2 * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
4 * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
7 * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
8 * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
10 * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
12 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
14 * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
21 #include <linux/xattr.h>
22 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
23 #include <linux/mount.h>
24 #include <linux/stat.h>
26 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
28 #include <linux/tcp.h>
29 #include <linux/udp.h>
30 #include <linux/dccp.h>
31 #include <linux/slab.h>
32 #include <linux/mutex.h>
33 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
34 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
37 #include <linux/audit.h>
38 #include <linux/magic.h>
39 #include <linux/dcache.h>
40 #include <linux/personality.h>
41 #include <linux/msg.h>
42 #include <linux/shm.h>
43 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
44 #include <linux/parser.h>
47 #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
48 #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
50 #define SMK_CONNECTING 0
51 #define SMK_RECEIVING 1
54 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
55 DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ipv6_lock);
56 static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
58 static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
61 static const match_table_t smk_mount_tokens = {
62 {Opt_fsdefault, SMK_FSDEFAULT "%s"},
63 {Opt_fsfloor, SMK_FSFLOOR "%s"},
64 {Opt_fshat, SMK_FSHAT "%s"},
65 {Opt_fsroot, SMK_FSROOT "%s"},
66 {Opt_fstransmute, SMK_FSTRANS "%s"},
70 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
71 static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
72 "Bringup Error", /* Unused */
73 "Bringup", /* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
74 "Unconfined Subject", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
75 "Unconfined Object", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
78 static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
88 if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
90 if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
101 static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
102 struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
104 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
108 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
111 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
112 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
113 sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
117 #define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
120 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
121 static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
124 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
125 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
129 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
132 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
133 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
134 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
135 acc, current->comm, note);
139 #define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
142 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
143 static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
145 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
146 struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
147 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
151 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
154 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
155 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
156 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
157 current->comm, otp->comm);
161 #define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
164 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
165 static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
167 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
168 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
169 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
171 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
172 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
173 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
177 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
179 if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
180 (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
181 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
183 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
185 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
186 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
187 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
191 #define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
194 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
195 static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
197 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
198 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
199 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
200 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
201 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
203 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
204 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
205 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
209 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
212 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
213 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
214 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
215 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
220 #define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
223 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
224 static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
227 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
228 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
229 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
230 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
231 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
233 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
234 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
235 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
239 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
242 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
243 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
244 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
245 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
250 #define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
254 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
255 * @name: type of the label (attribute)
256 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
257 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
259 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
260 * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
262 static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
267 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
269 if (!(ip->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
270 return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
272 buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_KERNEL);
274 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
276 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, ip, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
282 skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
290 * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
291 * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
293 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
295 static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
297 struct inode_smack *isp;
299 isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
303 isp->smk_inode = skp;
305 mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
311 * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
312 * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
313 * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
314 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
316 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
318 static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task,
319 struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp)
321 struct task_smack *tsp;
323 tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
327 tsp->smk_task = task;
328 tsp->smk_forked = forked;
329 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
330 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
331 mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
337 * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
338 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
339 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
340 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
342 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
344 static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
347 struct smack_rule *nrp;
348 struct smack_rule *orp;
351 list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
352 nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
358 list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
364 * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
365 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
366 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
367 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
369 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
371 static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
374 struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
375 struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
377 list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
378 nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp);
380 smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
383 nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
384 list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
391 * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
392 * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
394 * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
396 static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
398 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
399 return MAY_READWRITE;
400 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
407 * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
408 * @tracer: tracer process
409 * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
410 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
411 * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
413 * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
415 static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
416 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
417 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
420 struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
421 struct task_smack *tsp;
422 struct smack_known *tracer_known;
424 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
425 smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
426 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
431 tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
432 tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
434 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
435 (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
436 smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
437 if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
439 else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
441 else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
447 smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
448 tracee_known->smk_known,
455 /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
456 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
464 * We he, that is fun!
468 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
469 * @ctp: child task pointer
470 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
472 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
474 * Do the capability checks.
