https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
release branch.
+ Changes between 1.1.1v and 1.1.1w [11 Sep 2023]
+
+ *) Fix POLY1305 MAC implementation corrupting XMM registers on Windows.
+
+ The POLY1305 MAC (message authentication code) implementation in OpenSSL
+ does not save the contents of non-volatile XMM registers on Windows 64
+ platform when calculating the MAC of data larger than 64 bytes. Before
+ returning to the caller all the XMM registers are set to zero rather than
+ restoring their previous content. The vulnerable code is used only on newer
+ x86_64 processors supporting the AVX512-IFMA instructions.
+
+ The consequences of this kind of internal application state corruption can
+ be various - from no consequences, if the calling application does not
+ depend on the contents of non-volatile XMM registers at all, to the worst
+ consequences, where the attacker could get complete control of the
+ application process. However given the contents of the registers are just
+ zeroized so the attacker cannot put arbitrary values inside, the most likely
+ consequence, if any, would be an incorrect result of some application
+ dependent calculations or a crash leading to a denial of service.
+
+ (CVE-2023-4807)
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1u and 1.1.1v [1 Aug 2023]
+
+ *) Fix excessive time spent checking DH q parameter value.
+
+ The function DH_check() performs various checks on DH parameters. After
+ fixing CVE-2023-3446 it was discovered that a large q parameter value can
+ also trigger an overly long computation during some of these checks.
+ A correct q value, if present, cannot be larger than the modulus p
+ parameter, thus it is unnecessary to perform these checks if q is larger
+ than p.
+
+ If DH_check() is called with such q parameter value,
+ DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE return flag is set and the computationally
+ intensive checks are skipped.
+
+ (CVE-2023-3817)
+ [Tomáš Mráz]
+
+ *) Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
+
+ The function DH_check() performs various checks on DH parameters. One of
+ those checks confirms that the modulus ("p" parameter) is not too large.
+ Trying to use a very large modulus is slow and OpenSSL will not normally use
+ a modulus which is over 10,000 bits in length.
+
+ However the DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or
+ parameters that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied
+ modulus value even if it has already been found to be too large.
+
+ A new limit has been added to DH_check of 32,768 bits. Supplying a
+ key/parameters with a modulus over this size will simply cause DH_check()
+ to fail.
+ (CVE-2023-3446)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1t and 1.1.1u [30 May 2023]
+
+ *) Mitigate for the time it takes for `OBJ_obj2txt` to translate gigantic
+ OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identifiers to canonical numeric text form.
+
+ OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical
+ numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very
+ long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that
+ sub-identifier. (CVE-2023-2650)
+
+ To mitigitate this, `OBJ_obj2txt()` will only translate an OBJECT
+ IDENTIFIER to canonical numeric text form if the size of that OBJECT
+ IDENTIFIER is 586 bytes or less, and fail otherwise.
+
+ The basis for this restriction is RFC 2578 (STD 58), section 3.5. OBJECT
+ IDENTIFIER values, which stipulates that OBJECT IDENTIFIERS may have at
+ most 128 sub-identifiers, and that the maximum value that each sub-
+ identifier may have is 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).
+
+ For each byte of every sub-identifier, only the 7 lower bits are part of
+ the value, so the maximum amount of bytes that an OBJECT IDENTIFIER with
+ these restrictions may occupy is 32 * 128 / 7, which is approximately 586
+ bytes.
+
+ Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
+
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Reworked the Fix for the Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption (CVE-2022-4304).
+ The previous fix for this timing side channel turned out to cause
+ a severe 2-3x performance regression in the typical use case
+ compared to 1.1.1s. The new fix uses existing constant time
+ code paths, and restores the previous performance level while
+ fully eliminating all existing timing side channels.
+ The fix was developed by Bernd Edlinger with testing support
+ by Hubert Kario.
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ *) Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention
+ that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to
+ David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0466)
+ [Tomas Mraz]
+
+ *) Fixed an issue where invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates are
+ silently ignored by OpenSSL and other certificate policy checks are skipped
+ for that certificate. A malicious CA could use this to deliberately assert
+ invalid certificate policies in order to circumvent policy checking on the
+ certificate altogether. (CVE-2023-0465)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Limited the number of nodes created in a policy tree to mitigate
+ against CVE-2023-0464. The default limit is set to 1000 nodes, which
+ should be sufficient for most installations. If required, the limit
+ can be adjusted by setting the OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX build
+ time define to a desired maximum number of nodes or zero to allow
+ unlimited growth. (CVE-2023-0464)
+ [Paul Dale]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
+
+ *) Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName.
