2 * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
27 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
29 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
32 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
33 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
34 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
35 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
37 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
38 * (transition not allowed)
40 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
42 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
45 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
46 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
47 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
49 switch (st->hand_state) {
53 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
54 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
55 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
56 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
60 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
61 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
62 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
69 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
70 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
71 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
72 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
73 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
77 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
78 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
85 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
86 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
87 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
91 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
92 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
98 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
99 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
100 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
107 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
108 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
110 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
113 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
114 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
126 /* No valid transition found */
131 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
132 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
133 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
134 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
136 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
137 * (transition not allowed)
139 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
141 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
143 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
144 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
149 switch (st->hand_state) {
155 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
162 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
164 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
165 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
167 * 2) If we did request one then
168 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
170 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
171 * list if we requested a certificate)
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
174 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
175 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
176 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
177 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
179 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
180 * not going to accept it because we require a client
183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
184 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
185 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
192 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
195 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
196 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
197 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
204 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
205 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
210 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
212 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
213 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
214 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
215 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
216 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
219 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
222 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
223 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
224 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
225 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
231 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
238 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
239 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
240 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
245 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
247 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
264 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
265 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
272 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
281 /* No valid transition found */
282 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
286 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
287 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
290 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
291 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
292 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
293 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
296 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
297 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
298 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
303 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
305 * Valid return values are:
309 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
311 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
314 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
315 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
316 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
317 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
318 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
321 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
323 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
327 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
328 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
329 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
330 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
331 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
334 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
335 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
345 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
347 * Valid return values are:
351 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
354 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
355 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
357 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
358 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
360 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
361 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
363 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
366 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
367 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
369 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
370 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
373 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
375 * ... except when the application insists on
376 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
379 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
380 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
381 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
383 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
386 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
394 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
395 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
398 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
400 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
403 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
404 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
407 switch (st->hand_state) {
409 /* Shouldn't happen */
410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
411 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
412 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
413 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
416 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
421 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
424 /* Try to read from the client instead */
425 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
427 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
432 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
433 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
435 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
441 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
442 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
451 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
459 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
460 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
471 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
482 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
484 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
485 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
488 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
489 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
490 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
492 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
493 * handshake at this point.
495 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
496 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
498 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
499 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
504 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
505 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
506 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
511 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
515 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
516 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
517 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
518 * been configured for.
520 if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
521 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
529 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
530 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
532 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
534 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
537 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
538 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
542 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
544 switch (st->hand_state) {
546 /* Shouldn't happen */
547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
548 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
549 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
550 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
553 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
554 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
556 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
559 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
560 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
561 /* SSLfatal() already called */
562 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
567 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
568 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
570 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
574 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
575 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
576 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
577 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
578 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
579 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
587 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
588 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
590 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
592 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
597 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
598 /* normal PSK or SRP */
599 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
600 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
602 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
604 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
619 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
620 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
626 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
627 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
628 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
633 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
634 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
635 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
638 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
640 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
642 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
644 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
645 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
649 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
651 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
655 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
659 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
661 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
663 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
664 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
669 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
670 * the server to the client.
672 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
674 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
676 switch (st->hand_state) {
678 /* No pre work to be done */
681 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
684 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
687 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
689 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
690 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
691 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
696 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
697 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
699 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
700 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
708 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
709 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
710 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
713 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
715 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
716 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
718 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
719 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
720 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
722 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
724 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
725 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
727 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
728 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
734 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
737 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
738 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
742 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
744 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
745 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
746 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
747 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
751 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
753 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
754 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
755 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
756 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
760 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
761 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
764 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
767 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
769 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
774 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
778 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
788 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
789 * server to the client.