476 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
478 struct smack_known *skp;
480 skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
482 return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
486 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
487 * @ptp: parent task pointer
489 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
491 * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
493 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
496 struct smack_known *skp;
498 skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
500 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
505 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
506 * @type: message type
508 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
510 static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
513 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
515 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
518 if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
530 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
531 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
533 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
535 static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
537 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
539 sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
544 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
545 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
546 sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
547 sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
549 * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
551 sb->s_security = sbsp;
557 * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
558 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
561 static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
563 kfree(sb->s_security);
564 sb->s_security = NULL;
568 * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
569 * @orig: where to start
570 * @smackopts: mount options string
572 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
574 * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
577 static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
579 char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
581 otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
582 if (otheropts == NULL)
585 for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
586 if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
588 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
590 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
592 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
594 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSTRANS) == cp)
599 commap = strchr(cp, ',');
608 strcpy(orig, otheropts);
609 free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
615 * smack_parse_opts_str - parse Smack specific mount options
616 * @options: mount options string
617 * @opts: where to store converted mount opts
619 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
621 * converts Smack specific mount options to generic security option format
623 static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options,
624 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
627 char *fsdefault = NULL;
628 char *fsfloor = NULL;
631 char *fstransmute = NULL;
633 int num_mnt_opts = 0;
636 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
641 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
642 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
647 token = match_token(p, smk_mount_tokens, args);
653 fsdefault = match_strdup(&args[0]);
660 fsfloor = match_strdup(&args[0]);
667 fshat = match_strdup(&args[0]);
674 fsroot = match_strdup(&args[0]);
678 case Opt_fstransmute:
681 fstransmute = match_strdup(&args[0]);
687 pr_warn("Smack: unknown mount option\n");
692 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
696 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
698 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags)
702 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsdefault;
703 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSDEFAULT_MNT;
706 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsfloor;
707 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSFLOOR_MNT;
710 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fshat;
711 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSHAT_MNT;
714 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsroot;
715 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSROOT_MNT;
718 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fstransmute;
719 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSTRANS_MNT;
722 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
727 pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
739 * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
740 * @sb: the file system superblock
741 * @opts: Smack mount options
742 * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
743 * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
745 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
747 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
750 static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
751 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
752 unsigned long kern_flags,
753 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
755 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
756 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
757 struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
758 struct inode_smack *isp;
759 struct smack_known *skp;
761 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
764 if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
767 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
769 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
774 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
776 skp = smk_of_current();
778 sp->smk_default = skp;
780 * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
781 * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
782 * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
784 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
785 sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
786 sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
788 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
792 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
794 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
795 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
797 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
800 sp->smk_default = skp;
803 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
809 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
815 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
821 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
833 * Initialize the root inode.
835 isp = inode->i_security;
837 isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
840 inode->i_security = isp;
842 isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
845 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
851 * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
852 * @sb: the file system superblock
853 * @flags: the mount flags
854 * @data: the smack mount options
856 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
858 static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
861 char *options = data;
862 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
864 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
869 rc = smack_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
874 rc = smack_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
877 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
882 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
883 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
885 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
886 * and error code otherwise
888 static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
890 struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
892 struct smk_audit_info ad;
894 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
895 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
897 rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
898 rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
907 * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
908 * @bprm: the exec information
910 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
912 static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
914 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
915 struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
916 struct inode_smack *isp;
917 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
920 if (bprm->called_set_creds)
923 isp = inode->i_security;
924 if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
927 sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
928 if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
929 isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
932 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
933 struct task_struct *tracer;
937 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
938 if (likely(tracer != NULL))
939 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
947 } else if (bprm->unsafe)
950 bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
951 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
953 /* Decide if this is a secure exec. */
954 if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
955 bprm->secureexec = 1;
965 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
966 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
968 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
970 static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
972 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
974 inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp);
975 if (inode->i_security == NULL)
981 * smack_inode_free_rcu - Free inode_smack blob from cache
982 * @head: the rcu_head for getting inode_smack pointer
984 * Call back function called from call_rcu() to free
985 * the i_security blob pointer in inode
987 static void smack_inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
989 struct inode_smack *issp;
991 issp = container_of(head, struct inode_smack, smk_rcu);
992 kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, issp);
996 * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob using call_rcu()
997 * @inode: the inode with a blob
999 * Clears the blob pointer in inode using RCU
1001 static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
1003 struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
1006 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
1007 * a call to smack_inode_permission() can be made
1008 * after smack_inode_free_security() is called.
1009 * To avoid race condition free the i_security via RCU
1010 * and leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
1011 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
1013 call_rcu(&issp->smk_rcu, smack_inode_free_rcu);
1017 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
1018 * @inode: the newly created inode
1019 * @dir: containing directory object
1021 * @name: where to put the attribute name
1022 * @value: where to put the attribute value
1023 * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
1025 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
1027 static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1028 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
1029 void **value, size_t *len)
1031 struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
1032 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1033 struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1034 struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
1038 *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
1042 may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
1047 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
1048 * the directory requests transmutation then
1049 * by all means transmute.
1050 * Mark the inode as changed.
1052 if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
1053 smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) {
1055 issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
1058 *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
1062 *len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1069 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
1070 * @old_dentry: the existing object
1072 * @new_dentry: the new object
1074 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1076 static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
1077 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1079 struct smack_known *isp;
1080 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1083 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1084 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1086 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1087 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1088 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1090 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1091 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1092 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1093 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1094 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1101 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
1102 * @dir: containing directory object
1103 * @dentry: file to unlink
1105 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1106 * and the object, error code otherwise
1108 static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1110 struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1111 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1114 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1115 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1118 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
1120 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1121 rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1124 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1126 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1127 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1128 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1129 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1135 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
1136 * @dir: containing directory object
1137 * @dentry: directory to unlink
1139 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1140 * and the directory, error code otherwise
1142 static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1144 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1147 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1148 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1151 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
1153 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1154 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1157 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1159 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1160 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1161 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1162 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1169 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
1170 * @old_inode: unused
1171 * @old_dentry: the old object
1172 * @new_inode: unused
1173 * @new_dentry: the new object
1175 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
1178 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1180 static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
1181 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1182 struct inode *new_inode,
1183 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1186 struct smack_known *isp;
1187 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1189 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1190 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1192 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1193 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1194 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1196 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1197 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1198 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1199 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1200 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1206 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
1207 * @inode: the inode in question
1208 * @mask: the access requested
1210 * This is the important Smack hook.
