1 // Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
3 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
24 type clientHandshakeState struct {
26 serverHello *serverHelloMsg
29 finishedHash finishedHash
31 session *ClientSessionState
34 func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error {
36 c.config = defaultConfig()
39 if len(c.config.ServerName) == 0 && !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
40 return errors.New("tls: either ServerName or InsecureSkipVerify must be specified in the tls.Config")
43 c.sendHandshakeSeq = 0
44 c.recvHandshakeSeq = 0
47 for _, proto := range c.config.NextProtos {
48 if l := len(proto); l == 0 || l > 255 {
49 return errors.New("tls: invalid NextProtos value")
51 nextProtosLength += 1 + l
54 if nextProtosLength > 0xffff {
55 return errors.New("tls: NextProtos values too large")
58 hello := &clientHelloMsg{
60 vers: c.config.maxVersion(),
61 compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone},
62 random: make([]byte, 32),
64 serverName: c.config.ServerName,
65 supportedCurves: c.config.curvePreferences(),
66 supportedPoints: []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed},
67 nextProtoNeg: len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0,
68 secureRenegotiation: []byte{},
69 alpnProtocols: c.config.NextProtos,
70 duplicateExtension: c.config.Bugs.DuplicateExtension,
71 channelIDSupported: c.config.ChannelID != nil,
72 npnLast: c.config.Bugs.SwapNPNAndALPN,
73 extendedMasterSecret: c.config.maxVersion() >= VersionTLS10,
76 if c.config.Bugs.SendClientVersion != 0 {
77 hello.vers = c.config.Bugs.SendClientVersion
80 if c.config.Bugs.NoExtendedMasterSecret {
81 hello.extendedMasterSecret = false
84 if len(c.clientVerify) > 0 && !c.config.Bugs.EmptyRenegotiationInfo {
85 if c.config.Bugs.BadRenegotiationInfo {
86 hello.secureRenegotiation = append(hello.secureRenegotiation, c.clientVerify...)
87 hello.secureRenegotiation[0] ^= 0x80
89 hello.secureRenegotiation = c.clientVerify
93 possibleCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites()
94 hello.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(possibleCipherSuites))
97 for _, suiteId := range possibleCipherSuites {
98 for _, suite := range cipherSuites {
99 if suite.id != suiteId {
102 // Don't advertise TLS 1.2-only cipher suites unless
103 // we're attempting TLS 1.2.
104 if hello.vers < VersionTLS12 && suite.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
107 // Don't advertise non-DTLS cipher suites on DTLS.
108 if c.isDTLS && suite.flags&suiteNoDTLS != 0 {
111 hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, suiteId)
112 continue NextCipherSuite
116 if c.config.Bugs.SendFallbackSCSV {
117 hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, fallbackSCSV)
120 _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.random)
122 c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
123 return errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error())
126 if hello.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
127 hello.signatureAndHashes = supportedSKXSignatureAlgorithms
130 var session *ClientSessionState
132 sessionCache := c.config.ClientSessionCache
133 if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
137 if sessionCache != nil {
138 hello.ticketSupported = true
140 // Try to resume a previously negotiated TLS session, if
142 cacheKey = clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config)
143 candidateSession, ok := sessionCache.Get(cacheKey)
145 // Check that the ciphersuite/version used for the
146 // previous session are still valid.
147 cipherSuiteOk := false
148 for _, id := range hello.cipherSuites {
149 if id == candidateSession.cipherSuite {
155 versOk := candidateSession.vers >= c.config.minVersion() &&
156 candidateSession.vers <= c.config.maxVersion()
157 if versOk && cipherSuiteOk {
158 session = candidateSession
164 hello.sessionTicket = session.sessionTicket
165 if c.config.Bugs.CorruptTicket {
166 hello.sessionTicket = make([]byte, len(session.sessionTicket))
167 copy(hello.sessionTicket, session.sessionTicket)
168 if len(hello.sessionTicket) > 0 {
170 if offset > len(hello.sessionTicket) {
171 offset = len(hello.sessionTicket) - 1
173 hello.sessionTicket[offset] ^= 0x40
176 // A random session ID is used to detect when the
177 // server accepted the ticket and is resuming a session
180 if c.config.Bugs.OversizedSessionId {
183 hello.sessionId = make([]byte, sessionIdLen)
184 if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.sessionId); err != nil {
185 c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
186 return errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error())
190 var helloBytes []byte
191 if c.config.Bugs.SendV2ClientHello {
192 v2Hello := &v2ClientHelloMsg{
194 cipherSuites: hello.cipherSuites,
195 // No session resumption for V2ClientHello.