791 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
793 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
797 switch (st->hand_state) {
799 /* No post work to be done */
802 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
803 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
805 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
806 /* SSLfatal() already called */
811 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
812 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
814 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
815 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
820 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
821 * treat like it was the first packet
826 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
827 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
828 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
829 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
834 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
835 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
836 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
840 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
843 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
844 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
846 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
847 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
848 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
851 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
852 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
856 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
857 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
861 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
862 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
866 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
867 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
871 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
872 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
873 if (!statem_flush(s))
878 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
879 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
880 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
881 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
882 /* SSLfatal() already called */
886 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
887 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
888 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
889 /* SSLfatal() already called */
893 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
894 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
895 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
897 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
902 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
904 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
907 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
911 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
912 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
914 /* SSLfatal() already called */
919 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
922 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
923 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
927 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
928 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
931 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
933 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
936 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
940 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
941 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
942 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
943 &s->session->master_key_length)
944 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
945 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
946 /* SSLfatal() already called */
951 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
952 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
953 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
958 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
959 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
961 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
962 /* SSLfatal() already called */
967 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
969 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
970 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
971 && conn_is_closed()) {
973 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
974 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
975 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
976 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
977 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
979 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
988 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
992 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
995 * Valid return values are:
999 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1000 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
1002 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1004 switch (st->hand_state) {
1006 /* Shouldn't happen */
1007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1008 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
1009 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1012 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1014 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1016 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1017 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1020 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1021 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1022 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1025 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1026 /* No construction function needed */
1028 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1031 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1032 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1033 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1036 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1037 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1038 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1041 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1042 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1043 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1047 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1048 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1049 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1052 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1053 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1054 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1057 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1058 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1059 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1062 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1063 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1064 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1067 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1068 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1069 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1072 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1073 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1074 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1077 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1079 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1082 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1083 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1084 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1087 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1088 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1089 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1097 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1098 * calculated as follows:
1100 * 2 + # client_version
1101 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1102 * 1 + # length of session_id
1103 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1104 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1105 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1106 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1107 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1108 * 2 + # length of extensions
1109 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1111 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1113 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1114 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1117 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1118 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1120 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1122 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1124 switch (st->hand_state) {
1126 /* Shouldn't happen */
1129 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1130 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1132 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1133 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1135 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1136 return s->max_cert_list;
1138 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1139 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1141 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1142 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1145 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1146 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1149 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1150 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1152 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1153 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1155 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1156 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1161 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1163 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1165 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1167 switch (st->hand_state) {
1169 /* Shouldn't happen */
1170 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1171 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1172 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1175 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1176 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1178 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1179 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1181 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1182 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1184 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1185 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1187 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1188 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1191 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1192 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1195 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1196 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1198 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1199 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1201 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1202 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1208 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1211 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1213 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1215 switch (st->hand_state) {
1217 /* Shouldn't happen */
1218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1219 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1220 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1223 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1224 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1226 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1227 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1232 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1233 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1236 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1238 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1239 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1240 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1242 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1246 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1247 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1250 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1253 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1254 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1255 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1256 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1257 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1266 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1269 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1270 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1271 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1277 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1279 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1280 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1281 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1282 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1283 cookie_leni > 255) {
1284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1285 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1288 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1290 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1291 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1293 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1302 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1303 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1304 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1308 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1310 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1311 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1312 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1313 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1315 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1317 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1318 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1319 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1320 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1321 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1322 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1323 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1325 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1326 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1327 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1328 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1329 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1330 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1331 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1332 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1333 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1334 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1335 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1336 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1337 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1339 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1340 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1345 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1347 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1348 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1349 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1353 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1356 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1357 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1359 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1362 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1364 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1366 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1367 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1368 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1369 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1371 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1372 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1373 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1375 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1378 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1379 || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
1381 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1382 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1383 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1389 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1390 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1392 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1397 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1399 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1400 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1402 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1405 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1406 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1408 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1413 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1414 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1415 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1416 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1418 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1419 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1421 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1422 * 7-8 session_id_length
1423 * 9-10 challenge_length
1427 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1428 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1430 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1431 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1432 * in the first place
1434 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1440 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1441 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1442 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1446 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1447 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1449 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1450 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1451 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1453 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1456 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1457 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1458 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1459 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1460 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1464 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1466 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1470 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1472 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1473 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1474 /* No extensions. */
1475 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1477 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1480 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1482 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1483 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1484 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1485 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1487 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1488 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1489 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1490 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1491 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1492 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1493 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1494 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1496 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1500 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1502 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1503 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1504 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1505 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1506 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1507 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1509 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1513 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1514 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1515 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1516 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1519 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1520 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1521 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1523 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1527 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1528 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1529 * So check cookie length...