1212 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
1214 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
1216 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1217 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1218 int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
1221 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
1223 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
1228 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) {
1229 if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root)
1233 /* May be droppable after audit */
1236 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1237 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
1238 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
1239 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
1244 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
1245 * @dentry: the object
1246 * @iattr: for the force flag
1248 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1250 static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
1252 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1256 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
1258 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
1260 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1261 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1263 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1264 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1269 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
1270 * @mnt: vfsmount of the object
1271 * @dentry: the object
1273 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1275 static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
1277 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1278 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1281 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1282 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
1283 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1284 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
1289 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
1290 * @dentry: the object
1291 * @name: name of the attribute
1292 * @value: value of the attribute
1293 * @size: size of the value
1296 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
1298 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1300 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1301 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1303 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1304 struct smack_known *skp;
1306 int check_import = 0;
1311 * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
1313 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1314 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1315 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
1318 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1319 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1323 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1325 if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
1326 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
1329 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
1331 if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1334 if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
1335 skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
1338 else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
1339 (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
1343 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1344 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1347 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1348 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1355 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
1357 * @name: attribute name
1358 * @value: attribute value
1359 * @size: attribute size
1362 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
1363 * in the master label list.
1365 static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1366 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1368 struct smack_known *skp;
1369 struct inode_smack *isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1371 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1372 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1376 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1377 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1379 isp->smk_inode = skp;
1380 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
1381 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1383 isp->smk_task = skp;
1384 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1385 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1387 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
1394 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
1395 * @dentry: the object
1398 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1400 static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1402 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1405 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1406 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1408 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
1409 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
1414 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
1415 * @dentry: the object
1416 * @name: name of the attribute
1418 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
1420 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1422 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1424 struct inode_smack *isp;
1425 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1428 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1429 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1430 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
1431 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1432 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
1433 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1434 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1437 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
1442 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1443 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1445 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1446 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1450 isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1452 * Don't do anything special for these.
1453 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
1454 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
1456 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1457 struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
1458 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
1460 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
1461 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
1462 isp->smk_task = NULL;
1463 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
1464 isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
1465 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
1466 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1472 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
1473 * @inode: the object
1474 * @name: attribute name
1475 * @buffer: where to put the result
1476 * @alloc: duplicate memory
1478 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
1480 static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
1481 const char *name, void **buffer,
1484 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1485 struct socket *sock;
1486 struct super_block *sbp;
1487 struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
1488 struct smack_known *isp;
1490 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0)
1491 isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1494 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1497 if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1500 sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
1501 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
1504 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1506 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1508 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
1515 *buffer = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
1516 if (*buffer == NULL)
1520 return strlen(isp->smk_known);
1525 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
1526 * @inode: the object
1527 * @buffer: where they go
1528 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
1530 static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
1533 int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
1535 if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
1536 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
1542 * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
1543 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
1544 * @secid: where result will be saved
1546 static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
1548 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
1550 *secid = isp->smk_inode->smk_secid;
1558 * There is no smack_file_permission hook
1560 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1561 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1562 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1564 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1565 * label changing that SELinux does.
1569 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1572 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1573 * label list, so no allocation is done.
1575 * f_security is the owner security information. It
1576 * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
1580 static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1582 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1584 file->f_security = skp;
1589 * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
1592 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1593 * label list, so no memory is freed.
1595 static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
1597 file->f_security = NULL;
1601 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1606 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1608 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1610 static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1614 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1615 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1617 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1620 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1621 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1623 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
1624 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1625 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1628 if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
1629 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1630 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
1637 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1641 * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
1643 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1645 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1647 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1649 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1652 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1653 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1654 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1655 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1660 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1662 * @cmd: what action to check
1665 * Generally these operations are harmless.
1666 * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
1667 * for passing information, so they require write access.
1669 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1671 static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1674 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1676 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1678 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1686 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1687 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1688 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1689 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1693 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1694 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1695 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1696 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1707 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
1708 * if mapping anonymous memory.
1709 * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1710 * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
1711 * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1712 * @flags contains the operational flags.
1713 * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1715 static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
1716 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1717 unsigned long flags)
1719 struct smack_known *skp;
1720 struct smack_known *mkp;
1721 struct smack_rule *srp;
1722 struct task_smack *tsp;
1723 struct smack_known *okp;
1724 struct inode_smack *isp;
1725 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
1734 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file))))
1737 isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
1738 if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1740 sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
1741 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
1742 isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
1744 mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
1746 tsp = current_security();
1747 skp = smk_of_current();
1752 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1753 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1754 * to that rule's object label.
1756 list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
1757 okp = srp->smk_object;
1759 * Matching labels always allows access.
1761 if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
1764 * If there is a matching local rule take
1765 * that into account as well.
1767 may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
1771 may = srp->smk_access;
1773 may &= srp->smk_access;
1775 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1776 * possibly have less access.
1782 * Fetch the global list entry.
1783 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1784 * can't have as much access as current.
