+ }
+
+ device_set_block_size(crypt_data_device(cd), sector_size);
+
+ r = LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, cd->metadata_device != NULL);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
+ mdata_device_path(cd));
+ if (dev_size < LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr))
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is too small."), device_path(crypt_metadata_device(cd)));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Wipe integrity superblock and create integrity superblock */
+ if (crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd)) {
+ r = crypt_wipe_device(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO,
+ crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE,
+ 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (r == -EBUSY)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s in use."),
+ data_device_path(cd));
+ else if (r == -EACCES) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s, permission denied."),
+ data_device_path(cd));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ } else
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
+ data_device_path(cd));
+
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = INTEGRITY_format(cd, params ? params->integrity_params : NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot format integrity for device %s."),
+ data_device_path(cd));
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* override sequence id check with format */
+ r = LUKS2_hdr_write_force(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (r == -EBUSY)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s in use."),
+ mdata_device_path(cd));
+ else if (r == -EACCES) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s, permission denied."),
+ mdata_device_path(cd));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ } else
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s."),
+ mdata_device_path(cd));
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (r) {
+ LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ /* Device size can be larger now if it is a file container */
+ if (!device_size(crypt_data_device(cd), &dev_size) &&
+ dev_size <= (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE))
+ log_std(cd, _("Device %s is too small for activation, there is no remaining space for data.\n"),
+ device_path(crypt_data_device(cd)));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_loopaes(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *cipher,
+ const char *uuid,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ struct crypt_params_loopaes *params)
+{
+ if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Can't format LOOPAES without device."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (volume_key_size > 1024) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Invalid key size."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (uuid) {
+ log_err(cd, _("UUID is not supported for this crypt type."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (cd->metadata_device) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LOOPAES)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cd->u.loopaes.key_size = volume_key_size;
+
+ cd->u.loopaes.cipher = strdup(cipher ?: DEFAULT_LOOPAES_CIPHER);
+
+ if (params && params->hash)
+ cd->u.loopaes.hdr.hash = strdup(params->hash);
+
+ cd->u.loopaes.hdr.offset = params ? params->offset : 0;
+ cd->u.loopaes.hdr.skip = params ? params->skip : 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_verity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *uuid,
+ struct crypt_params_verity *params)
+{
+ int r = 0, hash_size;
+ uint64_t data_device_size, hash_blocks_size;
+ struct device *fec_device = NULL;
+ char *fec_device_path = NULL, *hash_name = NULL, *root_hash = NULL, *salt = NULL;
+
+ if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Can't format VERITY without device."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!params)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!params->data_device && !cd->metadata_device)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (params->hash_type > VERITY_MAX_HASH_TYPE) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."), params->hash_type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(params->data_block_size) ||
+ VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(params->hash_block_size)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY block size."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (MISALIGNED_512(params->hash_area_offset)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY hash offset."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (MISALIGNED_512(params->fec_area_offset)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY FEC offset."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_VERITY)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (params->data_device) {
+ r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, params->data_device);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (!params->data_size) {
+ r = device_size(cd->device, &data_device_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size = data_device_size / params->data_block_size;
+ } else
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size = params->data_size;
+
+ if (device_is_identical(crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd)) > 0 &&
+ (cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size * params->data_block_size) > params->hash_area_offset) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Data area overlaps with hash area."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ hash_size = crypt_hash_size(params->hash_name);
+ if (hash_size <= 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Hash algorithm %s not supported."),
+ params->hash_name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = hash_size;
+
+ if (params->fec_device) {
+ fec_device_path = strdup(params->fec_device);
+ if (!fec_device_path)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ r = device_alloc(cd, &fec_device, params->fec_device);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ hash_blocks_size = VERITY_hash_blocks(cd, params) * params->hash_block_size;
+ if (device_is_identical(crypt_metadata_device(cd), fec_device) > 0 &&
+ (params->hash_area_offset + hash_blocks_size) > params->fec_area_offset) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Hash area overlaps with FEC area."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (device_is_identical(crypt_data_device(cd), fec_device) > 0 &&
+ (cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size * params->data_block_size) > params->fec_area_offset) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Data area overlaps with FEC area."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ root_hash = malloc(cd->u.verity.root_hash_size);
+ hash_name = strdup(params->hash_name);
+ salt = malloc(params->salt_size);
+
+ if (!root_hash || !hash_name || !salt) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = params->flags;
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash = root_hash;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name = hash_name;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.data_device = NULL;
+ cd->u.verity.fec_device = fec_device;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_device = fec_device_path;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots = params->fec_roots;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.data_block_size = params->data_block_size;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_block_size = params->hash_block_size;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset = params->hash_area_offset;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_area_offset = params->fec_area_offset;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type = params->hash_type;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = params->flags;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size = params->salt_size;
+ cd->u.verity.hdr.salt = salt;
+
+ if (params->salt)
+ memcpy(salt, params->salt, params->salt_size);
+ else
+ r = crypt_random_get(cd, salt, params->salt_size, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_CREATE_HASH) {
+ r = VERITY_create(cd, &cd->u.verity.hdr,
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size);
+ if (!r && params->fec_device)
+ r = VERITY_FEC_process(cd, &cd->u.verity.hdr, cd->u.verity.fec_device, 0, NULL);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!(params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER)) {
+ if (uuid) {
+ if (!(cd->u.verity.uuid = strdup(uuid)))
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ } else
+ r = VERITY_UUID_generate(&cd->u.verity.uuid);
+
+ if (!r)
+ r = VERITY_write_sb(cd, cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset,
+ cd->u.verity.uuid,
+ &cd->u.verity.hdr);
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (r) {
+ device_free(cd, fec_device);
+ free(root_hash);
+ free(hash_name);
+ free(fec_device_path);
+ free(salt);
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *uuid,
+ struct crypt_params_integrity *params)
+{
+ int r;
+ uint32_t integrity_tag_size;
+ char *integrity = NULL, *journal_integrity = NULL, *journal_crypt = NULL;
+ struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key = NULL, *journal_mac_key = NULL;
+
+ if (!params)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (uuid) {
+ log_err(cd, _("UUID is not supported for this crypt type."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = device_check_access(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), DEV_EXCL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* Wipe first 8 sectors - fs magic numbers etc. */
+ r = crypt_wipe_device(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 0,
+ 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
+ mdata_device_path(cd));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_INTEGRITY)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (params->journal_crypt_key) {
+ journal_crypt_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_crypt_key_size,
+ params->journal_crypt_key);
+ if (!journal_crypt_key)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (params->journal_integrity_key) {
+ journal_mac_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_integrity_key_size,
+ params->journal_integrity_key);
+ if (!journal_mac_key) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (params->integrity && !(integrity = strdup(params->integrity))) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (params->journal_integrity && !(journal_integrity = strdup(params->journal_integrity))) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (params->journal_crypt && !(journal_crypt = strdup(params->journal_crypt))) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ integrity_tag_size = INTEGRITY_hash_tag_size(integrity);
+ if (integrity_tag_size > 0 && params->tag_size && integrity_tag_size != params->tag_size)
+ log_std(cd, _("WARNING: Requested tag size %d bytes differs from %s size output (%d bytes).\n"),
+ params->tag_size, integrity, integrity_tag_size);
+
+ if (params->tag_size)
+ integrity_tag_size = params->tag_size;
+
+ cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key;
+ cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key = journal_mac_key;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_size = params->journal_size;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_watermark = params->journal_watermark;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_commit_time = params->journal_commit_time;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.interleave_sectors = params->interleave_sectors;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors = params->buffer_sectors;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size = params->sector_size;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size = integrity_tag_size;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.integrity = integrity;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity = journal_integrity;
+ cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt = journal_crypt;
+
+ r = INTEGRITY_format(cd, params, cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key, cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key);
+ if (r)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot format integrity for device %s."),
+ mdata_device_path(cd));
+out:
+ if (r) {
+ crypt_free_volume_key(journal_crypt_key);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(journal_mac_key);
+ free(integrity);
+ free(journal_integrity);
+ free(journal_crypt);
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *type,
+ const char *cipher,
+ const char *cipher_mode,
+ const char *uuid,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ void *params,
+ bool sector_size_autodetect)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd || !type)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (cd->type) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Context already formatted as %s.", cd->type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Formatting device %s as type %s.", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)", type);
+
+ crypt_reset_null_type(cd);
+
+ r = init_crypto(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (isPLAIN(type))
+ r = _crypt_format_plain(cd, cipher, cipher_mode,
+ uuid, volume_key_size, params);
+ else if (isLUKS1(type))
+ r = _crypt_format_luks1(cd, cipher, cipher_mode,
+ uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params);
+ else if (isLUKS2(type))
+ r = _crypt_format_luks2(cd, cipher, cipher_mode,
+ uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params, sector_size_autodetect);
+ else if (isLOOPAES(type))
+ r = _crypt_format_loopaes(cd, cipher, uuid, volume_key_size, params);
+ else if (isVERITY(type))
+ r = _crypt_format_verity(cd, uuid, params);
+ else if (isINTEGRITY(type))
+ r = _crypt_format_integrity(cd, uuid, params);
+ else {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unknown crypt device type %s requested."), type);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0) {
+ crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(cd->volume_key);
+ cd->volume_key = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+CRYPT_SYMBOL_EXPORT_NEW(int, crypt_format, 2, 4,
+ /* crypt_format parameters follows */
+ struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *type,
+ const char *cipher,
+ const char *cipher_mode,
+ const char *uuid,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ void *params)
+{
+ return _crypt_format(cd, type, cipher, cipher_mode, uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params, true);
+}
+
+
+CRYPT_SYMBOL_EXPORT_OLD(int, crypt_format, 2, 0,
