src/third_party/boringssl/src/ssl/t1_enc.c

   1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
   2  * All rights reserved.
   3  *
   4  * This package is an SSL implementation written
   5  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
   6  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
   7  *
   8  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
   9  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  10  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  11  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  12  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  13  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  14  *
  15  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  16  * the code are not to be removed.
  17  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  18  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  19  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  20  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
  21  *
  22  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  23  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  24  * are met:
  25  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
  26  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  27  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  28  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  29  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  30  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
  31  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
  32  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
  33  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  34  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  35  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
  36  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  37  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  38  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
  39  *
  40  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  41  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  42  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  43  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
  44  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  45  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
  46  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  47  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
  48  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  49  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  50  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  51  *
  52  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  53  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  54  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  55  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  56  */
  57 /* ====================================================================
  58  * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  59  *
  60  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  61  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  62  * are met:
  63  *
  64  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
  65  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  66  *
  67  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  68  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
  69  *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
  70  *    distribution.
  71  *
  72  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
  73  *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
  74  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
  75  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
  76  *
  77  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
  78  *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
  79  *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
  80  *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
  81  *
  82  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
  83  *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
  84  *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
  85  *
  86  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
  87  *    acknowledgment:
  88  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
  89  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
  90  *
  91  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
  92  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  93  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
  94  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
  95  * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
  96  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
  97  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
  98  * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  99  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 100  * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 101  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 102  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 103  * ====================================================================
 104  *
 105  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
 106  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
 107  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 108  *
 109  */
 110 /* ====================================================================
 111  * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
 112  *
 113  * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
 114  * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
 115  * license.
 116  *
 117  * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
 118  * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
 119  * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
 120  *
 121  * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
 122  * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
 123  * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
 124  *
 125  * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
 126  * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
 127  * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
 128  * to make use of the Contribution.
 129  *
 130  * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
 131  * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
 132  * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
 133  * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
 134  * OTHERWISE. */
 135
 136 #include <stdio.h>
 137 #include <assert.h>
 138
 139 #include <openssl/err.h>
 140 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 141 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 142 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 143 #include <openssl/mem.h>
 144 #include <openssl/obj.h>
 145 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 146
 147 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 148
 149 /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
 150 static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
 151                         int sec_len,
 152                         const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
 153                         const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
 154                         const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
 155                         unsigned char *out, int olen)
 156         {
 157         int chunk;
 158         size_t j;
 159         EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init;
 160         EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
 161         unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 162         size_t A1_len;
 163         int ret = 0;
 164
 165         chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
 166
 167         EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 168         EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
 169         EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_init);
 170         mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
 171         if (!mac_key)
 172                 goto err;
 173         if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_init,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