+
+ There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
+ inside an X.509 GeneralName. X.400 addresses were parsed as an ASN1_STRING
+ but subsequently interpreted by GENERAL_NAME_cmp as an ASN1_TYPE. This
+ vulnerability may allow an attacker who can provide a certificate chain and
+ CRL (neither of which need have a valid signature) to pass arbitrary
+ pointers to a memcmp call, creating a possible read primitive, subject to
+ some constraints. Refer to the advisory for more information. Thanks to
+ David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0286)
+
+ This issue has been fixed by changing the public header file definition of
+ GENERAL_NAME so that x400Address reflects the implementation. It was not
+ possible for any existing application to successfully use the existing
+ definition; however, if any application references the x400Address field
+ (e.g. in dead code), note that the type of this field has changed. There is
+ no ABI change.
+ [Hugo Landau]
+
+ *) Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF.
+
+ The public API function BIO_new_NDEF is a helper function used for
+ streaming ASN.1 data via a BIO. It is primarily used internally to OpenSSL
+ to support the SMIME, CMS and PKCS7 streaming capabilities, but may also
+ be called directly by end user applications.
+
+ The function receives a BIO from the caller, prepends a new BIO_f_asn1
+ filter BIO onto the front of it to form a BIO chain, and then returns
+ the new head of the BIO chain to the caller. Under certain conditions,
+ for example if a CMS recipient public key is invalid, the new filter BIO
+ is freed and the function returns a NULL result indicating a failure.
+ However, in this case, the BIO chain is not properly cleaned up and the
+ BIO passed by the caller still retains internal pointers to the previously
+ freed filter BIO. If the caller then goes on to call BIO_pop() on the BIO
+ then a use-after-free will occur. This will most likely result in a crash.
+ (CVE-2023-0215)
+ [Viktor Dukhovni, Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex.
+
+ The function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and
+ decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload
+ data. If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data"
+ arguments are populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant
+ decoded data. The caller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is
+ possible to construct a PEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data.
+ In this case PEM_read_bio_ex() will return a failure code but will populate
+ the header argument with a pointer to a buffer that has already been freed.
+ If the caller also frees this buffer then a double free will occur. This
+ will most likely lead to a crash.
+
+ The functions PEM_read_bio() and PEM_read() are simple wrappers around
+ PEM_read_bio_ex() and therefore these functions are also directly affected.
+
+ These functions are also called indirectly by a number of other OpenSSL
+ functions including PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and
+ SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() which are also vulnerable. Some OpenSSL
+ internal uses of these functions are not vulnerable because the caller does
+ not free the header argument if PEM_read_bio_ex() returns a failure code.
+ (CVE-2022-4450)
+ [Kurt Roeckx, Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption.
+
+ A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
+ implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
+ a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
+ decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
+ of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding
+ modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
+ (CVE-2022-4304)
+ [Dmitry Belyavsky, Hubert Kario]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1r and 1.1.1s [1 Nov 2022]
+
+ *) Fixed a regression introduced in 1.1.1r version not refreshing the
+ certificate data to be signed before signing the certificate.
+ [Gibeom Gwon]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1q and 1.1.1r [11 Oct 2022]
+
+ *) Fixed the linux-mips64 Configure target which was missing the
+ SIXTY_FOUR_BIT bn_ops flag. This was causing heap corruption on that
+ platform.
+ [Adam Joseph]
+
+ *) Fixed a strict aliasing problem in bn_nist. Clang-14 optimisation was
+ causing incorrect results in some cases as a result.
+ [Paul Dale]
+
+ *) Fixed SSL_pending() and SSL_has_pending() with DTLS which were failing to
+ report correct results in some cases
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fixed a regression introduced in 1.1.1o for re-signing certificates with
+ different key sizes
+ [Todd Short]
+
+ *) Added the loongarch64 target
+ [Shi Pujin]
+
+ *) Fixed a DRBG seed propagation thread safety issue
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ *) Fixed a memory leak in tls13_generate_secret
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ *) Fixed reported performance degradation on aarch64. Restored the
+ implementation prior to commit 2621751 ("aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl: avoid
+ 32-bit lane assignment in CTR mode") for 64bit targets only, since it is
+ reportedly 2-17% slower and the silicon errata only affects 32bit targets.