1786 mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1788 if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1793 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1794 * potential access, too.
1796 tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1798 if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1802 * If there is any access available to current that is
1803 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1806 if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1818 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1819 * @file: object in question
1822 static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1824 file->f_security = smk_of_current();
1828 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1829 * @tsk: The target task
1830 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1833 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1835 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1836 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1838 static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1839 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1841 struct smack_known *skp;
1842 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
1845 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1848 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1850 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
1852 /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1853 skp = file->f_security;
1854 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
1855 rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
1856 if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1859 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1860 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1861 smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_DELIVER, rc, &ad);
1866 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1869 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1871 static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1875 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1876 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1877 struct socket *sock;
1878 struct task_smack *tsp;
1879 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1881 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1884 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1885 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1887 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
1888 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
1889 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1890 tsp = current_security();
1892 * If the receiving process can't write to the
1893 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
1894 * write to the receiving process don't accept
1895 * the passed socket.
1897 rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1898 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1901 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1902 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1906 * This code relies on bitmasks.
1908 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1910 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1913 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
1914 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1919 * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
1921 * @cred: task credential
1923 * Set the security blob in the file structure.
1924 * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
1925 * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
1926 * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
1930 static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
1932 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1933 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1934 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1937 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1938 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1939 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1940 rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
1950 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
1951 * @new: the new credentials
1952 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1954 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
1955 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
1956 * complete without error.
1958 static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1960 struct task_smack *tsp;
1962 tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
1966 cred->security = tsp;
1973 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
1974 * @cred: the credentials in question
1977 static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
1979 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1980 struct smack_rule *rp;
1981 struct list_head *l;
1982 struct list_head *n;
1986 cred->security = NULL;
1988 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
1990 list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
1991 rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
1992 list_del(&rp->list);
1999 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
2000 * @new: the new credentials
2001 * @old: the original credentials
2002 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
2004 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
2006 static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2009 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
2010 struct task_smack *new_tsp;
2013 new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
2014 if (new_tsp == NULL)
2017 new->security = new_tsp;
2019 rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
2023 rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
2032 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
2033 * @new: the new credentials
2034 * @old: the original credentials
2036 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
2038 static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2040 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
2041 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2043 new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
2044 new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
2045 mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
2046 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
2049 /* cbs copy rule list */
2053 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
2054 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
2055 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
2057 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
2059 static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
2061 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2063 new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
2068 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
2069 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
2070 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
2072 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
2073 * as the objective context of the specified inode
2075 static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
2076 struct inode *inode)
2078 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2079 struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
2081 tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
2082 tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
2087 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
2088 * @p: the task object
2089 * @access: the access requested
2090 * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
2092 * Return 0 if access is permitted
2094 static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
2097 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2098 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2101 smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2102 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2103 rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
2104 rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
2109 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
2110 * @p: the task object
2113 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2115 static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2117 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2121 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
2122 * @p: the object task
2124 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2126 static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2128 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2132 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
2133 * @p: the object task
2135 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2137 static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2139 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2143 * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
2144 * @p: the object task
2145 * @secid: where to put the result
2147 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
2149 static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2151 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2153 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
2157 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
2158 * @p: the task object
2161 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2163 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2165 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2169 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
2170 * @p: the task object
2173 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2175 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2177 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2181 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
2182 * @p: the task object
2184 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2186 static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2188 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2192 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
2193 * @p: the task object
2197 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2199 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2201 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2205 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
2206 * @p: the task object
2208 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2210 static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2212 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2216 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
2217 * @p: the task object
2219 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2221 static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2223 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2227 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
2228 * @p: the task object
2231 * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
2233 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2235 * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
2236 * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
2238 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2241 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2242 struct smack_known *skp;
2243 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2247 return 0; /* null signal; existence test */
2249 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2250 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2252 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
2253 * can write the receiver.
2256 rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2257 rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2261 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
2262 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
2263 * we can't take privilege into account.
2265 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
2266 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2267 rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2272 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
2273 * @p: task to copy from
2274 * @inode: inode to copy to
2276 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
2278 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
2280 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2281 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2283 isp->smk_inode = skp;
2284 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2292 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
2295 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
2297 * Assign Smack pointers to current
2299 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
2301 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
2303 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2304 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2306 ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
2311 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2313 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2314 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2315 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2320 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
2322 sk->sk_security = ssp;
2328 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
2331 * Clears the blob pointer
2333 static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
2335 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2336 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2338 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
2340 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2341 if (spp->smk_sock != sk)
2343 spp->smk_can_reuse = 1;
2349 kfree(sk->sk_security);
2353 * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
2354 * @sip: the object end
2356 * looks for host based access restrictions
2358 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2359 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2360 * taken before calling this function.
2362 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2364 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
2366 struct smk_net4addr *snp;
2367 struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
2369 if (siap->s_addr == 0)
2372 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
2374 * we break after finding the first match because
2375 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2376 * so we have found the most specific match
2378 if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
2379 (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
2380 return snp->smk_label;
2385 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2387 * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
2390 * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
2392 static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2394 __be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2395 __be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2397 if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
2398 ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
2404 * smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
2405 * @sip: the object end
2407 * looks for host based access restrictions
2409 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2410 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2411 * taken before calling this function.