 174                 goto err;
 175         if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,&ctx_init))
 176                 goto err;
 177         if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
 178                 goto err;
 179         if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
 180                 goto err;
 181         if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
 182                 goto err;
 183         A1_len = EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
 184         if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
 185                 goto err;
 186
 187         for (;;)
 188                 {
 189                 /* Reinit mac contexts */
 190                 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,&ctx_init))
 191                         goto err;
 192                 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
 193                         goto err;
 194                 if (olen>chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp,&ctx))
 195                         goto err;
 196                 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
 197                         goto err;
 198                 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
 199                         goto err;
 200                 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
 201                         goto err;
 202
 203                 if (olen > chunk)
 204                         {
 205                         j = olen;
 206                         if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
 207                                 goto err;
 208                         out+=j;
 209                         olen-=j;
 210                         /* calc the next A1 value */
 211                         A1_len = EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
 212                         if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
 213                                 goto err;
 214                         }
 215                 else    /* last one */
 216                         {
 217                         A1_len = EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
 218                         if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
 219                                 goto err;
 220                         memcpy(out,A1,olen);
 221                         break;
 222                         }
 223                 }
 224         ret = 1;
 225 err:
 226         EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
 227         EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 228         EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
 229         EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_init);
 230         OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
 231         return ret;
 232         }
 233
 234 /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
 235 static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
 236                      const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
 237                      const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
 238                      const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
 239                      const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
 240                      unsigned char *out1,
 241                      unsigned char *out2, int olen)
 242         {
 243         int len,i,idx,count;
 244         const unsigned char *S1;
 245         long m;
 246         const EVP_MD *md;
 247         int ret = 0;
 248
 249         /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
 250         count=0;
 251         for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
 252                 if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
 253         }
 254         len=slen/count;
 255         if (count == 1)
 256                 slen = 0;
 257         S1=sec;
 258         memset(out1,0,olen);
 259         for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
 260                 if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
 261                         if (!md) {
 262                                 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_PRF, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
 263                                 goto err;
 264                         }
 265                         if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1),
 266                                         seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,
 267                                         out2,olen))
 268                                 goto err;
 269                         S1+=len;
 270                         for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
 271                         {
 272                                 out1[i]^=out2[i];
 273                         }
 274                 }
 275         }
 276         ret = 1;
 277 err:
 278         return ret;
 279 }
 280
 281 static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
 282              unsigned char *tmp, int num)
 283         {
 284         int ret;
 285         ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
 286                  TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
 287                  s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
 288                  s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
 289                  s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
 290                  km,tmp,num);
 291         return ret;
 292         }
 293
 294 /* tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates |*aead_ctx|, if needed and returns 1. It
 295  * returns 0 on malloc error. */
 296 static int tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx)
 297         {
 298         if (*aead_ctx != NULL)
 299                 EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx);
 300         else
 301                 {
 302                 *aead_ctx = (SSL_AEAD_CTX*) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX));
 303                 if (*aead_ctx == NULL)
 304                         {
 305                         OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_aead_ctx_init, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 306                         return 0;
 307                         }
 308                 }
 309
 310         return 1;
 311         }
 312
 313 static void tls1_cleanup_enc_ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX **ctx)
 314         {
 315         if (*ctx != NULL)
 316                 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(*ctx);
 317         *ctx = NULL;
 318         }
 319
 320 static void tls1_cleanup_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **ctx)
 321         {
 322         if (*ctx != NULL)
 323                 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*ctx);
 324         *ctx = NULL;
 325         }
 326
 327 static int tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read,
 328         const unsigned char *key, unsigned key_len,
 329         const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len,
 330         const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned mac_secret_len)
 331         {
 332         const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead;
 333         SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx;
 334         /* mac_key_and_key is used to merge the MAC and cipher keys for an AEAD
 335          * which simulates pre-AEAD cipher suites. It needs to be large enough
 336          * to cope with the largest pair of keys. */
 337         uint8_t mac_key_and_key[32 /* HMAC(SHA256) */ + 32 /* AES-256 */];
 338
 339         if (is_read)
 340                 {
 341                 tls1_cleanup_enc_ctx(&s->enc_read_ctx);
 342                 tls1_cleanup_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
 343                 }
 344         else
 345                 {
 346                 tls1_cleanup_enc_ctx(&s->enc_write_ctx);
 347                 tls1_cleanup_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
 348                 }