+ The new algorithm is still used for 32 bit targets.
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ *) Added a missing header for memcmp that caused compilation failure on some
+ platforms
+ [Gregor Jasny]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1p and 1.1.1q [5 Jul 2022]
+
+ *) AES OCB mode for 32-bit x86 platforms using the AES-NI assembly optimised
+ implementation would not encrypt the entirety of the data under some
+ circumstances. This could reveal sixteen bytes of data that was
+ preexisting in the memory that wasn't written. In the special case of
+ "in place" encryption, sixteen bytes of the plaintext would be revealed.
+
+ Since OpenSSL does not support OCB based cipher suites for TLS and DTLS,
+ they are both unaffected.
+ (CVE-2022-2097)
+ [Alex Chernyakhovsky, David Benjamin, Alejandro Sedeño]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1o and 1.1.1p [21 Jun 2022]
+
+ *) In addition to the c_rehash shell command injection identified in
+ CVE-2022-1292, further bugs where the c_rehash script does not
+ properly sanitise shell metacharacters to prevent command injection have been
+ fixed.
+
+ When the CVE-2022-1292 was fixed it was not discovered that there
+ are other places in the script where the file names of certificates
+ being hashed were possibly passed to a command executed through the shell.
+
+ This script is distributed by some operating systems in a manner where
+ it is automatically executed. On such operating systems, an attacker
+ could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the script.
+
+ Use of the c_rehash script is considered obsolete and should be replaced
+ by the OpenSSL rehash command line tool.
+ (CVE-2022-2068)
+ [Daniel Fiala, Tomáš Mráz]
+
+ *) When OpenSSL TLS client is connecting without any supported elliptic
+ curves and TLS-1.3 protocol is disabled the connection will no longer fail
+ if a ciphersuite that does not use a key exchange based on elliptic
+ curves can be negotiated.
+ [Tomáš Mráz]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1n and 1.1.1o [3 May 2022]
+
+ *) Fixed a bug in the c_rehash script which was not properly sanitising shell
+ metacharacters to prevent command injection. This script is distributed
+ by some operating systems in a manner where it is automatically executed.
+ On such operating systems, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands
+ with the privileges of the script.
+
+ Use of the c_rehash script is considered obsolete and should be replaced
+ by the OpenSSL rehash command line tool.
+ (CVE-2022-1292)
+ [Tomáš Mráz]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1m and 1.1.1n [15 Mar 2022]
+
+ *) Fixed a bug in the BN_mod_sqrt() function that can cause it to loop forever
+ for non-prime moduli.
+
+ Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain
+ elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve
+ parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form.
+
+ It is possible to trigger the infinite loop by crafting a certificate that
+ has invalid explicit curve parameters.
+
+ Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate
+ signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate may
+ thus be subject to a denial of service attack. The infinite loop can also
+ be reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit
+ elliptic curve parameters.
+
+ Thus vulnerable situations include:
+
+ - TLS clients consuming server certificates
+ - TLS servers consuming client certificates
+ - Hosting providers taking certificates or private keys from customers
+ - Certificate authorities parsing certification requests from subscribers
+ - Anything else which parses ASN.1 elliptic curve parameters
+
+ Also any other applications that use the BN_mod_sqrt() where the attacker
+ can control the parameter values are vulnerable to this DoS issue.
+ (CVE-2022-0778)
+ [Tomáš Mráz]
+
+ *) Add ciphersuites based on DHE_PSK (RFC 4279) and ECDHE_PSK (RFC 5489)
+ to the list of ciphersuites providing Perfect Forward Secrecy as
+ required by SECLEVEL >= 3.
+
+ [Dmitry Belyavskiy, Nicola Tuveri]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1l and 1.1.1m [14 Dec 2021]
+
+ *) Avoid loading of a dynamic engine twice.
+
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ *) Fixed building on Debian with kfreebsd kernels
+
+ [Mattias Ellert]
+
+ *) Prioritise DANE TLSA issuer certs over peer certs
+
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ *) Fixed random API for MacOS prior to 10.12
+
+ These MacOS versions don't support the CommonCrypto APIs
+
+ [Lenny Primak]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1k and 1.1.1l [24 Aug 2021]
+
+ *) Fixed an SM2 Decryption Buffer Overflow.
