1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
24 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
31 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
32 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
50 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
52 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
53 #include <linux/tty.h>
55 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
56 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
57 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
58 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
59 #include <net/netlabel.h>
60 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
61 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
62 #include <linux/atomic.h>
63 #include <linux/bitops.h>
64 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
65 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
66 #include <net/netlink.h>
67 #include <linux/tcp.h>
68 #include <linux/udp.h>
69 #include <linux/dccp.h>
70 #include <linux/sctp.h>
71 #include <net/sctp/structs.h>
72 #include <linux/quota.h>
73 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
75 #include <linux/parser.h>
76 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
78 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
79 #include <linux/personality.h>
80 #include <linux/audit.h>
81 #include <linux/string.h>
82 #include <linux/mutex.h>
83 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
84 #include <linux/syslog.h>
85 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
86 #include <linux/export.h>
87 #include <linux/msg.h>
88 #include <linux/shm.h>
89 #include <linux/bpf.h>
90 #include <linux/kernfs.h>
91 #include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
92 #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
93 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
94 #include <linux/fanotify.h>
103 #include "netlabel.h"
107 struct selinux_state selinux_state;
109 /* SECMARK reference count */
110 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
112 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
113 static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
115 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
117 unsigned long enforcing;
118 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
119 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
122 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
124 #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
127 int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
128 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
129 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
131 unsigned long enabled;
132 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
133 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
136 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
139 static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
140 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
142 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
144 unsigned long checkreqprot;
146 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
147 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
149 pr_warn("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
153 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
156 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
159 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
160 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
161 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
162 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
163 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
166 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
168 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
169 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
173 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
176 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
177 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
178 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
179 * is always considered enabled.
182 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
184 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
185 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
188 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
190 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
199 static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
201 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
203 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
210 * initialise the security for the init task
212 static void cred_init_security(void)
214 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
215 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
217 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
218 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
222 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
224 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
226 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
228 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
233 * get the objective security ID of a task
235 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
240 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
245 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
248 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
249 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
250 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
251 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
253 static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
254 struct dentry *dentry,
257 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
259 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
261 if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) &&
262 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
267 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
268 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
269 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
271 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
276 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
278 return selinux_inode(inode);
281 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
285 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
287 return ERR_PTR(error);
288 return selinux_inode(inode);
292 * Get the security label of an inode.
294 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
296 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
297 return selinux_inode(inode);
300 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
302 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
304 return selinux_inode(inode);
308 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
310 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
312 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
314 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
315 return selinux_inode(inode);
318 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
320 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
321 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
325 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
327 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
328 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
329 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
331 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
332 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
333 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
334 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
336 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
337 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
338 list_del_init(&isec->list);
339 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
343 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
345 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
346 sb->s_security = NULL;
350 struct selinux_mnt_opts {
351 const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
354 static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
356 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
357 kfree(opts->fscontext);
358 kfree(opts->context);
359 kfree(opts->rootcontext);
360 kfree(opts->defcontext);
373 #define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
383 A(rootcontext, true),
388 static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
392 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
393 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
394 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
396 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
397 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
402 return tokens[i].opt;
407 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
409 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
410 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
411 const struct cred *cred)
413 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
416 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
417 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
418 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
422 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
423 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
424 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
428 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
429 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
430 const struct cred *cred)
432 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
434 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
435 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
436 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
440 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
441 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
442 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
446 static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
448 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
449 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
450 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
451 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
452 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
453 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
454 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
455 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
456 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
459 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
461 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
464 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
465 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
467 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
469 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
470 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
471 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
472 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
473 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
476 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
477 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
479 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
480 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
481 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
487 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
489 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
490 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
491 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
494 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
495 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
496 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
497 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
498 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
499 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
500 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
501 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
502 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
507 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
508 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
509 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
510 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
511 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
512 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
514 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
515 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
516 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
521 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
524 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
525 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
526 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
528 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
529 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
531 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
533 /* Initialize the root inode. */
534 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
536 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
537 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
538 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
540 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
541 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
542 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
543 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
544 struct inode_security_struct, list);
545 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
546 list_del_init(&isec->list);
547 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
548 inode = igrab(inode);
550 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
551 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
554 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
556 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
561 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
562 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
564 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
566 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
567 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
568 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
569 (old_sid != new_sid))
572 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
573 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
575 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
576 if (mnt_flags & flag)
581 static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid)
583 int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s,
586 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
587 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
588 s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
593 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
594 * labeling information.
596 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
598 unsigned long kern_flags,
599 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
601 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
602 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
603 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
604 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
605 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
606 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
607 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
610 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
612 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
614 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
615 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
616 server is ready to handle calls. */
620 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
621 "before the security server is initialized\n");
624 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
625 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
626 * place the results is not allowed */
632 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
633 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
634 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
635 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
637 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
638 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
639 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
640 * will be used for both mounts)
642 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
646 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
649 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
650 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
651 * than once with different security options.
654 if (opts->fscontext) {
655 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid);
658 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
660 goto out_double_mount;
661 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
664 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid);
667 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
669 goto out_double_mount;
670 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
672 if (opts->rootcontext) {
673 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid);
676 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
678 goto out_double_mount;
679 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
681 if (opts->defcontext) {
682 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid);
685 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
687 goto out_double_mount;
688 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
692 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
693 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
694 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
695 goto out_double_mount;
700 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
701 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
703 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
704 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
705 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
706 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
707 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
708 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
710 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
711 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
712 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
713 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
715 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
717 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
720 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
722 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
723 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
729 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
730 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
731 * line and security labels must be ignored.
733 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
734 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
735 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
736 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) {
737 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
742 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
743 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
744 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
748 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
755 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
757 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
761 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
765 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
766 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
767 * the superblock context if not already set.
