if HAVE_DECL_DM_TASK_RETRY_REMOVE
- /* Used only in DM_DEVICE_REMOVE */
- if (name && !dm_task_retry_remove(dmt))
- goto out;
-#endif
- if (udev_wait && !_dm_task_set_cookie(dmt, &cookie, 0))
+ hexsalt = crypt_safe_alloc(vp->salt_size ? vp->salt_size * 2 + 1 : 2);
+ if (!hexsalt)
goto out;
+ if (vp->salt_size)
+ hex_key(hexsalt, vp->salt_size, vp->salt);
+ else
+ strncpy(hexsalt, "-", 2);
- r = dm_task_run(dmt);
+ max_size = strlen(hexroot) + strlen(hexsalt) +
+ strlen(device_block_path(tgt->data_device)) +
+ strlen(device_block_path(tgt->u.verity.hash_device)) +
+ strlen(vp->hash_name) + strlen(features) + strlen(fec_features) + 128 +
+ strlen(verity_verify_args);
- if (udev_wait)
- (void)_dm_udev_wait(cookie);
+ params = crypt_safe_alloc(max_size);
+ if (!params)
+ goto out;
- out:
- dm_task_destroy(dmt);
- return r;
+ r = snprintf(params, max_size,
+ "%u %s %s %u %u %" PRIu64 " %" PRIu64 " %s %s %s%s%s%s",
+ vp->hash_type, device_block_path(tgt->data_device),
+ device_block_path(tgt->u.verity.hash_device),
+ vp->data_block_size, vp->hash_block_size,
+ vp->data_size, tgt->u.verity.hash_offset,
+ vp->hash_name, hexroot, hexsalt, features, fec_features,
+ verity_verify_args);
+
+ if (r < 0 || r >= max_size) {
+ crypt_safe_free(params);
+ params = NULL;
+ }
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(hexroot);
+ crypt_safe_free(hexsalt);
+ return params;
}
-static int _error_device(const char *name, size_t size)
+static char *get_dm_integrity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
{
- struct dm_task *dmt;
- int r = 0;
+ int r, max_size, num_options = 0;
+ char *params, *hexkey, mode;
+ char features[512], feature[256];
- if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_RELOAD)))
- return 0;
-
- if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
- goto error;
-
- if (!dm_task_add_target(dmt, UINT64_C(0), size, "error", ""))
- goto error;
+ if (!tgt)
+ return NULL;
- if (!dm_task_set_ro(dmt))
- goto error;
+ max_size = strlen(device_block_path(tgt->data_device)) +
+ (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device ? strlen(device_block_path(tgt->u.integrity.meta_device)) : 0) +
+ (tgt->u.integrity.vk ? tgt->u.integrity.vk->keylength * 2 : 0) +
+ (tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key ? tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->keylength * 2 : 0) +
+ (tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key ? tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->keylength * 2 : 0) +
+ (tgt->u.integrity.integrity ? strlen(tgt->u.integrity.integrity) : 0) +
+ (tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity ? strlen(tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity) : 0) +
+ (tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt ? strlen(tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt) : 0) + 128;
- if (!dm_task_no_open_count(dmt))
- goto error;
+ params = crypt_safe_alloc(max_size);
+ if (!params)
+ return NULL;
- if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
- goto error;
+ *features = '\0';
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_size) {
+ num_options++;
+ snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "journal_sectors:%u ",
+ (unsigned)(tgt->u.integrity.journal_size / SECTOR_SIZE));
+ strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+ }
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark) {
+ num_options++;
+ snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature),
+ /* bitmap overloaded values */
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP) ? "sectors_per_bit:%u " : "journal_watermark:%u ",
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark);
+ strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+ }
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time) {
+ num_options++;
+ snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature),
+ /* bitmap overloaded values */
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP) ? "bitmap_flush_interval:%u " : "commit_time:%u ",
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time);
+ strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+ }
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors) {
+ num_options++;
+ snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "interleave_sectors:%u ",
+ tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors);
+ strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+ }
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.sector_size) {
+ num_options++;
+ snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "block_size:%u ",
+ tgt->u.integrity.sector_size);
+ strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+ }
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors) {
+ num_options++;
+ snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "buffer_sectors:%u ",
+ tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors);
+ strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+ }
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.integrity) {
+ num_options++;
+
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.vk) {
+ hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.integrity.vk->keylength * 2 + 1);
+ if (!hexkey) {
+ crypt_safe_free(params);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.integrity.vk->keylength, tgt->u.integrity.vk->key);
+ } else
+ hexkey = NULL;
- if (!_dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_RESUME, name, 1)) {
- _dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_CLEAR, name, 0);
- goto error;
+ snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "internal_hash:%s%s%s ",
+ tgt->u.integrity.integrity, hexkey ? ":" : "", hexkey ?: "");
+ strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+ crypt_safe_free(hexkey);
}
- r = 1;
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity) {
+ num_options++;
-error:
- dm_task_destroy(dmt);
- return r;
-}
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key) {
+ hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->keylength * 2 + 1);
+ if (!hexkey) {
+ crypt_safe_free(params);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->keylength,
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->key);
+ } else
+ hexkey = NULL;
-int dm_remove_device(const char *name, int force, uint64_t size)
-{
- int r = -EINVAL;
- int retries = force ? RETRY_COUNT : 1;
- int error_target = 0;
+ snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "journal_mac:%s%s%s ",
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity, hexkey ? ":" : "", hexkey ?: "");
+ strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+ crypt_safe_free(hexkey);
+ }
- if (!name || (force && !size))
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt) {
+ num_options++;
- do {
- r = _dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_REMOVE, name, 1) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
- if (--retries && r) {
- log_dbg("WARNING: other process locked internal device %s, %s.",
- name, retries ? "retrying remove" : "giving up");
- if (force && (crypt_get_debug_level() == CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG))
- debug_processes_using_device(name);
- sleep(1);
- if (force && !error_target) {
- /* If force flag is set, replace device with error, read-only target.
- * it should stop processes from reading it and also removed underlying
- * device from mapping, so it is usable again.
- * Force flag should be used only for temporary devices, which are
- * intended to work inside cryptsetup only!
- * Anyway, if some process try to read temporary cryptsetup device,
- * it is bug - no other process should try touch it (e.g. udev).