 349
 350         if (mac_secret_len > 0)
 351                 {
 352                 /* This is a "stateful" AEAD (for compatibility with pre-AEAD
 353                  * cipher suites). */
 354                 if (mac_secret_len + key_len > sizeof(mac_key_and_key))
 355                         {
 356                         OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state_aead, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 357                         return 0;
 358                         }
 359                 memcpy(mac_key_and_key, mac_secret, mac_secret_len);
 360                 memcpy(mac_key_and_key + mac_secret_len, key, key_len);
 361                 key = mac_key_and_key;
 362                 key_len += mac_secret_len;
 363                 }
 364
 365         if (is_read)
 366                 {
 367                 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_read_ctx))
 368                         return 0;
 369                 aead_ctx = s->aead_read_ctx;
 370                 }
 371         else
 372                 {
 373                 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_write_ctx))
 374                         return 0;
 375                 aead_ctx = s->aead_write_ctx;
 376                 }
 377
 378         if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len,
 379                                EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL /* engine */))
 380                 {
 381                 OPENSSL_free(aead_ctx);
 382                 if (is_read)
 383                         s->aead_read_ctx = NULL;
 384                 else
 385                         s->aead_write_ctx = NULL;
 386                 return 0;
 387                 }
 388         if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce))
 389                 {
 390                 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state_aead, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 391                 return 0;
 392                 }
 393         memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len);
 394         aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len;
 395         aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 8;  /* correct for all true AEADs so far. */
 396         if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_STATEFUL_AEAD)
 397                 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 0;
 398         aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record =
 399                 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_INCLUDED_IN_RECORD) != 0;
 400         if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead))
 401                 {
 402                 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state_aead, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 403                 return 0;
 404                 }
 405         aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead);
 406
 407         return 1;
 408         }
 409
 410 static void tls1_cleanup_aead_ctx(SSL_AEAD_CTX **ctx)
 411         {
 412         if (*ctx != NULL)
 413                 {
 414                 EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*ctx)->ctx);
 415                 OPENSSL_free(*ctx);
 416                 }
 417         *ctx = NULL;
 418         }
 419
 420 /* tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher performs the work needed to switch cipher
 421  * states when using EVP_CIPHER. The argument |is_read| is true iff this
 422  * function is being called due to reading, as opposed to writing, a
 423  * ChangeCipherSpec message. In order to support export ciphersuites,
 424  * use_client_keys indicates whether the key material provided is in the
 425  * "client write" direction. */
 426 static int tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(
 427         SSL *s, char is_read, char use_client_keys,
 428         const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned mac_secret_len,
 429         const unsigned char *key, unsigned key_len,
 430         const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len)
 431         {
 432         const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
 433         EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx;
 434         EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
 435
 436         if (is_read)
 437                 tls1_cleanup_aead_ctx(&s->aead_read_ctx);
 438         else
 439                 tls1_cleanup_aead_ctx(&s->aead_write_ctx);
 440
 441         if (is_read)
 442                 {
 443                 if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
 444                         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
 445                 else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
 446                         goto err;
 447
 448                 cipher_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
 449                 mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
 450
 451                 memcpy(s->s3->read_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_len);
 452                 s->s3->read_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_len;
 453                 }
 454         else
 455                 {
 456                 /* When updating the write contexts for DTLS, we do not wish to
 457                  * free the old ones because DTLS stores pointers to them in
 458                  * order to implement retransmission. */
 459
 460                 if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
 461                         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
 462                 else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
 463                         goto err;
 464                 else
 465                         /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
 466                         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
 467
 468                 cipher_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
 469                 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
 470                         {
 471                         /* This is the same as ssl_replace_hash, but doesn't
 472                          * free the old |s->write_hash|. */
 473                         mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
 474                         if (!mac_ctx)
 475                                 goto err;
 476                         s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
 477                         }
 478                 else
 479                         mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
 480
 481                 memcpy(s->s3->write_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_len);
 482                 s->s3->write_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_len;
 483                 }
 484
 485         EVP_PKEY *mac_key =
 486                 EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type,
 487                                      NULL, mac_secret, mac_secret_len);
 488         if (!mac_key)
 489                 return 0;
 490         EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, s->s3->tmp.new_hash, NULL, mac_key);
 491         EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
 492
 493         EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL /* engine */, key, iv, !is_read);
 494
 495         return 1;
 496
 497 err:
 498         OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 499         return 0;
 500         }
 501
 502 int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 503         {
 504         /* is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message -
 505          * i.e. we need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have just
 506          * written one. */
 507         const char is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0;
 508         /* use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client
 509          * write" direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a
 510          * ChangeCipherSpec, or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. */
 511         const char use_client_keys = which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE ||