769 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
770 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
771 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
775 if (!fscontext_sid) {
776 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
780 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
782 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
787 if (!rootcontext_sid)
788 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
790 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
791 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
794 if (rootcontext_sid) {
795 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
800 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
801 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
804 if (defcontext_sid) {
805 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
806 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
808 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
809 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
813 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
814 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
820 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
824 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
826 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
830 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
831 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
836 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
837 const struct super_block *newsb)
839 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
840 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
841 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
842 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
844 if (oldflags != newflags)
846 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
848 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
850 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
852 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
853 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
854 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
855 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
860 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
861 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
862 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
866 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
867 struct super_block *newsb,
868 unsigned long kern_flags,
869 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
872 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
873 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
875 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
876 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
877 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
880 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
881 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
883 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
887 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
888 * place the results is not allowed.
890 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
893 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
894 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
896 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
897 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
898 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
899 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
900 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
903 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
905 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
907 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
908 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
909 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
911 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
912 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
913 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
918 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
919 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
920 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
924 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
928 if (!set_rootcontext) {
929 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
932 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
934 if (set_rootcontext) {
935 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
936 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
938 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
941 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
943 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
947 static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
949 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
951 if (token == Opt_seclabel) /* eaten and completely ignored */
955 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
964 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
973 case Opt_rootcontext:
974 if (opts->rootcontext)
976 opts->rootcontext = s;
979 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
981 opts->defcontext = s;
986 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
990 static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len,
993 int token = Opt_error;
996 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
997 if (strcmp(option, tokens[i].name) == 0) {
998 token = tokens[i].opt;
1003 if (token == Opt_error)
1006 if (token != Opt_seclabel) {
1007 val = kmemdup_nul(val, len, GFP_KERNEL);
1013 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, val, mnt_opts);
1022 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
1028 static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1030 char *context = NULL;
1034 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid,
1037 bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ',');
1042 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1050 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1052 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
1055 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1058 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
1061 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1063 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1064 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1068 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1070 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1071 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1075 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1077 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1078 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1082 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1083 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
1084 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1086 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1087 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1091 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1093 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1098 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1100 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1102 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1104 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1106 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1108 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1110 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1112 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1114 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1118 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1121 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1123 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1126 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1128 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1131 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1133 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1139 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1140 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1143 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1150 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1151 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1152 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1153 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1154 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1156 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1158 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1159 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1160 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1161 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1162 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1164 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1166 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1168 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1174 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1175 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1176 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1178 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1180 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1181 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1182 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1184 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1186 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1187 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1188 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1189 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1190 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1191 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1192 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1193 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1194 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1195 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1196 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1197 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1198 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1199 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1200 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1202 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1203 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1204 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1206 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1209 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1211 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1213 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1219 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1221 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1223 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1225 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1227 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1229 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1231 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1233 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1235 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1237 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1239 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1241 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1243 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1245 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1247 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1249 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1251 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1253 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1255 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1257 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1259 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1261 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1263 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1265 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1267 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1269 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1271 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1273 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1275 #error New address family defined, please update this function.
1280 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1283 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1289 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1290 char *buffer, *path;
1292 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1296 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1300 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1301 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1302 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1303 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1304 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1309 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1311 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1312 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1313 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1317 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1321 static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1322 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1324 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1329 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1330 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1334 context[len] = '\0';
1335 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1336 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1339 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1340 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1345 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1349 context[len] = '\0';
1350 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1355 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1356 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1357 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1364 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
1367 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1368 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1370 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1371 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1374 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1375 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1382 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1383 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1385 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1386 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1387 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1389 struct dentry *dentry;
1392 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1395 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1396 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1399 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1400 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1402 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1403 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1404 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1405 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1406 server is ready to handle calls. */
1407 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1408 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1409 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1410 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1414 sclass = isec->sclass;
1415 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1417 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1418 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1420 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1421 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1423 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1424 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1425 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1428 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1429 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1431 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1432 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1435 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1436 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1437 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1438 * two, depending upon that...
1440 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1442 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1446 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1447 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1448 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1449 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1450 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1451 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1452 * be used again by userspace.
1457 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1463 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1466 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1467 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1470 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1471 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1472 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1476 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1477 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1480 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1483 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1484 (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1485 selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1486 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1489 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1490 * d_splice_alias. */
1491 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1493 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1494 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1495 * a connected one, so try that first.
1497 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1499 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1502 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1503 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1504 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1505 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1506 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1507 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1508 * could be used again by userspace.
1512 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1513 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1519 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1520 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1521 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1534 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1535 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1537 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1540 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1545 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1549 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1550 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1551 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1554 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1558 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1559 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1565 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1566 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1569 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1570 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1573 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1574 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1577 /* All other signals. */
1578 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1585 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1586 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1589 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1590 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1591 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1593 struct common_audit_data ad;
1594 struct av_decision avd;
1596 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1597 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1600 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1603 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1605 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1608 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1611 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1616 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1617 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1618 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1619 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1620 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1627 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1628 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1629 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1630 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1631 struct inode *inode,
1633 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1635 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1638 validate_creds(cred);
1640 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1643 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1644 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1646 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1647 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1650 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1651 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1652 pathname if needed. */
1653 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1654 struct dentry *dentry,
1657 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1658 struct common_audit_data ad;
1660 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1661 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1662 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1663 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1666 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1667 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1668 pathname if needed. */
1669 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1670 const struct path *path,
1673 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1674 struct common_audit_data ad;
1676 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1678 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1679 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1682 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1683 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1687 struct common_audit_data ad;
1689 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1691 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1694 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1695 static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1698 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1699 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1700 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1701 check a particular permission to the file.