1531 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1532 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1533 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1534 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1539 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1541 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1545 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1547 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1551 /* Could be empty. */
1552 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1553 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1555 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1556 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1558 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1564 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1565 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1566 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1568 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1572 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1573 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1574 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1575 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1576 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1577 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1580 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1582 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1585 if (clienthello != NULL)
1586 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1587 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1589 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1592 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1595 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1600 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1602 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1603 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1604 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1605 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1606 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1608 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1609 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1610 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1611 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1612 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1613 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1615 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1616 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1618 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1621 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1622 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1627 /* Set up the client_random */
1628 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1630 /* Choose the version */
1632 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1633 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1634 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1635 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1637 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1641 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1642 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1646 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1649 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1650 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1652 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1653 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1654 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1655 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1656 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1662 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1663 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1664 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1667 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1671 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1672 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1673 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1674 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1675 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1679 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1680 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1681 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1682 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1683 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1684 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1686 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1687 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1689 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1691 /* default verification */
1692 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1693 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1694 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1695 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1696 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1697 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1700 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1702 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1703 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1704 if (protverr != 0) {
1705 s->version = s->client_version;
1706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1707 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1715 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1716 clienthello->isv2) ||
1717 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1718 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1719 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1723 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1724 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1725 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1726 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1727 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1728 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1729 if (s->renegotiate) {
1730 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1732 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1733 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1736 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1737 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1738 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1740 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1741 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1742 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1743 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1744 * an insecure downgrade.
1746 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1747 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1748 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1754 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1755 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1756 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1757 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1759 if (cipher == NULL) {
1760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1761 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1762 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1765 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1766 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1767 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1769 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1770 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1773 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1777 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1780 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1781 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1782 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1783 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1784 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1789 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1790 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1792 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1793 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1794 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1795 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1796 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1797 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1798 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1799 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1800 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1801 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1804 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1806 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1807 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1808 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1812 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1814 /* previous session */
1816 } else if (i == -1) {
1817 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1821 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1822 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1828 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1829 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1830 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1831 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1835 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1836 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1838 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1840 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1843 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1845 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1846 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1848 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1849 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1858 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1862 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1863 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1868 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1869 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1873 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1876 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1877 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1882 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1883 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1884 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1886 /* TLS extensions */
1887 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1888 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1889 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1894 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1895 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1896 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1897 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1901 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1902 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1904 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1905 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1911 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1914 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1915 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1917 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1918 * backwards compat reasons
1920 int master_key_length;
1922 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1923 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1924 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1926 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1927 && master_key_length > 0) {
1928 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1930 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1931 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1935 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1936 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1937 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1938 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1939 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1940 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1941 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1942 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1946 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1947 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1948 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1949 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1950 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1955 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1956 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1957 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1959 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1960 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1962 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1963 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1964 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1966 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1968 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1969 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1974 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1975 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1976 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1978 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1979 /* Can't disable compression */
1980 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1981 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1982 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1983 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1986 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1987 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1988 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1989 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1990 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1994 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1996 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1997 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2000 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
2001 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
2002 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
2005 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
2006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2007 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2008 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
2011 } else if (s->hit) {
2013 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
2014 /* See if we have a match */
2015 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
2018 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
2019 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2020 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2022 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2023 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2032 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
2038 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2039 * using compression.
2041 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2043 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2044 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2050 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2053 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2054 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
2055 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
2056 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2057 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2058 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2059 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2066 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2067 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2069 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2073 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2074 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2075 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2076 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2077 s->clienthello = NULL;
2080 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2081 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2082 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2083 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2084 s->clienthello = NULL;
2090 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2091 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2093 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2095 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2098 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2099 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2100 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2101 * influence which certificate is sent
2103 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2104 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2107 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
2110 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2111 * et al can pick it up.