- */
- _error_device(name, size);
- error_target = 1;
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key) {
+ hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->keylength * 2 + 1);
+ if (!hexkey) {
+ crypt_safe_free(params);
+ return NULL;
}
- }
- } while (r == -EINVAL && retries);
+ hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->keylength,
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->key);
+ } else
+ hexkey = NULL;
- dm_task_update_nodes();
+ snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "journal_crypt:%s%s%s ",
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt, hexkey ? ":" : "", hexkey ?: "");
+ strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+ crypt_safe_free(hexkey);
+ }
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.fix_padding) {
+ num_options++;
+ snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "fix_padding ");
+ strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+ }
+
+ if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE) {
+ num_options++;
+ snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "recalculate ");
+ strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+ }
+
+ if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) {
+ num_options++;
+ snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "allow_discards ");
+ strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+ }
+
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
+ num_options++;
+ snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "meta_device:%s ",
+ device_block_path(tgt->u.integrity.meta_device));
+ strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+ }
+
+ if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP)
+ mode = 'B';
+ else if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECOVERY)
+ mode = 'R';
+ else if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL)
+ mode = 'D';
+ else
+ mode = 'J';
+
+ r = snprintf(params, max_size, "%s %" PRIu64 " %d %c %d %s",
+ device_block_path(tgt->data_device), tgt->u.integrity.offset,
+ tgt->u.integrity.tag_size, mode,
+ num_options, *features ? features : "");
+ if (r < 0 || r >= max_size) {
+ crypt_safe_free(params);
+ params = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return params;
+}
+
+static char *get_dm_linear_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ char *params;
+ int r;
+ int max_size = strlen(device_block_path(tgt->data_device)) + int_log10(tgt->u.linear.offset) + 3;
+
+ params = crypt_safe_alloc(max_size);
+ if (!params)
+ return NULL;
+
+ r = snprintf(params, max_size, "%s %" PRIu64,
+ device_block_path(tgt->data_device), tgt->u.linear.offset);
+
+ if (r < 0 || r >= max_size) {
+ crypt_safe_free(params);
+ params = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return params;
+}
+
+static char *get_dm_zero_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ char *params = crypt_safe_alloc(1);
+ if (!params)
+ return NULL;
+
+ params[0] = 0;
+ return params;
+}
+
+/* DM helpers */
+static int _dm_remove(const char *name, int udev_wait, int deferred)
+{
+ int r = 0;
+ struct dm_task *dmt;
+ uint32_t cookie = 0;
+
+ if (!_dm_use_udev())
+ udev_wait = 0;
+
+ if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_REMOVE)))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+ goto out;
+
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_TASK_RETRY_REMOVE
+ if (!dm_task_retry_remove(dmt))
+ goto out;
+#endif
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_TASK_DEFERRED_REMOVE
+ if (deferred && !dm_task_deferred_remove(dmt))
+ goto out;
+#endif
+ if (udev_wait && !_dm_task_set_cookie(dmt, &cookie, DM_UDEV_DISABLE_LIBRARY_FALLBACK))
+ goto out;
+
+ r = dm_task_run(dmt);
+
+ if (udev_wait)
+ (void)_dm_udev_wait(cookie);
+out:
+ dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_simple(int task, const char *name, uint32_t dmflags)
+{
+ int r = 0;
+ struct dm_task *dmt;
+
+ if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(task)))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (name && !dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (task == DM_DEVICE_SUSPEND &&
+ (dmflags & DM_SUSPEND_SKIP_LOCKFS) && !dm_task_skip_lockfs(dmt))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (task == DM_DEVICE_SUSPEND &&
+ (dmflags & DM_SUSPEND_NOFLUSH) && !dm_task_no_flush(dmt))
+ goto out;
+
+ r = dm_task_run(dmt);
+out:
+ dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_resume_device(const char *name, uint32_t flags);
+
+static int _error_device(const char *name, size_t size)
+{
+ struct dm_task *dmt;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_RELOAD)))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!dm_task_add_target(dmt, UINT64_C(0), size, "error", ""))
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!dm_task_set_ro(dmt))
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!dm_task_no_open_count(dmt))
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+ goto error;
+
+ if (_dm_resume_device(name, 0)) {
+ _dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_CLEAR, name, 0);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ r = 1;
+
+error:
+ dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int dm_error_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+
+ if ((dm_query_device(cd, name, 0, &dmd) >= 0) && _error_device(name, dmd.size))
+ r = 0;
+ else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+
+ dm_exit_context();
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int dm_clear_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+
+ if (_dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_CLEAR, name, 0))
+ r = 0;
+ else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ dm_exit_context();
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int dm_remove_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+ int retries = (flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE) ? RETRY_COUNT : 1;
+ int deferred = (flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED) ? 1 : 0;
+ int error_target = 0;
+ uint32_t dmt_flags;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+
+ if (deferred && !dm_flags(cd, DM_UNKNOWN, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & DM_DEFERRED_SUPPORTED)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Requested deferred flag is not supported."));
+ dm_exit_context();
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ do {
+ r = _dm_remove(name, 1, deferred) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+ if (--retries && r) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "WARNING: other process locked internal device %s, %s.",
+ name, retries ? "retrying remove" : "giving up");
+ sleep(1);
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE) && !error_target) {
+ /* If force flag is set, replace device with error, read-only target.
+ * it should stop processes from reading it and also removed underlying
+ * device from mapping, so it is usable again.
+ * Anyway, if some process try to read temporary cryptsetup device,
+ * it is bug - no other process should try touch it (e.g. udev).
+ */
+ if (!dm_query_device(cd, name, 0, &dmd)) {
+ _error_device(name, dmd.size);
+ error_target = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } while (r == -EINVAL && retries);
+
+ dm_task_update_nodes();
+ dm_exit_context();
return r;
}
* CRYPT-LUKS1-00000000000000000000000000000000-name
* CRYPT-TEMP-name
*/
-static void dm_prepare_uuid(const char *name, const char *type, const char *uuid, char *buf, size_t buflen)
+static int dm_prepare_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *type,
+ const char *uuid, char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
char *ptr, uuid2[UUID_LEN] = {0};
uuid_t uu;
unsigned i = 0;
/* Remove '-' chars */
- if (uuid && !uuid_parse(uuid, uu)) {
+ if (uuid) {
+ if (uuid_parse(uuid, uu) < 0) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Requested UUID %s has invalid format.", uuid);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
for (ptr = uuid2, i = 0; i < UUID_LEN; i++)
if (uuid[i] != '-') {
*ptr = uuid[i];
uuid2[0] ? uuid2 : "", uuid2[0] ? "-" : "",
name);
- log_dbg("DM-UUID is %s", buf);
+ log_dbg(cd, "DM-UUID is %s", buf);
if (i >= buflen)
- log_err(NULL, _("DM-UUID for device %s was truncated.\n"), name);
+ log_err(cd, _("DM-UUID for device %s was truncated."), name);
+
+ return 1;
}
-int dm_create_device(const char *name,
- const char *type,
- struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
- int reload)
+int lookup_dm_dev_by_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *uuid, const char *type)
+{
+ int r;
+ char *c;
+ char dev_uuid[DM_UUID_LEN + DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN] = DM_BY_ID_PREFIX;
+
+ if (!dm_prepare_uuid(cd, "", type, uuid, dev_uuid + DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN, DM_UUID_LEN))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ c = strrchr(dev_uuid, '-');
+ if (!c)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* cut of dm name */
+ *c = '\0';
+
+ r = lookup_by_disk_id(dev_uuid);
+ if (r == -ENOENT) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Search by disk id not available. Using sysfs instead.");
+ r = lookup_by_sysfs_uuid_field(dev_uuid + DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN, DM_UUID_LEN);
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _add_dm_targets(struct dm_task *dmt, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+ const char *target;
+ struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd->segment;
+
+ do {
+ switch (tgt->type) {
+ case DM_CRYPT:
+ target = DM_CRYPT_TARGET;
+ break;
+ case DM_VERITY:
+ target = DM_VERITY_TARGET;
+ break;
+ case DM_INTEGRITY:
+ target = DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET;
+ break;
+ case DM_LINEAR:
+ target = DM_LINEAR_TARGET;
+ break;
+ case DM_ZERO:
+ target = DM_ZERO_TARGET;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ if (!dm_task_add_target(dmt, tgt->offset, tgt->size, target, tgt->params))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tgt = tgt->next;
+ } while (tgt);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void _destroy_dm_targets_params(struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+ struct dm_target *t = &dmd->segment;
+
+ do {
+ crypt_safe_free(t->params);
+ t->params = NULL;
+ t = t->next;
+ } while (t);
+}
+
+static int _create_dm_targets_params(struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd->segment;
+
+ do {
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT)
+ tgt->params = get_dm_crypt_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+ else if (tgt->type == DM_VERITY)
+ tgt->params = get_dm_verity_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+ else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+ tgt->params = get_dm_integrity_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+ else if (tgt->type == DM_LINEAR)
+ tgt->params = get_dm_linear_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+ else if (tgt->type == DM_ZERO)
+ tgt->params = get_dm_zero_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+ else {
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!tgt->params) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tgt = tgt->next;
+ } while (tgt);
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ _destroy_dm_targets_params(dmd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *type,
+ const char *uuid, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
{
struct dm_task *dmt = NULL;
struct dm_info dmi;
- char *params = NULL;
char dev_uuid[DM_UUID_LEN] = {0};
int r = -EINVAL;
- uint32_t read_ahead = 0;
- uint32_t cookie = 0;
- uint16_t udev_flags = 0;
-
- params = get_params(dmd);
- if (!params)
- goto out_no_removal;
+ uint32_t cookie = 0, read_ahead = 0;
+ uint16_t udev_flags = DM_UDEV_DISABLE_LIBRARY_FALLBACK;
if (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE)
- udev_flags = CRYPT_TEMP_UDEV_FLAGS;
+ udev_flags |= CRYPT_TEMP_UDEV_FLAGS;
/* All devices must have DM_UUID, only resize on old device is exception */
- if (reload) {
- if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_RELOAD)))
- goto out_no_removal;
+ if (!dm_prepare_uuid(cd, name, type, dmd->uuid, dev_uuid, sizeof(dev_uuid)))
+ goto out;
- if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
- goto out_no_removal;
- } else {
- dm_prepare_uuid(name, type, dmd->uuid, dev_uuid, sizeof(dev_uuid));
+ if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_CREATE)))
+ goto out;
- if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_CREATE)))
- goto out_no_removal;
+ if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+ goto out;
- if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
- goto out_no_removal;
+ if (!dm_task_set_uuid(dmt, dev_uuid))
+ goto out;
- if (!dm_task_set_uuid(dmt, dev_uuid))
- goto out_no_removal;
+ if (!dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
+ goto out;
+ if ((dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY) && !dm_task_set_ro(dmt))
+ goto out;
- if (_dm_use_udev() && !_dm_task_set_cookie(dmt, &cookie, udev_flags))
- goto out_no_removal;
- }
+ r = _create_dm_targets_params(dmd);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
- if ((dm_flags() & DM_SECURE_SUPPORTED) && !dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
- goto out_no_removal;
- if ((dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY) && !dm_task_set_ro(dmt))
- goto out_no_removal;
- if (!dm_task_add_target(dmt, 0, dmd->size, DM_CRYPT_TARGET, params))
- goto out_no_removal;
+ r = _add_dm_targets(dmt, dmd);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
#ifdef DM_READ_AHEAD_MINIMUM_FLAG
- if (device_read_ahead(dmd->device, &read_ahead) &&
+ if (device_read_ahead(dmd->segment.data_device, &read_ahead) &&
!dm_task_set_read_ahead(dmt, read_ahead, DM_READ_AHEAD_MINIMUM_FLAG))
- goto out_no_removal;
+ goto out;
#endif
+ if (_dm_use_udev() && !_dm_task_set_cookie(dmt, &cookie, udev_flags))
+ goto out;
if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
- goto out_no_removal;
+ goto out;
- if (reload) {
- dm_task_destroy(dmt);
- if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_RESUME)))
- goto out;
- if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
- goto out;
- if (dmd->uuid && !dm_task_set_uuid(dmt, dev_uuid))
- goto out;
- if (_dm_use_udev() && !_dm_task_set_cookie(dmt, &cookie, udev_flags))
- goto out;
- if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (!dm_task_get_info(dmt, &dmi))
- goto out;
+ if (dm_task_get_info(dmt, &dmi))
+ r = 0;
- r = 0;
-out:
if (_dm_use_udev()) {
(void)_dm_udev_wait(cookie);
cookie = 0;
}
- if (r < 0 && !reload)
- dm_remove_device(name, 0, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ _dm_remove(name, 1, 0);
-out_no_removal:
+out:
if (cookie && _dm_use_udev())
(void)_dm_udev_wait(cookie);
- if (params)
- crypt_safe_free(params);
if (dmt)
dm_task_destroy(dmt);
- dm_task_update_nodes();
+ dm_task_update_nodes();
+
+ /* If code just loaded target module, update versions */
+ _dm_check_versions(cd, dmd->segment.type);
+
+ _destroy_dm_targets_params(dmd);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_resume_device(const char *name, uint32_t dmflags)
+{
+ struct dm_task *dmt;
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+ uint32_t cookie = 0;
+ uint16_t udev_flags = DM_UDEV_DISABLE_LIBRARY_FALLBACK;
+
+ if (dmflags & DM_RESUME_PRIVATE)
+ udev_flags |= CRYPT_TEMP_UDEV_FLAGS;
+
+ if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_RESUME)))
+ return r;
+
+ if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((dmflags & DM_SUSPEND_SKIP_LOCKFS) && !dm_task_skip_lockfs(dmt))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((dmflags & DM_SUSPEND_NOFLUSH) && !dm_task_no_flush(dmt))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (_dm_use_udev() && !_dm_task_set_cookie(dmt, &cookie, udev_flags))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (dm_task_run(dmt))
+ r = 0;
+out:
+ if (cookie && _dm_use_udev())
+ (void)_dm_udev_wait(cookie);
+
+ dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+ dm_task_update_nodes();
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+ struct dm_task *dmt = NULL;
+ uint32_t read_ahead = 0;
+
+ /* All devices must have DM_UUID, only resize on old device is exception */
+ if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_RELOAD)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
+ goto out;
+ if ((dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY) && !dm_task_set_ro(dmt))
+ goto out;
+
+ r = _create_dm_targets_params(dmd);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = _add_dm_targets(dmt, dmd);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+#ifdef DM_READ_AHEAD_MINIMUM_FLAG
+ if (device_read_ahead(dmd->segment.data_device, &read_ahead) &&
+ !dm_task_set_read_ahead(dmt, read_ahead, DM_READ_AHEAD_MINIMUM_FLAG))
+ goto out;
+#endif
+
+ if (dm_task_run(dmt))
+ r = 0;
+out:
+ if (dmt)
+ dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+ /* If code just loaded target module, update versions */
+ _dm_check_versions(cd, dmd->segment.type);
+
+ _destroy_dm_targets_params(dmd);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static void crypt_free_verity_params(struct crypt_params_verity *vp)
+{
+ if (!vp)
+ return;
+
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)vp->hash_name);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)vp->data_device);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)vp->hash_device);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)vp->fec_device);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)vp->salt);
+ free(vp);
+}
+
+static void _dm_target_free_query_path(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+ switch(tgt->type) {
+ case DM_CRYPT:
+ crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.crypt.vk);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.crypt.cipher);
+ break;
+ case DM_INTEGRITY:
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.integrity.integrity);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.integrity.vk);
+
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key);
+
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key);
+
+ device_free(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device);
+ break;
+ case DM_VERITY:
+ crypt_free_verity_params(tgt->u.verity.vp);
+ device_free(cd, tgt->u.verity.hash_device);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.verity.root_hash);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc);
+ /* fall through */
+ case DM_LINEAR:
+ /* fall through */
+ case DM_ERROR:
+ /* fall through */
+ case DM_ZERO:
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_err(cd, _("Unknown dm target type."));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ device_free(cd, tgt->data_device);
+}
+
+static void _dm_target_erase(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+ if (tgt->direction == TARGET_QUERY)