1702 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1703 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1704 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1705 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1706 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1710 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1711 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1712 struct common_audit_data ad;
1713 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1716 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1719 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1720 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1729 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1730 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1735 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1738 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1745 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1748 selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1750 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1753 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1755 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1756 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1757 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1758 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1760 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1762 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1763 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1771 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1772 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1773 struct dentry *dentry,
1776 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1777 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1778 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1780 struct common_audit_data ad;
1783 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1784 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1788 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1789 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1791 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1792 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1793 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1798 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1803 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1804 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1808 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1810 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1811 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1815 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1818 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1819 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1820 struct dentry *dentry,
1824 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1825 struct common_audit_data ad;
1826 u32 sid = current_sid();
1830 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1831 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1833 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1834 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1837 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1838 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1839 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1854 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1859 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1860 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1864 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1865 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1866 struct inode *new_dir,
1867 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1869 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1870 struct common_audit_data ad;
1871 u32 sid = current_sid();
1873 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1876 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1877 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1878 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1879 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1881 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1883 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1884 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1885 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1886 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1889 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1891 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1894 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1895 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1897 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1902 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1903 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1904 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1905 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1906 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1907 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1910 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1911 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1912 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1913 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1916 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1924 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1925 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1926 struct super_block *sb,
1928 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1930 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1931 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1933 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1934 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1935 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1938 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1939 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1943 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1944 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1945 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1946 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1949 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1951 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1955 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1957 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1959 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1966 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1967 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1971 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1973 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1974 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1981 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1990 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
1993 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1995 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1996 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1998 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
1999 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2005 /* Hook functions begin here. */
2007 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
2009 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2010 current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
2011 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2014 static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
2015 const struct cred *to)
2017 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2018 u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from);
2019 u32 tosid = cred_sid(to);
2022 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2023 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2024 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2025 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2030 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid,
2031 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
2034 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
2035 const struct cred *to)
2037 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2038 cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to),
2039 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2043 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
2044 const struct cred *to,
2047 u32 sid = cred_sid(to);
2048 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2049 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2050 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2051 struct common_audit_data ad;
2054 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2055 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2057 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2058 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2067 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2068 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2073 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2076 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2077 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2078 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2082 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2085 u32 sid = current_sid();
2086 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2088 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2089 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2090 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2092 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2093 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2096 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2098 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2099 task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2100 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2103 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2104 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2106 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2107 current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2108 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2111 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2112 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2113 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2114 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2116 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2117 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2118 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2122 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2123 * which was removed).
2125 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2126 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2127 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2128 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2131 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2132 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2134 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2137 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2139 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2154 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2162 case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2163 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2166 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2172 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2174 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2176 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2179 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2182 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2183 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2184 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2185 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2186 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2187 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2188 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2189 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2190 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2191 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2192 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2193 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2196 /* All other syslog types */
2197 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2198 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2199 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2203 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2204 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2205 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2207 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2208 * processes that allocate mappings.
2210 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2212 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2214 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2215 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2219 return cap_sys_admin;
2222 /* binprm security operations */
2224 static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2227 struct task_struct *tracer;
2230 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2232 sid = task_sid(tracer);
2238 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2239 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2240 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2242 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2243 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2247 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2248 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2250 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2251 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2254 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2255 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2256 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2257 * the old and new contexts.
2259 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2262 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2264 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2265 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2266 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2267 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2273 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2274 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2275 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2277 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2283 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2284 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2285 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2292 static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2294 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2295 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2296 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2297 struct common_audit_data ad;
2298 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2301 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2302 * the script interpreter */
2304 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2305 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2306 isec = inode_security(inode);
2308 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2309 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2310 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2312 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2313 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2314 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2315 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2317 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2318 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2319 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2320 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2322 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2323 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2327 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2328 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2329 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2335 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2338 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2340 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2343 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2344 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2346 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2347 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2348 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2349 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2353 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2354 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2355 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2356 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2360 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2361 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2362 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2366 /* Check for shared state */
2367 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2368 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2369 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2370 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2376 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2377 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2378 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2379 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2381 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2382 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2384 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2390 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2391 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2393 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2394 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2395 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2396 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2397 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2398 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2400 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2406 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2408 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2411 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2412 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2413 struct files_struct *files)
2415 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2416 struct tty_struct *tty;
2420 tty = get_current_tty();
2422 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2423 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2424 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2426 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2427 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2428 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2429 open file may belong to another process and we are
2430 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2431 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2432 struct tty_file_private, list);
2433 file = file_priv->file;
2434 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2437 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2440 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2444 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2445 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2446 if (!n) /* none found? */
2449 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2450 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2452 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2454 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2455 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2461 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2463 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2465 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2466 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2469 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2470 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2473 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2474 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2476 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2477 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2479 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2480 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2481 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2483 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2484 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2485 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2486 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2487 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2489 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2490 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2491 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2493 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2495 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2496 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2497 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2498 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2500 task_unlock(current);
2501 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2502 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2507 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2510 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2512 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2522 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2523 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2524 * flush and unblock signals.
