1 /* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
2 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */
3 /* ====================================================================
4 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
15 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
18 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
19 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
20 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
21 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
23 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
24 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
25 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
26 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
28 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
29 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
30 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
32 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
34 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
35 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
37 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
38 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
39 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
40 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
41 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
42 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
43 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
44 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
45 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
46 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
47 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
48 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
49 * ====================================================================
51 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
52 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
53 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
56 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
57 * All rights reserved.
59 * This package is an SSL implementation written
60 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
61 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
63 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
64 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
65 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
66 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
67 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
68 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
70 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
71 * the code are not to be removed.
72 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
73 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
74 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
75 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
77 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
78 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
80 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
81 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
82 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
83 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
84 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
85 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
86 * must display the following acknowledgement:
87 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
88 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
89 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
90 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
91 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
92 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
93 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
95 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
96 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
97 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
98 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
99 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
100 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
101 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
102 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
103 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
104 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
107 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
108 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
109 * copied and put under another distribution licence
110 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
116 #include <openssl/buf.h>
117 #include <openssl/mem.h>
118 #include <openssl/evp.h>
119 #include <openssl/err.h>
120 #include <openssl/rand.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
124 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
127 if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
128 { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
131 if (is_endian.little) break;
132 /* not reached on little-endians */
133 /* following test is redundant, because input is
134 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
135 if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break;
139 if (l>128) return 128;
140 else if (l<-128) return -128;
144 ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
146 brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
149 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
156 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
161 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
163 if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80;
164 else return brw + (ret&0xFF);
167 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
169 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
170 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
171 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
172 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
174 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
175 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
177 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
178 unsigned char *priority);
179 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
180 static int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
183 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
185 dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
187 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
189 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
191 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
192 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
194 s->packet = rdata->packet;
195 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
196 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
197 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
199 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
200 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
207 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
209 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
212 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
213 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
216 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
217 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
218 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
220 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
221 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
223 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_buffer_record, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
227 rdata->packet = s->packet;
228 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
229 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
230 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
235 s->packet_length = 0;
236 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
237 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
239 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
241 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_buffer_record, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
247 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
248 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
250 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_buffer_record, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
261 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
265 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
268 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
270 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
280 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
282 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
283 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
284 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
286 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
287 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
288 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
289 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
292 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
296 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
299 /* Check if epoch is current. */
300 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
301 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
303 /* Process all the records. */
304 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
306 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
307 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
309 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
310 s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
314 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
315 * have been processed */
316 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
317 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
326 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
330 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
331 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
333 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
338 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
339 if (item && item->priority == priority)
341 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
342 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
344 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
345 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
346 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
348 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
349 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
351 s->packet = rdata->packet;
352 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
353 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
354 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
356 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
359 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
369 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
375 unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
376 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
381 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
382 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
384 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
386 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
387 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
388 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
389 * the decryption or by the decompression
390 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
391 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
393 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
394 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
396 /* check is not needed I believe */
397 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
399 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
400 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_process_record, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
404 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
407 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
409 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
410 * 1: if the padding is valid
411 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
414 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
416 s->packet_length = 0;
421 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
422 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
426 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
427 if ((sess != NULL) &&
428 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
429 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
431 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
432 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
433 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
434 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
435 assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
437 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
438 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
440 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
441 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
442 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
443 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
445 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
446 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
447 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
448 orig_len < mac_size+1))
450 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
451 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_process_record, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
455 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
457 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
458 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
459 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
460 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
463 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
464 rr->length -= mac_size;
468 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
469 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
470 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
471 rr->length -= mac_size;
472 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
475 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
476 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
478 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
484 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
486 s->packet_length = 0;
490 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
492 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
493 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_process_record, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
498 /* So at this point the following is true
499 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
500 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
501 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
502 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
506 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
508 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
512 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
518 /* Call this to get a new input record.
519 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
520 * or non-blocking IO.
521 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
522 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
523 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
524 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
526 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
527 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
529 int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
532 unsigned char *p = NULL;
533 unsigned short version;
534 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
535 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
539 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
540 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
541 dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
543 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
544 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
547 /* get something from the wire */
549 /* check if we have the header */
550 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
551 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
553 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
554 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
555 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
557 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
558 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
560 s->packet_length = 0;
564 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
569 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
571 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
575 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
577 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
580 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
585 /* Lets check version */
586 if (!s->first_packet)
588 if (version != s->version)
590 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
592 s->packet_length = 0;
597 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
599 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
601 s->packet_length = 0;
605 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
607 /* record too long, silently discard it */
609 s->packet_length = 0;
613 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
616 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
618 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
620 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
622 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
623 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
625 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
629 s->packet_length = 0;
633 /* now n == rr->length,
634 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
636 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
638 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
639 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
643 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
644 goto again; /* get another record */
647 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
648 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
649 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
650 * since they arrive from different connections and
651 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
653 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
654 *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
655 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
658 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
659 goto again; /* get another record */
662 /* just read a 0 length packet */
663 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
665 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
666 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
667 * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
668 * anything while listening.