+ _dm_target_free_query_path(cd, tgt);
+
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT)
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.crypt.integrity);
+}
+
+void dm_targets_free(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+ struct dm_target *t = &dmd->segment, *next = t->next;
+
+ _dm_target_erase(cd, t);
+
+ while (next) {
+ t = next;
+ next = t->next;
+ _dm_target_erase(cd, t);
+ free(t);
+ }
+
+ memset(&dmd->segment, 0, sizeof(dmd->segment));
+}
+
+int dm_targets_allocate(struct dm_target *first, unsigned count)
+{
+ if (!first || first->next || !count)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ while (--count) {
+ first->next = crypt_zalloc(sizeof(*first));
+ if (!first->next)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ first = first->next;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_retry(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t *dmd_flags, uint32_t dmt_flags)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* If discard not supported try to load without discard */
+ if ((*dmd_flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) &&
+ !(dmt_flags & DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Discard/TRIM is not supported");
+ *dmd_flags = *dmd_flags & ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* If kernel keyring is not supported load key directly in dm-crypt */
+ if ((*dmd_flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) &&
+ !(dmt_flags & DM_KERNEL_KEYRING_SUPPORTED)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "dm-crypt does not support kernel keyring");
+ *dmd_flags = *dmd_flags & ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Drop performance options if not supported */
+ if ((*dmd_flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS)) &&
+ !(dmt_flags & (DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED | DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED))) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "dm-crypt does not support performance options");
+ *dmd_flags = *dmd_flags & ~(CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS);
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ const char *type,
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+ uint32_t dmt_flags = 0;
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!type || !dmd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (dm_init_context(cd, dmd->segment.type))
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+
+ r = _dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd->uuid, dmd);
+
+ if (r < 0 && dm_flags(cd, dmd->segment.type, &dmt_flags))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (r && (dmd->segment.type == DM_CRYPT || dmd->segment.type == DM_LINEAR || dmd->segment.type == DM_ZERO) &&
+ check_retry(cd, &dmd->flags, dmt_flags))
+ r = _dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd->uuid, dmd);
+
+ if (r == -EINVAL &&
+ dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS) &&
+ !(dmt_flags & (DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED|DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED)))
+ log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."));
+
+ if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION|
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION|
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS|
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE) &&
+ !(dmt_flags & DM_VERITY_ON_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED))
+ log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."));
+
+ if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_VERITY &&
+ dmd->segment.u.verity.fec_device && !(dmt_flags & DM_VERITY_FEC_SUPPORTED))
+ log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported."));
+
+ if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_CRYPT) {
+ if (dmd->segment.u.crypt.integrity && !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))
+ log_err(cd, _("Requested data integrity options are not supported."));
+ if (dmd->segment.u.crypt.sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE && !(dmt_flags & DM_SECTOR_SIZE_SUPPORTED))
+ log_err(cd, _("Requested sector_size option is not supported."));
+ }
+
+ if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_INTEGRITY && (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE) &&
+ !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_RECALC_SUPPORTED))
+ log_err(cd, _("Requested automatic recalculation of integrity tags is not supported."));
+
+ if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_INTEGRITY && (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) &&
+ !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED))
+ log_err(cd, _("Discard/TRIM is not supported."));
+
+ if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_INTEGRITY && (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP) &&
+ !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_SUPPORTED))
+ log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-integrity bitmap mode is not supported."));
+out:
+ dm_exit_context();
+ return r;
+}
+
+int dm_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd, uint32_t dmflags, unsigned resume)
+{
+ int r;
+ uint32_t dmt_flags;
+
+ if (!dmd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (dm_init_context(cd, dmd->segment.type))
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+
+ if (dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmt_flags) || !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_RECALC_SUPPORTED))
+ dmd->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE;
+
+ r = _dm_reload_device(cd, name, dmd);
+
+ if (r == -EINVAL && (dmd->segment.type == DM_CRYPT || dmd->segment.type == DM_LINEAR)) {
+ if ((dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS)) &&
+ !dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & (DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED|DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED)))
+ log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."));
+ if ((dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) &&
+ !dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED))
+ log_err(cd, _("Discard/TRIM is not supported."));
+ if ((dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) &&
+ !dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED))
+ log_err(cd, _("Discard/TRIM is not supported."));
+ }
+
+ if (!r && resume)
+ r = _dm_resume_device(name, dmflags | act2dmflags(dmd->flags));
+
+ dm_exit_context();
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int dm_status_dmi(const char *name, struct dm_info *dmi,
+ const char *target, char **status_line)
+{
+ struct dm_task *dmt;
+ uint64_t start, length;
+ char *target_type, *params = NULL;
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_STATUS)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!dm_task_no_flush(dmt))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!dm_task_get_info(dmt, dmi))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!dmi->exists) {
+ r = -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ dm_get_next_target(dmt, NULL, &start, &length,
+ &target_type, ¶ms);
+
+ if (!target_type || start != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (target && strcmp(target_type, target))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* for target == NULL check all supported */
+ if (!target && (strcmp(target_type, DM_CRYPT_TARGET) &&
+ strcmp(target_type, DM_VERITY_TARGET) &&
+ strcmp(target_type, DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET) &&
+ strcmp(target_type, DM_LINEAR_TARGET) &&
+ strcmp(target_type, DM_ZERO_TARGET) &&
+ strcmp(target_type, DM_ERROR_TARGET)))
+ goto out;
+ r = 0;
+out:
+ if (!r && status_line && !(*status_line = strdup(params)))
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (dmt)
+ dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int dm_status_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct dm_info dmi;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /* libdevmapper is too clever and handles
+ * path argument differently with error.
+ * Fail early here if parameter is non-existent path.
+ */
+ if (strchr(name, '/') && stat(name, &st) < 0)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ r = dm_status_dmi(name, &dmi, NULL, NULL);
+ dm_exit_context();
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return (dmi.open_count > 0) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int dm_status_suspended(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct dm_info dmi;
+
+ if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ r = dm_status_dmi(name, &dmi, NULL, NULL);
+ dm_exit_context();
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return dmi.suspended ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static int _dm_status_verity_ok(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct dm_info dmi;
+ char *status_line = NULL;
+
+ r = dm_status_dmi(name, &dmi, DM_VERITY_TARGET, &status_line);
+ if (r < 0 || !status_line) {
+ free(status_line);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Verity volume %s status is %s.", name, status_line ?: "");
+ r = status_line[0] == 'V' ? 1 : 0;
+ free(status_line);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int dm_status_verity_ok(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_VERITY))