+
+ In order to decrypt SM2 encrypted data an application is expected to call the
+ API function EVP_PKEY_decrypt(). Typically an application will call this
+ function twice. The first time, on entry, the "out" parameter can be NULL and,
+ on exit, the "outlen" parameter is populated with the buffer size required to
+ hold the decrypted plaintext. The application can then allocate a sufficiently
+ sized buffer and call EVP_PKEY_decrypt() again, but this time passing a non-NULL
+ value for the "out" parameter.
+
+ A bug in the implementation of the SM2 decryption code means that the
+ calculation of the buffer size required to hold the plaintext returned by the
+ first call to EVP_PKEY_decrypt() can be smaller than the actual size required by
+ the second call. This can lead to a buffer overflow when EVP_PKEY_decrypt() is
+ called by the application a second time with a buffer that is too small.
+
+ A malicious attacker who is able present SM2 content for decryption to an
+ application could cause attacker chosen data to overflow the buffer by up to a
+ maximum of 62 bytes altering the contents of other data held after the
+ buffer, possibly changing application behaviour or causing the application to
+ crash. The location of the buffer is application dependent but is typically
+ heap allocated.
+ (CVE-2021-3711)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fixed various read buffer overruns processing ASN.1 strings
+
+ ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an ASN1_STRING
+ structure which contains a buffer holding the string data and a field holding
+ the buffer length. This contrasts with normal C strings which are repesented as
+ a buffer for the string data which is terminated with a NUL (0) byte.
+
+ Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed using OpenSSL's
+ own "d2i" functions (and other similar parsing functions) as well as any string
+ whose value has been set with the ASN1_STRING_set() function will additionally
+ NUL terminate the byte array in the ASN1_STRING structure.
+
+ However, it is possible for applications to directly construct valid ASN1_STRING
+ structures which do not NUL terminate the byte array by directly setting the
+ "data" and "length" fields in the ASN1_STRING array. This can also happen by
+ using the ASN1_STRING_set0() function.
+
+ Numerous OpenSSL functions that print ASN.1 data have been found to assume that
+ the ASN1_STRING byte array will be NUL terminated, even though this is not
+ guaranteed for strings that have been directly constructed. Where an application
+ requests an ASN.1 structure to be printed, and where that ASN.1 structure
+ contains ASN1_STRINGs that have been directly constructed by the application
+ without NUL terminating the "data" field, then a read buffer overrun can occur.
+
+ The same thing can also occur during name constraints processing of certificates
+ (for example if a certificate has been directly constructed by the application
+ instead of loading it via the OpenSSL parsing functions, and the certificate
+ contains non NUL terminated ASN1_STRING structures). It can also occur in the
+ X509_get1_email(), X509_REQ_get1_email() and X509_get1_ocsp() functions.
+
+ If a malicious actor can cause an application to directly construct an
+ ASN1_STRING and then process it through one of the affected OpenSSL functions
+ then this issue could be hit. This might result in a crash (causing a Denial of
+ Service attack). It could also result in the disclosure of private memory
+ contents (such as private keys, or sensitive plaintext).
+ (CVE-2021-3712)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1j and 1.1.1k [25 Mar 2021]
+
+ *) Fixed a problem with verifying a certificate chain when using the
+ X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag. This flag enables additional security checks
+ of the certificates present in a certificate chain. It is not set by
+ default.
+
+ Starting from OpenSSL version 1.1.1h a check to disallow certificates in
+ the chain that have explicitly encoded elliptic curve parameters was added
+ as an additional strict check.
+
+ An error in the implementation of this check meant that the result of a
+ previous check to confirm that certificates in the chain are valid CA
+ certificates was overwritten. This effectively bypasses the check
+ that non-CA certificates must not be able to issue other certificates.
+
+ If a "purpose" has been configured then there is a subsequent opportunity
+ for checks that the certificate is a valid CA. All of the named "purpose"
+ values implemented in libcrypto perform this check. Therefore, where
+ a purpose is set the certificate chain will still be rejected even when the
+ strict flag has been used. A purpose is set by default in libssl client and
+ server certificate verification routines, but it can be overridden or
+ removed by an application.
+
+ In order to be affected, an application must explicitly set the
+ X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT verification flag and either not set a purpose
+ for the certificate verification or, in the case of TLS client or server
+ applications, override the default purpose.