197 challenge: hello.random,
199 helloBytes = v2Hello.marshal()
200 c.writeV2Record(helloBytes)
202 helloBytes = hello.marshal()
203 c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloBytes)
206 msg, err := c.readHandshake()
212 helloVerifyRequest, ok := msg.(*helloVerifyRequestMsg)
214 if helloVerifyRequest.vers != VersionTLS10 {
215 // Per RFC 6347, the version field in
216 // HelloVerifyRequest SHOULD be always DTLS
217 // 1.0. Enforce this for testing purposes.
218 return errors.New("dtls: bad HelloVerifyRequest version")
222 hello.cookie = helloVerifyRequest.cookie
223 helloBytes = hello.marshal()
224 c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloBytes)
226 msg, err = c.readHandshake()
233 serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
235 c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
236 return unexpectedMessageError(serverHello, msg)
239 c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(serverHello.vers)
241 c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
242 return fmt.Errorf("tls: server selected unsupported protocol version %x", serverHello.vers)
246 suite := mutualCipherSuite(c.config.cipherSuites(), serverHello.cipherSuite)
248 c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
249 return fmt.Errorf("tls: server selected an unsupported cipher suite")
252 if len(c.clientVerify) > 0 {
253 var expectedRenegInfo []byte
254 expectedRenegInfo = append(expectedRenegInfo, c.clientVerify...)
255 expectedRenegInfo = append(expectedRenegInfo, c.serverVerify...)
256 if !bytes.Equal(serverHello.secureRenegotiation, expectedRenegInfo) {
257 c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
258 return fmt.Errorf("tls: renegotiation mismatch")
262 hs := &clientHandshakeState{
264 serverHello: serverHello,
267 finishedHash: newFinishedHash(c.vers, suite),
271 hs.writeHash(helloBytes, hs.c.sendHandshakeSeq-1)
272 hs.writeServerHash(hs.serverHello.marshal())
274 if c.config.Bugs.EarlyChangeCipherSpec > 0 {
276 c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
279 isResume, err := hs.processServerHello()
285 if c.config.Bugs.EarlyChangeCipherSpec == 0 {
286 if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
290 if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil {
293 if err := hs.readFinished(); err != nil {
296 if err := hs.sendFinished(isResume); err != nil {
300 if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
303 if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
306 if err := hs.sendFinished(isResume); err != nil {
309 if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil {
312 if err := hs.readFinished(); err != nil {
317 if sessionCache != nil && hs.session != nil && session != hs.session {
318 sessionCache.Put(cacheKey, hs.session)
321 c.didResume = isResume
322 c.handshakeComplete = true
323 c.cipherSuite = suite.id
327 func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
330 var leaf *x509.Certificate
331 if hs.suite.flags&suitePSK == 0 {
332 msg, err := c.readHandshake()
337 certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
338 if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
339 c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
340 return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
342 hs.writeServerHash(certMsg.marshal())
344 certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates))
345 for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates {
346 cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
348 c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
349 return errors.New("tls: failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error())
355 if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
356 opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
357 Roots: c.config.RootCAs,
358 CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
359 DNSName: c.config.ServerName,
360 Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
363 for i, cert := range certs {
367 opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
369 c.verifiedChains, err = leaf.Verify(opts)
371 c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
376 switch leaf.PublicKey.(type) {
377 case *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey:
380 c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
381 return fmt.Errorf("tls: server's certificate contains an unsupported type of public key: %T", leaf.PublicKey)
384 c.peerCertificates = certs
387 if hs.serverHello.ocspStapling {
388 msg, err := c.readHandshake()
392 cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg)
394 c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
395 return unexpectedMessageError(cs, msg)
397 hs.writeServerHash(cs.marshal())
399 if cs.statusType == statusTypeOCSP {
400 c.ocspResponse = cs.response
404 msg, err := c.readHandshake()
409 keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
411 skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg)
413 hs.writeServerHash(skx.marshal())
414 err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, leaf, skx)
416 c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
420 msg, err = c.readHandshake()
426 var chainToSend *Certificate
427 var certRequested bool
428 certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg)
432 // RFC 4346 on the certificateAuthorities field:
433 // A list of the distinguished names of acceptable certificate
434 // authorities. These distinguished names may specify a desired