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ r = _dm_status_verity_ok(cd, name);
+ dm_exit_context();
+ return r;
+}
+
+int dm_status_integrity_failures(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t *count)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct dm_info dmi;
+ char *status_line = NULL;
+
+ if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_INTEGRITY))
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+
+ r = dm_status_dmi(name, &dmi, DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET, &status_line);
+ if (r < 0 || !status_line) {
+ free(status_line);
+ dm_exit_context();
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Integrity volume %s failure status is %s.", name, status_line ?: "");
+ *count = strtoull(status_line, NULL, 10);
+ free(status_line);
+ dm_exit_context();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* FIXME use hex wrapper, user val wrappers for line parsing */
+static int _dm_target_query_crypt(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t get_flags,
+ char *params, struct dm_target *tgt,
+ uint32_t *act_flags)
+{
+ uint64_t val64;
+ char *rcipher, *rintegrity, *key_, *rdevice, *endp, buffer[3], *arg, *key_desc;
+ unsigned int i, val;
+ int r;
+ size_t key_size;
+ struct device *data_device = NULL;
+ char *cipher = NULL, *integrity = NULL;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+ tgt->type = DM_CRYPT;
+ tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+ tgt->u.crypt.sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ rcipher = strsep(¶ms, " ");
+ rintegrity = NULL;
+
+ /* skip */
+ key_ = strsep(¶ms, " ");
+ if (!params)
+ goto err;
+ val64 = strtoull(params, ¶ms, 10);
+ if (*params != ' ')
+ goto err;
+ params++;
+
+ tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset = val64;
+
+ /* device */
+ rdevice = strsep(¶ms, " ");
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE) {
+ arg = crypt_lookup_dev(rdevice);
+ r = device_alloc(cd, &data_device, arg);
+ free(arg);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ /*offset */
+ if (!params)
+ goto err;
+ val64 = strtoull(params, ¶ms, 10);
+ tgt->u.crypt.offset = val64;
+
+ tgt->u.crypt.tag_size = 0;
+
+ /* Features section, available since crypt target version 1.11 */
+ if (*params) {
+ if (*params != ' ')
+ goto err;
+ params++;
+
+ /* Number of arguments */
+ val64 = strtoull(params, ¶ms, 10);
+ if (*params != ' ')
+ goto err;
+ params++;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < val64; i++) {
+ if (!params)
+ goto err;
+ arg = strsep(¶ms, " ");
+ if (!strcasecmp(arg, "allow_discards"))
+ *act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "same_cpu_crypt"))
+ *act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "submit_from_crypt_cpus"))
+ *act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "iv_large_sectors"))
+ *act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS;
+ else if (sscanf(arg, "integrity:%u:", &val) == 1) {
+ tgt->u.crypt.tag_size = val;
+ rintegrity = strchr(arg + strlen("integrity:"), ':');
+ if (!rintegrity)
+ goto err;
+ rintegrity++;
+ } else if (sscanf(arg, "sector_size:%u", &val) == 1) {
+ tgt->u.crypt.sector_size = val;
+ } else /* unknown option */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* All parameters should be processed */
+ if (params)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* cipher */
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER) {
+ r = cipher_dm2c(CONST_CAST(char**)&cipher,
+ CONST_CAST(char**)&integrity,
+ rcipher, rintegrity);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (key_[0] == ':')
+ *act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE) {
+ /* we will trust kernel the key_string is in expected format */
+ if (key_[0] == ':') {
+ if (sscanf(key_ + 1, "%zu", &key_size) != 1)
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ key_size = strlen(key_) / 2;
+
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, NULL);
+ if (!vk) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY) {
+ if (key_[0] == ':') {
+ /* :<key_size>:<key_type>:<key_description> */
+ key_desc = NULL;
+ endp = strpbrk(key_ + 1, ":");
+ if (endp)
+ key_desc = strpbrk(endp + 1, ":");
+ if (!key_desc) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ key_desc++;
+ crypt_volume_key_set_description(vk, key_desc);
+ } else {
+ buffer[2] = '\0';
+ for(i = 0; i < vk->keylength; i++) {
+ memcpy(buffer, &key_[i * 2], 2);
+ vk->key[i] = strtoul(buffer, &endp, 16);
+ if (endp != &buffer[2]) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ memset(key_, 0, strlen(key_));
+
+ if (cipher)
+ tgt->u.crypt.cipher = cipher;
+ if (integrity)
+ tgt->u.crypt.integrity = integrity;
+ if (data_device)
+ tgt->data_device = data_device;
+ if (vk)
+ tgt->u.crypt.vk = vk;
+ return 0;
+err:
+ free(cipher);
+ free(integrity);
+ device_free(cd, data_device);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_target_query_verity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ uint32_t get_flags,
+ char *params,
+ struct dm_target *tgt,
+ uint32_t *act_flags)
+{
+ struct crypt_params_verity *vp = NULL;
+ uint32_t val32;
+ uint64_t val64;
+ ssize_t len;
+ char *str, *str2, *arg;
+ unsigned int i, features;
+ int r;
+ struct device *data_device = NULL, *hash_device = NULL, *fec_device = NULL;
+ char *hash_name = NULL, *root_hash = NULL, *salt = NULL, *fec_dev_str = NULL;
+ char *root_hash_sig_key_desc = NULL;
+
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_PARAMS) {
+ vp = crypt_zalloc(sizeof(*vp));
+ if (!vp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ tgt->type = DM_VERITY;
+ tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+ tgt->u.verity.vp = vp;
+
+ /* version */
+ val32 = strtoul(params, ¶ms, 10);
+ if (*params != ' ')
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (vp)
+ vp->hash_type = val32;
+ params++;
+
+ /* data device */
+ str = strsep(¶ms, " ");
+ if (!params)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE) {
+ str2 = crypt_lookup_dev(str);
+ r = device_alloc(cd, &data_device, str2);
+ free(str2);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ /* hash device */
+ str = strsep(¶ms, " ");
+ if (!params)
+ goto err;
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_HASH_DEVICE) {
+ str2 = crypt_lookup_dev(str);
+ r = device_alloc(cd, &hash_device, str2);
+ free(str2);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ /* data block size*/
+ val32 = strtoul(params, ¶ms, 10);
+ if (*params != ' ')
+ goto err;
+ if (vp)
+ vp->data_block_size = val32;
+ params++;
+
+ /* hash block size */
+ val32 = strtoul(params, ¶ms, 10);
+ if (*params != ' ')
+ goto err;
+ if (vp)
+ vp->hash_block_size = val32;
+ params++;
+
+ /* data blocks */
+ val64 = strtoull(params, ¶ms, 10);
+ if (*params != ' ')
+ goto err;
+ if (vp)
+ vp->data_size = val64;
+ params++;
+
+ /* hash start */
+ val64 = strtoull(params, ¶ms, 10);
+ if (*params != ' ')
+ goto err;
+ tgt->u.verity.hash_offset = val64;
+ params++;
+
+ /* hash algorithm */
+ str = strsep(¶ms, " ");
+ if (!params)
+ goto err;
+ if (vp) {
+ hash_name = strdup(str);
+ if (!hash_name) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* root digest */
+ str = strsep(¶ms, " ");
+ if (!params)
+ goto err;
+ len = crypt_hex_to_bytes(str, &str2, 0);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ r = len;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size = len;
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_ROOT_HASH)
+ root_hash = str2;
+ else
+ free(str2);
+
+ /* salt */
+ str = strsep(¶ms, " ");
+ if (vp) {
+ if (!strcmp(str, "-")) {
+ vp->salt_size = 0;
+ vp->salt = NULL;
+ } else {
+ len = crypt_hex_to_bytes(str, &str2, 0);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ r = len;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ vp->salt_size = len;
+ salt = str2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Features section, available since verity target version 1.3 */
+ if (params) {
+ /* Number of arguments */
+ val64 = strtoull(params, ¶ms, 10);
+ if (*params != ' ')
+ goto err;
+ params++;
+
+ features = (int)val64;
+ for (i = 0; i < features; i++) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ if (!params)
+ goto err;
+ arg = strsep(¶ms, " ");
+ if (!strcasecmp(arg, "ignore_corruption"))
+ *act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "restart_on_corruption"))
+ *act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "ignore_zero_blocks"))
+ *act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "check_at_most_once"))
+ *act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "use_fec_from_device")) {
+ str = strsep(¶ms, " ");
+ str2 = crypt_lookup_dev(str);
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_HASH_DEVICE) {
+ r = device_alloc(cd, &fec_device, str2);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK) {
+ free(str2);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (vp) {
+ free(fec_dev_str);
+ fec_dev_str = str2;
+ } else
+ free(str2);
+ i++;
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "fec_start")) {
+ val64 = strtoull(params, ¶ms, 10);
+ if (*params)
+ params++;
+ tgt->u.verity.fec_offset = val64;
+ if (vp)
+ vp->fec_area_offset = val64 * vp->hash_block_size;
+ i++;
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "fec_blocks")) {
+ val64 = strtoull(params, ¶ms, 10);
+ if (*params)
+ params++;
+ tgt->u.verity.fec_blocks = val64;
+ i++;
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "fec_roots")) {