+ /* crypt_format parameters follows */
+ struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *type,
+ const char *cipher,
+ const char *cipher_mode,
+ const char *uuid,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ void *params)
+{
+ return _crypt_format(cd, type, cipher, cipher_mode, uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params, false);
+}
+
+int crypt_repair(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *requested_type,
+ void *params __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Trying to repair %s crypt type from device %s.",
+ requested_type ?: "any", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)");
+
+ if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Load with repair */
+ r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, false, true);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* cd->type and header must be set in context */
+ r = crypt_check_data_device_size(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* compare volume keys */
+static int _compare_volume_keys(struct volume_key *svk, unsigned skeyring_only,
+ struct volume_key *tvk, unsigned tkeyring_only)
+{
+ if (!svk && !tvk)
+ return 0;
+ else if (!svk || !tvk)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (svk->keylength != tvk->keylength)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!skeyring_only && !tkeyring_only)
+ return crypt_backend_memeq(svk->key, tvk->key, svk->keylength);
+
+ if (svk->key_description && tvk->key_description)
+ return strcmp(svk->key_description, tvk->key_description);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _compare_device_types(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const struct crypt_dm_active_device *src,
+ const struct crypt_dm_active_device *tgt)
+{
+ if (!tgt->uuid) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Missing device uuid in target device.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && !strncmp("INTEGRITY-", tgt->uuid, strlen("INTEGRITY-"))) {
+ if (crypt_uuid_cmp(tgt->uuid, src->uuid)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "LUKS UUID mismatch.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else if (isLUKS(cd->type)) {
+ if (!src->uuid || strncmp(cd->type, tgt->uuid, strlen(cd->type)) ||
+ crypt_uuid_cmp(tgt->uuid, src->uuid)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "LUKS UUID mismatch.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else if (isPLAIN(cd->type) || isLOOPAES(cd->type)) {
+ if (strncmp(cd->type, tgt->uuid, strlen(cd->type))) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Unexpected uuid prefix %s in target device.", tgt->uuid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else if (!isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device type %s for reload.", cd->type ?: "<empty>");
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _compare_crypt_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const struct dm_target *src,
+ const struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+ char *src_cipher = NULL, *src_integrity = NULL;
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+
+ /* for crypt devices keys are mandatory */
+ if (!src->u.crypt.vk || !tgt->u.crypt.vk)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* CIPHER checks */
+ if (!src->u.crypt.cipher || !tgt->u.crypt.cipher)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * dm_query_target converts capi cipher specification to dm-crypt format.
+ * We need to do same for cipher specification requested in source
+ * device.
+ */
+ if (crypt_capi_to_cipher(&src_cipher, &src_integrity, src->u.crypt.cipher, src->u.crypt.integrity))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (strcmp(src_cipher, tgt->u.crypt.cipher)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Cipher specs do not match.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength == 0 && crypt_is_cipher_null(tgt->u.crypt.cipher))
+ log_dbg(cd, "Existing device uses cipher null. Skipping key comparison.");
+ else if (_compare_volume_keys(src->u.crypt.vk, 0, tgt->u.crypt.vk, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description != NULL)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Keys in context and target device do not match.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_strcmp(src_integrity, tgt->u.crypt.integrity)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Integrity parameters do not match.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (src->u.crypt.offset != tgt->u.crypt.offset ||
+ src->u.crypt.sector_size != tgt->u.crypt.sector_size ||
+ src->u.crypt.iv_offset != tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset ||
+ src->u.crypt.tag_size != tgt->u.crypt.tag_size) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Integer parameters do not match.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (device_is_identical(src->data_device, tgt->data_device) <= 0)
+ log_dbg(cd, "Data devices do not match.");
+ else
+ r = 0;
+
+out:
+ free(src_cipher);
+ free(src_integrity);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _compare_integrity_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const struct dm_target *src,
+ const struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+ /*
+ * some parameters may be implicit (and set in dm-integrity ctor)
+ *
+ * journal_size
+ * journal_watermark
+ * journal_commit_time
+ * buffer_sectors
+ * interleave_sectors
+ */
+
+ /* check remaining integer values that makes sense */
+ if (src->u.integrity.tag_size != tgt->u.integrity.tag_size ||
+ src->u.integrity.offset != tgt->u.integrity.offset ||
+ src->u.integrity.sector_size != tgt->u.integrity.sector_size) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Integer parameters do not match.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_strcmp(src->u.integrity.integrity, tgt->u.integrity.integrity) ||
+ crypt_strcmp(src->u.integrity.journal_integrity, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity) ||
+ crypt_strcmp(src->u.integrity.journal_crypt, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Journal parameters do not match.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* unfortunately dm-integrity doesn't support keyring */
+ if (_compare_volume_keys(src->u.integrity.vk, 0, tgt->u.integrity.vk, 0) ||
+ _compare_volume_keys(src->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, 0, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, 0) ||
+ _compare_volume_keys(src->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key, 0, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key, 0)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Journal keys do not match.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (device_is_identical(src->data_device, tgt->data_device) <= 0) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Data devices do not match.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_compare_dm_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const struct crypt_dm_active_device *src,
+ const struct crypt_dm_active_device *tgt)
+{
+ int r;
+ const struct dm_target *s, *t;
+
+ if (!src || !tgt)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = _compare_device_types(cd, src, tgt);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ s = &src->segment;
+ t = &tgt->segment;
+
+ while (s || t) {
+ if (!s || !t) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "segments count mismatch.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (s->type != t->type) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "segment type mismatch.");
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (s->type) {
+ case DM_CRYPT:
+ r = _compare_crypt_devices(cd, s, t);
+ break;
+ case DM_INTEGRITY:
+ r = _compare_integrity_devices(cd, s, t);
+ break;
+ case DM_LINEAR:
+ r = (s->u.linear.offset == t->u.linear.offset) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ if (r)
+ break;
+
+ s = s->next;
+ t = t->next;
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device *sdmd)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device tdmd;
+ struct dm_target *src, *tgt = &tdmd.segment;
+
+ if (!cd || !cd->type || !name || !(sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+ DM_ACTIVE_UUID | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE |
+ DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY | DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS |
+ DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY | DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_MAC_KEY, &tdmd);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!single_segment(&tdmd) ||
+ (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT && tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY) ||
+ (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT && tgt->u.crypt.tag_size)) {
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_compare_dm_devices(cd, sdmd, &tdmd);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Mismatching parameters on device %s."), name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ src = &sdmd->segment;
+
+ /* Changing read only flag for active device makes no sense */
+ if (tdmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY)
+ sdmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+ else
+ sdmd->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT && sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+ r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(tgt->u.crypt.vk, src->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ } else if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+ crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.crypt.vk);
+ tgt->u.crypt.vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(src->u.crypt.vk->keylength, src->u.crypt.vk->key);
+ if (!tgt->u.crypt.vk) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT)
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
+ src->u.crypt.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+ else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
+ src->u.integrity.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+ else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ tdmd.flags = sdmd->flags;
+ tgt->size = tdmd.size = sdmd->size;
+
+ r = dm_reload_device(cd, name, &tdmd, 0, 1);
+out:
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &tdmd);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)tdmd.uuid);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _reload_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *iname,
+ const char *ipath,
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device *sdmd,
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device *sdmdi)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device tdmd, tdmdi = {};
+ struct dm_target *src, *srci, *tgt = &tdmd.segment, *tgti = &tdmdi.segment;
+ struct device *data_device = NULL;
+ bool clear = false;
+
+ if (!cd || !cd->type || !name || !iname || !(sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+ DM_ACTIVE_UUID | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE |
+ DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY, &tdmd);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!single_segment(&tdmd) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT || !tgt->u.crypt.tag_size) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), name);
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, iname, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &tdmdi);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), iname);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!single_segment(&tdmdi) || tgti->type != DM_INTEGRITY) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), iname);
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_compare_dm_devices(cd, sdmdi, &tdmdi);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Mismatching parameters on device %s."), iname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* unsupported underneath dm-crypt with auth. encryption */
+ if (sdmdi->segment.u.integrity.meta_device || tdmdi.segment.u.integrity.meta_device)
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+
+ src = &sdmd->segment;
+ srci = &sdmdi->segment;
+
+ r = device_alloc(cd, &data_device, ipath);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, srci->data_device, DEV_OK,
+ srci->u.integrity.offset, &sdmdi->size, NULL);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ src->data_device = data_device;
+
+ r = crypt_compare_dm_devices(cd, sdmd, &tdmd);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Crypt devices mismatch."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Changing read only flag for active device makes no sense */
+ if (tdmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY)
+ sdmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+ else
+ sdmd->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+ if (tdmdi.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY)
+ sdmdi->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+ else
+ sdmdi->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+ if (sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+ r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(tgt->u.crypt.vk, src->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.crypt.vk);
+ tgt->u.crypt.vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(src->u.crypt.vk->keylength, src->u.crypt.vk->key);
+ if (!tgt->u.crypt.vk) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
+ src->u.crypt.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ tdmd.flags = sdmd->flags;
+ tdmd.size = sdmd->size;
+
+ if ((r = dm_reload_device(cd, iname, sdmdi, 0, 0))) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to reload device %s."), iname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = dm_reload_device(cd, name, &tdmd, 0, 0))) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to reload device %s."), name);
+ clear = true;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = dm_suspend_device(cd, name, 0))) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to suspend device %s."), name);
+ clear = true;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = dm_suspend_device(cd, iname, 0))) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to suspend device %s."), iname);
+ clear = true;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = dm_resume_device(cd, iname, act2dmflags(sdmdi->flags)))) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to resume device %s."), iname);
+ clear = true;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = dm_resume_device(cd, name, act2dmflags(tdmd.flags));
+ if (!r)
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * This is worst case scenario. We have active underlying dm-integrity device with
+ * new table but dm-crypt resume failed for some reason. Tear everything down and
+ * burn it for good.