2526 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2527 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2529 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2530 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2534 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2535 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2536 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2537 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2538 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2539 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2540 recalc_sigpending();
2542 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2545 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2546 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2547 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2548 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2549 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2552 /* superblock security operations */
2554 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2556 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2558 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
2562 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2563 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2564 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2566 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2567 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2568 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2569 sb->s_security = sbsec;
2574 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2576 superblock_free_security(sb);
2579 static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2581 bool open_quote = false;
2585 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2587 open_quote = !open_quote;
2588 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2594 static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2596 char *from = options;
2602 int len = opt_len(from);
2606 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2608 if (token != Opt_error) {
2613 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2618 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2624 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2630 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2635 memmove(to, from, len);
2648 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2654 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2656 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2657 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2661 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2667 if (opts->fscontext) {
2668 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid);
2671 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2672 goto out_bad_option;
2674 if (opts->context) {
2675 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid);
2678 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2679 goto out_bad_option;
2681 if (opts->rootcontext) {
2682 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2683 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2684 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid);
2687 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2688 goto out_bad_option;
2690 if (opts->defcontext) {
2691 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid);
2694 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2695 goto out_bad_option;
2700 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2701 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2706 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
2708 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2709 struct common_audit_data ad;
2711 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2712 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2713 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2716 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2718 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2719 struct common_audit_data ad;
2721 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2722 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2723 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2726 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2727 const struct path *path,
2729 unsigned long flags,
2732 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2734 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2735 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2736 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2738 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2741 static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2742 const struct path *to_path)
2744 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2746 return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2749 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2751 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2753 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2754 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2757 static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2758 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2760 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2761 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
2766 fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
2770 opts = fc->security;
2772 if (src->fscontext) {
2773 opts->fscontext = kstrdup(src->fscontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2774 if (!opts->fscontext)
2778 opts->context = kstrdup(src->context, GFP_KERNEL);
2782 if (src->rootcontext) {
2783 opts->rootcontext = kstrdup(src->rootcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2784 if (!opts->rootcontext)
2787 if (src->defcontext) {
2788 opts->defcontext = kstrdup(src->defcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2789 if (!opts->defcontext)
2795 static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2796 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2797 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2798 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2799 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2800 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2804 static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2805 struct fs_parameter *param)
2807 struct fs_parse_result result;
2810 opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2814 rc = selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2816 param->string = NULL;
2822 /* inode security operations */
2824 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2826 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2827 u32 sid = current_sid();
2829 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2830 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2831 isec->inode = inode;
2832 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2833 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2834 isec->task_sid = sid;
2835 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2840 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2842 inode_free_security(inode);
2845 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2846 const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2852 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2853 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2854 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2859 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
2863 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2865 const struct cred *old,
2870 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2872 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2873 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2874 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2879 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2880 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2884 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2885 const struct qstr *qstr,
2887 void **value, size_t *len)
2889 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2890 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2895 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2897 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2899 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr,
2900 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2905 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2906 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2907 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2908 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2910 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2913 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
2914 !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2918 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2921 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
2932 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2934 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2937 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2939 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2942 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2944 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2947 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2949 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2952 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2954 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2957 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2959 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2962 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2964 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2967 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2968 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2970 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2973 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2975 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2977 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2980 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
2983 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2984 struct common_audit_data ad;
2985 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2988 validate_creds(cred);
2990 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2991 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2992 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2993 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
2995 return PTR_ERR(isec);
2997 return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state,
2998 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
2999 rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
3002 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3003 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3006 struct common_audit_data ad;
3007 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3010 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3013 rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3014 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3015 audited, denied, result, &ad);
3021 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3023 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3026 bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3027 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3029 struct av_decision avd;
3031 u32 audited, denied;
3033 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3034 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3036 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3040 validate_creds(cred);
3042 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3045 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3047 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3048 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3050 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3052 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3053 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3054 no_block ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0,
3056 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3057 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3059 if (likely(!audited))
3062 /* fall back to ref-walk if we have to generate audit */
3066 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3072 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3074 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3075 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3076 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3077 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3079 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3080 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3081 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3087 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3088 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3089 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3091 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3092 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3093 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3094 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3097 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3100 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3102 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3105 static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3107 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3108 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3110 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3112 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3117 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3118 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3120 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3121 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3122 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3123 struct common_audit_data ad;
3124 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3127 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3128 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3132 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3133 ordinary setattr permission. */
3134 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3137 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3138 return (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3140 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3141 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3144 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3147 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3148 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3150 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3151 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3152 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3153 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3157 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3159 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3160 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3161 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3164 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3165 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3167 const char *str = value;
3169 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3170 audit_size = size - 1;
3176 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3177 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3178 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3179 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3184 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3190 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3191 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3192 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3196 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3201 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3204 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3205 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3209 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3210 const void *value, size_t size,
3213 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3214 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3218 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3219 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3223 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
3224 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3225 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3226 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3227 * we've since initialized.
3232 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3235 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3236 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3237 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3241 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3242 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3243 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3245 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3246 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3251 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3253 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3255 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3258 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3260 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3262 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3265 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3267 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3268 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
3272 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3273 ordinary setattr permission. */
3274 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3277 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3280 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3281 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3285 static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3286 unsigned int obj_type)
3291 struct common_audit_data ad;
3293 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3297 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3298 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3301 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3302 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3304 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3305 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3306 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3307 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3311 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3318 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3319 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3320 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3322 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3323 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3324 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3326 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3330 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3332 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3334 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3338 char *context = NULL;
3339 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3342 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3343 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3345 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
3346 strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3350 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3351 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3352 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3353 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3354 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3355 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3356 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3358 isec = inode_security(inode);
3359 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3360 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3361 isec->sid, &context,
3364 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3378 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3379 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3381 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3382 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3386 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3389 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3392 if (!value || !size)
3395 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3400 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3401 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3403 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3404 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3408 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3410 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3412 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3415 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3416 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3420 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3422 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3426 static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3429 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3430 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3432 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3433 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3438 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3439 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3440 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3441 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3446 static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3448 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3449 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3450 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3452 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3453 return 1; /* Discard */
3455 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3461 /* kernfs node operations */
3463 static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3464 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3466 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3467 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3471 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3478 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3482 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3488 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
3494 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3495 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3497 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3501 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3503 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
3504 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3510 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3515 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3522 /* file security operations */
3524 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3526 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3527 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3529 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3530 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3533 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3534 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3537 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3539 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3540 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3541 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3542 u32 sid = current_sid();
3545 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3548 isec = inode_security(inode);
3549 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3550 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3551 /* No change since file_open check. */
3554 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3557 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3559 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3560 u32 sid = current_sid();
3563 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3569 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3570 * operation to an inode.
3572 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3573 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3575 struct common_audit_data ad;
3576 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3577 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3578 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3579 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3580 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3582 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3583 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3585 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3588 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3590 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3591 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3600 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3603 isec = inode_security(inode);
3604 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3605 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3606 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3611 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3614 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3621 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3622 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3623 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3626 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3627 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3628 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3631 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3634 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3639 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3640 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3643 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3644 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3647 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3652 static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3654 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3656 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3657 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3660 if (default_noexec &&
3661 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3662 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3664 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3665 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3666 * This has an additional check.