2413 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2415 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2417 struct smk_net6addr *snp;
2418 struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
2423 * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
2425 if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
2428 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
2430 * If the label is NULL the entry has
2431 * been renounced. Ignore it.
2433 if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
2436 * we break after finding the first match because
2437 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2438 * so we have found the most specific match
2440 for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
2441 if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
2442 snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
2448 return snp->smk_label;
2453 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2456 * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
2458 * @labeled: socket label scheme
2460 * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
2461 * secattr and attach it to the socket.
2463 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
2465 static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
2467 struct smack_known *skp;
2468 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2472 * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
2473 * packet labeling based on the label.
2474 * The case of a single label host is different, because
2475 * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
2476 * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
2480 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2482 if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
2483 labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
2484 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
2487 rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
2497 * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
2499 * @sap: the destination address
2501 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
2502 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
2504 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
2507 static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
2509 struct smack_known *skp;
2512 struct smack_known *hkp;
2513 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2514 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2517 hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
2520 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2522 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2523 ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
2524 ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
2525 ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
2527 sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
2529 rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2530 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2532 sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
2539 return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
2542 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2544 * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
2545 * @subject: subject Smack label
2546 * @object: object Smack label
2548 * @act: the action being taken
2550 * Check an IPv6 access
2552 static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
2553 struct smack_known *object,
2554 struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
2557 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2559 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2563 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2564 ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
2565 ad.a.u.net->dport = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2566 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2567 ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
2569 ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
2571 rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2572 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2575 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2577 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2579 * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
2583 * Create or update the port list entry
2585 static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
2587 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2588 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
2589 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2590 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2591 unsigned short port = 0;
2593 if (address == NULL) {
2595 * This operation is changing the Smack information
2596 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
2600 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2601 if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
2603 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2604 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2609 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
2610 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
2616 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
2617 port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
2619 * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
2625 * Look for an existing port list entry.
2626 * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
2629 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2630 if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sock->type)
2632 if (spp->smk_can_reuse != 1) {
2636 spp->smk_port = port;
2638 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2639 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2640 spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
2646 * A new port entry is required.
2648 spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
2652 spp->smk_port = port;
2654 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2655 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2656 spp->smk_sock_type = sock->type;
2657 spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
2659 mutex_lock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
2660 list_add_rcu(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
2661 mutex_unlock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
2666 * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
2670 * Create or update the port list entry
2672 static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
2675 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2676 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2677 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
2678 unsigned short port;
2679 struct smack_known *object;
2681 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
2682 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2683 object = ssp->smk_in;
2686 object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2690 * The other end is a single label host.
2692 if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
2693 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2695 skp = smack_net_ambient;
2697 object = smack_net_ambient;
2700 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
2702 if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
2703 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2706 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
2708 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2711 port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2713 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2714 if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sk->sk_type)
2716 object = spp->smk_in;
2717 if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
2718 ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
2723 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2725 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2728 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
2729 * @inode: the object
2730 * @name: attribute name
2731 * @value: attribute value
2732 * @size: size of the attribute
2735 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
2737 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
2739 static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2740 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2742 struct smack_known *skp;
2743 struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
2744 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2745 struct socket *sock;
2748 if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
2751 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
2753 return PTR_ERR(skp);
2755 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
2756 nsp->smk_inode = skp;
2757 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2761 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
2763 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2766 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2767 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
2770 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2772 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
2774 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
2776 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
2777 rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2780 "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
2786 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2787 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2788 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
2795 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
2797 * @family: protocol family
2802 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
2804 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2806 static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2807 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2809 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2811 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2815 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2817 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2818 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2819 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2820 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2823 if (family != PF_INET)
2826 * Set the outbound netlbl.
2828 return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2831 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2833 * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
2835 * @address: the port address
2836 * @addrlen: size of the address
2838 * Records the label bound to a port.
2842 static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
2845 if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2846 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
2849 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2852 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
2854 * @sap: the other end
2855 * @addrlen: size of sap
2857 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
2859 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2861 static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
2865 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2866 struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
2868 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2869 struct smack_known *rsp;
2870 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2873 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2876 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
2878 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
2880 rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
2883 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
2885 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2886 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
2888 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
2891 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2892 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
2900 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
2901 * @flags: the S_ value
2903 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
2905 static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
2909 if (flags & S_IRUGO)
2911 if (flags & S_IWUGO)
2913 if (flags & S_IXUGO)
2920 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
2925 static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2927 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2929 msg->security = skp;
2934 * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
2937 * Clears the blob pointer
2939 static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2941 msg->security = NULL;
2945 * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
2948 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2950 static struct smack_known *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2952 return (struct smack_known *)shp->shm_perm.security;
2956 * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
2961 static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2963 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2964 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2966 isp->security = skp;
2971 * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
2974 * Clears the blob pointer
2976 static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2978 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2980 isp->security = NULL;
2984 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
2986 * @access : access requested
2988 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2990 static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
2992 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
2993 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2997 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2998 ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
3000 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3001 rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
3006 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
3008 * @shmflg: access requested
3010 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3012 static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
3016 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3017 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3021 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
3023 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3025 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3027 static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
3040 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3045 * System level information.