+ (CVE-2021-3450)
+ [Tomáš Mráz]
+
+ *) Fixed an issue where an OpenSSL TLS server may crash if sent a maliciously
+ crafted renegotiation ClientHello message from a client. If a TLSv1.2
+ renegotiation ClientHello omits the signature_algorithms extension (where
+ it was present in the initial ClientHello), but includes a
+ signature_algorithms_cert extension then a NULL pointer dereference will
+ result, leading to a crash and a denial of service attack.
+
+ A server is only vulnerable if it has TLSv1.2 and renegotiation enabled
+ (which is the default configuration). OpenSSL TLS clients are not impacted
+ by this issue.
+ (CVE-2021-3449)
+ [Peter Kästle and Samuel Sapalski]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1i and 1.1.1j [16 Feb 2021]
+
+ *) Fixed the X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() function. It attempts to
+ create a unique hash value based on the issuer and serial number data
+ contained within an X509 certificate. However it was failing to correctly
+ handle any errors that may occur while parsing the issuer field (which might
+ occur if the issuer field is maliciously constructed). This may subsequently
+ result in a NULL pointer deref and a crash leading to a potential denial of
+ service attack.
+ (CVE-2021-23841)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fixed the RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() function and the RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
+ padding mode to correctly check for rollback attacks. This is considered a
+ bug in OpenSSL 1.1.1 because it does not support SSLv2. In 1.0.2 this is
+ CVE-2021-23839.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fixed the EVP_CipherUpdate, EVP_EncryptUpdate and EVP_DecryptUpdate
+ functions. Previously they could overflow the output length argument in some
+ cases where the input length is close to the maximum permissable length for
+ an integer on the platform. In such cases the return value from the function
+ call would be 1 (indicating success), but the output length value would be
+ negative. This could cause applications to behave incorrectly or crash.
+ (CVE-2021-23840)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fixed SRP_Calc_client_key so that it runs in constant time. The previous
+ implementation called BN_mod_exp without setting BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. This
+ could be exploited in a side channel attack to recover the password. Since
+ the attack is local host only this is outside of the current OpenSSL
+ threat model and therefore no CVE is assigned.
+
+ Thanks to Mohammed Sabt and Daniel De Almeida Braga for reporting this
+ issue.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1h and 1.1.1i [8 Dec 2020]
+
+ *) Fixed NULL pointer deref in the GENERAL_NAME_cmp function
+ This function could crash if both GENERAL_NAMEs contain an EDIPARTYNAME.
+ If an attacker can control both items being compared then this could lead
+ to a possible denial of service attack. OpenSSL itself uses the
+ GENERAL_NAME_cmp function for two purposes:
+ 1) Comparing CRL distribution point names between an available CRL and a
+ CRL distribution point embedded in an X509 certificate
+ 2) When verifying that a timestamp response token signer matches the
+ timestamp authority name (exposed via the API functions
+ TS_RESP_verify_response and TS_RESP_verify_token)
+ (CVE-2020-1971)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Add support for Apple Silicon M1 Macs with the darwin64-arm64-cc target.
+ [Stuart Carnie]
+
+ *) The security callback, which can be customised by application code, supports
+ the security operation SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH. This is defined to take an EVP_PKEY
+ in the "other" parameter. In most places this is what is passed. All these
+ places occur server side. However there was one client side call of this
+ security operation and it passed a DH object instead. This is incorrect
+ according to the definition of SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, and is inconsistent with all
+ of the other locations. Therefore this client side call has been changed to
+ pass an EVP_PKEY instead.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) In 1.1.1h, an expired trusted (root) certificate was not anymore rejected
+ when validating a certificate path. This check is restored in 1.1.1i.
+ [David von Oheimb]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1g and 1.1.1h [22 Sep 2020]
+
+ *) Certificates with explicit curve parameters are now disallowed in
+ verification chains if the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag is used.
+ [Tomas Mraz]
+
+ *) The 'MinProtocol' and 'MaxProtocol' configuration commands now silently
+ ignore TLS protocol version bounds when configuring DTLS-based contexts, and
+ conversely, silently ignore DTLS protocol version bounds when configuring
+ TLS-based contexts. The commands can be repeated to set bounds of both
+ types. The same applies with the corresponding "min_protocol" and
+ "max_protocol" command-line switches, in case some application uses both TLS
+ and DTLS.
