#define MAX_NESTING_DEPTH 32
-/* An object to build a list of keyid related info. */
-struct kidlist_item
-{
- struct kidlist_item *next;
- u32 kid[2];
- int pubkey_algo;
- int reason;
-};
-
-
/*
* Object to hold the processing context.
*/
iobuf_t iobuf; /* Used to get the filename etc. */
int trustletter; /* Temporary usage in list_node. */
ulong symkeys; /* Number of symmetrically encrypted session keys. */
- struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */
+ struct pubkey_enc_list *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */
int seen_pkt_encrypted_aead; /* PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD packet seen. */
struct {
unsigned int sig_seen:1; /* Set to true if a signature packet
/*** Local prototypes. ***/
-static int do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a);
+static int do_proc_packets (CTX c, iobuf_t a);
static void list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
static void proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
release_kbnode (c->list);
while (c->pkenc_list)
{
- struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
+ struct pubkey_enc_list *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
+
+ mpi_release (c->pkenc_list->data[0]);
+ mpi_release (c->pkenc_list->data[1]);
xfree (c->pkenc_list);
c->pkenc_list = tmp;
}
return 1;
}
-
static gpg_error_t
symkey_decrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
- enum gcry_cipher_modes ciphermode;
unsigned int noncelen, keylen;
+ enum gcry_cipher_modes ciphermode;
if (dek->use_aead)
{
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY);
}
- err = openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, ciphermode, 1);
+ err = openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, ciphermode, GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE);
if (!err)
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
if (!err)
}
else
{
- gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, seskey, slen, NULL, 0);
-
+ gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, seskey, slen, NULL, 0 );
/* Here we can only test whether the algo given in decrypted
* session key is a valid OpenPGP algo. With 11 defined
* symmetric algorithms we will miss 4.3% of wrong passphrases
goto leave;
}
dek->algo = seskey[0];
- dek->keylen = slen-1;
+ dek->keylen = keylen;
memcpy (dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
}
leave:
gcry_cipher_close (hd);
- return 0;
+ return err;
}
{
if (!opt.quiet)
{
- /* Note: TMPSTR is only used to avoid i18n changes. */
- char *tmpstr = xstrconcat (s, ".", a, NULL);
if (enc->seskeylen)
- log_info (_("%s encrypted session key\n"), tmpstr);
+ log_info (_("%s.%s encrypted session key\n"), s, a );
else
- log_info (_("%s encrypted data\n"), tmpstr);
- xfree (tmpstr);
+ log_info (_("%s.%s encrypted data\n"), s, a );
}
}
else
{
- log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo);
+ log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d.%s\n"), algo, a);
s = NULL; /* Force a goto leave. */
}
}
else
{
- c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, &enc->s2k, 0, 0, NULL,
- GETPASSWORD_FLAG_SYMDECRYPT, NULL);
+ c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, &enc->s2k, 0, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (c->dek)
{
c->dek->symmetric = 1;
gpg_strerror (err));
if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
&& gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM)
- log_fatal ("process terminated to be bug compatible\n");
+ log_fatal ("process terminated to be bug compatible"
+ " with GnuPG <= 2.2\n");
if (c->dek->s2k_cacheid[0])
{
if (opt.debug)
static void
-proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+proc_pubkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
PKT_pubkey_enc *enc;
- int result = 0;
/* Check whether the secret key is available and store in this case. */
c->last_was_session_key = 1;
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("public key is %s\n"), keystr (enc->keyid));
- if (is_status_enabled())
+ if (is_status_enabled ())
{
char buf[50];
- /* FIXME: For ECC support we need to map the OpenPGP algo number
- to the Libgcrypt defined one. This is due a chicken-egg
- problem: We need to have code in Libgcrypt for a new
- algorithm so to implement a proposed new algorithm before the
- IANA will finally assign an OpenPGP identifier. */
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
- (ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo);
+ (ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo);
write_status_text (STATUS_ENC_TO, buf);
}
- if (!opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key)
+ if (!opt.list_only && !opt.override_session_key)
{
- /* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
- * secure memory because it has already been passed on the
- * command line and the GCHQ knows about it. */
- c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
- result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
- if (result)
- {
- xfree (c->dek);
- c->dek = NULL;
- }
- }
- else if (enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E
- || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
- || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
- || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E
- || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL)
- {
- /* Note that we also allow type 20 Elgamal keys for decryption.