+ */
+
+ log_err(cd, _("Fatal error while reloading device %s (on top of device %s)."), name, iname);
+
+ if (dm_error_device(cd, name))
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to switch device %s to dm-error."), name);
+ if (dm_error_device(cd, iname))
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to switch device %s to dm-error."), iname);
+out:
+ if (clear) {
+ dm_clear_device(cd, name);
+ dm_clear_device(cd, iname);
+
+ if (dm_status_suspended(cd, name) > 0)
+ dm_resume_device(cd, name, 0);
+ if (dm_status_suspended(cd, iname) > 0)
+ dm_resume_device(cd, iname, 0);
+ }
+
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &tdmd);
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &tdmdi);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)tdmdi.uuid);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)tdmd.uuid);
+ device_free(cd, data_device);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_resize(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t new_size)
+{
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdq, dmd = {};
+ struct dm_target *tgt = &dmdq.segment;
+ struct crypt_params_integrity params = {};
+ uint32_t supported_flags = 0;
+ uint64_t old_size;
+ int r;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Also with LUKS2 we must not allow resize when there's
+ * explicit size stored in metadata (length != "dynamic")
+ */
+
+ /* Device context type must be initialized */
+ if (!cd || !cd->type || !name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (isTCRYPT(cd->type) || isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for this device type."));
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Resizing device %s to %" PRIu64 " sectors.", name, new_size);
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY |
+ DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS | DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY |
+ DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_MAC_KEY, &dmdq);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (!single_segment(&dmdq) || (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT && tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((dmdq.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_key_in_keyring(cd)) {
+ r = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_key_in_keyring(cd)) {
+ if (!isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr,
+ tgt->u.crypt.vk, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ dmdq.flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_loop_device(crypt_get_device_name(cd))) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Trying to resize underlying loop device %s.",
+ crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+ /* Here we always use default size not new_size */
+ if (crypt_loop_resize(crypt_get_device_name(cd)))
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot resize loop device."));
+ }
+
+
+ /*
+ * Integrity device metadata are maintained by the kernel. We need to
+ * reload the device (with the same parameters) and let the kernel
+ * calculate the maximum size of integrity device and store it in the
+ * superblock.
+ */
+ if (!new_size && tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY) {
+ r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+ crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE, &old_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ dmd.size = dmdq.size;
+ dmd.flags = dmdq.flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE;
+
+ r = crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, ¶ms);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = dm_integrity_target_set(cd, &dmd.segment, 0, dmdq.segment.size,
+ crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd),
+ crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+ crypt_get_sector_size(cd), tgt->u.integrity.vk, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key,
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, ¶ms);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ r = _reload_device(cd, name, &dmd);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+ crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE, &new_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Maximum integrity device size from kernel %" PRIu64, new_size);
+
+ if (old_size == new_size && new_size == dmdq.size &&
+ !dm_flags(cd, tgt->type, &supported_flags) &&
+ !(supported_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_RESIZE_SUPPORTED))
+ log_std(cd, _("WARNING: Maximum size already set or kernel doesn't support resize.\n"));
+ }
+
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), DEV_OK,
+ crypt_get_data_offset(cd), &new_size, &dmdq.flags);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (MISALIGNED(new_size, (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT ? tgt->u.crypt.sector_size : tgt->u.integrity.sector_size) >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (MISALIGNED(new_size, device_block_size(cd, crypt_data_device(cd)) >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to device logical block size."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ dmd.uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd);
+ dmd.size = new_size;
+ dmd.flags = dmdq.flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+ r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, new_size, crypt_data_device(cd),
+ tgt->u.crypt.vk, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd),
+ crypt_get_iv_offset(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+ crypt_get_integrity(cd), crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
+ crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY) {
+ r = crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, ¶ms);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = dm_integrity_target_set(cd, &dmd.segment, 0, new_size,
+ crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd),
+ crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+ crypt_get_sector_size(cd), tgt->u.integrity.vk, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key,
+ tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, ¶ms);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (new_size == dmdq.size) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Device has already requested size %" PRIu64
+ " sectors.", dmdq.size);
+ r = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS2_unmet_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, 0, 0);
+ if (!r)
+ r = _reload_device(cd, name, &dmd);
+
+ if (r && tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY &&
+ !dm_flags(cd, tgt->type, &supported_flags) &&
+ !(supported_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_RESIZE_SUPPORTED))
+ log_err(cd, _("Resize failed, the kernel doesn't support it."));
+ }
+out:
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdq);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_set_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *uuid)
+{
+ const char *active_uuid;
+ int r;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "%s device uuid.", uuid ? "Setting new" : "Refreshing");
+
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+ return r;
+
+ active_uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd);
+
+ if (uuid && active_uuid && !strncmp(uuid, active_uuid, UUID_STRING_L)) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "UUID is the same as requested (%s) for device %s.",
+ uuid, mdata_device_path(cd));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (uuid)
+ log_dbg(cd, "Requested new UUID change to %s for %s.", uuid, mdata_device_path(cd));
+ else
+ log_dbg(cd, "Requested new UUID refresh for %s.", mdata_device_path(cd));
+
+ if (!crypt_confirm(cd, _("Do you really want to change UUID of device?")))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return LUKS_hdr_uuid_set(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, uuid, cd);
+ else
+ return LUKS2_hdr_uuid(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, uuid);
+}
+
+int crypt_set_label(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *label, const char *subsystem)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Setting new labels.");
+
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+ return r;
+
+ return LUKS2_hdr_labels(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, label, subsystem, 1);
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_label(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (_onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return cd->u.luks2.hdr.label;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_subsystem(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (_onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return cd->u.luks2.hdr.subsystem;
+}
+
+int crypt_header_backup(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *requested_type,
+ const char *backup_file)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!backup_file)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Load with repair */
+ r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, false, false);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Requested header backup of device %s (%s) to "
+ "file %s.", mdata_device_path(cd), requested_type ?: "any type", backup_file);
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS1(requested_type)))
+ r = LUKS_hdr_backup(backup_file, cd);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS2(requested_type)))
+ r = LUKS2_hdr_backup(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, backup_file);
+ else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_header_restore(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *requested_type,
+ const char *backup_file)
+{
+ struct luks_phdr hdr1;
+ struct luks2_hdr hdr2;
+ int r, version;
+
+ if (requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!cd || (cd->type && !isLUKS(cd->type)) || !backup_file)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = init_crypto(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Requested header restore to device %s (%s) from "
+ "file %s.", mdata_device_path(cd), requested_type ?: "any type", backup_file);
+
+ version = LUKS2_hdr_version_unlocked(cd, backup_file);
+ if (!version ||
+ (requested_type && version == 1 && !isLUKS1(requested_type)) ||
+ (requested_type && version == 2 && !isLUKS2(requested_type))) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ memset(&hdr2, 0, sizeof(hdr2));
+
+ if (!cd->type) {
+ if (version == 1)
+ r = LUKS_hdr_restore(backup_file, &hdr1, cd);
+ else
+ r = LUKS2_hdr_restore(cd, &hdr2, backup_file);
+
+ crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr1, sizeof(hdr1));
+ crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
+ } else if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS2(requested_type))) {
+ r = LUKS2_hdr_restore(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, backup_file);
+ if (r)
+ (void) _crypt_load_luks2(cd, 1, 0);
+ } else if (isLUKS1(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS1(requested_type)))
+ r = LUKS_hdr_restore(backup_file, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+ else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!r)
+ r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, version == 1 ? CRYPT_LUKS1 : CRYPT_LUKS2, false, true);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_header_is_detached(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd || (cd->type && !isLUKS(cd->type)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = device_is_identical(crypt_data_device(cd), crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Failed to compare data and metadata devices path.");
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return r ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+void crypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Releasing crypt device %s context.", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "empty");
+
+ dm_backend_exit(cd);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(cd->volume_key);
+
+ crypt_free_type(cd, NULL);
+
+ device_free(cd, cd->device);
+ device_free(cd, cd->metadata_device);
+
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->pbkdf.type);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->pbkdf.hash);
+
+ /* Some structures can contain keys (TCRYPT), wipe it */
+ crypt_safe_memzero(cd, sizeof(*cd));
+ free(cd);
+}
+
+static char *crypt_get_device_key_description(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ char *desc = NULL;
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+ struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+
+ if (dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE, &dmd) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (single_segment(&dmd) && tgt->type == DM_CRYPT &&
+ (dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description)
+ desc = strdup(tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
+
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+
+ return desc;
+}
+
+int crypt_suspend(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ char *key_desc;
+ crypt_status_info ci;
+ int r;
+ uint32_t dmflags = DM_SUSPEND_WIPE_KEY;
+
+ /* FIXME: check context uuid matches the dm-crypt device uuid (onlyLUKS branching) */
+
+ if (!cd || !name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Suspending volume %s.", name);
+
+ if (cd->type)
+ r = onlyLUKS(cd);