+ val32 = strtoul(params, ¶ms, 10);
+ if (*params)
+ params++;
+ if (vp)
+ vp->fec_roots = val32;
+ i++;
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "root_hash_sig_key_desc")) {
+ str = strsep(¶ms, " ");
+ if (!str)
+ goto err;
+ if (!root_hash_sig_key_desc)
+ root_hash_sig_key_desc = strdup(str);
+ i++;
+ if (vp)
+ vp->flags |= CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE;
+ } else /* unknown option */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* All parameters should be processed */
+ if (params && *params) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (data_device)
+ tgt->data_device = data_device;
+ if (hash_device)
+ tgt->u.verity.hash_device = hash_device;
+ if (fec_device)
+ tgt->u.verity.fec_device = fec_device;
+ if (root_hash)
+ tgt->u.verity.root_hash = root_hash;
+ if (vp && hash_name)
+ vp->hash_name = hash_name;
+ if (vp && salt)
+ vp->salt = salt;
+ if (vp && fec_dev_str)
+ vp->fec_device = fec_dev_str;
+ if (root_hash_sig_key_desc)
+ tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc = root_hash_sig_key_desc;
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ device_free(cd, data_device);
+ device_free(cd, hash_device);
+ device_free(cd, fec_device);
+ free(root_hash_sig_key_desc);
+ free(root_hash);
+ free(hash_name);
+ free(salt);
+ free(fec_dev_str);
+ free(vp);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_target_query_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ uint32_t get_flags,
+ char *params,
+ struct dm_target *tgt,
+ uint32_t *act_flags)
+{
+ uint32_t val32;
+ uint64_t val64;
+ char c, *str, *str2, *arg;
+ unsigned int i, features, val;
+ ssize_t len;
+ int r;
+ struct device *data_device = NULL, *meta_device = NULL;
+ char *integrity = NULL, *journal_crypt = NULL, *journal_integrity = NULL;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+ tgt->type = DM_INTEGRITY;
+ tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+
+ /* data device */
+ str = strsep(¶ms, " ");
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE) {
+ str2 = crypt_lookup_dev(str);
+ r = device_alloc(cd, &data_device, str2);
+ free(str2);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ /*offset */
+ if (!params)
+ goto err;
+ val64 = strtoull(params, ¶ms, 10);
+ if (!*params || *params != ' ')
+ goto err;
+ tgt->u.integrity.offset = val64;
+
+ /* tag size*/
+ val32 = strtoul(params, ¶ms, 10);
+ tgt->u.integrity.tag_size = val32;
+ if (!*params || *params != ' ')
+ goto err;
+
+ /* journal */
+ c = toupper(*(++params));
+ if (!*params || *(++params) != ' ' || (c != 'D' && c != 'J' && c != 'R' && c != 'B'))
+ goto err;
+ if (c == 'D')
+ *act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL;
+ if (c == 'R')
+ *act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECOVERY;
+ if (c == 'B') {
+ *act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL;
+ *act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP;
+ }
+
+ tgt->u.integrity.sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+ /* Features section */
+ if (params) {
+ /* Number of arguments */
+ val64 = strtoull(params, ¶ms, 10);
+ if (*params != ' ')
+ goto err;
+ params++;
+
+ features = (int)val64;
+ for (i = 0; i < features; i++) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ if (!params)
+ goto err;
+ arg = strsep(¶ms, " ");
+ if (sscanf(arg, "journal_sectors:%u", &val) == 1)
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_size = val * SECTOR_SIZE;
+ else if (sscanf(arg, "journal_watermark:%u", &val) == 1)
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark = val;
+ else if (sscanf(arg, "sectors_per_bit:%" PRIu64, &val64) == 1) {
+ if (val64 > UINT_MAX)
+ goto err;
+ /* overloaded value for bitmap mode */
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark = (unsigned int)val64;
+ } else if (sscanf(arg, "commit_time:%u", &val) == 1)
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time = val;
+ else if (sscanf(arg, "bitmap_flush_interval:%u", &val) == 1)
+ /* overloaded value for bitmap mode */
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time = val;
+ else if (sscanf(arg, "interleave_sectors:%u", &val) == 1)
+ tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors = val;
+ else if (sscanf(arg, "block_size:%u", &val) == 1)
+ tgt->u.integrity.sector_size = val;
+ else if (sscanf(arg, "buffer_sectors:%u", &val) == 1)
+ tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors = val;
+ else if (!strncmp(arg, "internal_hash:", 14) && !integrity) {
+ str = &arg[14];
+ arg = strsep(&str, ":");
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS) {
+ integrity = strdup(arg);
+ if (!integrity) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (str) {
+ len = crypt_hex_to_bytes(str, &str2, 1);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ r = len;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ r = 0;
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY) {
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(len, str2);
+ if (!vk)
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ } else if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE) {
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(len, NULL);
+ if (!vk)
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ crypt_safe_free(str2);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (!strncmp(arg, "meta_device:", 12) && !meta_device) {
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE) {
+ str = crypt_lookup_dev(&arg[12]);
+ r = device_alloc(cd, &meta_device, str);
+ free(str);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (!strncmp(arg, "journal_crypt:", 14) && !journal_crypt) {
+ str = &arg[14];
+ arg = strsep(&str, ":");
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS) {
+ journal_crypt = strdup(arg);
+ if (!journal_crypt) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (!strncmp(arg, "journal_mac:", 12) && !journal_integrity) {
+ str = &arg[12];
+ arg = strsep(&str, ":");
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS) {
+ journal_integrity = strdup(arg);
+ if (!journal_integrity) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (!strcmp(arg, "recalculate")) {
+ *act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE;
+ } else if (!strcmp(arg, "fix_padding")) {
+ tgt->u.integrity.fix_padding = true;
+ } else if (!strcmp(arg, "allow_discards")) {
+ *act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+ } else /* unknown option */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* All parameters should be processed */
+ if (params && *params) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (data_device)
+ tgt->data_device = data_device;
+ if (meta_device)
+ tgt->u.integrity.meta_device = meta_device;
+ if (integrity)
+ tgt->u.integrity.integrity = integrity;
+ if (journal_crypt)
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt = journal_crypt;
+ if (journal_integrity)
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity = journal_integrity;
+ if (vk)
+ tgt->u.integrity.vk = vk;
+ return 0;
+err:
+ device_free(cd, data_device);
+ device_free(cd, meta_device);
+ free(integrity);
+ free(journal_crypt);
+ free(journal_integrity);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_target_query_linear(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt,
+ uint32_t get_flags, char *params)
+{
+ uint64_t val64;
+ char *rdevice, *arg;
+ int r;
+ struct device *device = NULL;
+
+ /* device */
+ rdevice = strsep(¶ms, " ");
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE) {
+ arg = crypt_lookup_dev(rdevice);
+ r = device_alloc(cd, &device, arg);
+ free(arg);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ /*offset */
+ if (!params)
+ goto err;
+ val64 = strtoull(params, ¶ms, 10);
+
+ /* params should be empty now */
+ if (*params)
+ goto err;
+
+ tgt->type = DM_LINEAR;
+ tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+ tgt->data_device = device;
+ tgt->u.linear.offset = val64;
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ device_free(cd, device);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_target_query_error(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+ tgt->type = DM_ERROR;
+ tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _dm_target_query_zero(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+ tgt->type = DM_ZERO;
+ tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * on error retval has to be negative
+ *
+ * also currently any _dm_target_query fn does not perform cleanup on error
+ */
+static int dm_target_query(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt, const uint64_t *start,
+ const uint64_t *length, const char *target_type,
+ char *params, uint32_t get_flags, uint32_t *act_flags)
+{
+ int r = -ENOTSUP;
+
+ if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_CRYPT_TARGET))
+ r = _dm_target_query_crypt(cd, get_flags, params, tgt, act_flags);
+ else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_VERITY_TARGET))
+ r = _dm_target_query_verity(cd, get_flags, params, tgt, act_flags);
+ else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET))
+ r = _dm_target_query_integrity(cd, get_flags, params, tgt, act_flags);
+ else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_LINEAR_TARGET))
+ r = _dm_target_query_linear(cd, tgt, get_flags, params);
+ else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_ERROR_TARGET))
+ r = _dm_target_query_error(cd, tgt);
+ else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_ZERO_TARGET))