+
+ SSL_CTX instances that are created for a fixed protocol version (e.g.
+ TLSv1_server_method()) also silently ignore version bounds. Previously
+ attempts to apply bounds to these protocol versions would result in an
+ error. Now only the "version-flexible" SSL_CTX instances are subject to
+ limits in configuration files in command-line options.
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ *) Handshake now fails if Extended Master Secret extension is dropped
+ on renegotiation.
+ [Tomas Mraz]
+
+ *) Accidentally, an expired trusted (root) certificate is not anymore rejected
+ when validating a certificate path.
+ [David von Oheimb]
+
+ *) The Oracle Developer Studio compiler will start reporting deprecated APIs
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1f and 1.1.1g [21 Apr 2020]
+
+ *) Fixed segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain()
+ Server or client applications that call the SSL_check_chain() function
+ during or after a TLS 1.3 handshake may crash due to a NULL pointer
+ dereference as a result of incorrect handling of the
+ "signature_algorithms_cert" TLS extension. The crash occurs if an invalid
+ or unrecognised signature algorithm is received from the peer. This could
+ be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial of Service attack.
+ (CVE-2020-1967)
+ [Benjamin Kaduk]
+
+ *) Added AES consttime code for no-asm configurations
+ an optional constant time support for AES was added
+ when building openssl for no-asm.
+ Enable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_AES_CONST_TIME
+ Disable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_NO_AES_CONST_TIME
+ At this time this feature is by default disabled.
+ It will be enabled by default in 3.0.
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1e and 1.1.1f [31 Mar 2020]
+
+ *) Revert the change of EOF detection while reading in libssl to avoid
+ regressions in applications depending on the current way of reporting
+ the EOF. As the existing method is not fully accurate the change to
+ reporting the EOF via SSL_ERROR_SSL is kept on the current development
+ branch and will be present in the 3.0 release.
+ [Tomas Mraz]
+
+ *) Revised BN_generate_prime_ex to not avoid factors 3..17863 in p-1
+ when primes for RSA keys are computed.
+ Since we previously always generated primes == 2 (mod 3) for RSA keys,
+ the 2-prime and 3-prime RSA modules were easy to distinguish, since
+ N = p*q = 1 (mod 3), but N = p*q*r = 2 (mod 3). Therefore fingerprinting
+ 2-prime vs. 3-prime RSA keys was possible by computing N mod 3.
+ This avoids possible fingerprinting of newly generated RSA modules.
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1d and 1.1.1e [17 Mar 2020]
+ *) Properly detect EOF while reading in libssl. Previously if we hit an EOF
+ while reading in libssl then we would report an error back to the
+ application (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) but errno would be 0. We now add
+ an error to the stack (which means we instead return SSL_ERROR_SSL) and
+ therefore give a hint as to what went wrong.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Check that ed25519 and ed448 are allowed by the security level. Previously
+ signature algorithms not using an MD were not being checked that they were
+ allowed by the security level.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ *) Fixed SSL_get_servername() behaviour. The behaviour of SSL_get_servername()
+ was not quite right. The behaviour was not consistent between resumption
+ and normal handshakes, and also not quite consistent with historical
+ behaviour. The behaviour in various scenarios has been clarified and
+ it has been updated to make it match historical behaviour as closely as
+ possible.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) [VMS only] The header files that the VMS compilers include automatically,
+ __DECC_INCLUDE_PROLOGUE.H and __DECC_INCLUDE_EPILOGUE.H, use pragmas that
+ the C++ compiler doesn't understand. This is a shortcoming in the
+ compiler, but can be worked around with __cplusplus guards.
+
+ C++ applications that use OpenSSL libraries must be compiled using the
+ qualifier '/NAMES=(AS_IS,SHORTENED)' to be able to use all the OpenSSL
+ functions. Otherwise, only functions with symbols of less than 31
+ characters can be used, as the linker will not be able to successfully
+ resolve symbols with longer names.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Corrected the documentation of the return values from the EVP_DigestSign*
+ set of functions. The documentation mentioned negative values for some
+ errors, but this was never the case, so the mention of negative values
+ was removed.