3051 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3055 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
3058 * @shmflg: access requested
3060 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3062 static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
3067 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3068 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3072 * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
3075 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
3077 static struct smack_known *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
3079 return (struct smack_known *)sma->sem_perm.security;
3083 * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
3088 static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3090 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3091 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3093 isp->security = skp;
3098 * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
3101 * Clears the blob pointer
3103 static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3105 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3107 isp->security = NULL;
3111 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
3113 * @access : access requested
3115 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3117 static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
3119 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
3120 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3124 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3125 ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
3127 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3128 rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
3133 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
3135 * @semflg: access requested
3137 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3139 static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
3143 may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
3144 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3148 * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
3150 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3152 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3154 static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
3172 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3177 * System level information
3184 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3188 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
3194 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
3196 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
3198 static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
3199 unsigned nsops, int alter)
3201 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
3205 * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
3210 static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3212 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3213 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3215 kisp->security = skp;
3220 * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
3223 * Clears the blob pointer
3225 static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3227 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3229 kisp->security = NULL;
3233 * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
3236 * Returns a pointer to the smack label entry
3238 static struct smack_known *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
3240 return (struct smack_known *)msq->q_perm.security;
3244 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
3246 * @access : access requested
3248 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
3250 static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
3252 struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
3253 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3257 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3258 ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
3260 rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
3261 rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
3266 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
3268 * @msqflg: access requested
3270 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3272 static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3276 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3277 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3281 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
3283 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3285 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3287 static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3298 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3303 * System level information
3310 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3314 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3317 * @msqflg: access requested
3319 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3321 static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3326 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3327 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3331 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3338 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3340 static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3341 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
3343 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
3347 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
3348 * @ipp: the object permissions
3349 * @flag: access requested
3351 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3353 static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
3355 struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3356 int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
3357 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3361 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3362 ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
3364 rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
3365 rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
3370 * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
3371 * @ipp: the object permissions
3372 * @secid: where result will be saved
3374 static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
3376 struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3378 *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
3382 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
3383 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
3384 * @inode: the object
3386 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
3388 static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
3390 struct super_block *sbp;
3391 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
3392 struct inode_smack *isp;
3393 struct smack_known *skp;
3394 struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
3395 struct smack_known *final;
3396 char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
3404 isp = inode->i_security;
3406 mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
3408 * If the inode is already instantiated
3409 * take the quick way out
3411 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
3415 sbsp = sbp->s_security;
3417 * We're going to use the superblock default label
3418 * if there's no label on the file.
3420 final = sbsp->smk_default;
3423 * If this is the root inode the superblock
3424 * may be in the process of initialization.
3425 * If that is the case use the root value out
3426 * of the superblock.
3428 if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
3429 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3430 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3432 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
3433 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
3436 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
3437 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
3438 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3442 * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
3443 * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
3445 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3448 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3452 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
3453 * structures associated with the task involved.
3455 isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_star;
3458 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3461 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
3466 * This is pretty hackish.
3467 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
3468 * file system specific code, but it does help
3469 * with keeping it simple.
3471 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3473 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3475 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
3476 * that the smack file system doesn't do
3477 * extended attributes.
3479 * Cgroupfs is special
3481 final = &smack_known_star;
3483 case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
3485 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
3486 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
3491 case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
3493 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
3494 * The superblock default suffices.
3499 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
3500 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
3501 * getting recreated on every reboot.
3503 final = &smack_known_star;
3507 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
3508 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
3509 * to set mount options simulate setting the
3510 * superblock default.
3514 * This isn't an understood special case.
3515 * Get the value from the xattr.
3519 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
3521 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
3522 final = &smack_known_star;
3526 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
3527 * Use the aforeapplied default.
3528 * It would be curious if the label of the task
3529 * does not match that assigned.
3531 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
3534 * Get the dentry for xattr.
3536 dp = dget(opt_dentry);
3537 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
3538 if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
3542 * Transmuting directory
3544 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
3546 * If this is a new directory and the label was
3547 * transmuted when the inode was initialized
3548 * set the transmute attribute on the directory
3549 * and mark the inode.
3551 * If there is a transmute attribute on the
3552 * directory mark the inode.
3554 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
3555 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
3556 rc = __vfs_setxattr(dp, inode,
3557 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
3558 TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
3561 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode,
3562 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
3564 if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
3565 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
3569 transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
3572 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
3574 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
3575 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3576 skp == &smack_known_web)
3578 isp->smk_task = skp;
3580 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
3581 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3582 skp == &smack_known_web)
3584 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
3591 isp->smk_inode = ckp;
3593 isp->smk_inode = final;
3595 isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
3598 mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
3603 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
3604 * @p: the object task
3605 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3606 * @value: where to put the result
3608 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
3610 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3612 static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
3614 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
3618 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3621 cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3631 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
3632 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3633 * @value: the value to set
3634 * @size: the size of the value
3636 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
3637 * is permitted and only with privilege
3639 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3641 static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
3643 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
3645 struct smack_known *skp;
3646 struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
3649 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
3652 if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
3655 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3658 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
3660 return PTR_ERR(skp);
3663 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label
3664 * and the star ("*") label.