+ else {
+ r = crypt_uuid_type_cmp(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1);
+ if (r < 0)
+ r = crypt_uuid_type_cmp(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device."));
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ ci = crypt_status(NULL, name);
+ if (ci < CRYPT_ACTIVE) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not active."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ dm_backend_init(cd);
+
+ r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is already suspended."), name);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ key_desc = crypt_get_device_key_description(cd, name);
+
+ /* we can't simply wipe wrapped keys */
+ if (crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)))
+ dmflags &= ~DM_SUSPEND_WIPE_KEY;
+
+ r = dm_suspend_device(cd, name, dmflags);
+ if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+ log_err(cd, _("Suspend is not supported for device %s."), name);
+ else if (r)
+ log_err(cd, _("Error during suspending device %s."), name);
+ else
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key_by_description(cd, key_desc, LOGON_KEY);
+ free(key_desc);
+out:
+ dm_backend_exit(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* key must be properly verified */
+static int resume_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct volume_key *vk,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ int digest, r;
+ struct volume_key *zerokey = NULL;
+
+ if (crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd))) {
+ zerokey = crypt_alloc_volume_key(0, NULL);
+ if (!zerokey)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ vk = zerokey;
+ } else if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) {
+ /* LUKS2 path only */
+ digest = LUKS2_digest_by_segment(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+ if (digest < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, vk, digest);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(cd, name, vk);
+
+ if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+ log_err(cd, _("Resume is not supported for device %s."), name);
+ else if (r)
+ log_err(cd, _("Error during resuming device %s."), name);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk);
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(zerokey);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size)
+{
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ /* FIXME: check context uuid matches the dm-crypt device uuid */
+
+ if (!passphrase || !name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s.", name);
+
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+ return r;
+
+ r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (!r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+ &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+ else
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ keyslot = r;
+
+ r = resume_by_volume_key(cd, vk, name);
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ uint64_t keyfile_offset)
+{
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ char *passphrase_read = NULL;
+ size_t passphrase_size_read;
+ int r;
+
+ /* FIXME: check context uuid matches the dm-crypt device uuid */
+
+ if (!name || !keyfile)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s.", name);
+
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+ return r;
+
+ r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (!r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, keyfile,
+ &passphrase_read, &passphrase_size_read,
+ keyfile_offset, keyfile_size, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read,
+ &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+ else
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT,
+ passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read, &vk);
+
+ crypt_safe_free(passphrase_read);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ keyslot = r;
+
+ r = resume_by_volume_key(cd, vk, name);
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size)
+{
+ return crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot,
+ keyfile, keyfile_size, 0);
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ size_t keyfile_offset)
+{
+ return crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot,
+ keyfile, keyfile_size, keyfile_offset);
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size)
+{
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!name || !volume_key)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s by volume key.", name);
+
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+ return r;
+
+ r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (!r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+ if (!vk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+ else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ if (r == -EPERM || r == -ENOENT)
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = resume_by_volume_key(cd, vk, name);
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_token_pin(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ const char *type, int token, const char *pin, size_t pin_size,
+ void *usrptr)
+{
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ int r, keyslot;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s by token (%s type) %d.",
+ name, type ?: "any", token);
+
+ if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET, 0)))
+ return r;
+
+ r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (!r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = LUKS2_token_unlock_key(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, type,
+ pin, pin_size, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, usrptr, &vk);
+ keyslot = r;
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = resume_by_volume_key(cd, vk, name);
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Keyslot manipulation
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot, // -1 any
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ const char *new_passphrase,
+ size_t new_passphrase_size)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context kc, new_kc;
+
+ if (!passphrase || !new_passphrase)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&kc, passphrase, passphrase_size);
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&new_kc, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size);
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyslot_context(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &kc, keyslot, &new_kc, 0);
+
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&new_kc);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot_old,
+ int keyslot_new,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ const char *new_passphrase,
+ size_t new_passphrase_size)
+{
+ int digest = -1, r, keyslot_new_orig = keyslot_new;
+ struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+ if (!passphrase || !new_passphrase)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Changing passphrase from old keyslot %d to new %d.",
+ keyslot_old, keyslot_new);
+
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+ return r;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot_old, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+ &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot_old, CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT, passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+ /* will fail for keyslots w/o digest. fix if supported in a future */
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, r);
+ if (digest < 0)
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (keyslot_old != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT && keyslot_old != r) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot mismatch.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ keyslot_old = r;
+
+ if (keyslot_new == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ keyslot_new = LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ keyslot_new = LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk->keylength);
+ if (keyslot_new < 0)
+ keyslot_new = keyslot_old;
+ }
+ log_dbg(cd, "Key change, old slot %d, new slot %d.", keyslot_old, keyslot_new);
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ if (keyslot_old == keyslot_new) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Key slot %d is going to be overwritten.", keyslot_old);
+ (void)crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, keyslot_old);
+ }
+ r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot_new, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size,
+ &cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd);
+ } else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, ¶ms);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (keyslot_old != keyslot_new) {
+ r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_new, digest, 1, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = LUKS2_token_assignment_copy(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_old, keyslot_new, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Key slot %d is going to be overwritten.", keyslot_old);
+ /* FIXME: improve return code so that we can detect area is damaged */
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_old, 1);
+ if (r) {
+ /* (void)crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, keyslot_old); */
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr,
+ keyslot_new, new_passphrase,
+ new_passphrase_size, vk, ¶ms);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Swap old & new so the final keyslot number remains */
+ if (keyslot_new_orig == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT && keyslot_old != keyslot_new) {
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_swap(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_old, keyslot_new);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Swap slot id */
+ r = keyslot_old;
+ keyslot_old = keyslot_new;
+ keyslot_new = r;
+ }
+ } else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (r >= 0 && keyslot_old != keyslot_new)
+ r = crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, keyslot_old);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to swap new key slot."));
+out:
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ _luks2_rollback(cd);
+ return r;
+ }
+ return keyslot_new;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ uint64_t keyfile_offset,
+ const char *new_keyfile,
+ size_t new_keyfile_size,
+ uint64_t new_keyfile_offset)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context kc, new_kc;
+
+ if (!keyfile || !new_keyfile)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_keyfile_init_internal(&kc, keyfile, keyfile_size, keyfile_offset);
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_keyfile_init_internal(&new_kc, new_keyfile, new_keyfile_size, new_keyfile_offset);
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyslot_context(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &kc, keyslot, &new_kc, 0);
+
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&new_kc);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ const char *new_keyfile,
+ size_t new_keyfile_size)
+{
+ return crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, keyslot,
+ keyfile, keyfile_size, 0,
+ new_keyfile, new_keyfile_size, 0);
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ size_t keyfile_offset,
+ const char *new_keyfile,
+ size_t new_keyfile_size,
+ size_t new_keyfile_offset)
+{
+ return crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, keyslot,
+ keyfile, keyfile_size, keyfile_offset,
+ new_keyfile, new_keyfile_size, new_keyfile_offset);
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context kc, new_kc;
+
+ if (!passphrase)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_key_init_internal(&kc, volume_key, volume_key_size);
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&new_kc, passphrase, passphrase_size);
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyslot_context(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &kc, keyslot, &new_kc, 0);
+
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&new_kc);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_destroy(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+ crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+ int r;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Destroying keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+
+ if ((r = _onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED)))
+ return r;
+
+ ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, keyslot);
+ if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is invalid."), keyslot);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Keyslot %d is not active."), keyslot);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return LUKS_del_key(keyslot, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+ }
+
+ return LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, 0);
+}
+
+static int _check_header_data_overlap(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ if (!name || !isLUKS(cd->type))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (device_is_identical(crypt_data_device(cd), crypt_metadata_device(cd)) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* FIXME: check real header size */