+
+ Code that followed the documentation and thereby check with something
+ like 'EVP_DigestSignInit(...) <= 0' will continue to work undisturbed.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Fixed an an overflow bug in the x64_64 Montgomery squaring procedure
+ used in exponentiation with 512-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are
+ affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against 2-prime RSA1024,
+ 3-prime RSA1536, and DSA1024 as a result of this defect would be very
+ difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH512
+ are considered just feasible. However, for an attack the target would
+ have to re-use the DH512 private key, which is not recommended anyway.
+ Also applications directly using the low level API BN_mod_exp may be
+ affected if they use BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
+ (CVE-2019-1551)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Added a new method to gather entropy on VMS, based on SYS$GET_ENTROPY.
+ The presence of this system service is determined at run-time.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Added newline escaping functionality to a filename when using openssl dgst.
+ This output format is to replicate the output format found in the '*sum'
+ checksum programs. This aims to preserve backward compatibility.
+ [Matt Eaton, Richard Levitte, and Paul Dale]
+
+ *) Print all values for a PKCS#12 attribute with 'openssl pkcs12', not just
+ the first value.
+ [Jon Spillett]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1c and 1.1.1d [10 Sep 2019]
+
+ *) Fixed a fork protection issue. OpenSSL 1.1.1 introduced a rewritten random
+ number generator (RNG). This was intended to include protection in the
+ event of a fork() system call in order to ensure that the parent and child
+ processes did not share the same RNG state. However this protection was not
+ being used in the default case.
+
+ A partial mitigation for this issue is that the output from a high
+ precision timer is mixed into the RNG state so the likelihood of a parent
+ and child process sharing state is significantly reduced.
+
+ If an application already calls OPENSSL_init_crypto() explicitly using
+ OPENSSL_INIT_ATFORK then this problem does not occur at all.
+ (CVE-2019-1549)
+ [Matthias St. Pierre]
+
+ *) For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
+ used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key
+ or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/
+ `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`.
+ This prevents bypass of security hardening and performance gains,
+ especially for curves with specialized EC_METHODs.
+ By default, if a key encoded with explicit parameters is loaded and later
+ serialized, the output is still encoded with explicit parameters, even if
+ internally a "named" EC_GROUP is used for computation.
+ [Nicola Tuveri]
+
+ *) Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction. Before
+ this change, EC_GROUP_set_generator would accept order and/or cofactor as
+ NULL. After this change, only the cofactor parameter can be NULL. It also
+ does some minimal sanity checks on the passed order.
+ (CVE-2019-1547)
+ [Billy Bob Brumley]
+
+ *) Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey.
+ An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
+ second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
+ recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
+ encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
+ decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
+ used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
+ As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
+ key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
+ certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
+ The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
+ (CVE-2019-1563)
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ *) Early start up entropy quality from the DEVRANDOM seed source has been
+ improved for older Linux systems. The RAND subsystem will wait for
+ /dev/random to be producing output before seeding from /dev/urandom.
+ The seeded state is stored for future library initialisations using
+ a system global shared memory segment. The shared memory identifier
+ can be configured by defining OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID to
+ the desired value. The default identifier is 114.
+ [Paul Dale]
+
+ *) Correct the extended master secret constant on EBCDIC systems. Without this
+ fix TLS connections between an EBCDIC system and a non-EBCDIC system that
+ negotiate EMS will fail. Unfortunately this also means that TLS connections
+ between EBCDIC systems with this fix, and EBCDIC systems without this
+ fix will fail if they negotiate EMS.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Use Windows installation paths in the mingw builds
+
+ Mingw isn't a POSIX environment per se, which means that Windows
+ paths should be used for installation.
+ (CVE-2019-1552)
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Changed DH_check to accept parameters with order q and 2q subgroups.
+ With order 2q subgroups the bit 0 of the private key is not secret
+ but DH_generate_key works around that by clearing bit 0 of the
+ private key for those. This avoids leaking bit 0 of the private key.
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ *) Significantly reduce secure memory usage by the randomness pools.
+ [Paul Dale]
+
+ *) Revert the DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature for Linux systems
+
+ The DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature added a select() call to wait for the
+ /dev/random device to become readable before reading from the
+ /dev/urandom device.
+
+ It turned out that this change had negative side effects on
+ performance which were not acceptable. After some discussion it
+ was decided to revert this feature and leave it up to the OS
+ resp. the platform maintainer to ensure a proper initialization
+ during early boot time.