3666 if (skp == &smack_known_web || skp == &smack_known_star)
3669 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3671 list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list)
3672 if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
3680 new = prepare_creds();
3684 tsp = new->security;
3685 tsp->smk_task = skp;
3687 * process can change its label only once
3689 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
3696 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
3698 * @other: the other sock
3701 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3702 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3704 static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
3705 struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
3707 struct smack_known *skp;
3708 struct smack_known *okp;
3709 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
3710 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
3711 struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
3712 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3715 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3718 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
3722 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3723 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
3725 rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3726 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3730 rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3731 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
3737 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
3740 nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
3741 ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
3748 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
3750 * @other: the other socket
3752 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3753 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3755 static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
3757 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3758 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
3759 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3763 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3765 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3766 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
3769 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
3772 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3773 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3778 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
3781 * @size: the size of the message
3783 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
3784 * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
3785 * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
3787 static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3790 struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
3791 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3792 struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
3794 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3795 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3796 struct smack_known *rsp;
3801 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
3806 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
3808 rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
3811 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3812 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
3814 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
3817 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3818 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
3826 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
3827 * @sap: netlabel secattr
3828 * @ssp: socket security information
3830 * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
3832 static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
3833 struct socket_smack *ssp)
3835 struct smack_known *skp;
3840 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
3842 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
3843 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
3844 * behaving the way we expect it to.
3846 * Look it up in the label table
3847 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3848 * for the packet fall back on the network
3852 list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
3853 if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
3856 * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
3858 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
3859 if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
3860 NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
3864 for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
3865 acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
3867 kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
3868 skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
3870 if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
3883 if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
3884 return &smack_known_web;
3885 return &smack_known_star;
3887 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
3889 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
3891 return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
3893 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3894 * for the packet fall back on the network
3897 return smack_net_ambient;
3900 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3901 static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
3905 int proto = -EINVAL;
3906 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
3907 struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
3909 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3910 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3911 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3915 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3916 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3919 sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
3921 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3922 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3923 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3930 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3932 sip->sin6_port = th->source;
3935 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3937 sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
3940 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3942 sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
3947 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3950 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
3954 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
3956 static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3958 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3959 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3960 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
3962 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3963 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
3965 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3967 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3968 struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
3971 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3973 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3977 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
3979 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
3980 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
3981 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
3983 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
3984 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
3987 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
3989 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
3991 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3993 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
3995 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
3997 skp = smack_net_ambient;
3999 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4001 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4005 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4006 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4007 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4008 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4011 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
4012 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
4013 * This is the simplist possible security model
4016 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4017 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4020 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0);
4022 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4024 proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
4025 if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
4027 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4028 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
4029 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4031 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
4033 skp = smack_net_ambient;
4035 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4036 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4037 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4038 ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4039 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4040 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4041 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4043 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
4044 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4045 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
4046 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
4048 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4055 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
4057 * @optval: user's destination
4058 * @optlen: size thereof
4061 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
4063 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
4064 char __user *optval,
4065 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4067 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4072 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4073 if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
4074 rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
4075 slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
4080 else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
4083 if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
4091 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
4092 * @sock: the peer socket
4094 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
4096 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
4098 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
4099 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4102 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4103 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
4104 struct smack_known *skp;
4105 int family = PF_UNSPEC;
4106 u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
4110 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4112 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4113 else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4115 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4117 if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
4118 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4122 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4123 s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
4126 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4132 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
4134 if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
4135 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4136 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4137 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4139 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4142 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4145 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4157 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
4159 * @parent: parent socket
4161 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
4162 * is creating the new socket.
4164 static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4166 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4167 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
4170 (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
4173 ssp = sk->sk_security;
4176 /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
4180 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
4181 * @sk: socket involved
4185 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
4186 * the socket, otherwise an error code
4188 static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4189 struct request_sock *req)
4191 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4192 struct smack_known *skp;
4193 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4194 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4195 struct sockaddr_in addr;
4197 struct smack_known *hskp;
4199 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4201 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4204 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4205 if (family == PF_INET6) {
4207 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
4208 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
4209 * processing on IPv6.
4211 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4216 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4218 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4220 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4221 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4222 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4224 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
4225 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4228 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
4230 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4231 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4233 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4235 skp = &smack_known_huh;
4236 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4238 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4243 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4244 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4245 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4246 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4249 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
4250 * here. Read access is not required.
4252 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4253 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4258 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
4259 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
4261 req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
4264 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
4265 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
4266 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
4269 addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
4271 hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
4275 rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
4277 netlbl_req_delattr(req);
4283 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
4284 * @sk: the new socket
4285 * @req: the connection's request_sock
4287 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
4289 static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
4290 const struct request_sock *req)
4292 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4293 struct smack_known *skp;
4295 if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
4296 skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
4297 ssp->smk_packet = skp;
4299 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
4303 * Key management security hooks
4305 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
4306 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
4307 * If you care about keys please have a look.
4312 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
4314 * @cred: the credentials to use
4317 * No allocation required
4321 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
4322 unsigned long flags)
4324 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4326 key->security = skp;
4331 * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
4334 * Clear the blob pointer
4336 static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
4338 key->security = NULL;
4342 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
4343 * @key_ref: gets to the object
4344 * @cred: the credentials to use
4345 * @perm: requested key permissions
4347 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
4348 * an error code otherwise
4350 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4351 const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
4354 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4355 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4359 keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4363 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4366 if (keyp->security == NULL)
4369 * This should not occur
4374 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4375 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
4376 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
4378 if (perm & KEY_NEED_READ)
4380 if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
4381 request = MAY_WRITE;
4382 rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
4383 rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
4388 * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
4389 * @key points to the key to be queried
4390 * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
4391 * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
4392 * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
4394 * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
4396 static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
4398 struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
4402 if (key->security == NULL) {
4407 copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
4410 length = strlen(copy) + 1;
4416 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4421 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
4422 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
4423 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
4424 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
4426 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
4427 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
4428 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
4429 * model where nearly everything is a label.
4434 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
4435 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
4436 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
4437 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
4438 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
4440 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
4441 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
4443 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
4445 struct smack_known *skp;
4446 char **rule = (char **)vrule;
4449 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4452 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
4455 skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
4457 return PTR_ERR(skp);
4459 *rule = skp->smk_known;
4465 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
4466 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
4468 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
4469 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
4470 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
4472 static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
4474 struct audit_field *f;
4477 for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
4478 f = &krule->fields[i];
4480 if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4488 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
4489 * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
4490 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
4491 * @op: required testing operator
4492 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
4493 * @actx: audit context associated with the check
4495 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
4496 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
4498 static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
4499 struct audit_context *actx)
4501 struct smack_known *skp;
4504 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
4505 WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
4509 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4512 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4515 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
4516 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
4519 if (op == Audit_equal)
4520 return (rule == skp->smk_known);
4521 if (op == Audit_not_equal)
4522 return (rule != skp->smk_known);
4528 * There is no need for a smack_audit_rule_free hook.
4529 * No memory was allocated.
4532 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4535 * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
4536 * @name: Full xattr name to check.
4538 static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
4540 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
4545 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
4546 * @secid: incoming integer
4547 * @secdata: destination
4548 * @seclen: how long it is
4550 * Exists for networking code.
4552 static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4554 struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4557 *secdata = skp->smk_known;
4558 *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4563 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
4564 * @secdata: smack label
4565 * @seclen: how long result is
4566 * @secid: outgoing integer
4568 * Exists for audit and networking code.
4570 static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
4572 struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
4575 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
4582 * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
4583 * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
4584 * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
4587 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4589 return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4592 static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4594 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4597 static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
4600 len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
4608 static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
4609 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
4610 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
4611 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
4613 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
4614 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
4615 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
4616 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
4617 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
4618 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
4619 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, smack_parse_opts_str),
4621 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
4623 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
4624 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
4625 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
4626 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
4627 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
4628 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
4629 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
4630 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
4631 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
4632 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
4633 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
4634 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
4635 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
4636 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
4637 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
4638 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
4639 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
4640 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
4642 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
4643 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security),
4644 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
4645 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
4646 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
4647 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
4648 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
4649 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
4650 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
4651 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
4653 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
4655 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
4656 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
4657 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
4658 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
4659 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
4660 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
4661 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
4662 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
4663 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
4664 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
4665 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
4666 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
4667 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
4668 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
4669 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
4670 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
4671 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
4672 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
4674 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
4675 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
4677 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
4678 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, smack_msg_msg_free_security),
4680 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_msg_queue_alloc_security),
4681 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, smack_msg_queue_free_security),
4682 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
4683 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
4684 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
4685 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
4687 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_shm_alloc_security),
4688 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, smack_shm_free_security),
4689 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
4690 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
4691 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
4693 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security),
4694 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, smack_sem_free_security),
4695 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
4696 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
4697 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
4699 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
4701 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
4702 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
4704 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
4705 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
4707 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
4708 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4709 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
4711 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
4712 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
4713 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
4714 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
4715 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
4716 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
4717 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
4718 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
4719 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
4720 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
4722 /* key management security hooks */
4724 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
4725 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
4726 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
4727 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
4728 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4732 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
4733 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
4734 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
4735 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4737 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
4738 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
4739 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
4740 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
4741 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
4742 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
4746 static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
4749 * Initialize rule list locks
4751 mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
4752 mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
4753 mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
4754 mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
4755 mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
4757 * Initialize rule lists
4759 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
4760 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
4761 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
4762 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
4763 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
4765 * Create the known labels list
4767 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
4768 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
4769 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
4770 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
4771 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
4775 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
4779 static __init int smack_init(void)
4782 struct task_smack *tsp;
4784 if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
4787 smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
4788 if (!smack_inode_cache)
4791 tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
4794 kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache);
4800 pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
4801 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4802 pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n");
4804 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4805 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
4807 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4808 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
4812 * Set the security state for the initial task.
4814 cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
4815 cred->security = tsp;
4817 /* initialize the smack_known_list */
4818 init_smack_known_list();
4823 security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
4829 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
4830 * all processes and objects when they are created.
4832 security_initcall(smack_init);