- There are still a couple of those keys in active use as a
- subkey. */
-
- /* FIXME: Store this all in a list and process it later so that
- we can prioritize what key to use. This gives a better user
- experience if wildcard keyids are used. */
- if (!c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
- || opt.try_all_secrets
- || have_secret_key_with_kid (enc->keyid)))
- {
- if(opt.list_only)
- result = GPG_ERR_MISSING_ACTION; /* fixme: Use better error code. */
- else
- {
- c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
- if ((result = get_session_key (ctrl, enc, c->dek)))
- {
- /* Error: Delete the DEK. */
- xfree (c->dek);
- c->dek = NULL;
- }
- }
- }
- else
- result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
- }
- else
- result = GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+ struct pubkey_enc_list *x = xmalloc (sizeof *x);
- if (1)
- {
- /* Store it for later display. */
- struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc (sizeof *x);
- x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
- x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
+ x->keyid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
+ x->keyid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
- x->reason = result;
+ x->result = -1;
+ x->data[0] = x->data[1] = NULL;
+ if (enc->data[0])
+ {
+ x->data[0] = mpi_copy (enc->data[0]);
+ x->data[1] = mpi_copy (enc->data[1]);
+ }
x->next = c->pkenc_list;
c->pkenc_list = x;
-
- if (!result && opt.verbose > 1)
- log_info (_("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n"));
}
free_packet(pkt, NULL);
* not decrypt.
*/
static void
-print_pkenc_list (ctrl_t ctrl, struct kidlist_item *list, int failed)
+print_pkenc_list (ctrl_t ctrl, struct pubkey_enc_list *list)
{
for (; list; list = list->next)
{
PKT_public_key *pk;
- const char *algstr;
-
- if (failed && !list->reason)
- continue;
- if (!failed && list->reason)
- continue;
+ char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
+ char *p;
- algstr = openpgp_pk_algo_name (list->pubkey_algo);
pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
- if (!algstr)
- algstr = "[?]";
pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
- if (!get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, list->kid))
+ if (!get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, list->keyid))
{
- char *p;
- log_info (_("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
- nbits_from_pk (pk), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
+ pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf);
+
+ log_info (_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
+ pkstrbuf, keystr_from_pk (pk),
strtimestamp (pk->timestamp));
- p = get_user_id_native (ctrl, list->kid);
+ p = get_user_id_native (ctrl, list->keyid);
log_printf (_(" \"%s\"\n"), p);
xfree (p);
}
else
log_info (_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"),
- algstr, keystr(list->kid));
+ openpgp_pk_algo_name (list->pubkey_algo),
+ keystr(list->keyid));
free_public_key (pk);
-
- if (gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
- {
- if (is_status_enabled())
- {
- char buf[20];
- snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
- (ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1]);
- write_status_text (STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf);
- }
- }
- else if (gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_MISSING_ACTION)
- {
- /* Not tested for secret key due to --list-only mode. */
- }
- else if (list->reason)
- {
- log_info (_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
- gpg_strerror (list->reason));
- if (gpg_err_source (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_SOURCE_SCD
- && gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_INV_ID)
- print_further_info ("a reason might be a card with replaced keys");
- write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", list->reason);
- }
}
}
log_info (_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"), c->symkeys);
else if (c->symkeys == 1)
log_info (_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n"));
- print_pkenc_list (c->ctrl, c->pkenc_list, 1 );
- print_pkenc_list (c->ctrl, c->pkenc_list, 0 );
+ print_pkenc_list (c->ctrl, c->pkenc_list);
+ }
+
+ /* Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */
+ if (opt.list_only || c->dek)
+ ;
+ else if (opt.override_session_key)
+ {
+ c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
+ result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
+ if (result)
+ {
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
+ log_info (_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
+ gpg_strerror (result));
+ write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", result);
+ }
+ }