+ r = _dm_target_query_zero(cd, tgt);
+
+ if (!r) {
+ tgt->offset = *start;
+ tgt->size = *length;
+ }
+
return r;
}
-static int dm_status_dmi(const char *name, struct dm_info *dmi)
+static int _dm_query_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ uint32_t get_flags, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
{
+ struct dm_target *t;
struct dm_task *dmt;
+ struct dm_info dmi;
uint64_t start, length;
char *target_type, *params;
+ const char *tmp_uuid;
void *next = NULL;
int r = -EINVAL;
- if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_STATUS)))
- goto out;
+ t = &dmd->segment;
+ if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_TABLE)))
+ return r;
+ if (!dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
+ goto out;
if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
goto out;
-
+ r = -ENODEV;
if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
goto out;
- if (!dm_task_get_info(dmt, dmi))
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ if (!dm_task_get_info(dmt, &dmi))
goto out;
- if (!dmi->exists) {
+ if (!dmi.exists) {
r = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
- next = dm_get_next_target(dmt, next, &start, &length,
- &target_type, ¶ms);
- if (!target_type || strcmp(target_type, DM_CRYPT_TARGET) != 0 ||
- start != 0 || next)
+ if (dmi.target_count <= 0) {
r = -EINVAL;
- else
- r = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Never allow to return empty key */
+ if ((get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY) && dmi.suspended) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Cannot read volume key while suspended.");
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = dm_targets_allocate(&dmd->segment, dmi.target_count);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ do {
+ next = dm_get_next_target(dmt, next, &start, &length,
+ &target_type, ¶ms);
+
+ r = dm_target_query(cd, t, &start, &length, target_type, params, get_flags, &dmd->flags);
+ if (!r && t->type == DM_VERITY) {
+ r = _dm_status_verity_ok(cd, name);
+ if (r == 0)
+ dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CORRUPTED;
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (r != -ENOTSUP)
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to query dm-%s segment."), target_type);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ dmd->size += length;
+ t = t->next;
+ } while (next && t);
+
+ if (dmi.read_only)
+ dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+ if (dmi.suspended)
+ dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED;
+
+ tmp_uuid = dm_task_get_uuid(dmt);
+ if (!tmp_uuid)
+ dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_UUID;
+ else if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_UUID) {
+ if (!strncmp(tmp_uuid, DM_UUID_PREFIX, DM_UUID_PREFIX_LEN))
+ dmd->uuid = strdup(tmp_uuid + DM_UUID_PREFIX_LEN);
+ }
+
+ dmd->holders = 0;
+#if (HAVE_DECL_DM_DEVICE_HAS_HOLDERS && HAVE_DECL_DM_DEVICE_HAS_MOUNTED_FS)
+ if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_HOLDERS)
+ dmd->holders = (dm_device_has_mounted_fs(dmi.major, dmi.minor) ||
+ dm_device_has_holders(dmi.major, dmi.minor));
+#endif
+
+ r = (dmi.open_count > 0);
out:
if (dmt)
dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+ if (r < 0)
+ dm_targets_free(cd, dmd);
+
return r;
}
-int dm_status_device(const char *name)
+int dm_query_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ uint32_t get_flags, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
{
int r;
- struct dm_info dmi;
- r = dm_status_dmi(name, &dmi);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ if (!dmd)
+ return -EINVAL;
- return (dmi.open_count > 0);
-}
+ memset(dmd, 0, sizeof(*dmd));
-int dm_status_suspended(const char *name)
-{
- int r;
- struct dm_info dmi;
+ if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+ return -ENOTSUP;
- r = dm_status_dmi(name, &dmi);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ r = _dm_query_device(cd, name, get_flags, dmd);
- return dmi.suspended ? 1 : 0;
+ dm_exit_context();
+ return r;
}
-int dm_query_device(const char *name, uint32_t get_flags,
- struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+static int _process_deps(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *prefix, struct dm_deps *deps, char **names, size_t names_offset, size_t names_length)
{
- struct dm_task *dmt;
- struct dm_info dmi;
- uint64_t start, length, val64;
- char *target_type, *params, *rcipher, *key_, *rdevice, *endp, buffer[3], *arg;
- const char *tmp_uuid;
- void *next = NULL;
- unsigned int i;
- int r = -EINVAL;
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_DEVICE_GET_NAME
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+ char dmname[PATH_MAX];
+ unsigned i;
+ int r, major, minor, count = 0;
- memset(dmd, 0, sizeof(*dmd));
+ if (!prefix || !deps)
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_TABLE)))
- goto out;
- if ((dm_flags() & DM_SECURE_SUPPORTED) && !dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
- goto out;
- if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
- goto out;
- r = -ENODEV;
- if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
- goto out;
+ for (i = 0; i < deps->count; i++) {
+ major = major(deps->device[i]);
+ if (!dm_is_dm_major(major))
+ continue;
- r = -EINVAL;
- if (!dm_task_get_info(dmt, &dmi))
- goto out;
+ minor = minor(deps->device[i]);
+ if (!dm_device_get_name(major, minor, 0, dmname, PATH_MAX))
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (!dmi.exists) {
- r = -ENODEV;
- goto out;
- }
+ memset(&dmd, 0, sizeof(dmd));
+ r = _dm_query_device(cd, dmname, DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &dmd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ continue;
- tmp_uuid = dm_task_get_uuid(dmt);
+ if (!dmd.uuid ||
+ strncmp(prefix, dmd.uuid, strlen(prefix)) ||
+ crypt_string_in(dmname, names, names_length))
+ *dmname = '\0';
- next = dm_get_next_target(dmt, next, &start, &length,
- &target_type, ¶ms);
- if (!target_type || strcmp(target_type, DM_CRYPT_TARGET) != 0 ||
- start != 0 || next)
- goto out;
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
- dmd->size = length;
+ if ((size_t)count >= (names_length - names_offset))
+ return -ENOMEM;
- rcipher = strsep(¶ms, " ");
- /* cipher */
- if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CIPHER)
- dmd->cipher = strdup(rcipher);
+ if (*dmname && !(names[names_offset + count++] = strdup(dmname)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
- /* skip */
- key_ = strsep(¶ms, " ");
- if (!params)
- goto out;
- val64 = strtoull(params, ¶ms, 10);
- if (*params != ' ')
- goto out;
- params++;
+ return count;
+#else
+ return -EINVAL;
+#endif
+}
- dmd->iv_offset = val64;
+int dm_device_deps(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *prefix, char **names, size_t names_length)
+{
+ struct dm_task *dmt;
+ struct dm_info dmi;
+ struct dm_deps *deps;
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+ size_t i, last = 0, offset = 0;
- /* device */
- rdevice = strsep(¶ms, " ");
- if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE)
- dmd->device = crypt_lookup_dev(rdevice);
+ if (!name || !names_length || !names)
+ return -EINVAL;
- /*offset */
- if (!params)
- goto out;
- val64 = strtoull(params, ¶ms, 10);
- dmd->offset = val64;
+ if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+ return -ENOTSUP;
- /* Features section, available since crypt target version 1.11 */
- if (*params) {
- if (*params != ' ')
+ while (name) {
+ if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_DEPS)))
goto out;
- params++;
-
- /* Number of arguments */
- val64 = strtoull(params, ¶ms, 10);
- if (*params != ' ')
+ if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
goto out;
- params++;
-
- for (i = 0; i < val64; i++) {
- if (!params)
- goto out;
- arg = strsep(¶ms, " ");
- if (!strcasecmp(arg, "allow_discards"))
- dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
- else /* unknown option */
- goto out;
- }
- /* All parameters shold be processed */
- if (params)
+ r = -ENODEV;
+ if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
goto out;
- }
- /* Never allow to return empty key */
- if ((get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_KEY) && dmi.suspended) {
- log_dbg("Cannot read volume key while suspended.");
r = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!dm_task_get_info(dmt, &dmi))
+ goto out;
+ if (!(deps = dm_task_get_deps(dmt)))
+ goto out;
- if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_KEYSIZE) {
- dmd->vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(strlen(key_) / 2, NULL);
- if (!dmd->vk) {
- r = -ENOMEM;
+ r = -ENODEV;
+ if (!dmi.exists)
goto out;
- }
- if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_KEY) {
- buffer[2] = '\0';
- for(i = 0; i < dmd->vk->keylength; i++) {
- memcpy(buffer, &key_[i * 2], 2);
- dmd->vk->key[i] = strtoul(buffer, &endp, 16);
- if (endp != &buffer[2]) {
- crypt_free_volume_key(dmd->vk);
- dmd->vk = NULL;
- r = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- memset(key_, 0, strlen(key_));
+ r = _process_deps(cd, prefix, deps, names, offset, names_length - 1);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
- if (dmi.read_only)
- dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+ dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+ dmt = NULL;
- if (!tmp_uuid)
- dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_UUID;
- else if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_UUID) {