2113 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2114 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2116 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2117 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2118 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2120 /* status request response should be sent */
2121 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2122 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2123 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2125 /* something bad happened */
2126 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2129 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2130 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2140 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2141 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2143 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2145 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2146 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2148 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2149 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2150 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
2151 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2152 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2154 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2155 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2156 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2157 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2158 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2159 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2162 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2164 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2165 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2168 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2169 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2170 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2171 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2172 selected_len) != 0) {
2173 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2174 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2178 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2179 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2182 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2184 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2185 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2188 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2190 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2192 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2193 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2196 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2201 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2203 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2207 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2212 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2213 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2214 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2215 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2221 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2223 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2225 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2226 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2228 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2235 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2236 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2237 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2239 if (s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2240 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2243 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2244 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2248 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2251 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2253 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2254 /* SSLfatal already called */
2259 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2260 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2262 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2264 if (cipher == NULL) {
2265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2266 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2267 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2270 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2273 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2274 /* SSLfatal already called */
2277 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2278 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2279 s->session->not_resumable =
2280 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2281 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2282 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2283 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2284 /* do not send a session ticket */
2285 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2288 /* Session-id reuse */
2289 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2293 * we now have the following setup.
2295 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2296 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2297 * compression - basically ignored right now
2298 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2299 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2300 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2301 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2305 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2306 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2308 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2309 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2313 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2314 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2315 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2316 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2318 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2319 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2326 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2328 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2330 * callback indicates further work to be done
2332 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2336 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2342 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2347 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2352 unsigned char *session_id;
2353 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2355 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2356 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2358 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2359 * tls_process_client_hello()
2361 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2362 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2363 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
2364 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2366 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2371 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2372 * back in the server hello:
2373 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2374 * we send back the old session ID.
2375 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2376 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2377 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2378 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2380 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2381 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2382 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2384 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2385 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2388 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2389 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2391 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2394 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2395 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2397 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2398 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2401 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2403 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2407 /* set up the compression method */
2408 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2411 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2414 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2417 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2418 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2419 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2420 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2421 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2425 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2426 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2427 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2429 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2430 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2432 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2436 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2437 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2438 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2443 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2444 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2446 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2447 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2450 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2451 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2452 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2459 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2461 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2462 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2463 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2470 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2473 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2476 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2477 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2480 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2484 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2485 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2486 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2488 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2489 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2490 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2494 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2496 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2500 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2502 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2504 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2505 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2507 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2509 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2510 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2512 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2515 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2516 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2517 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2518 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2521 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2522 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2525 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2528 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2530 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2531 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2532 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2535 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2536 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2541 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2543 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2544 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2547 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2548 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2550 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2551 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2554 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2555 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2556 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2557 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2561 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2562 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2563 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2567 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2570 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2571 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2575 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2578 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2579 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2583 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2585 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2587 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2588 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2592 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2593 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2594 if (curve_id == 0) {
2595 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2596 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2597 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2600 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2601 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2602 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2603 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2607 /* Encode the public key. */
2608 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2610 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2611 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2612 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2617 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2618 * can set these to NULLs
2625 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2627 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2628 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2629 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2630 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2632 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2633 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2636 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2637 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2638 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2639 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2644 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2645 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2649 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2650 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2652 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2653 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2654 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2659 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2660 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2661 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2664 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2665 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2667 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2668 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2671 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2672 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2678 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2679 unsigned char *binval;
2682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2683 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2684 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2687 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2691 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2692 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2698 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2699 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2702 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2703 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2706 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2708 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2709 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2712 memset(binval, 0, len);
2716 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2717 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2719 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2720 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2724 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2728 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2730 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2731 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2732 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2735 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2736 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2737 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2738 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2739 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2740 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2741 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2744 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2745 encodedPoint = NULL;
2751 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2753 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2754 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2757 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2758 /* Should never happen */
2759 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2760 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2761 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2764 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2765 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2767 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2768 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2771 /* send signature algorithm */
2772 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2774 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2775 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2779 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2780 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2781 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2784 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2785 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2786 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2788 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2789 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2792 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2793 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2794 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2796 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2801 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2802 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2805 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2808 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2810 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2811 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2813 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2814 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2819 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2823 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2826 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2828 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2832 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2834 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2835 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2836 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2837 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2838 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2839 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2840 || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2841 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2843 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2844 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2847 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2848 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2849 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2853 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2855 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2856 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2861 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2862 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2864 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2870 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2871 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2872 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2874 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2878 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2879 const uint16_t *psigs;
2880 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2882 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2883 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2884 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2885 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2886 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2887 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2888 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2893 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2894 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2900 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2904 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2907 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2909 PACKET psk_identity;
2911 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2912 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2913 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2916 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2918 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2921 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2923 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2927 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2928 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2929 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2933 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2936 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2938 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2940 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2942 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2945 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2946 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2950 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2951 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2952 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2954 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2956 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2960 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2964 /* Should never happen */
2965 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2966 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2971 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2974 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2976 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2977 size_t j, padding_len;
2978 PACKET enc_premaster;
2980 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2983 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2986 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2990 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2991 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2992 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2994 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2995 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2996 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2997 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3003 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
3004 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
3005 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
3006 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
3008 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3010 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
3014 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
3015 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
3016 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3017 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3022 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3023 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3024 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
3025 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
3026 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3029 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
3030 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
3031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3032 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3037 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
3038 * the timing-sensitive code below.