435 // distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA;
436 // thus, this message can be used to describe both known roots
437 // and a desired authorization space. If the
438 // certificate_authorities list is empty then the client MAY
439 // send any certificate of the appropriate
440 // ClientCertificateType, unless there is some external
441 // arrangement to the contrary.
443 hs.writeServerHash(certReq.marshal())
445 var rsaAvail, ecdsaAvail bool
446 for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes {
448 case CertTypeRSASign:
450 case CertTypeECDSASign:
455 // We need to search our list of client certs for one
456 // where SignatureAlgorithm is RSA and the Issuer is in
457 // certReq.certificateAuthorities
459 for i, chain := range c.config.Certificates {
460 if !rsaAvail && !ecdsaAvail {
464 for j, cert := range chain.Certificate {
465 x509Cert := chain.Leaf
466 // parse the certificate if this isn't the leaf
467 // node, or if chain.Leaf was nil
468 if j != 0 || x509Cert == nil {
469 if x509Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(cert); err != nil {
470 c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
471 return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate #" + strconv.Itoa(i) + ": " + err.Error())
476 case rsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA:
477 case ecdsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.ECDSA:
482 if len(certReq.certificateAuthorities) == 0 {
483 // they gave us an empty list, so just take the
484 // first RSA cert from c.config.Certificates
489 for _, ca := range certReq.certificateAuthorities {
490 if bytes.Equal(x509Cert.RawIssuer, ca) {
498 msg, err = c.readHandshake()
504 shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg)
506 c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
507 return unexpectedMessageError(shd, msg)
509 hs.writeServerHash(shd.marshal())
511 // If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a
512 // Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a
513 // certificate to send.
515 certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
516 if chainToSend != nil {
517 certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate
519 hs.writeClientHash(certMsg.marshal())
520 c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())
523 preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, leaf)
525 c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
529 if c.config.Bugs.EarlyChangeCipherSpec < 2 {
530 hs.writeClientHash(ckx.marshal())
532 c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal())
535 if hs.serverHello.extendedMasterSecret && c.vers >= VersionTLS10 {
536 hs.masterSecret = extendedMasterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.finishedHash)
537 c.extendedMasterSecret = true
539 if c.config.Bugs.RequireExtendedMasterSecret {
540 return errors.New("tls: extended master secret required but not supported by peer")
542 hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random)
545 if chainToSend != nil {
547 certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{
548 hasSignatureAndHash: c.vers >= VersionTLS12,
551 switch key := c.config.Certificates[0].PrivateKey.(type) {
552 case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
553 certVerify.signatureAndHash, err = hs.finishedHash.selectClientCertSignatureAlgorithm(certReq.signatureAndHashes, signatureECDSA)
558 digest, _, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(certVerify.signatureAndHash, hs.masterSecret)
563 r, s, err = ecdsa.Sign(c.config.rand(), key, digest)
565 signed, err = asn1.Marshal(ecdsaSignature{r, s})
567 case *rsa.PrivateKey:
568 certVerify.signatureAndHash, err = hs.finishedHash.selectClientCertSignatureAlgorithm(certReq.signatureAndHashes, signatureRSA)
573 var hashFunc crypto.Hash
574 digest, hashFunc, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(certVerify.signatureAndHash, hs.masterSecret)
578 signed, err = rsa.SignPKCS1v15(c.config.rand(), key, hashFunc, digest)
580 err = errors.New("unknown private key type")
583 c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
584 return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake with client certificate: " + err.Error())
586 certVerify.signature = signed
588 hs.writeClientHash(certVerify.marshal())
589 c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal())
592 hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
597 func (hs *clientHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
600 clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
601 keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
602 var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{}
603 var clientHash, serverHash macFunction
604 if hs.suite.cipher != nil {
605 clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */)
606 clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC)
607 serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */)
608 serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC)
610 clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
611 serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
614 c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
615 c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
619 func (hs *clientHandshakeState) serverResumedSession() bool {
620 // If the server responded with the same sessionId then it means the
621 // sessionTicket is being used to resume a TLS session.
622 return hs.session != nil && hs.hello.sessionId != nil &&
623 bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.sessionId, hs.hello.sessionId)
626 func (hs *clientHandshakeState) processServerHello() (bool, error) {
629 if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
630 c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
631 return false, errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format")
634 clientDidNPN := hs.hello.nextProtoNeg
635 clientDidALPN := len(hs.hello.alpnProtocols) > 0
636 serverHasNPN := hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg
637 serverHasALPN := len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) > 0
639 if !clientDidNPN && serverHasNPN {
640 c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
641 return false, errors.New("server advertised unrequested NPN extension")
644 if !clientDidALPN && serverHasALPN {
645 c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
646 return false, errors.New("server advertised unrequested ALPN extension")
649 if serverHasNPN && serverHasALPN {
650 c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
651 return false, errors.New("server advertised both NPN and ALPN extensions")
655 c.clientProtocol = hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol
656 c.clientProtocolFallback = false
660 if !hs.hello.channelIDSupported && hs.serverHello.channelIDRequested {
661 c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
662 return false, errors.New("server advertised unrequested Channel ID extension")
665 if hs.serverResumedSession() {
666 // Restore masterSecret and peerCerts from previous state
667 hs.masterSecret = hs.session.masterSecret
668 c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates
669 c.extendedMasterSecret = hs.session.extendedMasterSecret
670 hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
676 func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readFinished() error {
679 c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
680 if err := c.in.error(); err != nil {
684 msg, err := c.readHandshake()
688 serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
690 c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
691 return unexpectedMessageError(serverFinished, msg)
694 if c.config.Bugs.EarlyChangeCipherSpec == 0 {
695 verify := hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
696 if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) ||
697 subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
698 c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
699 return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect")
702 c.serverVerify = append(c.serverVerify[:0], serverFinished.verifyData...)
703 hs.writeServerHash(serverFinished.marshal())
707 func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error {
708 if !hs.serverHello.ticketSupported {
713 msg, err := c.readHandshake()
717 sessionTicketMsg, ok := msg.(*newSessionTicketMsg)
719 c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
720 return unexpectedMessageError(sessionTicketMsg, msg)
723 hs.session = &ClientSessionState{
724 sessionTicket: sessionTicketMsg.ticket,
726 cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
727 masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
728 handshakeHash: hs.finishedHash.server.Sum(nil),
729 serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates,
732 hs.writeServerHash(sessionTicketMsg.marshal())
737 func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished(isResume bool) error {
740 var postCCSBytes []byte
741 seqno := hs.c.sendHandshakeSeq
742 if hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg {
743 nextProto := new(nextProtoMsg)
744 proto, fallback := mutualProtocol(c.config.NextProtos, hs.serverHello.nextProtos)
745 nextProto.proto = proto
746 c.clientProtocol = proto
747 c.clientProtocolFallback = fallback
749 nextProtoBytes := nextProto.marshal()
750 hs.writeHash(nextProtoBytes, seqno)
752 postCCSBytes = append(postCCSBytes, nextProtoBytes...)
755 if hs.serverHello.channelIDRequested {
756 encryptedExtensions := new(encryptedExtensionsMsg)
757 if c.config.ChannelID.Curve != elliptic.P256() {
758 return fmt.Errorf("tls: Channel ID is not on P-256.")
760 var resumeHash []byte
762 resumeHash = hs.session.handshakeHash
764 r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(c.config.rand(), c.config.ChannelID, hs.finishedHash.hashForChannelID(resumeHash))
768 channelID := make([]byte, 128)
769 writeIntPadded(channelID[0:32], c.config.ChannelID.X)
770 writeIntPadded(channelID[32:64], c.config.ChannelID.Y)
771 writeIntPadded(channelID[64:96], r)
772 writeIntPadded(channelID[96:128], s)
773 encryptedExtensions.channelID = channelID
775 c.channelID = &c.config.ChannelID.PublicKey
777 encryptedExtensionsBytes := encryptedExtensions.marshal()
778 hs.writeHash(encryptedExtensionsBytes, seqno)
780 postCCSBytes = append(postCCSBytes, encryptedExtensionsBytes...)
783 finished := new(finishedMsg)
784 if c.config.Bugs.EarlyChangeCipherSpec == 2 {
785 finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(nil)
787 finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
789 c.clientVerify = append(c.clientVerify[:0], finished.verifyData...)
790 finishedBytes := finished.marshal()
791 hs.writeHash(finishedBytes, seqno)
792 postCCSBytes = append(postCCSBytes, finishedBytes...)
794 if c.config.Bugs.FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSpec {
795 c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, postCCSBytes[:5])
796 postCCSBytes = postCCSBytes[5:]
799 if !c.config.Bugs.SkipChangeCipherSpec &&
800 c.config.Bugs.EarlyChangeCipherSpec == 0 {
801 c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
804 c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, postCCSBytes)
808 func (hs *clientHandshakeState) writeClientHash(msg []byte) {
809 // writeClientHash is called before writeRecord.
810 hs.writeHash(msg, hs.c.sendHandshakeSeq)
813 func (hs *clientHandshakeState) writeServerHash(msg []byte) {
814 // writeServerHash is called after readHandshake.
815 hs.writeHash(msg, hs.c.recvHandshakeSeq-1)
818 func (hs *clientHandshakeState) writeHash(msg []byte, seqno uint16) {
820 // This is somewhat hacky. DTLS hashes a slightly different format.
821 // First, the TLS header.
822 hs.finishedHash.Write(msg[:4])
823 // Then the sequence number and reassembled fragment offset (always 0).
824 hs.finishedHash.Write([]byte{byte(seqno >> 8), byte(seqno), 0, 0, 0})
825 // Then the reassembled fragment (always equal to the message length).
826 hs.finishedHash.Write(msg[1:4])
827 // And then the message body.
828 hs.finishedHash.Write(msg[4:])
830 hs.finishedHash.Write(msg)
834 // clientSessionCacheKey returns a key used to cache sessionTickets that could
835 // be used to resume previously negotiated TLS sessions with a server.
836 func clientSessionCacheKey(serverAddr net.Addr, config *Config) string {
837 if len(config.ServerName) > 0 {
838 return config.ServerName
840 return serverAddr.String()
843 // mutualProtocol finds the mutual Next Protocol Negotiation or ALPN protocol
844 // given list of possible protocols and a list of the preference order. The
845 // first list must not be empty. It returns the resulting protocol and flag
846 // indicating if the fallback case was reached.
847 func mutualProtocol(protos, preferenceProtos []string) (string, bool) {
848 for _, s := range preferenceProtos {
849 for _, c := range protos {
856 return protos[0], true
859 // writeIntPadded writes x into b, padded up with leading zeros as
861 func writeIntPadded(b []byte, x *big.Int) {
866 copy(b[len(b)-len(xb):], xb)