3668 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3669 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3670 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3676 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3677 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3679 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3680 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3683 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3684 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3686 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3693 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3697 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3698 u32 sid = current_sid();
3699 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3700 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3701 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3707 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3708 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3710 struct common_audit_data ad;
3714 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3716 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3722 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3725 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3726 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3729 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3730 unsigned long reqprot,
3733 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3734 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3736 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3739 if (default_noexec &&
3740 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3742 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3743 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3744 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3745 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3746 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3747 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3748 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3749 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3750 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3751 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3752 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3753 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3754 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3756 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3757 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3758 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3759 * modified content. This typically should only
3760 * occur for text relocations.
3762 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3768 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3771 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3773 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3775 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3778 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3781 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3786 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3787 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3796 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3797 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3798 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3806 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3811 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3818 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3820 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3822 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3823 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3826 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3827 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3830 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3832 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3834 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3835 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3837 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3840 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3842 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3844 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3845 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3846 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3849 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3851 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3853 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3856 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
3858 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3859 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3861 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3862 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3864 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3865 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3866 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3867 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3868 * struct as its SID.
3870 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3871 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
3873 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3874 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3875 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3876 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3877 * new inode label or new policy.
3878 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3880 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3883 /* task security operations */
3885 static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3886 unsigned long clone_flags)
3888 u32 sid = current_sid();
3890 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3891 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3895 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3897 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3900 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3901 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3908 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3910 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3912 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3913 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3918 static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
3920 *secid = cred_sid(c);
3924 * set the security data for a kernel service
3925 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3927 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3929 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3930 u32 sid = current_sid();
3933 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3935 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3936 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3940 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3941 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3942 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3948 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3949 * objective context of the specified inode
3951 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3953 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
3954 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3955 u32 sid = current_sid();
3958 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3960 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3961 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3965 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3969 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3971 struct common_audit_data ad;
3973 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3974 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3976 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3977 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3978 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3981 static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
3983 struct common_audit_data ad;
3984 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3985 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3986 u32 sid = current_sid();
3991 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3992 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3993 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
3997 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4000 fsec = selinux_file(file);
4001 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4002 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4003 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4008 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4009 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4010 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4011 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4014 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4015 enum kernel_read_file_id id,
4021 case READING_MODULE:
4022 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
4031 static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
4036 case LOADING_MODULE:
4037 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4045 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4047 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4048 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4049 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4052 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4054 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4055 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4056 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4059 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4061 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4062 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4063 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4066 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4068 *secid = task_sid(p);
4071 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4073 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4074 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4075 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4078 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4080 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4081 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4082 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4085 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4087 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4088 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4089 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4092 static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4099 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4100 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4101 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4102 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4103 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4104 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4105 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4108 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4109 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4111 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4113 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4114 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4115 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4116 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4117 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4118 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4119 current_sid(), task_sid(p),
4120 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4125 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4127 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4128 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4129 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4132 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4134 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4135 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4136 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4139 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4141 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4142 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4143 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4146 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4147 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4153 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4155 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4157 secid = current_sid();
4159 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4160 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4161 secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4164 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4165 struct inode *inode)
4167 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4168 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
4170 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4171 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4173 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4174 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4177 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4178 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4179 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4181 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4182 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4184 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4185 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4189 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4190 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4193 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4194 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4198 *proto = ih->protocol;
4200 switch (ih->protocol) {
4202 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4204 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4208 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4212 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4213 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4218 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4220 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4224 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4228 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4229 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4233 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4234 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4236 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4240 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4244 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4245 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4249 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4250 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4251 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4253 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4257 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4261 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4262 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4273 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4275 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4276 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4277 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4280 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4281 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4284 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4285 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4289 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4290 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4293 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4294 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4295 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4304 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4306 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4310 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4311 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4316 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4318 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4322 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4323 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4327 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4328 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4330 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4334 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4335 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4339 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4340 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4341 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4343 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4347 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4348 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4352 /* includes fragments */
4362 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4363 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4368 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4370 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4373 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4374 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4377 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4379 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4382 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4383 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4393 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4394 " unable to parse packet\n");
4404 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4406 * @family: protocol family
4407 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4410 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4411 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4412 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4413 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4414 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4418 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4425 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4428 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4432 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4433 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4434 if (unlikely(err)) {
4436 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4437 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4445 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4446 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4447 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4448 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4450 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4451 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4452 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4453 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4456 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4460 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4461 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4469 /* socket security operations */
4471 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4472 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4474 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4475 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4479 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4480 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4483 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4485 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4486 struct common_audit_data ad;
4487 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4489 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4492 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4496 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4497 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4501 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4502 int protocol, int kern)
4504 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4512 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4513 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4517 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4518 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4521 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4522 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4524 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4525 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4526 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4527 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4528 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4532 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4537 isec->sclass = sclass;
4539 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4542 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4543 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4545 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4546 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4547 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4549 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4555 static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4556 struct socket *sockb)
4558 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4559 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4561 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4562 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4567 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4568 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4569 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4571 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4573 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4574 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4578 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4582 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4583 family = sk->sk_family;
4584 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4586 struct common_audit_data ad;
4587 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4588 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4589 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4591 unsigned short snum;
4595 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4596 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4597 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4598 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4600 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4602 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4603 switch (family_sa) {
4606 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4608 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4609 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4610 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4611 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4613 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4615 family_sa = AF_INET;
4617 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4618 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4621 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4623 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4624 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4625 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4631 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4633 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4634 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4639 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4641 if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4642 snum < low || snum > high) {