+ if (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) == 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device header overlaps with data area."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_devices(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *iname, uint32_t *flags)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!flags || !name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (iname) {
+ r = dm_status_device(cd, iname);
+ if (r >= 0 && !(*flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+ return -EBUSY;
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENODEV)
+ return r;
+ if (r == -ENODEV)
+ *flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+ }
+
+ r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
+ if (r >= 0 && !(*flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+ return -EBUSY;
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENODEV)
+ return r;
+ if (r == -ENODEV)
+ *flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _create_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *type, const char *name, const char *iname,
+ const char *ipath, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmdi)
+{
+ int r;
+ enum devcheck device_check;
+ struct dm_target *tgt;
+ struct device *device = NULL;
+
+ if (!single_segment(dmd))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tgt = &dmd->segment;
+ if (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ device_check = dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED ? DEV_OK : DEV_EXCL;
+
+ r = INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(cd, iname, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, dmdi, 0);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ r = device_alloc(cd, &device, ipath);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ tgt->data_device = device;
+
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, device_check,
+ tgt->u.crypt.offset, &dmd->size, &dmd->flags);
+
+ if (!r)
+ r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
+out:
+ if (r < 0)
+ dm_remove_device(cd, iname, 0);
+
+ device_free(cd, device);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int kernel_keyring_support(void)
+{
+ static unsigned _checked = 0;
+
+ if (!_checked) {
+ _kernel_keyring_supported = keyring_check();
+ _checked = 1;
+ }
+
+ return _kernel_keyring_supported;
+}
+
+static int dmcrypt_keyring_bug(void)
+{
+ uint64_t kversion;
+
+ if (kernel_version(&kversion))
+ return 1;
+ return kversion < compact_version(4,15,0,0);
+}
+
+int create_or_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ const char *type, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+ int r;
+ enum devcheck device_check;
+ struct dm_target *tgt;
+
+ if (!type || !name || !single_segment(dmd))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tgt = &dmd->segment;
+ if (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT && tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* drop CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH flag if any device is inactive */
+ r = check_devices(cd, name, NULL, &dmd->flags);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ if (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH)
+ r = _reload_device(cd, name, dmd);
+ else {
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+ device_check = dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED ? DEV_OK : DEV_EXCL;
+
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, device_check,
+ tgt->u.crypt.offset, &dmd->size, &dmd->flags);
+ if (!r) {
+ tgt->size = dmd->size;
+ r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
+ }
+ } else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY) {
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, DEV_EXCL,
+ tgt->u.integrity.offset, NULL, &dmd->flags);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device, DEV_EXCL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int create_or_reload_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ const char *type, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmdi)
+{
+ int r;
+ const char *iname = NULL;
+ char *ipath = NULL;
+
+ if (!type || !name || !dmd || !dmdi)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (asprintf(&ipath, "%s/%s_dif", dm_get_dir(), name) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ iname = ipath + strlen(dm_get_dir()) + 1;
+
+ /* drop CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH flag if any device is inactive */
+ r = check_devices(cd, name, iname, &dmd->flags);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH)
+ r = _reload_device_with_integrity(cd, name, iname, ipath, dmd, dmdi);
+ else
+ r = _create_device_with_integrity(cd, type, name, iname, ipath, dmd, dmdi);
+out:
+ free(ipath);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _open_and_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ bool use_keyring;
+ int r;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot,
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) ?
+ CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT : CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT,
+ passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ keyslot = r;
+
+ if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+ use_keyring = false;
+ else
+ use_keyring = ((name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) ||
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY));
+
+ if (use_keyring) {
+ r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd,
+ &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, keyslot);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (name)
+ r = LUKS2_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+out:
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
+static int load_all_keys(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vks)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct volume_key *vk = vks;
+
+ while (vk) {
+ r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ vk = crypt_volume_key_next(vk);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _open_all_keys(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ uint32_t flags,
+ struct volume_key **vks)
+{
+ int r, segment;
+ struct volume_key *_vks = NULL;
+ crypt_reencrypt_info ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(hdr);
+
+ segment = (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) ? CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT : CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT;
+
+ switch (ri) {
+ case CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE:
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, segment, passphrase, passphrase_size, &_vks);
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CLEAN:
+ case CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CRASH:
+ if (segment == CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT)
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, segment, passphrase,
+ passphrase_size, &_vks);
+ else
+ r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_all_segments(cd, keyslot,
+ keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+ &_vks);
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+ keyslot = r;
+
+ if (r >= 0 && (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY))
+ r = load_all_keys(cd, hdr, _vks);
+
+ if (r >= 0 && vks)
+ MOVE_REF(*vks, _vks);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, _vks);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(_vks);
+
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+static int _open_and_activate_reencrypt_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ bool dynamic_size;
+ crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
+ uint64_t minimal_size, device_size;
+ struct volume_key *vks = NULL;
+ int r = 0;
+ struct crypt_lock_handle *reencrypt_lock = NULL;
+
+ if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+ flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+
+ r = LUKS2_reencrypt_lock(cd, &reencrypt_lock);
+ if (r) {
+ if (r == -EBUSY)
+ log_err(cd, _("Reencryption in-progress. Cannot activate device."));
+ else
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to get reencryption lock."));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL)))
+ goto out;
+
+ ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(hdr);
+
+ if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CRASH) {
+ r = LUKS2_reencrypt_locked_recovery_by_passphrase(cd, keyslot,
+ keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, &vks);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("LUKS2 reencryption recovery failed."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ keyslot = r;
+
+ ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(hdr);
+ }
+
+ /* recovery finished reencryption or it's already finished */
+ if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vks);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vks);
+ LUKS2_reencrypt_unlock(cd, reencrypt_lock);
+ return _open_and_activate(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+ }
+
+ if (ri > CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CLEAN) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (LUKS2_get_data_size(hdr, &minimal_size, &dynamic_size))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!vks) {
+ r = _open_all_keys(cd, hdr, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags, &vks);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ keyslot = r;
+ }
+
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ r = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vks);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Entering clean reencryption state mode.");
+
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = LUKS2_reencrypt_check_device_size(cd, hdr, minimal_size, &device_size, true, dynamic_size);
+
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = LUKS2_activate_multi(cd, name, vks, device_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT, flags);
+out:
+ LUKS2_reencrypt_unlock(cd, reencrypt_lock);
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vks);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vks);
+
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Activation/deactivation of a device
+ */
+static int _open_and_activate_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
+ int r, rv;
+ struct luks2_hdr *hdr = &cd->u.luks2.hdr;
+ struct volume_key *vks = NULL;
+
+ ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(hdr);
+ if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (ri > CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
+ if (name)
+ r = _open_and_activate_reencrypt_device(cd, hdr, keyslot, name, passphrase,
+ passphrase_size, flags);
+ else {
+ r = _open_all_keys(cd, hdr, keyslot, passphrase,
+ passphrase_size, flags, &vks);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ rv = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vks);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vks);
+ if (rv < 0)
+ return rv;
+ }
+ } else
+ r = _open_and_activate(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase,
+ passphrase_size, flags);
+
+ return r;
+}
+#else
+static int _open_and_activate_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
+
+ ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (ri > CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
+ log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for this device type."));
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ return _open_and_activate(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int _activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) && name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = _check_header_data_overlap(cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF)
+ cd->memory_hard_pbkdf_lock_enabled = true;
+
+ /* plain, use hashed passphrase */
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ if (!name)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = process_key(cd, cd->u.plain.hdr.hash,
+ cd->u.plain.key_size,
+ passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = PLAIN_activate(cd, name, vk, cd->u.plain.hdr.size, flags);
+ keyslot = 0;
+ } else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase,
+ passphrase_size, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ keyslot = r;
+ if (name)
+ r = LUKS1_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+ }
+ } else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ r = _open_and_activate_luks2(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+ keyslot = r;
+ } else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+ r = BITLK_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+ &cd->u.bitlk.params, flags);
+ keyslot = 0;
+ } else if (isFVAULT2(cd->type)) {
+ r = FVAULT2_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+ &cd->u.fvault2.params, flags);
+ keyslot = 0;
+ } else {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device type is not properly initialized."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+out:
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+ cd->memory_hard_pbkdf_lock_enabled = false;
+
+ return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+static int _activate_loopaes(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ char *buffer,
+ size_t buffer_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ int r;
+ unsigned int key_count = 0;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+ r = LOOPAES_parse_keyfile(cd, &vk, cd->u.loopaes.hdr.hash, &key_count,
+ buffer, buffer_size);