 512                                      which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
 513         const unsigned char *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret, *mac_secret;
 514         const unsigned char *client_write_key, *server_write_key, *key;
 515         const unsigned char *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv, *iv;
 516         const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
 517         const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead;
 518         unsigned key_len, iv_len, mac_secret_len;
 519         const unsigned char *key_data;
 520
 521         /* Reset sequence number to zero. */
 522         if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
 523                 memset(is_read ? s->s3->read_sequence : s->s3->write_sequence, 0, 8);
 524
 525         mac_secret_len = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
 526
 527         if (aead != NULL)
 528                 {
 529                 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
 530                 /* For "stateful" AEADs (i.e. compatibility with pre-AEAD
 531                  * cipher suites) the key length reported by
 532                  * |EVP_AEAD_key_length| will include the MAC key bytes. */
 533                 if (key_len < mac_secret_len)
 534                         {
 535                         OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 536                         return 0;
 537                         }
 538                 key_len -= mac_secret_len;
 539                 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
 540                 }
 541         else
 542                 {
 543                 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
 544                 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
 545                 }
 546
 547         key_data = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
 548         client_write_mac_secret = key_data; key_data += mac_secret_len;
 549         server_write_mac_secret = key_data; key_data += mac_secret_len;
 550         client_write_key =        key_data; key_data += key_len;
 551         server_write_key =        key_data; key_data += key_len;
 552         client_write_iv  =        key_data; key_data += iv_len;
 553         server_write_iv  =        key_data; key_data += iv_len;
 554
 555         if (use_client_keys)
 556                 {
 557                 mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret;
 558                 key = client_write_key;
 559                 iv = client_write_iv;
 560                 }
 561         else
 562                 {
 563                 mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret;
 564                 key = server_write_key;
 565                 iv = server_write_iv;
 566                 }
 567
 568         if (key_data - s->s3->tmp.key_block != s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
 569                 {
 570                 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 571                 return 0;
 572                 }
 573
 574         if (aead != NULL)
 575                 {
 576                 if (!tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read,
 577                                                    key, key_len, iv, iv_len,
 578                                                    mac_secret, mac_secret_len))
 579                         return 0;
 580                 }
 581         else
 582                 {
 583                 if (!tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(s, is_read, use_client_keys,
 584                                                      mac_secret, mac_secret_len,
 585                                                      key, key_len,
 586                                                      iv, iv_len))
 587                         return 0;
 588                 }
 589
 590         return 1;
 591         }
 592
 593 int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
 594         {
 595         unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL;
 596         const EVP_CIPHER *c = NULL;
 597         const EVP_MD *hash = NULL;
 598         const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL;
 599         int num;
 600         int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0;
 601         int ret=0;
 602         unsigned key_len, iv_len;
 603
 604
 605         if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
 606                 return(1);
 607
 608         if (s->session->cipher &&
 609             ((s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD) ||
 610              (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_STATEFUL_AEAD)))
 611                 {
 612                 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(s->session, &aead))
 613                         goto cipher_unavailable_err;
 614                 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
 615                 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->session->cipher);
 616                 if ((s->session->cipher->algorithm2 &
 617                                 SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_STATEFUL_AEAD) &&
 618                         !ssl_cipher_get_mac(s->session, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size))
 619                         goto cipher_unavailable_err;
 620                 /* For "stateful" AEADs (i.e. compatibility with pre-AEAD
 621                  * cipher suites) the key length reported by
 622                  * |EVP_AEAD_key_length| will include the MAC key bytes. */
 623                 if (key_len < (size_t)mac_secret_size)
 624                         {
 625                         OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 626                         return 0;
 627                         }
 628                 key_len -= mac_secret_size;
 629                 }
 630         else
 631                 {
 632                 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size))
 633                         goto cipher_unavailable_err;
 634                 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
 635                 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
 636                 }
 637
 638         s->s3->tmp.new_aead=aead;
 639         s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
 640         s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
 641         s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
 642         s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
 643
 644         num=key_len+mac_secret_size+iv_len;
 645         num*=2;
 646
 647         ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
 648
 649         if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
 650                 {
 651                 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_setup_key_block, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 652                 goto err;
 653                 }
 654
 655         s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
 656         s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1;
 657
 658         if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
 659                 {
 660                 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_setup_key_block, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 661                 goto err;
 662                 }
 663
 664 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 665 printf("client random\n");
 666 { int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
 667 printf("server random\n");
 668 { int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
 669 printf("pre-master\n");
 670 { int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
 671 #endif
 672         if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num))
 673                 goto err;
 674 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 675 printf("\nkey block\n");
 676 { int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
 677 #endif
 678
 679         if (s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION &&
 680             (s->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) != 0)