+ else if (c->pkenc_list)
+ {
+ c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
+ result = get_session_key (c->ctrl, c->pkenc_list, c->dek);
+ if (is_status_enabled ())
+ {
+ struct pubkey_enc_list *list;
+
+ for (list = c->pkenc_list; list; list = list->next)
+ if (list->result && list->result != -1)
+ {
+ char buf[20];
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
+ (ulong)list->keyid[0], (ulong)list->keyid[1]);
+ write_status_text (STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (result)
+ {
+ log_info (_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
+ gpg_strerror (result));
+ write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", result);
+
+ /* Error: Delete the DEK. */
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
+ }
}
- /* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */
+ if (c->dek && opt.verbose > 1)
+ log_info (_("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n"));
write_status (STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION);
log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
}
- c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, s2k, 0, 0, NULL,
- GETPASSWORD_FLAG_SYMDECRYPT, &canceled);
+ c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, s2k, 0, 0, NULL, &canceled);
if (c->dek)
c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
else if (canceled)
}
}
else if (!c->dek)
- result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+ {
+ if (c->symkeys && !c->pkenc_list)
+ result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY);
+
+ if (!result)
+ result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
+ }
/* Compute compliance with CO_DE_VS. */
if (!result && is_status_enabled ()
&& gnupg_cipher_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, c->dek->algo,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB))
{
- struct kidlist_item *i;
+ struct pubkey_enc_list *i;
int compliant = 1;
PKT_public_key *pk = xmalloc (sizeof *pk);
{
memset (pk, 0, sizeof *pk);
pk->pubkey_algo = i->pubkey_algo;
- if (get_pubkey (c->ctrl, pk, i->kid) != 0
+ if (get_pubkey (c->ctrl, pk, i->keyid) != 0
|| ! gnupg_pk_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, pk->pubkey_algo, 0,
pk->pkey, nbits_from_pk (pk), NULL))
compliant = 0;
}
-
if (!result)
result = decrypt_data (c->ctrl, c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
&& !pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method
&& !pkt->pkt.encrypted->aead_algo)
{
- /* The message has been decrypted but does not carry an MDC.
- * The option --ignore-mdc-error has also not been used. To
- * avoid attacks changing an MDC message to a non-MDC message,
- * we fail here. */
+ /* The message has been decrypted but does not carry an MDC or
+ * uses AEAD encryption. --ignore-mdc-error has also not been
+ * used. To avoid attacks changing an MDC message to a non-MDC
+ * message, we fail here. */
log_error (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
if (!pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method
&& (openpgp_cipher_get_algo_blklen (c->dek->algo) == 8
* are rare in practice we print a hint on how to decrypt
* such messages. */
log_string
- (GPGRT_LOG_INFO,
+ (GPGRT_LOGLVL_INFO,
_("Hint: If this message was created before the year 2003 it is\n"
"likely that this message is legitimate. This is because back\n"
"then integrity protection was not widely used.\n"));
if ((gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
|| gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM
|| gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO)
- && *c->dek->s2k_cacheid != '\0')
+ && c->dek && *c->dek->s2k_cacheid != '\0')
{
if (opt.debug)
log_debug ("cleared passphrase cached with ID: %s\n",
PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext;
int any, clearsig, rc;
kbnode_t n;
+ unsigned char *extrahash;
+ size_t extrahashlen;
- /* This is a literal data packet. Bumb a counter for later checks. */
+ /* This is a literal data packet. Bump a counter for later checks. */
literals_seen++;
if (pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8))
{
log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n"));
- if (!opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages)
- {
- write_status_text (STATUS_ERROR, "proc_pkt.plaintext 89_BAD_DATA");
- log_inc_errorcount ();
- rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
- }
+ write_status_text (STATUS_ERROR, "proc_pkt.plaintext 89_BAD_DATA");
+ log_inc_errorcount ();
+ rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
}
if (!rc)
if (rc)
log_error ("handle plaintext failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+ /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
+ * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences.
+ * The packet is further used to convey extra data from the
+ * plaintext packet to the signature verification. */
+ extrahash = xtrymalloc (6 + pt->namelen);
+ if (!extrahash)
+ {
+ /* No way to return an error. */
+ rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
+ log_error ("malloc failed in %s: %s\n", __func__, gpg_strerror (rc));
+ extrahashlen = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ extrahash[0] = pt->mode;
+ extrahash[1] = pt->namelen;
+ if (pt->namelen)
+ memcpy (extrahash+2, pt->name, pt->namelen);
+ extrahashlen = 2 + pt->namelen;
+ extrahash[extrahashlen++] = pt->timestamp >> 24;
+ extrahash[extrahashlen++] = pt->timestamp >> 16;
+ extrahash[extrahashlen++] = pt->timestamp >> 8;
+ extrahash[extrahashlen++] = pt->timestamp ;
+ }
+
free_packet (pkt, NULL);
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
- /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
- * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences. */
- n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
+ n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK,
+ extrahash, extrahashlen));
+ xfree (extrahash);
if (c->list)
add_kbnode (c->list, n);
else
* signature or an error code
*/
static int
-do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node,
+do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, const void *extrahash, size_t extrahashlen,
PKT_public_key *forced_pk, int *is_selfsig,
int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey, PKT_public_key **r_pk)
{
/* We only get here if we are checking the signature of a binary
(0x00) or text document (0x01). */
- rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md,
+ rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md, extrahash, extrahashlen,
forced_pk,
NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, r_pk);
if (! rc)
{
PKT_public_key *pk2;
- rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md2,
+ rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md2, extrahash, extrahashlen,
forced_pk,
NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey,
r_pk? &pk2 : NULL);
if (opt.check_sigs)
{
fflush (stdout);
- rc2 = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ rc2 = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, 0, NULL,
+ &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL, NULL);
switch (gpg_err_code (rc2))
{
case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
c->ctrl = ctrl;
c->anchor = anchor;
- rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
+ rc = do_proc_packets (c, a);
xfree (c);
return rc;
c->signed_data.used = !!signedfiles;
c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
- rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
+ rc = do_proc_packets (c, a);
/* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
c->signed_data.data_names = NULL;
c->signed_data.used = (signed_data_fd != -1);
- rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
+ rc = do_proc_packets (c, a);
/* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
c->ctrl = ctrl;
c->anchor = anchor;
c->encrypt_only = 1;
- rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
+ rc = do_proc_packets (c, a);
xfree (c);
return rc;
}
static int
-do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a)
+do_proc_packets (CTX c, iobuf_t a)
{
PACKET *pkt;
struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx;
{
switch (pkt->pkttype)
{
- case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
- case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
break;
case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
- case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
}
-/* Helper for pka_uri_from_sig to parse the to-be-verified address out
- of the notation data. */
-static pka_info_t *
-get_pka_address (PKT_signature *sig)
-{
- pka_info_t *pka = NULL;
- struct notation *nd,*notation;
-
- notation=sig_to_notation(sig);
-
- for(nd=notation;nd;nd=nd->next)
- {
- if(strcmp(nd->name,"pka-address@gnupg.org")!=0)
- continue; /* Not the notation we want. */
-
- /* For now we only use the first valid PKA notation. In future
- we might want to keep additional PKA notations in a linked
- list. */
- if (is_valid_mailbox (nd->value))
- {
- pka = xmalloc (sizeof *pka + strlen(nd->value));
- pka->valid = 0;
- pka->checked = 0;
- pka->uri = NULL;
- strcpy (pka->email, nd->value);
- break;
- }
- }
-
- free_notation(notation);
-
- return pka;
-}
-
-
-/* Return the URI from a DNS PKA record. If this record has already
- be retrieved for the signature we merely return it; if not we go
- out and try to get that DNS record. */
-static const char *
-pka_uri_from_sig (CTX c, PKT_signature *sig)
-{
- if (!sig->flags.pka_tried)
- {
- log_assert (!sig->pka_info);
- sig->flags.pka_tried = 1;
- sig->pka_info = get_pka_address (sig);
- if (sig->pka_info)
- {
- char *url;
- unsigned char *fpr;
- size_t fprlen;
-
- if (!gpg_dirmngr_get_pka (c->ctrl, sig->pka_info->email,
- &fpr, &fprlen, &url))
- {
- if (fpr && fprlen == sizeof sig->pka_info->fpr)
- {
- memcpy (sig->pka_info->fpr, fpr, fprlen);
- if (url)
- {
- sig->pka_info->valid = 1;
- if (!*url)
- xfree (url);
- else
- sig->pka_info->uri = url;
- url = NULL;
- }
- }
- xfree (fpr);
- xfree (url);
- }
- }
- }
- return sig->pka_info? sig->pka_info->uri : NULL;
-}
-
-
/* Return true if the AKL has the WKD method specified. */
static int
akl_has_wkd_method (void)
}
-/* Return the ISSUER fingerprint buffer and its lenbgth at R_LEN.
+/* Return the ISSUER fingerprint buffer and its length at R_LEN.
* Returns NULL if not available. The returned buffer is valid as
* long as SIG is not modified. */
const byte *
const byte *p;
size_t n;
- p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR, &n);
- if (p && n == 21 && p[0] == 4)
+ p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR, &n);
+ if (p && ((n == 21 && p[0] == 4) || (n == 33 && p[0] == 5)))
{
*r_len = n - 1;
return p+1;
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
const char *astr;
- int rc;
+ gpg_error_t rc;
int is_expkey = 0;
int is_revkey = 0;
char *issuer_fpr = NULL;
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL; /* The public key for the signature or NULL. */
+ const void *extrahash = NULL;
+ size_t extrahashlen = 0;
kbnode_t included_keyblock = NULL;
if (opt.skip_verify)
{
if (n->next)
goto ambiguous; /* We only allow one P packet. */
+ extrahash = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
+ extrahashlen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
}
else
goto ambiguous;
&& (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
goto ambiguous;
+ extrahash = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
+ extrahashlen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
+
for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
n_sig++;
goto ambiguous;
/* If we wanted to disallow multiple sig verification, we'd do
- something like this:
-
- if (n && !opt.allow_multisig_verification)
- goto ambiguous;
-
- However, now that we have --allow-multiple-messages, this
- can stay allowable as we can't get here unless multiple
- messages (i.e. multiple literals) are allowed. */
+ * something like this:
+ *
+ * if (n)
+ * goto ambiguous;
+ *
+ * However, this can stay allowable as we can't get here. */
if (n_onepass != n_sig)
{
&& (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
goto ambiguous;
+ extrahash = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
+ extrahashlen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
n_sig++;
log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n"));
return 0;
}
- }
+ } /* End checking signature packet composition. */
if (sig->signers_uid)
write_status_buffer (STATUS_NEWSIG,
if (sig->signers_uid)
log_info (_(" issuer \"%s\"\n"), sig->signers_uid);
- rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
+ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, extrahash, extrahashlen, NULL,
+ NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
/* If the key is not found but the signature includes a key block we
* use that key block for verification and on success import it. */
size_t kblock_len;
included_pk = xcalloc (1, sizeof *included_pk);
- kblock = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_BLOCK, &kblock_len);
+ kblock = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_BLOCK, &kblock_len);
if (kblock && kblock_len > 1
&& !get_pubkey_from_buffer (c->ctrl, included_pk,
kblock+1, kblock_len-1,
sig->keyid, &included_keyblock))
{
- rc = do_check_sig (c, node, included_pk,
+ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, extrahash, extrahashlen, included_pk,
NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
+ if (opt.verbose)
+ log_debug ("checked signature using included key block: %s\n",
+ gpg_strerror (rc));
if (!rc)
{
/* The keyblock has been verified, we now import it. */
size_t n;
int any_pref_ks = 0;
- while ((p=enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
+ while ((p=enum_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, &n, &seq, NULL)))
{
/* According to my favorite copy editor, in English grammar,
you say "at" if the key is located on a web page, but
KEYSERVER_IMPORT_FLAG_QUICK);
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
if (!res)
- rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL,
+ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, extrahash, extrahashlen, NULL,
NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
else if (DBG_LOOKUP)
log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "Pref-KS",
/* Fixme: If the fingerprint is embedded in the signature,
* compare it to the fingerprint of the returned key. */
if (!res)
- rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
+ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, extrahash, extrahashlen, NULL,
+ NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
else if (DBG_LOOKUP)
log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "WKD", gpg_strerror (res));
}
- /* If the avove methods didn't work, our next try is to use the URI
- * from a DNS PKA record. This is a legacy method which will
- * eventually be removed. */
- if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
- && (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
- && (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD))
- {
- const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig);
-
- if (uri)
- {
- /* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the
- fingerprint instead of the keyid. */
- int res;
- struct keyserver_spec *spec;
-
- spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1);
- if (spec)
- {
- if (DBG_LOOKUP)
- log_debug ("trying auto-key-retrieve method %s\n", "PKA");
-
- free_public_key (pk);
- pk = NULL;
- glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
- res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, spec, 1);
- glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
- free_keyserver_spec (spec);
- if (!res)
- rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL,
- NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
- else if (DBG_LOOKUP)
- log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "PKA",
- gpg_strerror (res));
- }
- }
- }
-
/* If the above methods didn't work, our next try is to locate
* the key via its fingerprint from a keyserver. This requires
* that the signers fingerprint is encoded in the signature. */
p = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &n);
if (p)
{
- /* v4 packet with a SHA-1 fingerprint. */
if (DBG_LOOKUP)
log_debug ("trying auto-key-retrieve method %s\n", "KS");
+ /* v4 or v5 packet with a SHA-1/256 fingerprint. */
free_public_key (pk);
pk = NULL;
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
KEYSERVER_IMPORT_FLAG_QUICK);
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
if (!res)
- rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL,
+ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, extrahash, extrahashlen, NULL,
NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
else if (DBG_LOOKUP)
log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "KS", gpg_strerror (res));
}
}
+ /* Do do something with the result of the signature checking. */
if (!rc || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
{
+ /* We have checked the signature and the result is either a good
+ * signature or a bad signature. Further examination follows. */
kbnode_t un, keyblock;
int count = 0;
+ int keyblock_has_pk = 0; /* For failsafe check. */
int statno;
char keyid_str[50];
PKT_public_key *mainpk = NULL;
{
int valid;
- if (un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
+ if (!keyblock_has_pk
+ && (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+ || un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+ && !cmp_public_keys (un->pkt->pkt.public_key, pk))
+ {
+ keyblock_has_pk = 1;
+ }
+ if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
mainpk = un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
continue;
log_printf ("\n");
count++;
+ /* At this point we could in theory stop because the primary
+ * UID flag is never set for more than one User ID per
+ * keyblock. However, we use this loop also for a failsafe
+ * check that the public key used to create the signature is
+ * contained in the keyring.*/
}
log_assert (mainpk);
+ if (!keyblock_has_pk)
+ {
+ log_error ("signature key lost from keyblock\n");
+ rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
+ }
/* In case we did not found a valid textual userid above
we print the first user id packet or a "[?]" instead along
how to resolve a conflict. */
if (!rc)
{
- if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS))
- pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */
- rc = check_signatures_trust (c->ctrl, sig);
+ rc = check_signatures_trust (c->ctrl, keyblock, pk, sig);
}
/* Print extra information about the signature. */
if (sig->flags.expired)
{
log_info (_("Signature expired %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
- rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Need a better error here? */
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); /* Need a better error here? */
}
else if (sig->expiredate)
log_info (_("Signature expires %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
if (opt.batch && rc)
g10_exit (1);
}
- else
+ else /* Error checking the signature. (neither Good nor Bad). */
{
write_status_printf (STATUS_ERRSIG, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d %s",
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
projects / platform / upstream / gpg2.git / blobdiff