+
+ if (!r && name)
+ r = LOOPAES_activate(cd, name, cd->u.loopaes.cipher, key_count,
+ vk, flags);
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _activate_check_status(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, unsigned reload)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return 0;
+
+ r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
+
+ if (r >= 0 && reload)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (r >= 0 || r == -EEXIST) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s already exists."), name);
+ return -EEXIST;
+ }
+
+ if (r == -ENODEV)
+ return 0;
+
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."), name);
+ return r;
+}
+
+// activation/deactivation of device mapping
+int crypt_activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd || !passphrase || (!name && (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s [keyslot %d] using passphrase.",
+ name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase",
+ keyslot);
+
+ r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return _activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ uint64_t keyfile_offset,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ char *passphrase_read = NULL;
+ size_t passphrase_size_read;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd || !keyfile ||
+ ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s [keyslot %d] using keyfile %s.",
+ name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase", keyslot, keyfile);
+
+ r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, keyfile,
+ &passphrase_read, &passphrase_size_read,
+ keyfile_offset, keyfile_size, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+ r = _activate_loopaes(cd, name, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read, flags);
+ else
+ r = _activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read, flags);
+
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(passphrase_read);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ return crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot, keyfile,
+ keyfile_size, 0, flags);
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *keyfile,
+ size_t keyfile_size,
+ size_t keyfile_offset,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ return crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot, keyfile,
+ keyfile_size, keyfile_offset, flags);
+}
+int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ bool use_keyring;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd ||
+ ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s by volume key.", name ? "Activating" : "Checking",
+ name ?: "");
+
+ r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = _check_header_data_overlap(cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* use key directly, no hash */
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
+ if (!name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!volume_key || !volume_key_size || volume_key_size != cd->u.plain.key_size) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Incorrect volume key specified for plain device."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+ if (!vk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = PLAIN_activate(cd, name, vk, cd->u.plain.hdr.size, flags);
+ } else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ /* If key is not provided, try to use internal key */
+ if (!volume_key) {
+ if (!cd->volume_key) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ volume_key_size = cd->volume_key->keylength;
+ volume_key = cd->volume_key->key;
+ }
+
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+ if (!vk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
+
+ if (r == -EPERM)
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+
+ if (!r && name)
+ r = LUKS1_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+ } else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ /* If key is not provided, try to use internal key */
+ if (!volume_key) {
+ if (!cd->volume_key) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ volume_key_size = cd->volume_key->keylength;
+ volume_key = cd->volume_key->key;
+ }
+
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+ if (!vk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+ if (r == -EPERM || r == -ENOENT)
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+ if (r > 0)
+ r = 0;
+
+ if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+ use_keyring = false;
+ else
+ use_keyring = (name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) ||
+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY);
+
+ if (!r && use_keyring) {
+ r = LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(cd,
+ &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+ if (!r)
+ r = crypt_volume_key_load_in_keyring(cd, vk);
+ if (!r)
+ flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (!r && name)
+ r = LUKS2_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+ } else if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
+ r = crypt_activate_by_signed_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size, NULL, 0, flags);
+ } else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+ if (!name)
+ return 0;
+ r = TCRYPT_activate(cd, name, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr,
+ &cd->u.tcrypt.params, flags);
+ } else if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+ if (!name)
+ return 0;
+ if (volume_key) {
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+ if (!vk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ r = INTEGRITY_activate(cd, name, &cd->u.integrity.params, vk,
+ cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key,
+ cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key, flags,
+ cd->u.integrity.sb_flags);
+ } else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+ r = BITLK_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size,
+ &cd->u.bitlk.params, flags);
+ } else {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device type is not properly initialized."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_signed_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ const char *signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ char description[512];
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd || !isVERITY(cd->type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!volume_key || !volume_key_size || (!name && signature)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (name)
+ log_dbg(cd, "Activating volume %s by %skey.", name, signature ? "signed " : "");
+ else
+ log_dbg(cd, "Checking volume by key.");
+
+ if (cd->u.verity.hdr.flags & CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE && !signature) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Root hash signature required."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (signature && !kernel_keyring_support()) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Kernel keyring missing: required for passing signature to kernel."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* volume_key == root hash */
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.root_hash);
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash = NULL;
+
+ if (signature) {
+ r = snprintf(description, sizeof(description)-1, "cryptsetup:%s%s%s",
+ crypt_get_uuid(cd) ?: "", crypt_get_uuid(cd) ? "-" : "", name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Adding signature into keyring %s", description);
+ r = keyring_add_key_in_thread_keyring(USER_KEY, description, signature, signature_size);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to load key in kernel keyring."));
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = VERITY_activate(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size,
+ signature ? description : NULL,
+ cd->u.verity.fec_device,
+ &cd->u.verity.hdr, flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY);
+
+ if (!r) {
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = volume_key_size;
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash = malloc(volume_key_size);
+ if (cd->u.verity.root_hash)
+ memcpy(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.root_hash, volume_key, volume_key_size);
+ }
+
+ if (signature)
+ crypt_drop_keyring_key_by_description(cd, description, USER_KEY);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_deactivate_by_name(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *fake_cd = NULL;
+ struct luks2_hdr *hdr2 = NULL;
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
+ int r;
+ uint32_t get_flags = DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_UUID | DM_ACTIVE_HOLDERS;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED) && (flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Deactivating volume %s.", name);
+
+ if (!cd) {
+ r = crypt_init_by_name(&fake_cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ cd = fake_cd;
+ }
+
+ /* skip holders detection and early abort when some flags raised */
+ if (flags & (CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE | CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED | CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL))
+ get_flags &= ~DM_ACTIVE_HOLDERS;
+
+ switch (crypt_status(cd, name)) {
+ case CRYPT_ACTIVE:
+ case CRYPT_BUSY:
+ if (flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL) {
+ r = dm_cancel_deferred_removal(name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Could not cancel deferred remove from device %s."), name);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, name, get_flags, &dmd);
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ if (dmd.holders) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is still in use."), name);
+ r = -EBUSY;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ hdr2 = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+
+ if ((dmd.uuid && !strncmp(CRYPT_LUKS2, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LUKS2)-1)) || hdr2)
+ r = LUKS2_deactivate(cd, name, hdr2, &dmd, flags);
+ else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ r = TCRYPT_deactivate(cd, name, flags);
+ else
+ r = dm_remove_device(cd, name, flags);
+ if (r < 0 && crypt_status(cd, name) == CRYPT_BUSY) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is still in use."), name);
+ r = -EBUSY;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_INACTIVE:
+ log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+ r = -ENODEV;
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_err(cd, _("Invalid device %s."), name);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+ free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+ crypt_free(fake_cd);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ return crypt_deactivate_by_name(cd, name, 0);
+}
+
+int crypt_get_active_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+ struct crypt_active_device *cad)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd, dmdi = {};
+ const char *namei = NULL;
+ struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+ uint64_t min_offset = UINT64_MAX;
+
+ if (!cd || !name || !cad)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE, &dmd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* For LUKS2 with integrity we need flags from underlying dm-integrity */
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd) && single_segment(&dmd)) {
+ namei = device_dm_name(tgt->data_device);
+ if (namei && dm_query_device(cd, namei, 0, &dmdi) >= 0)
+ dmd.flags |= dmdi.flags;
+ }
+
+ if (cd && isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+ cad->offset = TCRYPT_get_data_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+ cad->iv_offset = TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+ } else {
+ while (tgt) {
+ if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT && (min_offset > tgt->u.crypt.offset)) {
+ min_offset = tgt->u.crypt.offset;
+ cad->iv_offset = tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset;
+ } else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY && (min_offset > tgt->u.integrity.offset)) {
+ min_offset = tgt->u.integrity.offset;
+ cad->iv_offset = 0;
+ } else if (tgt->type == DM_LINEAR && (min_offset > tgt->u.linear.offset)) {
+ min_offset = tgt->u.linear.offset;
+ cad->iv_offset = 0;
+ }
+ tgt = tgt->next;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (min_offset != UINT64_MAX)
+ cad->offset = min_offset;
+
+ cad->size = dmd.size;
+ cad->flags = dmd.flags;
+
+ r = 0;
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+uint64_t crypt_get_active_integrity_failures(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+ uint64_t failures = 0;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* LUKS2 / dm-crypt does not provide this count. */
+ if (dm_query_device(cd, name, 0, &dmd) < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (single_segment(&dmd) && dmd.segment.type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+ (void)dm_status_integrity_failures(cd, name, &failures);
+
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+
+ return failures;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Volume key handling
+ */
+int crypt_volume_key_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ char *volume_key,
+ size_t *volume_key_size,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_size)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context kc;
+
+ if (!passphrase)