4643 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4647 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4650 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4656 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4657 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4658 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4661 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4662 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4665 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4666 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4669 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4670 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4674 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4678 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4682 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4683 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4685 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4687 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4689 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4696 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4697 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4699 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4702 /* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4703 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4705 static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4706 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4708 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4709 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4712 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4715 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4718 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4719 * way to disconnect the socket
4721 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4725 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4728 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4729 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4730 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4731 struct common_audit_data ad;
4732 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4733 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4734 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4735 unsigned short snum;
4738 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4739 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4740 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4741 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4743 switch (address->sa_family) {
4745 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4746 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4748 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4751 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4752 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4754 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4757 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4758 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4760 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4763 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4766 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4770 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4771 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4772 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4774 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4775 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4777 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4778 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4782 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4784 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4785 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4786 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4787 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4795 /* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4796 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4797 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4800 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4802 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4806 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4809 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4811 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4814 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4817 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4818 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4822 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4826 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4827 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4828 sclass = isec->sclass;
4830 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4832 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4833 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4835 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4840 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4843 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4846 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4847 int size, int flags)
4849 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4852 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4854 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4857 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4859 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4862 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4866 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4870 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4873 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4876 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4879 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4881 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4884 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4888 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4889 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4890 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4891 struct common_audit_data ad;
4892 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4895 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4897 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4899 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4900 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4901 sksec_other->sclass,
4902 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4906 /* server child socket */
4907 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4908 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
4909 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
4913 /* connecting socket */
4914 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4919 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4920 struct socket *other)
4922 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4923 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4924 struct common_audit_data ad;
4925 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4927 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4929 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4931 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4932 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4936 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4937 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4938 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4944 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4947 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4949 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4953 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4956 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4958 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4961 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4965 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4966 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4967 struct common_audit_data ad;
4968 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4971 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4973 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4974 ad.u.net->family = family;
4975 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4979 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4980 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4981 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4987 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4990 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4995 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4998 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4999 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5000 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5001 struct common_audit_data ad;
5002 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5007 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5010 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5011 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5014 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5015 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5016 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5017 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5018 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5019 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5021 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5022 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5023 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5026 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5028 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5029 ad.u.net->family = family;
5030 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5034 if (peerlbl_active) {
5037 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5040 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5041 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5043 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5046 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5047 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5050 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5055 if (secmark_active) {
5056 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5057 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5066 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
5067 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
5072 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5073 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5075 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5076 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5077 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5078 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5079 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5080 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5082 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5087 if (scontext_len > len) {
5092 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5096 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
5102 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5104 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5106 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5108 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5110 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5113 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5117 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5118 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5119 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5121 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5124 *secid = peer_secid;
5125 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5130 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5132 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5134 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5138 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5139 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5140 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5141 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5142 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5147 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5149 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5151 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5152 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5156 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5158 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5159 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5161 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5162 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5163 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5165 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5168 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5171 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5173 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5175 *secid = sksec->sid;
5179 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5181 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5182 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5183 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5185 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5186 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5187 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5188 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5191 /* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
5192 * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
5195 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
5196 struct sk_buff *skb)
5198 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
5199 struct common_audit_data ad;
5200 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5202 u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5206 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5209 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5211 if (peerlbl_active) {
5212 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5213 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5215 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
5220 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5221 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5224 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5225 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5227 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5228 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5229 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5230 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5232 sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
5233 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
5234 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5235 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5237 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5239 ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
5240 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5241 sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
5242 SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
5247 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5248 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5249 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5250 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5251 * plug this into the new socket.
5253 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
5257 ep->secid = conn_sid;
5258 ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
5260 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5261 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
5264 /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5265 * based on their @optname.
5267 static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5268 struct sockaddr *address,
5271 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5273 struct sockaddr *addr;
5274 struct socket *sock;
5276 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5279 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5280 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5283 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5284 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5288 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5291 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5294 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5300 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5306 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5307 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5308 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5309 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5311 /* Connect checks */
5312 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5313 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5314 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5315 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5316 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5320 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5321 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5322 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
5323 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5324 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5325 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5326 * primary address is selected.
5327 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5328 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5329 * selinux_socket_connect().
5331 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5345 /* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5346 static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
5349 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5350 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5352 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5353 * the non-sctp clone version.
5355 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5356 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5358 newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
5359 newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
5360 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5361 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5364 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5365 struct request_sock *req)
5367 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5369 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5373 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5376 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5379 req->secid = connsid;
5380 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5382 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5385 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5386 const struct request_sock *req)
5388 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5390 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5391 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5392 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5393 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5394 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5395 time it will have been created and available. */
5397 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5398 * thread with access to newsksec */
5399 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5402 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5404 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5405 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5407 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5408 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5411 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5414 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5416 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5419 __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
5422 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5423 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5427 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5429 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5432 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5434 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5437 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5440 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
5443 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5445 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5447 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5450 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5456 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5461 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5463 u32 sid = current_sid();
5465 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5466 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5467 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5468 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5469 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5470 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5472 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5473 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5477 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5479 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5481 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5482 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5483 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5486 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5488 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5489 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5491 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5492 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5493 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5494 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5495 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5496 * protocols were being used */
5498 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5499 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5504 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5506 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5507 u32 sid = current_sid();
5510 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5511 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5512 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5515 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5516 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5517 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5525 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5527 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
5528 const struct net_device *indev,
5534 struct common_audit_data ad;
5535 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5540 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5543 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5544 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
5545 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5546 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5549 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5552 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5554 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
5555 ad.u.net->family = family;
5556 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5559 if (peerlbl_active) {
5560 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
5561 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5563 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5569 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5570 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5571 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5575 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5576 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5577 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5579 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5585 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
5586 struct sk_buff *skb,
5587 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5589 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
5592 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5593 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
5594 struct sk_buff *skb,
5595 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5597 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
5601 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
5607 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5610 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5611 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5612 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5615 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5617 if (sk_listener(sk))