+ [Matthias St. Pierre]
+
Changes between 1.1.1b and 1.1.1c [28 May 2019]
*) Add build tests for C++. These are generated files that only do one
(CVE-2019-1543)
[Matt Caswell]
+ *) Add DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature for Linux systems
+
+ On older Linux systems where the getrandom() system call is not available,
+ OpenSSL normally uses the /dev/urandom device for seeding its CSPRNG.
+ Contrary to getrandom(), the /dev/urandom device will not block during
+ early boot when the kernel CSPRNG has not been seeded yet.
+
+ To mitigate this known weakness, use select() to wait for /dev/random to
+ become readable before reading from /dev/urandom.
+
*) Ensure that SM2 only uses SM3 as digest algorithm
[Paul Yang]
SSL_set_ciphersuites()
[Matt Caswell]
- *) Memory allocation failures consistenly add an error to the error
+ *) Memory allocation failures consistently add an error to the error
stack.
[Rich Salz]
bytes long. In theory it is permissible in SSLv3 - TLSv1.2 to fragment such
alerts across multiple records (some of which could be empty). In practice
it make no sense to send an empty alert record, or to fragment one. TLSv1.3
- prohibts this altogether and other libraries (BoringSSL, NSS) do not
+ prohibits this altogether and other libraries (BoringSSL, NSS) do not
support this at all. Supporting it adds significant complexity to the
- record layer, and its removal is unlikely to cause inter-operability
+ record layer, and its removal is unlikely to cause interoperability
issues.
[Matt Caswell]
implementations).
[Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
- *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
+ *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instead of ssize_t which isn't available on
all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
header file e_os2.h as it now appears in public header file cms.h
[Steve Henson]
reason texts, thereby removing some of the footprint that may not
be interesting if those errors aren't displayed anyway.
- NOTE: it's still possible for any application or module to have it's
+ NOTE: it's still possible for any application or module to have its
own set of error texts inserted. The routines are there, just not
used by default when no-err is given.
[Richard Levitte]
*) New OCSP utility. Allows OCSP requests to be generated or
read. The request can be sent to a responder and the output
- parsed, outputed or printed in text form. Not complete yet:
+ parsed, outputted or printed in text form. Not complete yet:
still needs to check the OCSP response validity.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.6g and 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]
*) New function OPENSSL_cleanse(), which is used to cleanse a section of
- memory from it's contents. This is done with a counter that will
+ memory from its contents. This is done with a counter that will
place alternating values in each byte. This can be used to solve
two issues: 1) the removal of calls to memset() by highly optimizing
compilers, and 2) cleansing with other values than 0, since those can
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Modified SSL library such that the verify_callback that has been set
- specificly for an SSL object with SSL_set_verify() is actually being
+ specifically for an SSL object with SSL_set_verify() is actually being
used. Before the change, a verify_callback set with this function was
ignored and the verify_callback() set in the SSL_CTX at the time of
the call was used. New function X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() introduced
as other interfaces in OpenSSL, like the BIO interface.
NCONF_dump_* dump the internal storage of the configuration file,
which is useful for debugging. All other functions take the same
- arguments as the old CONF_* functions wth the exception of the
+ arguments as the old CONF_* functions with the exception of the
first that must be a `CONF *' instead of a `LHASH *'.
- To make it easer to use the new classes with the old CONF_* functions,
+ To make it easier to use the new classes with the old CONF_* functions,
the function CONF_set_default_method is provided.
[Richard Levitte]
than the old method: it now uses a modified version of Ulf's parser to
read the ANSI prototypes in all header files (thus the old K&R definitions
aren't needed for error creation any more) and do a better job of
- translating function codes into names. The old 'ASN1 error code imbedded
+ translating function codes into names. The old 'ASN1 error code embedded
in a comment' is no longer necessary and it doesn't use .err files which
have now been deleted. Also the error code call doesn't have to appear all
on one line (which resulted in some large lines...).
*) Add a useful kludge to allow package maintainers to specify compiler and
other platforms details on the command line without having to patch the
- Configure script everytime: One now can use ``perl Configure
+ Configure script every time: One now can use ``perl Configure
<id>:<details>'', i.e. platform ids are allowed to have details appended
to them (separated by colons). This is treated as there would be a static
pre-configured entry in Configure's %table under key <id> with value
projects / platform / upstream / openssl1.1.git / blobdiff