+ return crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context(cd, keyslot, volume_key, volume_key_size, NULL);
+
+ crypt_keyslot_unlock_by_passphrase_init_internal(&kc, passphrase, passphrase_size);
+
+ r = crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context(cd, keyslot, volume_key, volume_key_size, &kc);
+
+ crypt_keyslot_context_destroy_internal(&kc);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ char *volume_key,
+ size_t *volume_key_size,
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context *kc)
+{
+ size_t passphrase_size;
+ int key_len, r;
+ const char *passphrase = NULL;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+ if (!cd || !volume_key || !volume_key_size ||
+ (!kc && !isLUKS(cd->type) && !isTCRYPT(cd->type) && !isVERITY(cd->type)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+ key_len = LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+ else
+ key_len = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+
+ if (key_len < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (key_len > (int)*volume_key_size) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Volume key buffer too small."));
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (kc && (!kc->get_passphrase || kc->type == CRYPT_KC_TYPE_KEY))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (kc) {
+ r = kc->get_passphrase(cd, kc, &passphrase, &passphrase_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ if (kc && !kc->get_luks2_key)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for LUKS2 device."));
+ else if (!kc)
+ r = -ENOENT;
+ else
+ r = kc->get_luks2_key(cd, kc, keyslot,
+ keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT ? CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT : CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT,
+ &vk);
+ } else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ if (kc && !kc->get_luks1_volume_key)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for LUKS1 device."));
+ else if (!kc)
+ r = -ENOENT;
+ else
+ r = kc->get_luks1_volume_key(cd, kc, keyslot, &vk);
+ } else if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
+ if (passphrase && cd->u.plain.hdr.hash)
+ r = process_key(cd, cd->u.plain.hdr.hash, key_len,
+ passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."));
+ } else if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
+ /* volume_key == root hash */
+ if (cd->u.verity.root_hash) {
+ memcpy(volume_key, cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size);
+ *volume_key_size = cd->u.verity.root_hash_size;
+ r = 0;
+ } else
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve root hash for verity device."));
+ } else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+ r = TCRYPT_get_volume_key(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params, &vk);
+ } else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+ if (passphrase)
+ r = BITLK_get_volume_key(cd, passphrase, passphrase_size, &cd->u.bitlk.params, &vk);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for BITLK device."));
+ } else if (isFVAULT2(cd->type)) {
+ if (passphrase)
+ r = FVAULT2_get_volume_key(cd, passphrase, passphrase_size, &cd->u.fvault2.params, &vk);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for FVAULT2 device."));
+ } else
+ log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."), cd->type ?: "(none)");
+
+ if (r == -ENOENT && isLUKS(cd->type) && cd->volume_key) {
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
+ r = vk ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (r >= 0 && vk) {
+ memcpy(volume_key, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+ *volume_key_size = vk->keylength;
+ }
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_volume_key_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *volume_key,
+ size_t volume_key_size)
+{
+ struct volume_key *vk;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = _onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED)))
+ return r;
+
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+ if (!vk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+ else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+ return r >= 0 ? 0 : r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RNG and memory locking
+ */
+void crypt_set_rng_type(struct crypt_device *cd, int rng_type)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return;
+
+ switch (rng_type) {
+ case CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM:
+ case CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM:
+ log_dbg(cd, "RNG set to %d (%s).", rng_type, rng_type ? "random" : "urandom");
+ cd->rng_type = rng_type;
+ }
+}
+
+int crypt_get_rng_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return cd->rng_type;
+}
+
+int crypt_memory_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, int lock)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_set_compatibility(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ if (cd)
+ cd->compatibility = flags;
+}
+
+uint32_t crypt_get_compatibility(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (cd)
+ return cd->compatibility;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reporting
+ */
+crypt_status_info crypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return CRYPT_INVALID;
+
+ if (!cd)
+ dm_backend_init(cd);
+
+ r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
+
+ if (!cd)
+ dm_backend_exit(cd);
+
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENODEV)
+ return CRYPT_INVALID;
+
+ if (r == 0)
+ return CRYPT_ACTIVE;
+
+ if (r > 0)
+ return CRYPT_BUSY;
+
+ return CRYPT_INACTIVE;
+}
+
+static int _luks_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ log_std(cd, "LUKS header information for %s\n\n", mdata_device_path(cd));
+ log_std(cd, "Version: \t%" PRIu16 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.version);
+ log_std(cd, "Cipher name: \t%s\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherName);
+ log_std(cd, "Cipher mode: \t%s\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherMode);
+ log_std(cd, "Hash spec: \t%s\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.hashSpec);
+ log_std(cd, "Payload offset:\t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.payloadOffset);
+ log_std(cd, "MK bits: \t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes * 8);
+ log_std(cd, "MK digest: \t");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE, " ", 0, NULL);
+ log_std(cd, "\n");
+ log_std(cd, "MK salt: \t");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
+ log_std(cd, "\n \t");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt+LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
+ log_std(cd, "\n");
+ log_std(cd, "MK iterations: \t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestIterations);
+ log_std(cd, "UUID: \t%s\n\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.uuid);
+ for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+ if(cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED) {
+ log_std(cd, "Key Slot %d: ENABLED\n",i);
+ log_std(cd, "\tIterations: \t%" PRIu32 "\n",
+ cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordIterations);
+ log_std(cd, "\tSalt: \t");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt,
+ LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
+ log_std(cd, "\n\t \t");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt +
+ LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
+ log_std(cd, "\n");
+
+ log_std(cd, "\tKey material offset:\t%" PRIu32 "\n",
+ cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset);
+ log_std(cd, "\tAF stripes: \t%" PRIu32 "\n",
+ cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].stripes);
+ }
+ else
+ log_std(cd, "Key Slot %d: DISABLED\n", i);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return _luks_dump(cd);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_hdr_dump(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ else if (isVERITY(cd->type))
+ return VERITY_dump(cd, &cd->u.verity.hdr,
+ cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size,
+ cd->u.verity.fec_device);
+ else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ return TCRYPT_dump(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+ else if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+ return INTEGRITY_dump(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), 0);
+ else if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+ return BITLK_dump(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), &cd->u.bitlk.params);
+ else if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return FVAULT2_dump(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), &cd->u.fvault2.params);
+
+ log_err(cd, _("Dump operation is not supported for this device type."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_dump_json(struct crypt_device *cd, const char **json, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ if (!cd || flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_hdr_dump_json(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, json);
+
+ log_err(cd, _("Dump operation is not supported for this device type."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+const char *crypt_get_cipher_spec(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return NULL;
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+ else if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec;
+ else if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.plain.cipher_spec;
+ else if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec;
+ else if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec;
+ else if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+ return cd->u.none.cipher_spec;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_cipher(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.plain.cipher;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherName;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ if (crypt_parse_name_and_mode(LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT),
+ cd->u.luks2.cipher, NULL, cd->u.luks2.cipher_mode))
+ return NULL;
+ return cd->u.luks2.cipher;
+ }
+
+ if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.loopaes.cipher;
+
+ if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.tcrypt.params.cipher;
+
+ if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher;
+
+ if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.fvault2.params.cipher;
+
+ if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+ return cd->u.none.cipher;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_cipher_mode(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.plain.cipher_mode;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherMode;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ if (crypt_parse_name_and_mode(LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT),
+ cd->u.luks2.cipher, NULL, cd->u.luks2.cipher_mode))
+ return NULL;
+ return cd->u.luks2.cipher_mode;
+ }
+
+ if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.loopaes.cipher_mode;
+
+ if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.tcrypt.params.mode;
+
+ if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher_mode;
+
+ if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.fvault2.params.cipher_mode;
+
+ if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+ return cd->u.none.cipher_mode;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* INTERNAL only */
+const char *crypt_get_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.integrity.params.integrity;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_get_integrity(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* INTERNAL only */
+int crypt_get_integrity_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ int key_size = 0;
+
+ if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+ key_size = INTEGRITY_key_size(crypt_get_integrity(cd));
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ key_size = INTEGRITY_key_size(crypt_get_integrity(cd));
+
+ return key_size > 0 ? key_size : 0;
+}
+
+/* INTERNAL only */
+int crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return INTEGRITY_tag_size(crypt_get_integrity(cd),
+ crypt_get_cipher(cd),
+ crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_sector_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.plain.hdr.sector_size;
+
+ if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_get_sector_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+
+ return SECTOR_SIZE;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks1.hdr.uuid;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks2.hdr.uuid;
+
+ if (isVERITY(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.verity.uuid;
+
+ if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.bitlk.params.guid;
+
+ if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.fvault2.params.family_uuid;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ const char *path;
+
+ if (!cd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ path = device_block_path(cd->device);
+ if (!path)
+ path = device_path(cd->device);
+
+ return path;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_metadata_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ const char *path;
+
+ if (!cd || !cd->metadata_device)
+ return NULL;
+
+ path = device_block_path(cd->metadata_device);
+ if (!path)
+ path = device_path(cd->metadata_device);
+
+ return path;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_volume_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!cd)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.plain.key_size;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ r = LUKS2_get_volume_key_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+ if (r < 0 && cd->volume_key)
+ r = cd->volume_key->keylength;
+ return r < 0 ? 0 : r;
+ }
+
+ if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.loopaes.key_size;
+
+ if (isVERITY(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.verity.root_hash_size;
+
+ if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.tcrypt.params.key_size;
+
+ if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.bitlk.params.key_size / 8;
+
+ if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.fvault2.params.key_size;
+
+ if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+ return cd->u.none.key_size;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_get_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+ if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= crypt_keyslot_max(cd->type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *cipher,
+ size_t key_size)
+{
+ char *tmp;
+
+ if (!cd || !cipher || !key_size || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(cd, cipher))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!(tmp = strdup(cipher)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ free(cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher);
+ cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher = tmp;
+ cd->u.luks2.keyslot_key_size = key_size;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, size_t *key_size)
+{
+ const char *cipher;
+
+ if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type) || !key_size)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ if (keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT &&
+ LUKS_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot) < CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE)
+ return NULL;
+ *key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ return cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec;
+ }
+
+ if (keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+ return LUKS2_get_keyslot_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, key_size);
+
+ /* Keyslot encryption was set through crypt_keyslot_set_encryption() */
+ if (cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher) {
+ *key_size = cd->u.luks2.keyslot_key_size;
+ return cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to reuse volume encryption parameters */
+ cipher = LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+ if (!LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(cd, cipher)) {
+ *key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ if (*key_size)
+ return cipher;
+ }
+
+ /* Fallback to default LUKS2 keyslot encryption */
+ *key_size = DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_KEYBITS / 8;
+ return DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_CIPHER;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf)
+{
+ if (!cd || !pbkdf || keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return LUKS_keyslot_pbkdf(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot, pbkdf);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_keyslot_pbkdf(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, pbkdf);
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_set_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t data_offset)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (data_offset % (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Data offset is not multiple of %u bytes."), MAX_SECTOR_SIZE);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ cd->data_offset = data_offset;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Data offset set to %" PRIu64 " (512-byte) sectors.", data_offset);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_set_metadata_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ uint64_t metadata_size,
+ uint64_t keyslots_size)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (cd->type && !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (metadata_size && LUKS2_check_metadata_area_size(metadata_size))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (keyslots_size && LUKS2_check_keyslots_area_size(keyslots_size))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ cd->metadata_size = metadata_size;
+ cd->keyslots_size = keyslots_size;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_metadata_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ uint64_t *metadata_size,
+ uint64_t *keyslots_size)
+{
+ uint64_t msize, ksize;
+
+ if (!cd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!cd->type) {
+ msize = cd->metadata_size;
+ ksize = cd->keyslots_size;
+ } else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+ msize = LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS;
+ ksize = LUKS_device_sectors(&cd->u.luks1.hdr) * SECTOR_SIZE - msize;
+ } else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ msize = LUKS2_metadata_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ ksize = LUKS2_keyslots_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+ } else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (metadata_size)
+ *metadata_size = msize;
+ if (keyslots_size)
+ *keyslots_size = ksize;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+uint64_t crypt_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.plain.hdr.offset;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.luks1.hdr.payloadOffset;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_get_data_offset(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+
+ if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.loopaes.hdr.offset;
+
+ if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ return TCRYPT_get_data_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+
+ if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.bitlk.params.volume_header_size / SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+ if (isFVAULT2(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.fvault2.params.log_vol_off / SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+ return cd->data_offset;
+}
+
+uint64_t crypt_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ if (!cd)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.plain.hdr.skip;
+
+ if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+ return cd->u.loopaes.hdr.skip;
+
+ if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+ return TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+crypt_keyslot_info crypt_keyslot_status(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+ if (_onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED) < 0)
+ return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+ return LUKS_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot);
+ else if(isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+
+ return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_max(const char *type)
+{
+ if (isLUKS1(type))
+ return LUKS_NUMKEYS;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(type))
+ return LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX;
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_area(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ uint64_t *offset,
+ uint64_t *length)
+{
+ if (_onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED) || !offset || !length)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_keyslot_area(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, offset, length);
+
+ return LUKS_keyslot_area(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot, offset, length);
+}
+
+crypt_keyslot_priority crypt_keyslot_get_priority(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+ if (_onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED))
+ return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID;
+
+ if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= crypt_keyslot_max(cd->type))
+ return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID;
+
+ if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+ return LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+
+ return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_set_priority(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, crypt_keyslot_priority priority)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Setting keyslot %d to priority %d.", keyslot, priority);
+
+ if (priority == CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= crypt_keyslot_max(cd->type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+ return r;
+
+ return LUKS2_keyslot_priority_set(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, priority, 1);
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ return cd ? cd->type : NULL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_default_type(void)
+{
+ return DEFAULT_LUKS_FORMAT;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_verity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct crypt_params_verity *vp)
+{
+ if (!cd || !isVERITY(cd->type) || !vp)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ vp->data_device = device_path(cd->device);
+ vp->hash_device = mdata_device_path(cd);
+ vp->fec_device = device_path(cd->u.verity.fec_device);
+ vp->fec_area_offset = cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_area_offset;
+ vp->fec_roots = cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots;
+ vp->hash_name = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name;
+ vp->salt = cd->u.verity.hdr.salt;
+ vp->salt_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size;
+ vp->data_block_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.data_block_size;
+ vp->hash_block_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_block_size;
+ vp->data_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size;
+ vp->hash_area_offset = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset;
+ vp->hash_type = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type;
+ vp->flags = cd->u.verity.hdr.flags & (CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER | CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_integrity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct crypt_params_integrity *ip)
+{
+ if (!cd || !ip)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+ ip->journal_size = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_size;
+ ip->journal_watermark = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_watermark;
+ ip->journal_commit_time = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_commit_time;
+ ip->interleave_sectors = cd->u.integrity.params.interleave_sectors;
+ ip->tag_size = cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size;
+ ip->sector_size = cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size;
+ ip->buffer_sectors = cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors;
+
+ ip->integrity = cd->u.integrity.params.integrity;
+ ip->integrity_key_size = crypt_get_integrity_key_size(cd);
+
+ ip->journal_integrity = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity;
+ ip->journal_integrity_key_size = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity_key_size;
+ ip->journal_integrity_key = NULL;
+
+ ip->journal_crypt = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt;
+ ip->journal_crypt_key_size = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt_key_size;
+ ip->journal_crypt_key = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ } else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+ ip->journal_size = 0; // FIXME
+ ip->journal_watermark = 0; // FIXME
+ ip->journal_commit_time = 0; // FIXME
+ ip->interleave_sectors = 0; // FIXME
+ ip->sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(cd);
+ ip->buffer_sectors = 0; // FIXME
+
+ ip->integrity = LUKS2_get_integrity(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+ ip->integrity_key_size = crypt_get_integrity_key_size(cd);
+ ip->tag_size = INTEGRITY_tag_size(ip->integrity, crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+
+ ip->journal_integrity = NULL;
+ ip->journal_integrity_key_size = 0;
+ ip->journal_integrity_key = NULL;
+
+ ip->journal_crypt = NULL;
+ ip->journal_crypt_key_size = 0;
+ ip->journal_crypt_key = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+}
+
+int crypt_convert(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *type,
+ void *params)
+{
+ struct luks_phdr hdr1;
+ struct luks2_hdr hdr2;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!type)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Converting LUKS device to type %s", type);
+
+ if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+ return r;
+
+ if (isLUKS1(cd->type) && isLUKS2(type))
+ r = LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(cd, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &hdr2);
+ else if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && isLUKS1(type))
+ r = LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, &hdr1);
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (r < 0) {
+ /* in-memory header may be invalid after failed conversion */
+ _luks2_rollback(cd);
+ if (r == -EBUSY)
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."), mdata_device_path(cd));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ crypt_free_type(cd, NULL);
+
+ return crypt_load(cd, type, params);
+}