3040 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3041 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
3042 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
3043 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
3044 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
3045 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3046 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3050 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
3053 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
3054 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
3055 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
3057 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3059 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3063 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3064 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
3065 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
3066 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
3067 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
3069 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
3072 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
3073 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
3074 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
3075 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
3076 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
3077 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
3080 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3081 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
3083 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3084 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
3087 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
3088 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
3089 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
3090 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
3091 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
3092 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
3095 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
3096 unsigned char workaround_good;
3097 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3098 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
3100 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3101 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
3102 version_good |= workaround_good;
3106 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3107 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3109 decrypt_good &= version_good;
3112 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3113 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3114 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3115 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3117 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
3118 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
3119 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
3120 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
3121 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
3124 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
3125 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
3126 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3132 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3135 /* Should never happen */
3136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3137 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3142 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3145 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3149 const unsigned char *data;
3150 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3153 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3154 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3155 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3158 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3161 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3165 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3166 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3167 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3170 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3171 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3172 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3173 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3176 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3177 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3178 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3183 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3184 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3185 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3187 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3192 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3193 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3198 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3199 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3201 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3204 /* Should never happen */
3205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3206 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3211 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3213 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3214 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3215 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3218 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3219 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3221 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3225 const unsigned char *data;
3228 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3229 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3232 /* Get encoded point length */
3233 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3234 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3236 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3241 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3245 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3246 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3251 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3258 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3259 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3264 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3265 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3267 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3271 /* Should never happen */
3272 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3273 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3278 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3282 const unsigned char *data;
3284 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3285 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3287 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3290 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3295 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3297 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3300 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3301 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3302 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3304 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3308 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3309 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3315 /* Should never happen */
3316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3317 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3322 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3325 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3326 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3327 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3328 const unsigned char *start;
3329 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3330 unsigned long alg_a;
3331 unsigned int asn1id, asn1len;
3335 /* Get our certificate private key */
3336 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3337 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3339 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3341 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3343 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3346 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3348 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3349 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3352 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3353 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3355 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3358 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3364 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3365 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3366 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3367 * client certificate for authorization only.
3369 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3370 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3371 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3374 /* Decrypt session key */
3375 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id)
3376 || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3377 || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) {
3378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3379 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3382 if (asn1len == 0x81) {
3384 * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
3386 * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
3388 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) {
3389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3390 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3393 } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) {
3395 * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
3398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3399 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3401 } /* else short form length */
3403 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) {
3404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3405 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3408 inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata);
3409 start = PACKET_data(&encdata);
3411 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3414 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3417 /* Generate master secret */
3418 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3419 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3420 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3423 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3424 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3426 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3430 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3433 /* Should never happen */
3434 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3440 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3442 unsigned long alg_k;
3444 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3446 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3447 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3448 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3452 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3453 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3454 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3455 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3456 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3457 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3460 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3461 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3462 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3465 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3466 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3467 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3470 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3471 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3472 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3475 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3476 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3477 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3480 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3481 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3482 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3485 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3486 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3487 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3492 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3493 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3497 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3500 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3501 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3503 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3506 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3509 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3510 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3511 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3512 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3515 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3518 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3519 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3521 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3522 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3523 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3526 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3527 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3531 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3532 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3536 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3537 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3542 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3544 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3545 * the handshake_buffer
3547 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3548 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3551 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3553 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3555 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3556 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3560 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3561 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3563 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3564 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3569 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3572 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3575 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3578 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3579 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3580 PACKET spkt, context;
3582 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3585 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3586 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3589 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
3591 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3593 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3597 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3598 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3599 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3600 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3601 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3602 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3606 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3607 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3609 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3613 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3614 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3615 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3616 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3617 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3618 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3622 certstart = certbytes;
3623 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3626 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3629 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3631 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3632 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3636 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3637 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3640 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3642 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3646 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3647 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3648 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3649 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3650 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3651 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3652 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3655 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3658 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3659 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3660 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3661 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3667 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3668 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3669 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3671 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3672 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3675 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3676 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3677 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3679 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3680 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3683 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3684 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3685 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3690 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3692 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3693 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3694 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3698 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3699 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3702 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3705 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3706 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3712 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3713 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3714 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3715 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3716 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3719 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3720 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3721 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3722 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3723 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3727 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3728 s->session = new_sess;
3731 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3732 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3733 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3735 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3736 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3739 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3742 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3743 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3748 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3749 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3753 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3754 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3755 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3756 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3757 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3758 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3762 /* Resend session tickets */
3763 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3766 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3770 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3774 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3776 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3780 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3785 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3786 * for the server Certificate message
3788 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3790 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3793 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3794 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3801 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3802 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3805 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3806 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3807 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3810 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3811 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3812 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
3813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3814 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3818 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3819 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3820 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3822 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3827 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3828 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3830 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3837 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3838 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3840 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3841 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3842 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3843 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3844 const unsigned char *const_p;
3845 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3848 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3849 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3850 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3852 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3854 /* get session encoding length */
3855 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3857 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3860 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3862 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3865 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3867 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3868 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3872 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3873 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3874 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3876 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3881 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3882 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3883 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3888 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3891 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3894 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3898 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3899 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3900 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3901 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3902 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3903 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3907 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3908 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3909 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3910 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3913 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3916 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3917 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3919 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3920 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3921 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3926 /* Put timeout and length */
3927 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3928 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3930 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3931 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3935 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3936 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3940 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3941 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3944 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3946 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3948 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3949 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
3950 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3951 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3952 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3953 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3954 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3956 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3959 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3960 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3963 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3964 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3968 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3969 /* Output key name */
3970 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3972 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3973 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3975 /* Encrypt session data */
3976 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3977 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3978 || encdata1 != encdata2
3979 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3980 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3981 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3982 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3983 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3984 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3985 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3986 macendoffset - macoffset)
3987 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3988 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3989 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3990 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3991 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
3992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3993 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3997 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3998 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
4000 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4007 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
4008 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
4012 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
4013 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
4015 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4016 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4020 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
4021 s->session->session_id_length)
4022 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4023 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
4024 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4031 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4033 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
4034 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
4036 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
4040 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
4042 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4045 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
4046 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
4047 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
4049 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4050 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
4051 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4052 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4053 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4056 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
4059 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4060 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4061 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4063 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4064 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4066 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4067 /* SSLfatal already called */
4071 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4072 s->session = new_sess;
4075 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4076 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4079 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
4080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4081 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4082 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4085 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4087 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4088 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4089 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4093 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4095 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4098 s->session->master_key,
4100 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4103 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4105 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
4106 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
4107 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4108 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4109 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
4110 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4111 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4112 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4113 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4116 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
4118 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4121 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4122 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
4126 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4127 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4128 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4131 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4132 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4133 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4134 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4135 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4138 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4140 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4144 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4145 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4146 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4148 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4152 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4153 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4154 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
4157 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4158 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4167 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4168 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4170 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4172 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4173 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4174 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4175 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
4176 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4183 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4185 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4186 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4195 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4196 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4198 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4200 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4201 size_t next_proto_len;
4204 * The payload looks like:
4206 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4207 * uint8 padding_len;
4208 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4210 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4211 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4212 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4214 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4215 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4218 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4221 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4222 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4225 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4227 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4231 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4233 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4235 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4242 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4244 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4246 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4247 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4250 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4251 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4253 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4254 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4258 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4259 * a record boundary.
4261 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4263 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4264 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4265 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4268 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4269 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4270 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4271 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4272 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4275 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;