- if (!strncmp(tmp_uuid, DM_UUID_PREFIX, DM_UUID_PREFIX_LEN))
- dmd->uuid = strdup(tmp_uuid + DM_UUID_PREFIX_LEN);
+ offset += r;
+ name = names[last++];
}
- r = (dmi.open_count > 0);
+ r = 0;
out:
+ if (r < 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < names_length - 1; i++)
+ free(names[i]);
+ *names = NULL;
+ }
+
if (dmt)
dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+ dm_exit_context();
return r;
}
if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_TARGET_MSG)))
return 0;
- if ((dm_flags() & DM_SECURE_SUPPORTED) && !dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
+ if (!dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
goto out;
if (name && !dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
goto out;
r = dm_task_run(dmt);
-
- out:
+out:
dm_task_destroy(dmt);
return r;
}
-int dm_suspend_and_wipe_key(const char *name)
+int dm_suspend_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t dmflags)
{
- if (!_dm_check_versions())
- return -ENOTSUP;
+ uint32_t dmt_flags;
+ int r = -ENOTSUP;
- if (!(_dm_crypt_flags & DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED))
- return -ENOTSUP;
+ if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+ return r;
- if (!_dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_SUSPEND, name, 0))
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (dmflags & DM_SUSPEND_WIPE_KEY) {
+ if (dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags))
+ goto out;
- if (!_dm_message(name, "key wipe")) {
- _dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_RESUME, name, 1);
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (!(dmt_flags & DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED))
+ goto out;
}
- return 0;
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!_dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_SUSPEND, name, dmflags))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (dmflags & DM_SUSPEND_WIPE_KEY) {
+ if (!_dm_message(name, "key wipe")) {
+ _dm_resume_device(name, 0);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = 0;
+out:
+ dm_exit_context();
+ return r;
}
-int dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(const char *name,
- size_t key_size,
- const char *key)
+int dm_resume_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t dmflags)
{
- int msg_size = key_size * 2 + 10; // key set <key>
- char *msg;
- int r = 0;
+ int r;
- if (!_dm_check_versions())
+ if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
return -ENOTSUP;
- if (!(_dm_crypt_flags & DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED))
+ r = _dm_resume_device(name, dmflags);
+
+ dm_exit_context();
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ const struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+ uint32_t dmt_flags;
+ int msg_size;
+ char *msg = NULL;
+ int r = -ENOTSUP;
+
+ if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_CRYPT) || dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags))
return -ENOTSUP;
+ if (!(dmt_flags & DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (vk->key_description)
+ msg_size = strlen(vk->key_description) + int_log10(vk->keylength) + 18;
+ else
+ msg_size = vk->keylength * 2 + 10; // key set <key>
+
msg = crypt_safe_alloc(msg_size);
- if (!msg)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!msg) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
- memset(msg, 0, msg_size);
strcpy(msg, "key set ");
- hex_key(&msg[8], key_size, key);
+ if (vk->key_description)
+ snprintf(msg + 8, msg_size - 8, ":%zu:logon:%s", vk->keylength, vk->key_description);
+ else
+ hex_key(&msg[8], vk->keylength, vk->key);
if (!_dm_message(name, msg) ||
- !_dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_RESUME, name, 1))
+ _dm_resume_device(name, 0)) {
r = -EINVAL;
-
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+out:
crypt_safe_free(msg);
+ dm_exit_context();
return r;
}
return dm_dir();
}
-int dm_is_dm_device(int major, int minor)
+int dm_is_dm_device(int major)
{
return dm_is_dm_major((uint32_t)major);
}
return strncmp(name, "dm-", 3) ? 0 : 1;
}
-int dm_check_segment(const char *name, uint64_t offset, uint64_t size)
+int dm_crypt_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size,
+ struct device *data_device, struct volume_key *vk, const char *cipher,
+ uint64_t iv_offset, uint64_t data_offset, const char *integrity, uint32_t tag_size,
+ uint32_t sector_size)
{
- struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
- int r;
+ int r = -EINVAL;
- log_dbg("Checking segments for device %s.", name);
+ /* free on error */
+ char *dm_integrity = NULL;
- r = dm_query_device(name, 0, &dmd);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ if (tag_size) {
+ /* Space for IV metadata only */
+ dm_integrity = strdup(integrity ?: "none");
+ if (!dm_integrity) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
- if (offset >= (dmd.offset + dmd.size) || (offset + size) <= dmd.offset)
- r = 0;
- else
- r = -EBUSY;
+ tgt->data_device = data_device;
- log_dbg("seg: %" PRIu64 " - %" PRIu64 ", new %" PRIu64 " - %" PRIu64 "%s",
- dmd.offset, dmd.offset + dmd.size, offset, offset + size,
- r ? " (overlapping)" : " (ok)");
+ tgt->type = DM_CRYPT;
+ tgt->direction = TARGET_SET;
+ tgt->u.crypt.vk = vk;
+ tgt->offset = seg_offset;
+ tgt->size = seg_size;
+
+ tgt->u.crypt.cipher = cipher;
+ tgt->u.crypt.integrity = dm_integrity;
+ tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset = iv_offset;
+ tgt->u.crypt.offset = data_offset;
+ tgt->u.crypt.tag_size = tag_size;
+ tgt->u.crypt.sector_size = sector_size;
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ free(dm_integrity);
return r;
}
+
+int dm_verity_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size,
+ struct device *data_device, struct device *hash_device, struct device *fec_device,
+ const char *root_hash, uint32_t root_hash_size, const char *root_hash_sig_key_desc,
+ uint64_t hash_offset_block, uint64_t hash_blocks, struct crypt_params_verity *vp)
+{
+ if (!data_device || !hash_device || !vp)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tgt->type = DM_VERITY;
+ tgt->direction = TARGET_SET;
+ tgt->offset = seg_offset;
+ tgt->size = seg_size;
+ tgt->data_device = data_device;
+
+ tgt->u.verity.hash_device = hash_device;
+ tgt->u.verity.fec_device = fec_device;
+ tgt->u.verity.root_hash = root_hash;
+ tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size = root_hash_size;
+ tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc = root_hash_sig_key_desc;
+ tgt->u.verity.hash_offset = hash_offset_block;
+ tgt->u.verity.fec_offset = vp->fec_area_offset / vp->hash_block_size;
+ tgt->u.verity.hash_blocks = hash_blocks;
+ tgt->u.verity.vp = vp;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int dm_integrity_target_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size,
+ struct device *meta_device,
+ struct device *data_device, uint64_t tag_size, uint64_t offset,
+ uint32_t sector_size, struct volume_key *vk,
+ struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key, struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
+ const struct crypt_params_integrity *ip)
+{
+ uint32_t dmi_flags;
+
+ if (!data_device)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ _dm_check_versions(cd, DM_INTEGRITY);
+
+ tgt->type = DM_INTEGRITY;
+ tgt->direction = TARGET_SET;
+ tgt->offset = seg_offset;
+ tgt->size = seg_size;
+ tgt->data_device = data_device;
+ if (meta_device != data_device)
+ tgt->u.integrity.meta_device = meta_device;
+ tgt->u.integrity.tag_size = tag_size;
+ tgt->u.integrity.offset = offset;
+ tgt->u.integrity.sector_size = sector_size;
+
+ tgt->u.integrity.vk = vk;
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key;
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key = journal_mac_key;
+
+ if (!dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) &&
+ (dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_FIX_PADDING_SUPPORTED) &&
+ !(crypt_get_compatibility(cd) & CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_PADDING))
+ tgt->u.integrity.fix_padding = true;
+
+ if (ip) {
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_size = ip->journal_size;
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark = ip->journal_watermark;
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time = ip->journal_commit_time;
+ tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors = ip->interleave_sectors;
+ tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors = ip->buffer_sectors;
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity = ip->journal_integrity;
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt = ip->journal_crypt;
+ tgt->u.integrity.integrity = ip->integrity;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int dm_linear_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size,
+ struct device *data_device, uint64_t data_offset)
+{
+ if (!data_device)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tgt->type = DM_LINEAR;
+ tgt->direction = TARGET_SET;
+ tgt->offset = seg_offset;
+ tgt->size = seg_size;
+ tgt->data_device = data_device;
+
+ tgt->u.linear.offset = data_offset;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int dm_zero_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size)
+{
+ tgt->type = DM_ZERO;
+ tgt->direction = TARGET_SET;
+ tgt->offset = seg_offset;
+ tgt->size = seg_size;
+
+ return 0;
+}
projects / platform / upstream / cryptsetup.git / blobdiff