5618 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5619 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5620 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5621 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5622 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5623 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5624 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5625 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5626 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5627 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5628 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5629 * best we can do. */
5632 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5633 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5636 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5637 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
5643 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
5644 struct sk_buff *skb,
5645 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5647 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
5650 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5651 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
5652 struct sk_buff *skb,
5653 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5655 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
5659 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5663 struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5664 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5665 struct common_audit_data ad;
5666 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5672 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5674 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5676 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5677 ad.u.net->family = family;
5678 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
5681 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5682 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5683 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5684 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5685 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5687 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5688 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5693 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
5694 const struct net_device *outdev,
5699 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
5701 struct common_audit_data ad;
5702 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5707 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5708 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5709 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5710 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5711 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5712 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
5714 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5715 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5716 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5719 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5722 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5723 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5724 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5725 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5726 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5727 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5728 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5729 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5730 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5731 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5733 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5734 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5739 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5740 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5741 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5742 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5744 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5745 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5748 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5749 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5751 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5752 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5753 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5754 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5755 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5756 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5757 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5758 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5759 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5760 * for similar problems. */
5762 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5764 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5765 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5767 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5768 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5769 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5770 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5771 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5772 * pass the packet. */
5773 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5776 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5780 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5784 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5787 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5789 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5791 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5792 * associated socket. */
5793 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5794 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5795 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5798 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5800 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5801 ad.u.net->family = family;
5802 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5806 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5807 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5808 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5809 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5811 if (peerlbl_active) {
5815 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5817 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5819 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5820 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5822 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5824 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5826 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5827 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5833 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
5834 struct sk_buff *skb,
5835 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5837 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5840 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5841 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
5842 struct sk_buff *skb,
5843 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5845 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5849 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5851 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5854 unsigned int msg_len;
5855 unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
5856 unsigned char *data = skb->data;
5857 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5858 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5859 u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
5862 while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
5863 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
5865 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
5866 * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
5867 * length fields; our solution is to follow what
5868 * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
5869 * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
5871 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
5874 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5876 rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5879 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
5880 /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
5881 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5882 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5883 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
5884 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5885 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
5886 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5887 if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
5888 !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
5891 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
5892 /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
5898 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
5899 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
5900 if (msg_len >= data_len)
5902 data_len -= msg_len;
5909 static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
5911 isec->sclass = sclass;
5912 isec->sid = current_sid();
5915 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5918 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5919 struct common_audit_data ad;
5920 u32 sid = current_sid();
5922 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
5924 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5925 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5927 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5928 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5931 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5933 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5935 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
5936 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5941 /* message queue security operations */
5942 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
5944 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5945 struct common_audit_data ad;
5946 u32 sid = current_sid();
5949 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5950 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5952 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5953 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5955 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5956 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5961 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
5963 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5964 struct common_audit_data ad;
5965 u32 sid = current_sid();
5967 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5969 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5970 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5972 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5973 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5974 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5977 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
5985 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5986 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5987 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
5988 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
5992 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5995 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5998 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6004 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6008 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6010 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6011 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6012 struct common_audit_data ad;
6013 u32 sid = current_sid();
6016 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6017 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6020 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6022 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6024 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6025 * message queue this message will be stored in
6027 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6028 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6033 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6034 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6036 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6037 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6038 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6041 /* Can this process send the message */
6042 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6043 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6046 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6047 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6048 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6049 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6054 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6055 struct task_struct *target,
6056 long type, int mode)
6058 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6059 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6060 struct common_audit_data ad;
6061 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
6064 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6065 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6067 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6068 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6070 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6072 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6074 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6076 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6080 /* Shared Memory security operations */
6081 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6083 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6084 struct common_audit_data ad;
6085 u32 sid = current_sid();
6088 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6089 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6091 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6092 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6094 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6095 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6100 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6102 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6103 struct common_audit_data ad;
6104 u32 sid = current_sid();
6106 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6108 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6109 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6111 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6112 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6113 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6116 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6117 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6125 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6126 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6127 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6128 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6132 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6135 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6142 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6148 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6152 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6153 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6157 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6160 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6162 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6165 /* Semaphore security operations */
6166 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6168 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6169 struct common_audit_data ad;
6170 u32 sid = current_sid();
6173 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6174 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6176 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6177 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6179 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6180 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6185 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6187 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6188 struct common_audit_data ad;
6189 u32 sid = current_sid();
6191 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6193 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6194 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6196 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6197 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6198 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6201 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6202 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6210 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6211 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6212 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6213 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6217 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6228 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6231 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6236 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6242 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6246 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6247 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6252 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6256 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6259 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6265 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6267 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6272 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6275 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6277 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6281 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6284 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6287 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6288 char *name, char **value)
6290 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6296 __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6299 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6300 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6301 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6306 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6308 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6310 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6311 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6312 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6313 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6314 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6315 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6316 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6317 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6327 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6337 static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6339 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6341 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6346 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6348 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6349 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6350 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6351 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6352 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6353 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6354 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6355 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6356 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6357 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6358 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6359 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6360 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6361 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6362 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6363 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6364 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6365 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6366 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6367 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6373 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6374 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6375 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6379 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6381 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6382 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6383 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6386 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6387 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6388 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6389 audit_size = size - 1;
6392 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6395 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6396 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6401 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6409 new = prepare_creds();
6413 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6414 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6415 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6416 operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6417 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6418 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6419 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6420 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6421 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6422 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6423 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6424 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6426 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid,
6427 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6431 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6432 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6433 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6434 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6439 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6441 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6442 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6448 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6449 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6450 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6451 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6455 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6456 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6457 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6459 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6460 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6461 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6480 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6482 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6485 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6487 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6491 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6493 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6497 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6502 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6504 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6506 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6507 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6508 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6512 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6514 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6516 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6518 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6519 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6523 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6525 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6527 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6530 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6533 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6542 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6543 unsigned long flags)
6545 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6546 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6548 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6552 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6553 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6554 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6556 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6562 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6564 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6570 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6571 const struct cred *cred,