672 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
674 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
677 s->packet_length = 0;
681 if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
684 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
685 goto again; /* get another record */
692 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
693 * 'type' is one of the following:
695 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
696 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
697 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
699 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
700 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
702 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
703 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
704 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
705 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
706 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
707 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
708 * Change cipher spec protocol
709 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
711 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
713 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
714 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
715 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
716 * Application data protocol
717 * none of our business
719 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
724 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
726 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
727 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
730 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
731 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
732 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
733 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
735 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
739 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
740 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
743 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
745 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
747 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
748 i=s->handshake_func(s);
749 if (i < 0) return(i);
752 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
758 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
760 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
761 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
762 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
763 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
766 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
767 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
768 * in advance, if any.
770 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
773 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
776 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
778 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
783 /* Check for timeout */
784 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
787 /* get new packet if necessary */
788 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
790 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
793 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
794 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
802 if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
808 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
810 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
811 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
812 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
814 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
815 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
816 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
817 * than dropping the connection.
819 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num);
824 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
825 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
826 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
829 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
834 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
836 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
837 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
838 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
839 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
841 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
842 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
846 if (len <= 0) return(len);
848 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
851 n = (unsigned int)len;
853 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
860 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
869 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
870 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
872 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
873 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
876 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
877 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
878 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
880 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
882 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
883 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
884 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
886 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
888 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
889 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
890 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
892 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
893 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
895 /* Application data while renegotiating
896 * is allowed. Try again reading.
898 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
901 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
903 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
904 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
905 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
909 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
910 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
911 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
917 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
918 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
919 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
921 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
926 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
927 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
929 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
932 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
936 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
937 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
938 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
940 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
942 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
943 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
944 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
946 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
948 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
949 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
950 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
952 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
953 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
957 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
960 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
961 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
963 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
964 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
967 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
970 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
972 i=s->handshake_func(s);
973 if (i < 0) return(i);
976 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
981 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
982 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
986 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
988 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
989 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
991 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
994 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
995 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
997 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
999 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1000 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1004 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1005 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1008 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1010 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1011 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1013 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1017 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1021 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1022 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1023 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1024 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1025 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1026 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1027 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1032 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1033 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1040 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1042 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1047 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1049 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1050 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1052 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1054 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1055 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1056 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1057 if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
1058 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1060 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1061 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1067 if (s->msg_callback)
1068 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1069 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1071 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
1072 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
1074 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
1079 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1081 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1082 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1085 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1086 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1091 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1092 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1095 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1097 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1098 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1099 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1105 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1106 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1108 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1110 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1113 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1118 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1119 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1121 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1122 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1123 * protocol violations): */
1124 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1128 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1133 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1134 if (i < 0) return(i);
1137 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1147 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1148 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1153 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1154 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1156 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1158 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1159 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1160 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1161 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1162 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1163 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1166 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1167 * but have application data. If the library was
1168 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1169 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1170 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1171 * we will indulge it.
1173 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1174 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1176 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1177 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1178 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1180 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1181 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1182 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1186 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1191 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1192 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1199 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1205 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1209 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1211 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1212 if (i < 0) return(i);
1215 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1220 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1222 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1226 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1231 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1234 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1238 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1239 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1241 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1242 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1247 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1250 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1253 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1254 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1255 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1265 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1266 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1268 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1272 assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1273 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1274 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len);
1278 static int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1281 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1282 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1289 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1290 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1291 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1293 assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1294 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1297 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1298 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1300 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1303 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1313 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1314 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1315 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1322 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1327 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1329 /* write the header */
1333 /* Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and
1334 * we haven't decided which version to use yet send back using
1335 * version 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
1337 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1339 *(p++)=DTLS1_VERSION>>8;
1340 *(p++)=DTLS1_VERSION&0xff;
1344 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1345 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1348 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1352 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1353 if (s->enc_write_ctx)
1355 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
1356 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
1358 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
1362 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1363 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1364 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1371 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1372 wr->data=p + eivlen; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1373 wr->length=(int)len;
1374 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1376 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1379 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1382 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1383 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1384 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1388 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
1390 wr->length+=mac_size;
1393 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1398 wr->length += eivlen;
1400 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1402 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1403 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1404 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1406 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1408 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1412 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1414 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1416 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1418 if (s->msg_callback)
1419 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1421 /* we should now have
1422 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1423 * wr->length long */
1424 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1425 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1427 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1428 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1429 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1430 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1431 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1434 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1436 /* now let's set up wb */
1437 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1440 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1441 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1442 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1443 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1444 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1446 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1447 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1454 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1458 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1460 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1463 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1464 return 1; /* this record in new */
1467 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1468 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1469 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift))
1470 return 0; /* record previously received */
1472 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1477 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1481 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1483 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1487 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1488 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1491 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
1495 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1496 bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
1501 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1504 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1505 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1506 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1508 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1510 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1511 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1512 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1514 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf));
1517 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1518 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1522 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1523 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1525 if (s->msg_callback)
1526 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1527 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1529 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1530 cb=s->info_callback;
1531 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1532 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1536 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1537 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1544 static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1545 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1550 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1551 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1552 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1554 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1555 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1556 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1557 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1560 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1568 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1569 unsigned long *offset)
1572 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1573 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1574 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1577 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1578 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1580 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1582 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1583 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1584 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1585 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1587 unsigned short seq_num;
1588 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1589 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1591 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1593 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1594 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1595 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1599 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1600 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1604 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1605 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1606 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1607 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1609 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1610 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1611 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1613 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1614 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1615 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1619 *priority = seq_num;
1623 else /* unknown record type */
1632 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1635 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1637 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1639 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1641 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1642 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1646 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1647 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1651 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);