 681                 {
 682                 /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
 683                  * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
 684                  */
 685                 s->s3->need_record_splitting = 1;
 686
 687                 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
 688                         {
 689                         if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
 690                                 s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0;
 691                         }
 692                 }
 693
 694         ret = 1;
 695 err:
 696         if (p2)
 697                 {
 698                 OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num);
 699                 OPENSSL_free(p2);
 700                 }
 701         return(ret);
 702
 703 cipher_unavailable_err:
 704         OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_setup_key_block, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
 705         return 0;
 706         }
 707
 708 /* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
 709  *
 710  * Returns:
 711  *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
 712  *       short etc).
 713  *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
 714  *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
 715  *       an internal error occured.
 716  */
 717 int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 718         {
 719         SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 720         EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 721         unsigned long l;
 722         int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
 723         const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 724         const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead;
 725
 726         if (send)
 727                 rec = &s->s3->wrec;
 728         else
 729                 rec = &s->s3->rrec;
 730
 731         if (send)
 732                 aead = s->aead_write_ctx;
 733         else
 734                 aead = s->aead_read_ctx;
 735
 736         if (aead)
 737                 {
 738                 unsigned char ad[13], *seq, *in, *out, nonce[16];
 739                 unsigned nonce_used;
 740                 size_t n;
 741
 742                 seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence;
 743
 744                 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
 745                         {
 746                         unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
 747
 748                         s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p);
 749                         memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
 750                         memcpy(ad, dtlsseq, 8);
 751                         }
 752                 else
 753                         {
 754                         memcpy(ad, seq, 8);
 755                         for (i=7; i>=0; i--)    /* increment */
 756                                 {
 757                                 ++seq[i];
 758                                 if (seq[i] != 0)
 759                                         break;
 760                                 }
 761                         }
 762
 763                 ad[8]  = rec->type;
 764                 ad[9]  = (unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
 765                 ad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
 766
 767                 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len + aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce) ||
 768                     aead->variable_nonce_len > 8)
 769                         return -1;  /* internal error - should never happen. */
 770
 771                 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, aead->fixed_nonce_len);
 772                 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len;
 773
 774                 if (send)
 775                         {
 776                         size_t len = rec->length;
 777                         size_t eivlen = 0;
 778                         in = rec->input;
 779                         out = rec->data;
 780
 781                         /* When sending we use the sequence number as the
 782                          * variable part of the nonce. */
 783                         if (aead->variable_nonce_len > 8)
 784                                 return -1;
 785                         memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len);
 786                         nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len;
 787
 788                         /* in do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by
 789                          * variable_nonce_len in order to leave space for the
 790                          * variable nonce. Thus we can copy the sequence number
 791                          * bytes into place without overwriting any of the
 792                          * plaintext. */
 793                         if (aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record)
 794                                 {
 795                                 memcpy(out, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len);
 796                                 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len;
 797                                 eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len;
 798                                 }
 799
 800                         ad[11] = len >> 8;
 801                         ad[12] = len & 0xff;
 802
 803                         if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(
 804                                 &aead->ctx,
 805                                 out + eivlen, &n, len + aead->tag_len,
 806                                 nonce, nonce_used,
 807                                 in + eivlen, len,
 808                                 ad, sizeof(ad)))
 809                                 {
 810                                 return -1;
 811                                 }
 812                         if (aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record)
 813                                 n += aead->variable_nonce_len;
 814                         }
 815                 else
 816                         {
 817                         /* receive */
 818                         size_t len = rec->length;
 819
 820                         if (rec->data != rec->input)
 821                                 return -1;  /* internal error - should never happen. */
 822                         out = in = rec->input;
 823
 824                         if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len)
 825                                 return 0;
 826                         memcpy(nonce + nonce_used,
 827                                aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record ? in : ad,
 828                                aead->variable_nonce_len);
 829                         nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len;
 830
 831                         if (aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record)
 832                                 {
 833                                 in += aead->variable_nonce_len;
 834                                 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len;
 835                                 out += aead->variable_nonce_len;
 836                                 }
 837
 838                         if (len < aead->tag_len)
 839                                 return 0;
 840                         len -= aead->tag_len;
 841
 842                         ad[11] = len >> 8;
 843                         ad[12] = len & 0xff;
 844
 845                         if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(
 846                                 &aead->ctx,
 847                                 out, &n, len,
 848                                 nonce, nonce_used,
 849                                 in, len + aead->tag_len,
 850                                 ad, sizeof(ad)))
 851                                 {
 852                                 return -1;
 853                                 }
 854
 855                         rec->data = rec->input = out;
 856                         }
 857
 858                 rec->length = n;
 859                 return 1;
 860                 }
 861
 862         if (send)
 863                 {
 864                 ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
 865                 rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
 866                 if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
 867                         enc=NULL;
 868                 else
 869                         {
 870                         int ivlen;
 871                         enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
 872                         /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
 873                         if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
 874                                 && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 875                                 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
 876                         else
 877                                 ivlen = 0;
 878                         if (ivlen > 1)
 879                                 {
 880                                 if ( rec->data != rec->input)
 881                                         /* we can't write into the input stream:
 882                                          * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
 883                                          */
 884                                         fprintf(stderr,
 885                                                 "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
 886                                                 __FILE__, __LINE__);
 887                                 else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
 888                                         return -1;
 889                                 }
 890                         }
 891                 }
 892         else
 893                 {
 894                 ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
 895                 rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
 896                 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
 897                         enc=NULL;
 898                 else
 899                         enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
 900                 }
 901
 902         if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
 903                 {
 904                 memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
 905                 rec->input=rec->data;
 906                 ret = 1;
 907                 }
 908         else
 909                 {
 910                 l=rec->length;
 911                 bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
 912
 913                 if ((bs != 1) && send)
 914                         {
 915                         i=bs-((int)l%bs);
 916
 917                         /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
 918
 919                         /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
 920                         j=i-1;
 921                         for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++)
 922                                 rec->input[k]=j;
 923                         l+=i;
 924                         rec->length+=i;
 925                         }
 926
 927                 if (!send)
 928                         {
 929                         if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
 930                                 return 0;
 931                         }
 932
 933                 i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
 934                 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
 935                                                 ?(i<0)
 936                                                 :(i==0))
 937                         return -1;      /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
 938
 939                 ret = 1;
 940                 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
 941                         mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
 942                 if ((bs != 1) && !send)
 943                         ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
 944                 if (pad && !send)
 945                         rec->length -= pad;
 946                 }
 947         return ret;
 948         }
 949
 950 int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
 951         {
 952         unsigned int ret;
 953         EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL;
 954         int i;
 955
 956         if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
 957                 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer))
 958                         return 0;
 959
 960         for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++)
 961                 {
 962                   if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid)
 963                         {
 964                         d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
 965                         break;
 966                         }
 967                 }
 968         if (!d) {
 969                 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_cert_verify_mac, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
 970                 return 0;
 971         }
 972
 973         EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 974         EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
 975         EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret);
 976         EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 977         return((int)ret);
 978         }
 979
 980 /* tls1_handshake_digest calculates the current handshake hash and writes it to
 981  * |out|, which has space for |out_len| bytes. It returns the number of bytes
 982  * written or -1 in the event of an error. This function works on a copy of the
 983  * underlying digests so can be called multiple times and prior to the final
 984  * update etc. */
 985 int tls1_handshake_digest(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len)
 986         {
 987         const EVP_MD *md;
 988         EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
 989         int i, err = 0, len = 0;
 990         long mask;
 991
 992         EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 993
 994         for (i = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(i, &mask, &md); i++)
 995                 {
 996                 int hash_size;
 997                 unsigned int digest_len;
 998                 EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
 999
1000                 if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) == 0)
1001                         continue;
1002
1003                 hash_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
1004                 if (!hdgst || hash_size < 0 || (size_t)hash_size > out_len)
1005                         {
1006                         err = 1;
1007                         break;
1008                         }
1009
1010                 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
1011                     !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &digest_len) ||
1012                     digest_len != (unsigned int)hash_size) /* internal error */
1013                         {
1014                         err = 1;
1015                         break;
1016                         }
1017                 out += digest_len;
1018                 out_len -= digest_len;
1019                 len += digest_len;
1020                 }
1021
1022         EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1023
1024         if (err != 0)
1025                 return -1;
1026         return len;
1027         }
1028
1029 int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
1030              const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
1031         {
1032         unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1033         unsigned char buf2[12];
1034         int err=0;
1035         int digests_len;
1036
1037         if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
1038                 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer))
1039                         return 0;
1040
1041         digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(s, buf, sizeof(buf));
1042         if (digests_len < 0)
1043                 {
1044                 err = 1;
1045                 digests_len = 0;
1046                 }
1047
1048         if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
1049                         str,slen, buf, digests_len, NULL,0,
1050                         s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
1051                         out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
1052                 err = 1;
1053
1054         if (err)
1055                 return 0;
1056         else
1057                 return sizeof buf2;
1058         }
1059
1060 int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
1061         {
1062         SSL3_RECORD *rec;
1063         unsigned char *seq;
1064         EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
1065         size_t md_size, orig_len;
1066         int i;
1067         EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
1068         unsigned char header[13];
1069         int t;
1070
1071         if (send)
1072                 {
1073                 rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
1074                 seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
1075                 hash=ssl->write_hash;
1076                 }
1077         else
1078                 {
1079                 rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
1080                 seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
1081                 hash=ssl->read_hash;
1082                 }
1083
1084         t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
1085         assert(t >= 0);
1086         md_size=t;
1087
1088         if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash))
1089                 return -1;
1090         mac_ctx = &hmac;
1091
1092         if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl))
1093                 {
1094                 unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
1095
1096                 s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
1097                 memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
1098
1099                 memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
1100                 }
1101         else
1102                 memcpy(header, seq, 8);
1103
1104         /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
1105         orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
1106         rec->type &= 0xff;
1107
1108         header[8]=rec->type;
1109         header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
1110         header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
1111         header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
1112         header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
1113
1114         if (!send &&
1115             EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
1116             ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
1117                 {
1118                 /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
1119                  * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
1120                  * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
1121                  * timing-oracle. */
1122                 ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
1123                         mac_ctx,
1124                         md, &md_size,
1125                         header, rec->input,
1126                         rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
1127                         ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
1128                         ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
1129                         0 /* not SSLv3 */);
1130                 }
1131         else
1132                 {
1133                 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
1134                 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
1135                 t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
1136                 assert(t > 0);
1137                 }
1138
1139         EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
1140
1141         if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl))
1142                 {
1143                 for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
1144                         {
1145                         ++seq[i];
1146                         if (seq[i] != 0) break;
1147                         }
1148                 }
1149
1150         return(md_size);
1151         }
1152
1153 int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
1154              int len)
1155         {
1156         unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
1157
1158         if (s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret)
1159                 {
1160                 uint8_t digests[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1161                 int digests_len;
1162
1163                 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
1164                         {
1165                         /* The master secret is based on the handshake hash
1166                          * just after sending the ClientKeyExchange. However,
1167                          * we might have a client certificate to send, in which
1168                          * case we might need different hashes for the
1169                          * verification and thus still need the handshake
1170                          * buffer around. Keeping both a handshake buffer *and*
1171                          * running hashes isn't yet supported so, when it comes
1172                          * to calculating the Finished hash, we'll have to hash
1173                          * the handshake buffer again. */
1174                         if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, dont_free_handshake_buffer))
1175                                 return 0;
1176                         }
1177
1178                 digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(s, digests, sizeof(digests));
1179
1180                 if (digests_len == -1)
1181                         {
1182                         return 0;
1183                         }
1184
1185                 tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
1186                         TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
1187                         TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
1188                         digests, digests_len,
1189                         NULL, 0,
1190                         p, len,
1191                         s->session->master_key,
1192                         buff, sizeof(buff));
1193                 }
1194         else
1195                 {
1196                 tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
1197                         TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
1198                         s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
1199                         s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
1200                         p, len,
1201                         s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
1202                 }
1203
1204 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
1205         fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
1206         BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
1207         fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
1208         BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1209         fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
1210         BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1211         fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
1212         BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
1213 #endif
1214
1215 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
1216         if (s->msg_callback)
1217                 {
1218                 s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER,
1219                                                 p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1220                 s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM,
1221                                         s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
1222                                                 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1223                 s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM,
1224                                         s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
1225                                         s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1226                 s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER,
1227                                         s->session->master_key,
1228                                         SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE,
1229                                         s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1230                 }
1231 #endif
1232
1233         return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
1234         }
1235
1236 int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
1237          const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
1238          size_t contextlen, int use_context)
1239         {
1240         unsigned char *buff;
1241         unsigned char *val = NULL;
1242         size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
1243         int rv;
1244
1245         buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
1246         if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
1247
1248         /* construct PRF arguments
1249          * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
1250          * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
1251          * does not create a prohibited label.
1252          */
1253         vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
1254         if (use_context)
1255                 {
1256                 vallen += 2 + contextlen;
1257                 }
1258
1259         val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
1260         if (val == NULL) goto err2;
1261         currentvalpos = 0;
1262         memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
1263         currentvalpos += llen;
1264         memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1265         currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1266         memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1267         currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1268
1269         if (use_context)
1270                 {
1271                 val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
1272                 currentvalpos++;
1273                 val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
1274                 currentvalpos++;
1275                 if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
1276                         {
1277                         memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
1278                         }
1279                 }
1280
1281         /* disallow prohibited labels
1282          * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
1283          * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
1284          * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
1285          */
1286         if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
1287                  TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
1288         if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
1289                  TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
1290         if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
1291                  TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
1292         if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
1293                  TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
1294
1295         rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
1296                       val, vallen,
1297                       NULL, 0,
1298                       NULL, 0,
1299                       s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
1300                       out,buff,olen);
1301
1302         goto ret;
1303 err1:
1304         OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_export_keying_material, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
1305         rv = 0;
1306         goto ret;
1307 err2:
1308         OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_export_keying_material, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1309         rv = 0;
1310 ret:
1311         if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
1312         if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
1313         return(rv);
1314         }
1315
1316 int tls1_alert_code(int code)
1317         {
1318         switch (code)
1319                 {
1320         case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:       return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
1321         case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1322         case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:     return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
1323         case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:  return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1324         case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:    return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
1325         case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1326         case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:  return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1327         case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:     return(-1);
1328         case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:    return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
1329         case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
1330         case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
1331         case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
1332         case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
1333         case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:  return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
1334         case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:         return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
1335         case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:      return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
1336         case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:       return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1337         case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:      return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
1338         case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
1339         case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:   return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
1340         case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
1341         case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:     return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1342         case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:     return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
1343         case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:   return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1344         case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
1345         case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
1346         case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:  return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
1347         case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
1348         case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
1349         case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
1350         case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1351         default:                        return(-1);
1352                 }
1353         }