x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs

[platform/kernel/linux-rpi.git] / arch / x86 / Kconfig

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index d9830e7..a170cfd 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -459,15 +459,6 @@ config GOLDFISH
        def_bool y
        depends on X86_GOLDFISH
 
-config RETPOLINE
-       bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
-       default y
-       help
-         Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against
-         kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect
-         branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
-         support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
-
 config X86_CPU_RESCTRL
        bool "x86 CPU resource control support"
        depends on X86 && (CPU_SUP_INTEL || CPU_SUP_AMD)
@@ -1256,7 +1247,8 @@ config TOSHIBA
 
 config I8K
        tristate "Dell i8k legacy laptop support"
-       select HWMON
+       depends on HWMON
+       depends on PROC_FS
        select SENSORS_DELL_SMM
        help
          This option enables legacy /proc/i8k userspace interface in hwmon
@@ -1310,7 +1302,7 @@ config MICROCODE
 
 config MICROCODE_INTEL
        bool "Intel microcode loading support"
-       depends on MICROCODE
+       depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && MICROCODE
        default MICROCODE
        help
          This options enables microcode patch loading support for Intel
@@ -1322,7 +1314,7 @@ config MICROCODE_INTEL
 
 config MICROCODE_AMD
        bool "AMD microcode loading support"
-       depends on MICROCODE
+       depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && MICROCODE
        help
          If you select this option, microcode patch loading support for AMD
          processors will be enabled.
@@ -1518,6 +1510,7 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
        select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
        select INSTRUCTION_DECODER
        select ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS
+       select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
        help
          Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory.
          This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
@@ -1917,6 +1910,7 @@ config EFI
        depends on ACPI
        select UCS2_STRING
        select EFI_RUNTIME_WRAPPERS
+       select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
        help
          This enables the kernel to use EFI runtime services that are
          available (such as the EFI variable services).
@@ -2392,6 +2386,88 @@ source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig"
 
 endmenu
 
+config CC_HAS_SLS
+       def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all)
+
+config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
+       def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern)
+
+menuconfig SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
+       bool "Mitigations for speculative execution vulnerabilities"
+       default y
+       help
+         Say Y here to enable options which enable mitigations for
+         speculative execution hardware vulnerabilities.
+
+         If you say N, all mitigations will be disabled. You really
+         should know what you are doing to say so.
+
+if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
+
+config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+       bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
+       default y
+       depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE)
+       help
+         This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
+         ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
+         into userspace.
+
+         See Documentation/x86/pti.rst for more details.
+
+config RETPOLINE
+       bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
+       default y
+       help
+         Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against
+         kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect
+         branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
+         support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
+
+config RETHUNK
+       bool "Enable return-thunks"
+       depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
+       default y
+       help
+         Compile the kernel with the return-thunks compiler option to guard
+         against kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding return speculation.
+         Requires a compiler with -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
+         support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
+
+config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+       bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry"
+       depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK
+       default y
+       help
+         Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation.
+
+config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY
+       bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry"
+       depends on CPU_SUP_AMD
+       default y
+       help
+         Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
+
+config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
+       bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
+       depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+       default y
+       help
+         Compile the kernel with support for the spectre_v2=ibrs mitigation.
+         This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to
+         performance.
+
+config SLS
+       bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation"
+       depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64
+       default n
+       help
+         Compile the kernel with straight-line-speculation options to guard
+         against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
+         larger.
+
+endif
+
 config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
        def_bool y
        depends on X86_64 && ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
@@ -2795,6 +2871,11 @@ config IA32_AOUT
 config X86_X32
        bool "x32 ABI for 64-bit mode"
        depends on X86_64
+       # llvm-objcopy does not convert x86_64 .note.gnu.property or
+       # compressed debug sections to x86_x32 properly:
+       # https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/514
+       # https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1141
+       depends on $(success,$(OBJCOPY) --version | head -n1 | grep -qv llvm)
        help
          Include code to run binaries for the x32 native 32-bit ABI
          for 64-bit processors.  An x32 process gets access to the