6572 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6575 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6578 switch (need_perm) {
6585 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6588 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6594 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6595 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6597 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6598 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6599 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6600 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6608 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6609 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6610 ksec = key->security;
6612 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6613 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6616 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6618 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6619 char *context = NULL;
6623 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6631 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6632 static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6634 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6635 u32 sid = current_sid();
6637 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6638 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6643 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6644 static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6646 struct common_audit_data ad;
6649 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6650 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6652 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6656 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6657 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6658 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6659 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6660 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6662 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6663 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6666 static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6669 struct common_audit_data ad;
6672 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6673 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6675 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6681 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6682 strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name));
6683 ibendport.port = port_num;
6684 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6685 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6687 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6688 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6691 static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6693 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6695 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6698 sec->sid = current_sid();
6704 static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6710 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6711 static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6714 u32 sid = current_sid();
6718 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6719 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6720 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6724 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6725 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6736 static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6740 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6741 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6742 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6743 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6747 /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6748 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
6749 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6750 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6751 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6752 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6753 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6755 static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6757 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6758 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6759 struct bpf_map *map;
6762 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6763 map = file->private_data;
6764 bpfsec = map->security;
6765 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6766 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6767 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6770 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6771 prog = file->private_data;
6772 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6773 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6774 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6775 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6782 static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6784 u32 sid = current_sid();
6785 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6787 bpfsec = map->security;
6788 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6789 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6790 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6793 static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6795 u32 sid = current_sid();
6796 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6798 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6799 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6800 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6801 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6804 static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6806 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6808 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6812 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6813 map->security = bpfsec;
6818 static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6820 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6822 map->security = NULL;
6826 static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6828 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6830 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6834 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6835 aux->security = bpfsec;
6840 static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6842 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
6844 aux->security = NULL;
6849 static int selinux_lockdown(enum lockdown_reason what)
6851 struct common_audit_data ad;
6852 u32 sid = current_sid();
6853 int invalid_reason = (what <= LOCKDOWN_NONE) ||
6854 (what == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) ||
6855 (what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
6857 if (WARN(invalid_reason, "Invalid lockdown reason")) {
6858 audit_log(audit_context(),
6859 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
6860 "lockdown_reason=invalid");
6864 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_LOCKDOWN;
6867 if (what <= LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX)
6868 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6869 sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
6870 LOCKDOWN__INTEGRITY, &ad);
6872 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6873 sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
6874 LOCKDOWN__CONFIDENTIALITY, &ad);
6877 struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6878 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
6879 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6880 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6881 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
6882 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
6885 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
6886 static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
6888 u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
6890 if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
6891 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
6892 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
6893 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
6894 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
6895 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
6896 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
6897 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
6901 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
6905 static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
6907 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
6909 perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6913 perfsec->sid = current_sid();
6914 event->security = perfsec;
6919 static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
6921 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6923 event->security = NULL;
6927 static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
6929 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6930 u32 sid = current_sid();
6932 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6933 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
6936 static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
6938 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6939 u32 sid = current_sid();
6941 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6942 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
6947 * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
6948 * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
6949 * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
6950 * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
6952 * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
6953 * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
6955 * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
6957 * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat
6958 * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs
6959 * when disabling SELinux at runtime.
6961 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6962 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
6963 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
6964 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
6965 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
6967 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
6968 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
6969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
6970 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
6971 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
6972 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
6973 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
6974 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
6975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
6977 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
6979 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
6980 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
6981 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
6983 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
6984 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
6985 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
6986 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
6987 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
6988 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
6989 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
6990 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
6991 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
6992 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
6994 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
6996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
6997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
6999 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
7000 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
7001 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
7002 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
7003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
7004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
7005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
7006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
7007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
7008 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
7009 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
7010 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7011 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7012 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7013 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7014 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7015 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7016 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7017 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7019 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7020 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7021 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7022 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
7023 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7024 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7025 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7029 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7030 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7031 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7032 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7033 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7034 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7035 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7036 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7037 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7038 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7039 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7041 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7043 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7044 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7045 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7046 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7047 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7048 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7049 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7050 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7055 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
7056 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7059 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7061 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7062 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7063 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7065 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7067 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7068 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
7070 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7071 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7076 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7077 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7085 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7086 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7091 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7092 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7102 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7104 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7107 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7108 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7109 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7110 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7112 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7114 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7116 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7119 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7120 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7121 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7122 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7124 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7129 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7132 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7133 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7135 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7138 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7141 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7146 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7148 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7155 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7156 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7164 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7167 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7169 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7175 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7177 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
7178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7179 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7182 LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, selinux_lockdown),
7185 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7188 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7189 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7190 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_add_mnt_opt, selinux_add_mnt_opt),
7191 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7192 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7196 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7198 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7199 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7200 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7201 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7202 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7203 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7205 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7206 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7207 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7208 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7209 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7210 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7212 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7213 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7214 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7215 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7216 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7219 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7222 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7224 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7225 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7226 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7228 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7229 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7233 static __init int selinux_init(void)
7235 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7237 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7238 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7239 checkreqprot_set(&selinux_state, selinux_checkreqprot_boot);
7240 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7241 mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7242 mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
7244 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7245 cred_init_security();
7247 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7253 ebitmap_cache_init();
7255 hashtab_cache_init();
7257 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7259 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7260 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7262 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7263 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7265 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7266 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7268 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7270 fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7275 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7277 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7280 void selinux_complete_init(void)
7282 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7284 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7285 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7286 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7289 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7290 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7291 DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7293 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7294 .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7295 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7296 .init = selinux_init,
7299 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7301 static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7303 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
7305 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7306 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7309 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
7311 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7312 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7315 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
7317 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7318 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7320 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7322 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
7324 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7325 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7328 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
7330 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7331 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7334 .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
7336 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7337 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7342 static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7344 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7345 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7348 static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7350 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7351 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7354 static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7355 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7356 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7359 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7363 if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7366 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7368 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7370 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7374 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7376 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7377 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7379 pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7381 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7385 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7387 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7388 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7391 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7393 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7394 int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7396 if (selinux_initialized(state)) {
7397 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7401 if (selinux_disabled(state)) {
7402 /* Only do this once. */
7406 selinux_mark_disabled(state);
7408 pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7411 * Unregister netfilter hooks.
7412 * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking
7415 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7417 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7419 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7422 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */